CALIFORNIA LAND CASE.-WASHINGTOM; July 26th-The Secretary of the Interior has affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office in the case of Alexander Grant Dallas vs Carl E. White and others. involving title to the Albion grant, in township 16 north, range 66 west, and township 16 north, range 17 west. Mendocino county, California, with two exceptions. The claim of D. N. Vickery is awarded to Dallas, and Thomas Boyle is awarded the tract claimed by him. The Secretary recently reversed the decision of the Commissioner of the General Land Office in the case of T. Wallace More vs S. A. Guiberson and others. involving lands in the Sespe Ranch, Santa Barbara county, California. The Commissioner of the General Land Office today transmitted to the Surveyor-General for delivery, the patent for the Rancho Cucua, or El Potrero, situated in San Diego county, California, and confirmed to Maria Juana de Los Angelos. The survey contains 2,174.25 acres.

HASTINGS COLLEGE OF LAW.-Professor J. N. Pomeroy of Rochestea, N. Y. has been selected to lecture before thestudents of Hastings' Law College. Fifty applicants for ad mission to the College have already been registered. The course of study is to extend through three years, and the classes will be formed accordingly. The preliminary examination of applicants will be held August 8th.

ADMITTED TO PRACTICE.-On July 18th, Jno. D. Whaling on motion of H. C. Firebaugh, and a license from the Supreme Court of Illinois.-July 24th, Walker E. Graves, on motion of Geo. E. Harphrue, and license from the Supreme Court of Kentucky.

AN IMPORTANT CASE.-A trial which is attracting considerable attention, is now progressing in the District Court for Sutter county. James H. Keyes, the plaintiff, is a farmer and owner of about one thousand acres of land on Bear river, six miles above the mouth of the stream. The defendant is the Little York Washing and Water Company, operating at hydraulic mining near the town of Little York, in Nevada county. There is a fine array of counsel on each side, including one of the ablest lawyers in Sacramento for the plaintift, and perhaps the very ablest in this city for the defendant. It is a civil suit for damages resulting to plantiff's land from the filling up of Bear river, and the spoliation of his farm by the discharge of silt, gravel and other debris from the defendant's mines. These discharges have been going on for over twenty years, and in the course of that time the natural bed of the river has been filled up to the extent of twenty feet or more; so that in the seasons of average rainfall, the water overflows banks, inundating the land and covering it in places with an extremely serile sandy sediment, and destroying all capacity for the production of any valuable crop. The defendants substantially admit all this, but they set up the plea against damages, that by the laws of the United States, and of the State of California, they have the right to discharge the debris from their mines in the manner complained of, and that if damage results to any land below them in the foothills or valleys, or to any other interest to that of farming or ranching, it is from no fault of theirs, and they are not in law responsible for it.

A LEGAL DIFFICULTY.-Forty members of the Salt Lake Bar, have complained of the incompetency of Chief Justice Schaeffer, and recently had a conference with special agent Chase, who is investigating the Federal officers. The attorneys in their petition to the President for the removal of the Judge, charged incompetency, and represented that litigants have no confidence in the Court. It is the impression. that the Judge will have trouble to save his official head, and. that Governor Emery will also have to go.

Supreme Court of California.

[July Term, 1878.]

[No. 5191.]

[Decided July 16th, 1878.]

MATTHEW KELLER, Plaintiff and Respondent.

VS.

CARRIE LEWIS, et al, Defendants and Appellants. Appeal from Seventeenth District Court, Los Angeles County. Y. SUPELVEDA, Judge.

ACTION brought to declare a contract for the purchase of land,-forfeited for non-payment of balance of purchase money.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

On the twenty-fifth day of March, 1872, the p'aintiff made an agreement to sell to defendant, whose husband, residing in Cleveland, Ohio, was unknown to him a certain tract of land in Los Angeles county, known as Rancho "Tobango Malibu," at which time defendant paid on account. of such purchase, the sum of $600; and on the second of April, 1875, the additional sum of $1I,066.66,-defendants, however, failing to pay the remainder of the purchase money, $23,333.33, when the same became due, June twenty-sixth, 1872. Plaintiff, alleges the belief, that said contract was fully known to defendant, G. F. Lewis, the husband of said Carrie Lewis, and ratified by him; and further, that the monies paid, were furnished by said G. F. Lewis, to his wife as her own separate property.

Plaintiff alleges, that in the said agreement, it was provided that if said defendants failed to comply with its terms, all her rights to said property were to be forfeited, and the plaintiff released from the obligations of the same-and further, that said defendant with her son, immediately upon the execution of the contract, took possession of-and resided upon said premises; residing upon the same, for the space of sixty days, after which time they returned to Cleveland, Ohio, failing to hold any further communication with plaintiff in relation to said lands, or payment for the same,-although still holding in her possesion said contract, the unsatisfied record of which is in the office of the County Recorder, remained as a cloud upon plantiff's title to said lands, by reason of which he was unable to sell the same,-wherefore he asked judgment of forfeiture, according to the terms of said contract.

Defendant's demurrer to the complaint in this case on the ground of insufficency-being over-ruled, -the parties set up a denial, that said plaintiff was ever served of more than one-undivided third of said land; alleging further, that the sole connection of said Carrie S. Lewis with said transactions, was as

the agent of the defendant G. F. Lewis, who was known to plaintiff as the real purchaser.

It is alleged in addition, that detendant, Carrie S. Lewis, was authorized by her husband to purchase a ranch in California, provided the title was undisputed, of which fact plaintiff was fully aware. Defendants admit the payment of the amounts stated, but deny that the remainder of the purchase money has under the terms of the contract ever became due, as payable to plaintiff-by reason of his failure to comply with same, further denial is made of the taking petition of said lands, further than a small portion of the same adverse claimants being in possession of the other portions of said rancho. The return to Ohio is admitted, but an abandonment of said purchase, or of this contract for the same is denied. Theyjallege repeated communications with plaintiff, evincing a wilingness to pay the money and take the property, on the plaintiff's compliance with the terms of the contract between said parties to the same. Upon the trial of the case a jury being waived, the Court found that the title to the land was in the plaintiff, and that in the negotiation of the same, no fraud or concealment was used--that the value of the same had largely enhanced since the last payment agreed upon became due, which defendants never offered to make, or excuse, or account for their laches in the premises. Judgment was accordingly entered up, from which defendants appealed.

Glasswell, Chapman & Smith, attorneys for plaintiff and respordent.
Brunson & Easman, attorneys for defendants and appellants.

OPINION BY THE COURT.

The decree declares the money already paid on the contract and all right of defendants in and to the lands,-forfeited.

It is a universal rule in equity never to enforce either a penalty or forfeiture, (2 Story's Eq. 1,319, and cases cited.) On the contrary, equity frequently interposes to prevent the enforcement of a forfeiture at law. In the view of a court of equity, in cases like the present, the legal title is retained by the vendor as security for the balance of the purchase money, and if the vendor obtains his money and interest, he gets all he expected when he entered into the contract. True, he is not bound to wait indefinitely after the failure of the purchaser to comply with the terms of his agreement. If the payments are not made when due, he may, if out of possession, bring his ejectment, and recover the possession; but if he comes into equitr for relief, his better remedy, in case of persistent default on the part of the vendee, is to institute proceedings to forclose the right of the vendee to purchase-the decrce usually giving

the latter a definite time within which to perform. (Hansborough vs Peck, 5 Wallace, 506).

Under the circumstances of this case, as presented by the pleadings and evidence, the decree of the District Court should have fixed a day within which the defendants should pay the balance due upon the contract, and costs, etc., or be forever foreclosed of all right or interest in the lands or to a conveyance thereof.

MCKINSTRY, J.

[No. 5423, Decided July, 16th, 1878.]

MONTEREY and SALINAS VALLEY R. R. COMPANY Plaintiff and Appellant

VS

THOMAS HILDRETH. Defendant and Respondent. Appeal from the Seventeenth District Court, Santa Clara Co. BELDEN, Judge.

ACTION-Brought by a Railroad Corporation to compel payment of $25,000 capital stock and assessments, by a subscriber to the agreements creating the same.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.

The plaintiff and appellant in this case brought its action to recover $25,000 with interest from the dates of the levies of assessments upon its capital stock.

The basis of this action is an agreement by which defendant and others, for the purpose of contracting a railroad between the points named in the title, contracted to pay the several amounts subscribed by them, in gold coin of the United States.

The articles of incorporation of said Railroad Company show that the defendant signed the same, and became for the first year one of its directors,— and in divers other acts before the commencement of this action ratified and acknowledged such corporation.

The plaintiff having built said road, which it now runs and operates, being unable to meet the liabilities of the same, -at various times assessments covering its capital stock-were levied by the Board of Directors of which defendant was a member,—all of which as well as any portion of his original subscriptions he refused to pay.