myself upon the activity of the cantons and private individuals, but confine myself to a short sketch of the action of the Federation, a sketch which is to show you how the monopoly originated, and what guarantee it offers that the objects of the Federation will be perfectly accomplished, or at least as nearly accomplished as possible. As far as the work of the cantons and organized private effort are concerned, I will only remark that so far comparatively little has been achieved by these two public factors, less, certainly, than might have been expected after the loud protestations of those who considered the very existence of those two factors a solution of an essential part of the problem.

The revision of 1885, which conferred upon the Federation authority to regulate the whiskey-question by law, was followed by the bringing in of four different Federal bills. All these bills pursued with equal earnestness the one chief object—namely, to combat alcoholism within the limits of the rights conceded to the Federation. But the guarantees which each one of these bills offered for the final accomplishment of the desired end, differed widely, and there was a still greater divergence in the manner of dealing with the interests which stood in opposition to ethical demands. These interests are manifold. The most important among them are, however, the interests of agriculture, those of finance, and, finally, the interest, if I may so call it, of the consumer. The first bill was simply a tax scheme, unaccompanied by any increase in the present Federal tariff; hence, to state it briefly, it was a free-trade revenue measure, which would have aided the continuance and development of large distilling establishments, but would have hampered, if not ruined, rural distillation, the demands of which had been pushed into the foreground.

The second project was based on similar fiscal premises, but with this difference, that it aimed at protecting the distilling agriculturist by the imposition of a very high Federal protective duty, which, so far as the action of the State was concerned, would have afforded equal chances to both large and small distillers, the latter of whom, however, would in a short time have been crushed by the superior competitive power of capital.

This danger to the smaller distillers was designed to be warded off by a third project, the so-called monopoly of sale, according to which the State was to buy up all raw spirits at a high price, and, after rectifying, bring them into the market in a purified condition and with a tax added to the price. This scheme, according to the intentions of its originators, would have enabled small and large distilleries to exist side by side, because the heavy hand of the State would have kept their

conflicting interests apart. The fourth plan, which may be styled a monopoly of manufacture, aimed at taking distillation entirely out of private hands and transferring it to the State.

In these four projects it was, above all, the antagonism between the two chief interests, husbandry and the finances, which came to the front. Husbandry would have fared so well, alike under a monopoly of sale and a high protective tariff, that the finances would necessarily have suffered; while, on the other hand, under a revenue scheme without a protective tariff, the exchequer would have been so well endowed that husbandry would have had cause to feel neglected. This being the situation, the authors of those bills which aimed at protecting agricultural distilling, conceived the idea, that the apprehensions of those who represented the wants of the exchequer could easily be allayed by so increasing the tax that, even beside protecting husbandry, the treasury would receive its full share. But now rose up the third interested party, the consumer, and protested against too greatly increasing the price of whiskey by the imposition of too high a tax. The protest ran something like this: Under present social conditions whiskey is to a certain extent a necessity, and will remain such, so long as nothing else takes its place. In the name of that necessity, we consumers protest against imposing a high tax upon the poorest of the poor. The catch-word, "the glass of the poor man," went its rounds through Switzerland. No one knows how it originated in this form. It was in the air, the spontaneous and typical expression of a sentiment cherished by large masses of the people.

Thus in the struggle of opinions as represented by the four bills, the three chief interests here named were drawn up in battle-array against each other.

In the Federal Council a long time was consumed in choosing a draft. The monopoly was favorably regarded, but the popular aversion to both the name and substance of it was feared. These scruples concerning public opinions were indeed so great, that the Federal Council finally rejected the monopoly and chose a tax system which aimed, by a new combination, to do justice to all interests.

This fifth project was referred to a committee of the Federal Council. In this committee, however, the scruples against the monopoly were not so strongly felt. Within a short time a new plan, the sixth in number, was completed, which attempted to unite all conflicting desires upon the basis of the monopoly. This plan, a combination of the monopoly of sale and manufacture, may be briefly stated thus: Inland production was to be made contingent upon demand, and to be restricted to one

third of the requisite supply; the other two-thirds were to be imported from such foreign countries as can produce spirits at lower rates. In this way, both the fiscal and agricultural interests were considered. The gains accruing to the State from the imported two-thirds might be looked upon as so large as to secure to the producers of the domestic one-third all the advantages which husbandry claimed for itself. The agricultural interests were, therefore, so to speak, to be assisted by foreign money. This draft was now accepted by the Federal Council, not, however, without a change, dictated by fiscal considerations, to the effect that the domestic production was to be reduced to a quarter instead of one-third, leaving threefourths to be imported from foreign countries. As a sort of counter-balance to this reduction, the committee sought to embody into its draft a proposition giving a guarantee that the one-quarter produced in the country should be furnished by the rural distilleries. Out of this sixth scheme ultimately grew, almost unchanged, the present monopoly-law.

This, as you may perceive from my brief sketch, is not the outgrowth of a doctrine, nor the outcome of any social theory, but an administrative measure recognized as the most effective means of reconciling the various conflicting interests in a judicious manner. Yet, although social doctrines had no active part in the construction of this monopoly-law, they nevertheless co-operated very decisively in the acceptation of the law by the people. The adherents of that opinion, which at the revision of the constitution in 1885 had brought forward the rights of the poor man, acquiesced in the law only, or at least principally, because it had assumed the form of a monopoly. And, indeed, in this form the law decidedly partakes, in a certain sense, of the character of a social experiment, which is to prove how far the modern State is capable of solving economic problems-an experiment which, if successful, will not remain without influence upon the disposition of similar questions in our own and other countries. I will now once more briefly sum up the provisions of the monopoly, and begin by giving a few figures.

The present consumption of whiskey in our country amounts annually, in round numbers, to 150,000 hectoliters of pure alcohol; of these 100,000 hectoliters are imported, 50,000 produced within our borders. Domestic production is divided pretty evenly between the large and the rural distilleries. The product of the former is centered in nine establishments using foreign raw material almost exclusively. As a rule, the refuse material from these factories is not utilized for purposes of husbandry. This manufacture, therefore, has the character of an industry,

pure and simple, serving agriculture neither by a consumption of domestic raw material, nor by the production of food for cattle. The rest of the production is covered by about 1,000 rural distilleries which chiefly use domestic raw material, and turn to account the refuse resulting from the manufacture, either in their own or some neighboring farm, thus representing that which husbandry claims to a certain extent as its right in the premises.

Now, in future, the matter will take the following course: It is assumed that under the effects of the monopoly, domestic consumption will be reduced even in the first year from 150,000 to 120,000 hectoliters; one-quarter of this consumption, that is to say, 30,000 hectoliters, are to be covered by domestic production, 90,000 are to be imported from other countries. The importation from foreign countries, therefore, remains about the same as before, when the reduction of the whole consumption is taken into account. The 30,000 hectoliters to be produced in the country are wholly reserved to the small agricultural distilleries. Their continuance is guaranteed by this means, at least to the present extent. The income from the monopoly goes to the cantons, and, as has already been stated, one-tenth part of this is to be used for combating alcoholism. This onetenth amounts to about 800,000 francs.

In conclusion, I should like briefly to sum up the advantages (for this will be of practical interest to you) which the monopoly necessarily offers as compared with any other of the proposed solutions of the question.

Foremost among them must be mentioned the concentration of public opinion upon the whole question. In a much higher degree than would be the case with a mere tax-bill, all eyes will now be turned upon the action of the Federation in this matter. The entire production passes through the hands of the Federal Government, and is in turn delivered by it into the open market for consumption. This fact alone would suffice to call public attention continually to the development of the consumption, to the places in which it is effected, to the centers wherein it accumulates. I consider this concentration of public attention to be one of the greatest advantages of the monopoly, an advantage which would scarcely exist under taxlaws having no other object save the replenishing of the exchequer.

The monopoly further offers a better distribution of the burdens among the different classes of the population, and thus realizes the views of those who claim-and their claim. is certainly justifiable in a sense that to many classes of the people ardent liquors are a social, I might even say,

a psychical necessity. For, the monopoly enables us to do, what in the present condition of our commercial treaties no mere tax-law would have warranted-namely, to tax the distilled spirits variously-i. e., the drink of the rich man higher than that of the poor man, a differentiation which, having helped to make the monopoly acceptable to the people, may be regarded for this very reason as a considerable advantage. Much might, no doubt, be said against this differentiation, but, practically speaking, it is far better to have obtained the monopoly with it, than to have lost both by an attempt to do without it.

Another great advantage of the monopoly is the guarantee it really offers for the purity of the product. If the entire sum of both domestic and foreign production passes under the control of the Federal Government and is delivered directly by them, there is much greater security that only pure beverages will be offered for consumption, than if it were put into circulation through the many thousand channels of private industry. This certainly is a most essential point. The State is, moreover, in a certain sense rewarded for its activity in the matter of purification. Aside from concentrating this business, the State will take hold of the manufacture of casks and establish it in the country to a much greater extent than has hitherto been, or could in future be, possible to private enterprise, and all this with greater pecuniary advantages necessarily arising from a centralization of the business. The combination of manufacture and sale in the hands of the Federal Government creates, moreover, a reform in the business management of the distilleries. By authority of the monopoly-administration these distilleries are being surrounded, figuratively speaking, by a high wall, having but one outlet, and that one under the control of the Government; whereas formerly, ardent liquors, uncontrolled and uncontrollable, issued forth from innumerable cracks and crevices into as many channels.

Another advantage of the monopoly lies in the fact that it regulates once for all the strife between large distilleries and the agricultural stills. Under the monopoly, agricultural distilling can only develop where it has a rational basis, and there it cannot be crowded off its own ground by the larger establishments, because the State draws the line between factory and rural still. The State also possesses the power (which could not have been conferred upon it by any mere taxlaw) to compel the distilleries to use only domestic raw material, and so to do justice to the well-founded demands of husbandry.

Still another advantage of the monopoly is the simplicity