Imagens das páginas
PDF
ePub
[blocks in formation]

nient organization of the Courts of the United States," ought to be repealed.

Mr. WHITE, of Delaware.-I shall be believed, sir, when I assure you, that nothing short of the highest sense of duty, and the great responsibility of the seat I have the honor to hold, could enable me to overcome the extreme embarrassment I feel in rising to present my sentiments to the Senate on this the most important question ever before them. I presume not to think, after the superior eloquence and talents that have been here displayed, it will be in my power to cast on the subject a single additional ray of light. Already, sir, has it been exhausted, and were I to consult my own feelings only, I should not now have to trespass upon your patience, whilst in the execution of a sacred duty, I pass hastily over part of the same ground that has before been trod by some of my honorable friends, making such additional remarks as might have escaped them. In the course of my observations, I shall confine myself to the same division of the question pursued by the honorable mover, and which it naturally presents.

1. As to the expediency. 2. As to the constitutionality of the measure proposed in the resolution.

That some system of courts is necessary in our country for the execution of laws and the administration of justice, gentlemen most hostile to the present establishment will readily admit. It is acknowledged, too, on the other side of the House, that the expenses of the present judiciary are unworthy of your consideration; that it is one of the least evils attending it; but, say gentlemen, it is upon too large a scale, it is useless, it is dan

gerous.

Sir, upon the original plan of the courts, it was found impossible that the six presiding judges traversing this extensive country, and holding their sessions in every State, could either do justice to the business, or at their advanced periods of life, withstand the fatigue of such severe and constant exercise; some alteration, some amendment of the system was found indispensable; the interest of the country demanded it of those in office, and it is for the execution of this duty that their political memories are now so illiberally reviled. It is well known, sir, that the United States are increasing in population, commerce, and wealth, beyond any former example; that new subjects of litigation are every day finding their way into your courts, and short-sighted indeed would have been the founders of the establishment now under consideration had they confined their views to the present time. Previous to the passing of this law, no man who could avoid it would commit his business to your courts, their arrangement amounted almost to a denial of justice; suitors preferred taking their chance in the State courts to the delay and expense attendant upon the proceedings in those of the United States. The constant change of presiding judges at every succeeding court, totally unacquainted with what had been done by their predecessors, and introducing new rules of practice, together with the unavoidable shortness of the terms, hung up the

SENATE.

business to the great inconvenience and injury of many suitors, and must in a short time have rendered that system not only useless, but even a nuisance to the country; people could not be expected to apply for justice to a bench where time was not given to administer it.

These, sir, among many others, are some of the reasons why business had not been originated in your courts antecedent to the present law. These are the reasons, sir, why their dockets are now so low; and permit me say, that the extracts contained in this document, even supposing them correct, which happens to be far from the fact, prove nothing; they were taken at a time when the present courts had scarcely commenced their operations, immediately after the first circuit, when no gentleman will undertake to say, there had been any thing like an opportunity at a fair experiment of them. And now, sir, before the people of the country have even become acquainted with the system, and before any man, unless by the power of inspiration, can judge of its utility, it is in a moment to be dashed to pieces. Why, I ask. sir, this precipitance? Do gentlemen fear that if the measure is delayed until another session the experiment might render the system popular? And these hateful judges-for there is the rub, sir-these hateful judges will not be so safely got rid of. I hope gentlemen, at least for the present, will quiet their fears; they need not, I can assure them, apprehend any immediate danger from this mighty army of judicial veterans, so terrible in sound; they are now, I believe, sir, in Winter quarters, and even if continued in service another year. could not totally ruin and enslave the country; or, as has been indeed very feelingly expressed by the honorable gentleman from Georgia, on my right, (Mr. JACKSON,) lay our virtuous citizens in irons. The honorable gentleman from the same State, on my left, (Mr. BALDWIN,) has been pleased to tell us, that the same justice was not to be expected from the courts of the United States, as from those of the individual States, because the judges of the former cannot have a sufficient knowledge of the usages and customs of the country, and their jurors not being of the vicinage, can know nothing of the parties or their suits. I admired much, sir, the ingenuity and candor of that gentleman, but this was certainly among the least solid parts of his argument; unhappily the very reasons he adduced, proved directly the opposite of what he wished. Judges, sir, should be governed only by the law of the land; they carry it with them; they are its expositors, and are sworn to decide according to it; and have nothing to do with the usages and customs of the neighborhoods where they may happen to sit. And I have always understood that the greatest possible security for the impartiality of jurors is their being entire strangers to the contending parties, and totally ignorant of their causes, until empannelled to decide them; they then view nothing but the naked facts arising out of competent testimony, and are influenced only by law and justice. And such, sir, is the frailty of our nature, that the best man in society may be acting under

[ocr errors]

C

[blocks in formation]

the influence of politics, friendship, passion, or prejudice, when he supposes himself governed by the purest motives. Well aware though, as I am, sir, that nothing short of the Constitution itself, and I fear that not even that will be sufficient to preserve the independence of the judiciary from this bold onset, I shall now proceed to the second division of the question.

I admit, sir, that the law proposed in the resolution to be repealed, is capable of much amendment, and it has never been denied but that Congress had the power of altering it in any way, so as not to impair the independence of the judiciary, by touching the offices or salaries of the judges; this cannot be done, the words of the Constitution on the subject are as explicit and certain as language can be. By the first section of the third article it is declared, that "the judicial power of 'the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and estab'lish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good 'behaviour." Does our language admit of words more positive than these, sir? Not a letter, nor even a comma, is wanting to complete the meaning we assign to them; and I ask gentlemen to point out any other words that the framers of this instrument could have used, that would have been less equivocal, or that could import with more certainty the construction we now contend for; it has not yet been done, and I defy them to do it; and if a different construction can be given to these words, this written Constitution is not worth a sous; it is to all useful purposes a mere carteblanch upon which a Legislative majority may write what they please.

JANUARY, 1802.

forever the entire independence of the judiciary. the Convention went still further, and in this same section, nay, in this same sentence, for they followed the thing closely up, they declared that these judges, viz., of the supreme and inferior courts "shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation which shall not be dimin'ished during their continuance in office." And under the words of this Constitution, we have just the same power to diminish their salaries whilst they continue in office, as we have to remove them from their offices and strip them of all salary; they hold their offices during good behaviour, and the full amount of their salaries whilst in office by the same strength and power of language; for can it be said, sir, that the words "shall not" are more prohibitory than the word "shall" is mandatory? Certainly not. These latter words apply especially to Congress; they must have been introduced for the express purpose of fixing and marking the bounds of Legislative authority towards the judiciary. And it would seem as if the wise framers of this instrument had feared not, sir, that Congress would ever presume themselves authorized absolutely to remove any judges from their offices without cause, as is contemplated in that resolution, for such an idea could never have entered their minds, after they had the moment before expressly declared, in so many words, that the judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts. should hold their offices during good behaviour, but that the aspiring pride and ambition of Legislative power, in some unhappy moment of intemperance or party warmth, might attempt to impair the independence of the judiciary in another way, by assuming a discretionary power over the salaries of the judges, and thus, rendering them dependent upon Legislative pleasure for a precarious support, make them servile and corrupt.

In a preceding part of this Constitution, power is given to Congress to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; by the act to which Gentlemen acknowledge that the judges of the the resolution on your table refers, they did so, and Supreme Court are out of their reach, (thank in pursuance of that act, the President of the Uni- Heaven that they happen to think so, or they, too, ted States issued commissions to certain gentle- would accompany their brethren ;) but, say they men as judges, they accepted of those commis- the judges of the inferior courts are creatures of sions, and at the moment of their becoming judges, our own, and we can do with them as we please. the Constitution attached to their offices, and Let me admit, sir, for argument sake, the positive guaranteed to them, the same independence and meaning of the Constitution to the contrary notpermanency as judges of the Supreme Court, for withstanding, that these words, "the judges, both it makes no distinction. "Judges both of the su- of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their preme and inferior courts shall hold their offices offices during good behaviour," are equivocal. during good behaviour." On the acceptance of What reasons can gentlemen have to believe, their commissions, a complete contract was formed upon what possible grounds can they presume, between them and the Government; the Consti- that the makers of this Constitution did not intution told them that the tenure of their offices tend to place the judges of the inferior courts should be their own good behaviour; the law told upon the same independent footing as those of them that, for their services, they should receive the superior courts? Do they not belong to the a certain sum annually; these were the terms, sir, same great department of your Government; inthat tempted them to leave their other pursuits in tended to be kept separate and distinct from the life, and carry into execution this contract; and it other two great departments? Is not their indeis a contract that no power on earth can dissolve pendence equally important to the faithful adbut by first altering this Constitution in the man-ministration of justice? Certainly, sir, and if pos ner it directs, or by violating it; and any law attempting its dissolution, operates retrospectively, is an ex post facto law, and in that respect, too, unconstitutional.

But, sir, in order to place beyond a question

sible more so, for it is to them the people, in most instances, must first apply for justice, and a vast proportion of the most important business that passes through their hands, is never carried into the Supreme Court.

[blocks in formation]

As to the outery that has been raised about sixteen hundred, or sixteen thousand, or sixteen millions of judges, if gentlemen please-calculating on the abuse of power by the constituted authorities in the use of it, the honorable gentleman from Connecticut has so fully and unanswerably replied to it, that I shall make no observations on the subject.

The gentleman from Georgia, on my right, has told us that the Constitution cannot be altered in any other way than by two-thirds of Congress agreeing to it, and then very emphatically asked, will two-thirds now agree? I hope not, sir; but because a sufficient number of us cannot agree upon altering it Constitutionally, will gentlemen force their way through it by violence, in order to get at these judges? The same honorable gentleman has been pleased to compare this system and these judges to a cotton machine; when done, | if it should not work to suit the maker, he tears it all to pieces and makes a new one. Are we at liberty to infer from this, sir, that the present judges connot be made to work to suit the present rulers, and that this system is to be demolished to displace them, in order to make a new one, and seat upon your benches of justice creatures more pliable? I hope not, sir; I am sure such cannot be the views of any honorable gentleman.

It has been day after day echoed and re-echoed from one side of the Chamber to the other, that this law was one of the last expiring acts of the former Administration; that the Legislature had no right to pass it, because they knew it would be repealed. What, sir, are we told that a majority of the last Congress had no right to pass a Constitutional law? This is novel doctrine, indeed; and were they to omit doing good because they had reason to believe their successors would do evil? I acknowledge, sir, that the establishment of this Judiciary system was one of the last acts of the former Administration, and it was the very best act; the destruction of it is likely to be one of the first acts of the present Administration, and I pray God that it may be the worst; but from such a beginning the end is indeed incalculable.

Sir, these judges may, by the strong arm of legislative power, be driven from their seats; not their own unimpeachable integrity, their virtue, and their learning, or even the sacred barriers of the Constitution itself may be sufficient to avert their fate; but remember, though advanced in years, many of them will live to see what the gentleman from Maryland has called the efflux of passion and reflux of reason-they will live to see the people of this country review with horror the present attempt; and, if till then they should happily preserve their peace and liberties, wonder how it has happened.

I will now, sir, in conclusion, notice, in a style that it deserves, the language of the gentleman from Virginia, in the discussion of this question, applied to the State of Delaware-language unworthy of this floor. He tortured an expression of my honorable friend from New York to furnish himself with an opportunity of travelling far out of the subject, in order to insult the honor of the

SENATE.

State I belong to. After speaking of the suability of States, he observed that he should feel the same interest for any State, large or small, whether it were the little State of Delaware herself, or the still more insignificant Republic of St. Marino." The speech is not yet in print, but if I am wrong the gentleman will correct me. [Mr. MASON explained: he did not mean by what he said anything derogatory to the State of Delaware; on the contrary, he entertained a high respect for that State.] Mr. WHITE.-I hope, Mr. President, I may be further indulged; I did not at the moment distinctly hear what the gentleman said, but now must insist on knowing explicitly from him, not only what he meant, but whether he believes the word "insignificant," as used by him, could in any way apply to the State of Delaware? [Mr. MASON was about to explain further, when the VICE PRESIDENT rose from his seat and observed, that he was not in the Senate when the gentleman from Virginia spoke, but if he had used any such words as were charged to him, they were improper, and ought not to have been permitted. That no reflections on any State or gentleman should be suffered in the Senate, and he hoped the gentleman from Delaware would take no further notice of it.] Mr. WHITE.-As the gentleman is now pleased to deny his intention, in obedience to the Chair, I shall spare myself the trouble and his feelings the pain of a retort that very readily presents itself.

Mr. CHIPMAN, of Vermont.-Mr. President, after the length of time which has already been consumed, and the abilities which have been displayed in this debate, I can have but little hope of exhibiting anything new for the consideration of the Senate. Yet, momentous as I consider the decision to be made on the present question, involving consequences powerfully affecting the most important principles of the Constitution, I cannot persuade myself to give a merely silent vote on the occasion. In the observations which I intend to make, I shall endeavor, briefly, to examine some of the principal arguments only, which have been offered in favor of the resolution on your table.

The arguments in support of the resolution have been reduced under two general heads:

1. The expediency of repealing the law contemplated in the resolution, and

2. The Constitutional power of Congress to repeal that law.

To evince the expediency of the measure, it has been said that the system of 1793 was adequate to all the purposes of the National Judiciary; and that the judges appointed under that system were competent to all the Judicial duties required. Upon this, sir, I shall briefly observe, that from the number of terms of the supreme and circuit courts, and the immense distance to be travelled, the labor was unreasonably great. From the labors and fatigues of riding the circuit, there could not be allowed time sufficient for those studies, and for that calm and deliberate attention which is so necessary to a proper discharge of the duties of a judge.

[blocks in formation]

At times, it has happened that a supreme judge could not attend a circuit court; from this circumstance, the court in the district to which I have the honor to belong, has more than once failed to be holden. At other times, the arrival of the judges has been so late that the proper business of the term could not be completed. These failures occasioned very great delay, expense, and vexation to the suitors; and we know that the same or greater failures and delays have unhappily been experienced in other parts of the United States-failures and delays which I cannot attribute to any criminal negligence of the judges, but to the burdensome duties imposed by that system, and the infirmities and accidents to which men must ever be exposed, in the performance of labors so arduous and extensive.

To prove that judges of the Supreme Court must have been competent to all the duties of that and the circuit courts, the honorable gentleman who brought forward the resolution drew a comparison from the courts and judges in England. He has told us that in England there are but twelve judges and three principal courts; that these courts embrace, in their original or appellate jurisdiction almost the whole circle of human concerns; that the two courts of King's Bench and Common Pleas, consisting each of four judges, entertain all the common law suits of forty shillings and upwards, arising among nine millions of the most commercial people in the world; and that they have, moreover, the revision of the proceedings of the subordinate courts in the Kingdom, down to the courts of pie-poudre; and that from long experience these courts have been found fully competent to all the business of the Kingdom. This statement, sir, is by no means correct. In England, the House of Lords is the supreme court of appeals in the last resort, in causes both in law and in equity. Instead of three, there are four superior courts. The court of Chancery, in which are decided all suits and matters in equity, including a very numerous and important class of causes. The courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas, and Exchequer, all of which have original jurisdiction in civil causes; and the King's Bench, besides being the highest court of criminal jurisdiction, has also the correction and revision of the proceedings of all the subordinate courts, by writ of error or otherwise. The subordinate courts, which were barely mentioned, are very numerous. There are in England, exclusive of Wales, more than forty counties, all of which have their separate courts and judges. Some of the counties are regular franchises. Lancaster, Chester, and Durham, have their separate courts, both of law and equity, which claim cognizance of causes and parties within their respective jurisdictions, even against the courts at Westminster. There are also an immense number of cities and towns corporate throughout the Kingdom; the courts and judges, of which, though more or less limited in their jurisdiction, entertain a vast variety of civil suits. There are, besides these, the high court of admiralty, which has an exclusive jurisdiction in maritime causes; the courts of the two universities,

JANUARY, 1802.

the prerogative court of the Archbishop of Canterbury, the archiepiscopal court of York, the diocesan and other ecclesiastical courts, having also an extensive jurisdiction, of a civil nature, in causes testamentary, and those relating to the distribution of the goods of intestates.

Wales is a principality, and its courts have exclusive original jurisdiction within the territory. The great sessions is the highest court of the principality from which a writ of error lies in the Court of King's Bench. The subordinate courts and judges are equally numerous, in proportion to the territory and inhabitants, with that of England. I omit the courts of conscience and other inferior courts, and magistrates almost without number. From this view, though imperfect, it is evident that the comparison attempted by the honorable gentleman, is by no means favorable to his conclusion. The population of that country exceeds in number that of the United States by one third, perhaps more; but its whole extent, inclusive of Wales, though not comprehended in the Nisi Prius circuits, does not equal one of the circuits of the United States, under the system of 1793; and yet that country employs, it is believed, more courts and judges, not only than the Government of the United States, but than all the individual States taken in addition. I do not however conceive that any advantage is to be derived from the comparison, to the one side or the other. The situation of property and civil policy, numerous and complicated rights, introduced by ancient usages, and supported by laws and habits, and by interests public and private, may render a greater number of courts and judges, a more extensive judicial system, necessary in one country than in another: I think it ought to be laid wholly out of the question.

It has been said, sir, that a knowledge of the local laws, of the customs and manners of the several States, is necessary to the judges of the Supreme Courts, and cannot be dispensed with on appeals in causes arising in different parts of the Union, and that the judges can acquire this knowledge in no way but by attending the circuit courts in the several States. But let me observe, sir, that the laws of the several States, which vary from the common law, are to be found in their statute books, in the decisions of their courts and their rules, of practice; for no custom can as such become a law. until it shall have been adopted by usages and established by judicial decisions. All these may be made to appear on an appeal, either on the face of the records in the pleadings, or in the special verdict, or by proper exemplification, and will afford the court in such case a more correct knowledge than the recollection of a judge, of what he has caught in the hurry and fatigue of the circuit.

A further objection has been urged against the continuance of the present judicial system, from the additional number of judges which it has introduced, which it is said may prove dangerous to the liberties of the country. An honorable gentleman from Georgia (Mr. JACKSON) cited the opinion of an author who has written on the British constitution, that the greatest political evil which could befall the country, was the existence of large

JANUARY, 1802.

Judiciary System.

SENATE.

Westminster Hall. After the trial at Nisi Prius, the verdict with the record is remitted to the court, out of which it was sent, and there the opinion of the Nisi Prius judge and the conduct of the jury are examined, and considered as matters passing in the same court. Here then the comparison wholly fails: there is no similarity between the two systems, except that of a judge riding the circuit.

tion of the courts, the offices of the judges and their salaries, and as the principal arguments have in the course of this debate been directed by that view of this subject, I shall be permitted to consider it on that ground.

judiciary bodies, and who had illustrated his ideas on that subject by instancing the Parliaments of France. This observation does not, neither was it meant by the author, to apply to any particular number of courts in due subordination, each consisting of a small and limited number of judges and employed solely in proper judicial business. But it applies with force to courts composed of numerous members and forming large bodies, who, Here, sir, I shall waive any further observations in addition to their proper judicial functions, are on this part of the subject, and come to the great permitted to assume an authority in the political question which it is necessary to decide. Have concerns of the nation. Such were the Parliaments Congress the Constitutional power to repeal the of France, the late judicial courts of that country; law as contemplated by the honorable mover of particularly the Parliament of Paris. The members this resolution? To abolish the courts established of this body were very numerous, and as it was by that law, put down the judges, and abolish their necessary that all royal edicts, before they were to salaries? It is true, as was observed by the honbe considered as laws, should be registered in that orable gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. BALDWIN) court, they claimed the right of deliberating and that the resolution does not necessarily involve that deciding on the registration of any edict offered by question, because the repealing act, if the resolution royal authority, and consequently of permitting or should be adopted, may be so modified as to avoid refusing it the sanction of a law. With this claim any difficulty on the great point. But as the honthat body certainly became dangerous to the exist-orable mover avowed his intention to be an aboliing Government, and the contest which ensued between them and the King on this subject, had no doubt a powerful effect in precipitating the late revolution in that country. But there is nothing in all this which can be applied to the courts of the United States. Let me observe, sir, that there One source of argument in favor of the measure has always appeared to me, in the system of 1793, proposed, has been derived from the powers conwhich is sought to be restored, a very great and sidered as incident to every legislative body. It manifest impropriety. The circuit courts were in is said that a power to repeal all its legislative acts that system, though subordinate, in some measure is inseparably incident to every sovereign Legislablended with the Supreme Court, one or more of ture-that the act, the repeal of which is contemthe judges of the Supreme Court being always plated, is a legislative act of Congress, therefore judges of the circuit courts. This rendered the Congress necessarily have the power to repeal it— Supreme Court a fluctuating body, some of the that to admit the contrary, is to say that the powjudges of the Supreme Court being always exclu-er of Congress at one time is not equal to its powded in the decision of causes coming by appeal from the different parts of the United States. And when two supreme judges held the circuit courts of the four remaining judges, who were to decide on an appeal, three might reverse a judgment against the opinion of the fourth, and the opinion of the two judges in the circuit court, unless those judges, from whose judgment the appeal was made, gave also their opinions in favor of an affirmance, and which they might do, their exclusion being indeed only voluntary, from a high and just sense of propriety. This has always appeared to me, to say no more, a very glaring impropriety in that system. The circuit courts under that system have indeed been compared to the Nisi Prius courts in England, but the slightest attention will convince any one that they do not compare. The circuit courts in our system are courts of original and distinct jurisdiction; not so the courts of Nisi Prius in England; they are considered as a branch of the superior courts, at Westminster, and are held by a commission of assize usually issued to a judge of one of the superior courts, and an associate for each of the six circuits into which England is for that purpose divided. When a cause in any of the superior courts is by the pleadings put on an issue of fact, it is with the record sent to be tried at Nisi Prius by a jury of the proper county; instead of calling up a jury to try it at the bar in

er at another time-that a subsequent may be bound by the acts of a former Congress, contrary to a very important maxim in legislation—in a word, that it is to make the creature greater than the creator, as it denies to Congress the power over its own acts, which it has passed, and will in course put a stop to all amendments, all improvements of our laws. This doctrine, here meant to be asserted, is not in the full extent applicable to the legislative powers under our Constitution. There are acts which Congress are by that instrument expressly denied the power of passing-there are acts which, whenever passed, Congress cannot repeal, or rather the effects of which they cannot even suspend, much less can they destroy. They are expressly denied the power of passing ex post facto laws; and this applies no less forcibly to a repealing act than to any other act-it is by its operation that the nature of the act is in this case determined. Every act which in its operation attempts to divest any right previously acquired, whether by a former act of legislation, or by any other lawful means of acquisition, is in name, nature, and essence, ex post facto.

Indeed, sir, I apprehend that some gentlemen have been led into a mistake on this subject, by an incautious admission of maxims and theories of legislative powers in another Government; but which do not apply to our Government, as insti

« AnteriorContinuar »