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SPEECH OF MR. CALHOUN,

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IN SENATE.-Monday, JANUARY 13, 1834.

The Special Order now came up, The ques-ly untenable; and yet, as broad as his assumpon being on Mr. CLAY's resolutions in regard tions are, there is an important part of the to the removal of the Public Deposites— transaction which he does not attempt to vinMr. CALHOUN then rose, and said, that the dicate, and to which he has not even alluded. I statement of this case might be given in a very shall, said Mr. CALHOUN, now proceed without few words. The 16th section of the act incorpora- further remark to make good these assertions. ting the bank, provides that wherever there is a The Secretary, at the commencement of his bank or branch of the U. States Bank. the pub-argument, assumes the position that, in the abdic moneys should be deposited therein, unless sence of all legal provision, he, as the head of otherwise ordered by the Secretary of the Trea- the financial department, had the right, in virtuo oury, and that, in that case, he should report to of his office, to designate the agent and place Congress, if in session, immediately; and if not, for the safe keeping of the public deposites. He at the commencement of the next session. The then contends that the 16th section does not reSecretary, acting under the provision of this sec strict his power, which stands, he says, on tion, has ordered the deposites to be withheld the same ground that it had before the passing of from the bank, and has reported his reasons, in the act incorporating the bank. It is unnecessary conformity with the provisions of the section. to inquire into the correctness of the position as The Senate is now called upon to consider sumed by the Secretary; but, if it were, it would his reasons, in order to determine whether not be difficult to show that when an agent, with the Secretary is justified or not. I have exam- general powers, assumes, in the execution of his ined them with care and deliberation without the agency, a power not delegated, the assumption slightest bins, as far as I am conscious, per-rests on the necessity of the case; and that no sonal or political. I have but a slight acquain-power in such case, can be lawfully exercised, tance with the Secretary, and that little is not which was not necessary to effect the obunfavorable to him. I stand wholly disconnected ject intended. Nor would it be difficult to show with the two great parties now contending for that, in this case, the power assumed by the Seascendancy. My political connexions are with that cretary would belong, not to him, but to the Treasmall and denounced party which has voluntarily surer, who, under the act organizing the Treawholly retired from the party strifes of the day, sury Department, is expressly charged with the with a view of saving, if possible, the liberty safe keeping of the public funds, for which, he is and the Constitution of the country, in this great responsible under bond, in heavy penalties. But, crisis of our affairs. as strongly and directly as these considerations Having maturely considered, with these im- bear on the question of the power ofthe Secrepartial feelings, the reasons of the Secretary, Itary, I do not think it necessary to pursue am constrained to say, that he has entirely failed them, for the plain reason that the Secretary has to make out his justification. At the very com- entirely mistaken the case. It is nota case, as he mencement he has placed his right to remove the supposes, where there is no legal provision in redeposites on an assumption resting on a miscon- lation to the safe keeping of the public funds, but ception of the case. In the progress of his argu- one of precisely the opposite character. The ment he has entirely abandoned the first, and as- 16th section expressly provides that the deposites sumed a new and greatly enlarged ground, shall be made in the bank and its branches, and utterly inconsistent with the first, and equal- of course it is perfectly clear that all powers

which the Secretary has derived from the gene-shall report his reasons. It is obvious, under this ral and inherent powers of his office, in the ab- view of the subject, that the Secretary has no sence of such provision, are wholly inapplicable to right to act in relation to the deposites but with a this case. Nor is it less clear, that if the section view to their increased security. That he has no had terminated with the provision directing the right to order them to be withheld from the bank sơ deposites to be made in the bar k, the Secretary long as the funds are in safety, and the bank has would have had no more control over the faithfully performed the doties imposed in relasubject, than myself, or any other Senator; and it tion to them; and not even thren, unless the depo follows, of course, that he must derive his power, sites can be placed in safer and more faithful not from any general reasons connected with the hands. That such was the opinion of the Execu nature of his office, but from some express pro- tive, in the first instance, we have demonstrative vision contained in the section, or some other part proof, in the message of the President to Congress of the act. It has not been attempted to be shown, at the close of the last session, which placed the that there is any such provision in any other subject of the removal of the deposites exclusive. section or part of the act. The only control, ly on the question of their safety; and that such then, which the Secretary can rightfully claim was also the opinion of the H. of Representatives over the deposites, is contained in the provision then, we have equally conclusive proof, from the which directs that the deposites shall be made in vote of that body, that the public funds in the the bank, unless otherwise ordered by the Secre- bank were safe, which was understood, at that tary of the Treasury; which brings the whole time, onfall sides, by friends and foes, as deciding question, in reference to the deposites, to the the question of the removal of the deposites. extent of the power which Congress intended to The extent of the power intended to be con. confer upon the Secretary, in these few words-ferred being established, the question now arises, "unless otherwise ordered." has the Secretary transcended its limit? It

In ascertaining the intention of Congress, can scarcely be necessary to argue this pointI lay it down as a rule, which I suppose will It is not even pretended that the public denot be controverted, that all political powers un-posites were in danger, or that the Bank had der our free institutions are trust powers, and not not faithfully performed all the duties imposed rights, liberties or immunities, belonging per- on it in relation to them; nor that the Secre sonally to the officer. I also lay it down as a tary had placed the money in a safer or in rule, not less incontrovertible, that trust powers more faithful hands. So far otherwise, there is are necessarily L.mited (unless there be some ex-not a man who hears me, who will not admit that press provision to the contrary,) to the subject mat- the public moneys are now less safe than they ter and object of the trust. This brings us to the were in the Bank of the United States. And I question-what is the subject and object of the will venture to assert, that not a capitalist car. trust, in this case. The whole section relates to be found who would not ask a considerably higher deposites to the safe and faithful keeping of the per centage to insure them in their present, public funds. With this view they are directed than in the place of deposite designated by law. to be made in the bank. With the same view, If these views are correct, and I hold them to be and in order to increase the security, power was unquestionable, the question is decided. The conferred on the Secretary to withhold the depo- Secretary has no right to withhold the deposites sites; and, with the same view, he is directed to from the Bank. There has been, and can be, report his reasons, for the removal, to Congress. but one argument advanced in favour of his right; All have one common object--the security of the which has even the appearance of being tenable: public funds. To this point the whole section that the power to withhold is given in general converges. The language of Congress, fairly un- terms, and without qualification, “unless the Seederstood, is—we have selected the bank because retary_otherwise direct." Those who resort to we confide in it as a safe and faithful agent to this argument, must assume the position-that keep the public money; but to prevent the abuse the letter ought to prevail over the clear and maof so important a trust, we invest the Secretary nifest intention of the act. They must regard with power to remove the deposites, with a view the power of the Scretary, not as a trust power, to their increased security. And lest the Secre- limited by the subject and the object of the trust, tary, on his part, should abuse so important a but as a chartered right, to be used according to trust--and in order still further to increase that his discretion and pleasure. There is a radical

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we direct. in case of removal, that he defect in our mode of construing political pow

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rs, of which this and many other instances afford ground, that he had a right to make such dispostriking examples; but I will give the Secretary sition of them as the public interest, or the conhis choice; either the intention or the letter must venience of the people might require. I have said prevail; he may select either, but cannot be per- that the transition of the Secretary was asobscure mitted to take one or the other as may suit his as it was rapid; but obscure as it is, he has said purpose. If he chooses the former, ke has tran- enough to enable us to perceive the process by scended his powers, as I have clearly demon-which he has reached so extraordinary a position; strated. If he selects the latter, he is equally and we may safely affirm, that his arguments are xiondemned, as he has clearly exercised power not less extraordinary than the conclusion at not comprehended in the letter of his authority, which he arrives, His first proposition, which, He has not confined himself simply to withhold- however, he has not ventured to lay down exing the public moneys from the Bank of the U. pressly, is that Congress has an unlimited conStates, but he has ordered them to be deposited trol over the deposites, and that it may dispose in other Banks, though there is not a word in of them in whatever manner it may please, in the section to justify it. I do not intend to argue order to promote the general welfare and conve the question, whether he had a right to order the nience of the people. He next asserts that Confunds, withheld from the United States Bank to gress has parted with this power, under the sixbe placed in the State Banks which he has select- teenth section, which directs the deposites to be but I ask, how has he acquired that right? made in the Bank of the United States, and then It rests wholly on construction—on the supposed concludes with affirming that it has invested the intention of the legislature, which, when it gives Secretary of the Treasury with it, for reasons a power, intends to give all the means necessary which he professes to be unable to understand, to render it available. But, as clear as this prin- It cannot be necessary, before so enlightened ciple of construction is, it is not more clear than a body, that I should undertake to refute an art which would limit the right of the Secretary gument so utterly untrue in premises and conto the question of the safe and faithful keeping clusion-to show that Congress never possessed of the public funds; and I cannot admit that the the power which the Secretary claims for itSecretary shall be permitted to resort to the letter that it is a power, from its very nature, incapable or to construction, as may best be calculated to of such enlargement, being limited solely to the enlarge his power, when the right construction safe keeping of the public funds-that if it exas denied to those who would limit his power by listed, it would be susceptible of the most dangerthe clear and obvious intention of Congress. ous abuses-that Congress might make the wildI might here, said Mr. CALHOUN, rest the ques-est and most dangerous association the depository tion of the power of the Secretary over the de- of the public funds-might place them in the posites, without adding another werd. I have hands of the fanatics and the madmen of the placed it on grounds from which no ingenuity, North, who are waging war against the domeshowever great, or subtlety, however refined, can tic institutions of the South, under the plea of remove it; but such is the magnitude of the case, promoting the general welfare. But admitting and such my desire to give the reasons of the that Congress possessed the 'power which the Secretary the fullest consideration, that I shall Secretary attributes to it, by what process of reafollow him through the remainder of his reasons. soning can he show that it has parted with this That the Secretary was conscious that the unlimited power, simply by directing the public first position which he assumed, and which I moneys to be deposited in the Bank of the United have considered, was untenable, we have States? or, if it has parted with the power, by ample proof in the precipitancy with which what extraordinary process has it been transferhe retreated from it. He had scarcely laid rod to the Secretary of the Treasury, by those it down, when, without illustration or argu- few and simple words, "unless he shall otheranent, he passed with a rapid transition, and I wise direct?" In support of this extraordin must say a transition as obscure as rapid, to an- argument, the Secretary has offered not a single other position wholly inconsistent with the first; illustration, nora single remark bearing the semand in assuming which he expressly repudiates blance of reason, but one, which I shall now prothe idea that the safe and faithful keeping of the ceed to notice. public funds had any necessary connexion with He asserts, and asserts truly, that the bank his removal of the deposites; his power to do charter is a contract between the Government, or which he places on the broad and unlimited' rather the people of the U. S. and the bank,and

then sumes that it constitutes him a common | faithfully observe it. flow has the Secretary peragent or trustee, to superintend the execution of formed these solemn duties, which, according to the stipulations contained in that portion of the his representation, have been imposed upon him. contract comprehended in the sixteenth section. Has he protected the bank against the aggression Let us now, taking these assumptions to be true, of the government, or the government against the ascertain what those stipulations are, the super-unfaithful conduct of the bank in relation to the intendence of the execution of which, as he af deposites? Or has he, forgetting his sacred ob firms, are jointly confided by the parties to the ligations, disregarded the interests of both-on Secretary, The Government stipulated, on its one side, divesting the bank of the deposites, and part, that the public money should be deposited on the other, defeating the government in the inin the Bank of the U. S.-a great and valuable tended security of the public funds, by seizing on privilege, on which the successful operation of the them as the property of the Executive, to be iastitution mainly depends. The Bank, on its disposed at pleasure, te favorite and partizan part, stipulated that the funds should be safely banks.

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kept that the duties imposed in relation to them But I shall relieve the Secretary from this awkshould be faithfully discharged, and that for this, ward and disreputable position in which his with other privileges, it would pay to the Governown'arguments have placed him. He is not the ment the sum of one million five hundred thou-mutual trustee, as he has represented, of the gov sand dollars. These are the stipulations, the ex-ernment and the bank; but simply the agent of ecution of which, according to the Secretary's as the former. vested under the contract, with power sumption, he has been appointed as joint agent or to withhold the deposites with a view, as has been trustee, to superintend, and from which he would stated, to their additional security—to their safo assume the extraordinary power which he claims keeping; and if he had but for a moment reflectover the deposites to dispose of them in such ed on the fact, that he was directed to report his manner as he may think the public interest or the reasons to Congress only, and not also to the convenience of the people may require.

Is it not obvious that the whole extent of power conferred upon him, admitting his assumption to be true, is to withhold the deposites in case that the bank should violate its stipulatious in relation to them on one side, and on the other to prevent the Government from withholding the deposites, so long as the bank faithfully performed is part

bank, for withholding the deposites, he could scarcely have failed to perceive that he was sim ply the agent of one of the parties, and not, as be supposes, a joint agent of both.

The Secretary having established, as he supposes, his right to dispose of the deposites, as. in his opinion the general interest and convenience of the people might require,proceeds to claim-and exercise power with a boldness commensurate with the extravagance of the right which he has Fassumed. He commences with a claim to deter mine in his official character, that the Bank of the United States is unconstitutional-a monopoly. baneful to the welfare of the community. Having determined this point, he comes to the conclusion that the charter of the bank ought not to be re newed, and then assumes that it will not be re newed. Having reached this point he then determines that it is his duty to remove the deposites. No one can object that Mr. Taney, as a citizen, in his individual character, should entertain au opinion as to the unconstitutionality of the bank, but that he, acting in his official character, and

of the contract. This is the full extent of his power. According to his own showing, not a partiele more can be added. But there is another aspect in which the position in which the Secre tary has placed himself may be viewed. It offers for consideration not only a question of the extent of his power, but a question as to the nature and extent of duty which has been imposed upon him. If the position be such as he has described, there has been confided to him a trust of the most sacred character, accompanied by duties of the inost lemn cbligation. He stands by the mutua confidence of the parties, vested with the high. judicial power to determine on the infraction o observance of a contract in which government and a large and respectable portion of the citi zene are deeply interested; and, in the execution performing official acts under the charter of the of this high power, he is bound, by honor and bank, should undertake to determine that the institution was unconstitutional, and that those who conscience, so to act as to protect oach of the par granted the charter, and bestowed upon him his ties in the full enjoyment of their respective portion of benefit in the contract, so long as they power to act under it, had violated the constitution, is an assumption of power of a nature which

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