CHAPTER XIV.

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.

ART. 2, § 1. "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows."

A prompt, vigorous, and faithful execution of the laws is essential to good government. Experience has shown that such an execution of the laws is most likely to be secured when the executive department is distinct from the legislative.

Experience has also shown that the executive power should be vested in a single person—that a single is better than a plural executive.

Unity, secrecy, promptness of decision and action are best secured by a single executive. Differences of opinion, jealousies, and a divided responsibility are liable to take place in a plural executive.

Rome had a plural executive in her two consuls. History records the resulting evils.

Some of the American States during the Revolu

tionary war had a plural executive. The executive power in Pennsylvania was at one time vested in a committee of thirteen. The palpable evils resulting, led all the States to adopt a single executive. It may, therefore, be regarded as a settled maxim in political science, that the executive power should be vested in a single person. On this point the framers of the Constitution were unanimous.

The President is elected for four years. There was a good deal of discussion on this point in the Federal Convention. Some wished to have the term of service much shorter, and some wished to have extended it to seven years. Hamilton would have had it to continue during good behavior.

In favor of four years it may be said, that it is long enough to carry out a system of policy. If the executive power were possessed but for one year, a system could only be entered upon; it could not be completed, or so far carried out as to be tested. Nothing important would be undertaken. To meet the exigencies of the hour would be all that the executive would attempt to do.

On the contrary, were the executive power possessed for ten years, there would be danger of its abuse. All experience has shown that men cannot be trusted with power for any great length of time. The weakness and wickedness of man requires that great power should not be in the same hands for a great length of time.

It will be observed that the President's term of office is intermediate between that of the representative and the senator. The House of Representatives may be entirely changed, and two-thirds of the Senate, during one Presidential term. If, therefore, the executive power is seen to influence unduly the legislature, the people can elect representatives and senators who will be less subservient to his will.

The President can be reëlected as many times as the people may see fit. Some think he should not be reëligible. If this were the case, he would not shape his policy with reference to securing a reëlection. On the other hand, he might pursue a course of corruption which the hope of a reëlection might prevent.

If he were not reëligible, the services of a very valuable man might be lost when most needed. There are times when experience is of the utmost importance. It would be very unwise to prevent the people from availing themselves of the experience gained by four years service in the executive department. The loss to the country of Washington's second term of service would have been irreparable.

It should be remembered that the office of President does not exist for the benefit of the politicians, but for the benefit of the people. The Constitution should make such provisions in respect to it, as will secure to the people the most faithful execution of the laws, not such as will give to political aspirants the

best opportunities of securing the exercise of execu

tive power.

The Constitution makes provision for a Vice-Presilent, to be chosen at the same time and in the same node as the President. It was the intention of the framers of the Constitution to make the office one of dignity, to which no one would be chosen who was not fully qualified to exercise the office of President. John Adams was chosen the first Vice-President, and Thomas Jefferson the second. Subsequently the office began to be regarded as an unimportant one; but the accession of three Vice-Presidents to the Presidency, in each case for nearly the full term of four years, has restored the importance of the office in the view of the people. Experience has shown the wisdom of providing for the filling of the office of President, in case of his decease or removal, without having recourse to a special election. Hereafter, it is hoped, the people will be as careful in selecting their VicePresident as their President.

Art. 2, § 1, 2. "Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no senator or representative, or person holding an office of profit or trust under the United States, shall be appointed an elector."

When the Constitution went into operation, the

Presidential Electors were in some States chosen by the legislatures, in others the legislatures directed that they should be chosen by the people. When John Jay was Governor of New York, the electors were chosen by the legislature. By calling an extra session of the legislature, he could have secured the election to the Presidency of his candidate, and kept his party in power for at least four years longer. He judged that it "did not become him to do it." He would not use his power as governor to promote the ascendency of his party, though it could be legally done.

At present, the electors in all the States are chosen by the people. All persons holding offices of profit or trust under the United States, are prohibited from being electors. This provision was designed to prevent office-holders from exerting their official influence. in the electoral college. The design of having electors was to secure a better choice for President than would be made by the people. It was thought and expected that the electors would select a man for President, and that they would be better qualified to make a selection than the people at large.

The practical working of this provision of the Constitution has been entirely different from what was expected by those who made it. The electors have not been called on to select a candidate but to elect one already selected. The people might just as