ated to the north of the zenith of their course.

The historian,

however, judged by a false standard; he condemned as incredible what he did not understand; because it was unknown, perhaps, in his time, that the appearance specified actually takes place, in the navigation he had related. He reprobates the account, for a circumstance which is the most plausible characteristic of its authenticity; for it could hardly be supposed to have been conjectured unless it had been seen.

Conclusion. We have now offered every rule and observation, which appeared of importance to be attended to in forming our judgments in science, arts, and business-we have unfolded the sources of those prejudices, which obstruct the rectitude of our judgments-we have inculcated patience and attention in forming them, when we have full information-we have enjoined suspense of judgment when information is wanting or deficient-we have recommended, finally, satisfaction with the best evidence that can be procured, and the propriety of judging, and acting on that evidence we know nothing more that can be done to render our judg- ments sound and logical, but that we carefully habituate ourselves to the practice of these rules.

REMARK.

Having thus far conducted the pupil through a popular course of INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, agreeably to the doctrines of the most respectable and most authentic authors, I take leave to offer him a word of advice previously to his entrance upon the remaining portion of the volume. Logic is neither a frivolous, an ostentatious, nor an unnecessary branch of your studies; but she pretends not to make mechanical reasoners; she pretends only to lend you her aid to find out truth, and to guide the exertions of your own faculties in the pursuit of knowledge. Her pretensions are at least commendable, and her efforts are entitled to the most patient reflection and candid examination. If, then, you will travel in the road that leads to the temple of truth, if you will employ your faculties to discriminate that celestial object when you have reached her sacred mansion, her handmaid, Logic, offers to conduct you thither; you have your choice then, whether you shall remain a stranger to her power, and be always the companion of those whom Prejudice consigns to ignorance and insignificance; or press on with those who become her candidates, who are grateful for her favours, and who improve them for their advantage. Strive, then, my friend, to obtain the flattering distinction claimed by superior judgment, and by which you can avoid the disgrace attached to ignorance and stupidity.

BOOK IV.

GRAMMAR OF LOGIC.

CHAPTER I.

OF IDEAS.

443. THAT the young logician may proceed with perspicuity, we begin with examining IDEAS as existing separately, or detached from one another. Ideas as the impressions made on the mind either by external objects, through the medium of the senses, or by the consciousness which it has of its own internal operations have been defined in Articles 34. and 36.

Illus. 1. When an external object presents itself to any of the five senses, sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell, some picture, or notion, or conception of it is formed in the mind; but this picture, or notion, or conception, is totally different from the object, and is called the Idea of it; whereas, the object is called the Archetype of the Idea. (Art. 38. Illus. 1. 2. 3.)

2. By sight, we receive the greatest number, and the most lively of all our Ideas; as, for example, those of all the visible objects in nature, animated and inanimated, with which we are already acquainted, or can become acquainted. By hearing, we get Ideas of natural and artificial sounds, particularly of the sounds of language, and the important information which they convey. The Ideas of the other three senses, taste, smell, touch, are not nearly so numerous, and they relate mostly to the preservation, or the comfortable subsistence of the individual. By taste and smell, we are directed to those aliments which are necessary and salutary, and are diverted from those which are hurtful or destructive. By the touch, we examine the surfaces of bodies, and receive all those Ideas which that operation is qualified to suggest. All the Ideas we acquire through the medium of the external senses, are said to be derived from sensation. (Art. 41.) The only other source of Ideas is our own consciousness of the feelings and operations, which pass within our own minds, and is called Reflection. (Art. 50. and 51.)

3. You will understand what is meant by Reflection, as a source

of Ideas, by the following examples. Every feeling or operation of the mind prompts an Idea of that feeling or operation: thus the Ideas suggested by the feelings of fear, joy, hope, or by the operations of perceiving, arranging, comparing, separating, and compounding our Ideas, communicate as distinct and as palpable impressions, as any that we receive through the medium of the external senses. But, as these feelings and operations are all attended with consciousness or consideration passing within the mind, they are therefore called Ideas of Reflection. (Art. 88. Illus. 1. 2.)

444. After the mind has been replenished with IDEAS in the manner now explained, it begins to prepare them for the purposes of Logic, or the discovery of truth and knowledge. It arranges them into CLASSES, and assigns them different names, according as they are SIMPLE or COMPLEX,

DISTINCT or CONFUSED, ADEQUATE OF INADEQUATE, PARTICULAR OF ABSTRACT.

I. Of simple and complex Ideas.

445. A SIMPLE IDEA, as its name imports, can be contemplated only in one view. It cannot be divided or taken to pieces, because it does not consist of parts, being naturally indivisible.

Illus. Most of our Ideas of the qualities of bodies are of this class, as hard, soft, round, smooth, white, black, cold, hot: all Ideas, perhaps, of tastes, smells, sounds, as bitter, sweet, low, loud, and many of our Ideas of the feelings and operations of the mind, as of desire, aversion, hunger, pain, thinking, willing, discerning, reasoning, are also of this class. We cannot divide them, even in imagination; they are perfectly uniform, and void of parts.

446. A COMPLEX IDEA contains two or more simple or subordinate Ideas, into which it may be divided; and these subordinate Ideas, when divided, may be considered separately.

Illus. All our Ideas of substances are complex, as of animals, vegetables, and the inanimate parts of nature. The Idea of a tree, for instance, includes a great variety of subordinate Ideas, as those of wood, stock, roots, branches, vegetable life, shape, leaves, bark, blossoms, fruit; several of which subordinate Ideas, may be subdivided into other Ideas. All Ideas of figures, as of circles, squares, triangles, cubes, cylinders, pyramids; most of the Ideas of virtues and vices, as of justice, fortitude, veracity, theft, ingratitude, falsehood, deceit.

II. Of distinct and confused Ideas.

447. The second division of Ideas was, into distinct and confused, or, which is much the same thing, into clear and

obscure. Distinct or clear Ideas are those of which we have a full and perfect comprehension, and which we can readily separate or distinguish from all other Ideas. Confused or obscure Ideas are those of which we have not a full and perfect comprehension, and which we cannot easily separate or distinguish from all other Ideas.

Illus. Distinct and clear Ideas are perceived with a perspicuity and energy, similar to that by which the mind contemplates figures in mathematics, or numbers in arithmetic; all their boundaries and their differences are completely discernible. Confused or obscure Ideas are like the colours of a rainbow; they run into one another, and the mind neither perceives fully their nature nor their limits.

448. The acquisition of clear and distinct Ideas is of the utmost consequence in the investigation of knowledge; for the degree of conviction with which it is presented to the mind, is always in proportion to the degree of clearness and distinctness which we have introduced among our Ideas.

Illus. 1. Were all our Ideas clear, all our knowledge would be demonstrative, a quality which belongs only to our scientific knowledge. Obscurity, more or less, adheres to all our other Ideas, and leaves us only greater or less degrees of Probable Evidence, corresponding to the less or greater obscurity of our Ideas.

2. In the Mathematical sciences, and in Arithmetic, the evidence is demonstrative, because our Ideas of all the figures and numbers about which we reason are perfectly clear and distinct, and because, in comparing them, we perceive accurately whether they agree or disagree; and if they disagree, how great the excess of one is above another, so that we can affirm, either that they are equal, or that the one exceeds the other by a certain quantity.

3. In Morals, in Politics, in Arts, and in Business, almost all our Ideas are more or less obscure: hence, in comparing them, we cannot precisely pronounce whether they agree or disagree; and though we were sure that they disagree, yet we cannot accurately ascertain the difference.

Corol. The necessary consequence is, that in all these branches of knowledge, we can obtain no Demonstrative Evidence for truth. We must be satisfied with Probable Evidence, (Art. 309. and 311.) "and we should be attentive to procure Ideas as clear and distinct as possible, that we may reach the highest degree of probability (See Art. 440, 441, and 442. with all their Illustrations.)

III. Of adequate and inadequate Ideas.

449. The third division of Ideas is into those which are ADEQUATE or INADEQUATE. An Adequate Idea is a perfect picture of its archetype, or contains a representation of all the parts of which the archetype consists.

Illus. 1. It is different from a distinct Idea, because an Idea may

be distinct and not adequate; that is, we may have a clear perception of all the parts of an Idea, as far as these parts extend, though these parts may not constitute a complete collection of those of the archetype.

Example 1. We may have a distinct Idea of a triangle, and yet not possess an Adequate Idea of a right angled triangle, an isosceles, or scalene; which, besides the general Ideas of three sides and three angles, require that the sides and angles should be of a particular species.

Illus. 2. An Inudequate Idea is not a perfect picture of its archetype, that is to say, it does not contain a complete representation of the parts of which the archetype consists.

Example 2. Almost all simple Ideas are adequate, as those of colours, tastes, or qualities; all ideas of mathematical figures, and of numbers, as triangles, squares, cubes, cylinders, fifty, a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand.

Illus. 3. But although, when we examine Archetypes with attention, Ideas will be as adequate as we can make them; and when knowledge is either demonstrative, or even highly probable, Ideas must really, or very nearly, be adequate, yet if we compare Ideas, not only with what we know of their Archetypes, but with what may be known of them, few of our Ideas, except those of mathematics and arithmetic, will be found to be adequate. There is hardly any other thing in nature, of which our knowledge is complete.

Example 3. We are acquainted with a few only of the properties of animals, vegetables, and inanimate matter; what substance is, whether of matter or spirit, is totally beyond our comprehension. (Carol. Art. 164.)

4. The whole system of the transmutation, or the assimilation of nature, by which the nutriment of animals is converted into the different parts of which their bodies consist, bones, flesh, sinews, blood, hair, horn, &c. and by which inanimate nature is converted into the numerous parts of vegetables and metals, seemingly so different from one another, as trees, shrubs, leaves, bark, blossoms, fruit, gold, silver, mercury, &c. is to us altogether unintelligible. (See Art. 164. Illus. 1, 2.)

Corol. In all these cases, and in many others which might be adduced as examples, our Ideas are unavoidably inadequate. Our Ideas are less adequate than they might be, chiefly from two causes; first, Carelessness in the examination of Archetypes, which overlooks some of their properties or parts; and, secondly, Inattention in ascertaining the meaning of the words employed to denote them, which words often do not express the same parts, or all the parts, in our minds, which they do in the minds of others. In both cases, our knowledge cannot be so complete as that of a person who has taken care to prevent these errors or defects: and in every discourse or controversy with that person, we must misunderstand him when these words occur. (Art. 86. Illus. 1. and 2.)

IV. Of particular or abstract Ideas.

450. The last distinction of Ideas considers them as PARTICULAR OF ABSTRACT. This is the most important distinc