pardon being granted by the Governor of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The record relates to a native and citizen of Canada, 42 years old, female, who was lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence on January 6, 1912. On August 4, 1931, the respondent was convicted on her plea of guilty in the Superior Court, Suffolk County, Mass., of the crimes of uttering a forged instrument and larceny. Thereafter she made brief visits to Canada in 1940 and 1943 and last entered the United States about July 1943 at Newport, Vt., being admitted as a returning resident alien. Section 19 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1917, as amended, (8 U. S. C. 155 (a) 1940 ed.) contains the following proviso: Provided further, That the provision of this section respecting the deportation of aliens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has been pardoned, nor shall such deportation be made or directed if the court, or judge thereof, sentencing such alien for such crime shall, at the time of imposing judgment or passing sentence or within thirty days thereafter, due notice having first been given to representatives of the State, make a recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien shall not be deported in pursuance of this Act; * In interpreting the proviso relating to valid pardons and recommendations against deportation the rule was laid down that the effectiveness of such pardons and recommendations against deportation was not limited to deportation proceedings based on the commission of a crime subsequent to entry but was also effective as to commission of crime prior to entry; that the proviso applied equally to exclusion and deportation proceedings and to arrest and deportation proceedings.1 It is contended, however, by the Service that section 241 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act represents a change in the law and must be given effect. Section 241 (b) provides as follows: The provisions of subsection (a) (4) respecting the deportation of an alien convicted of a crime or crimes shall not apply (1) in the case of any alien who has subsequent to such conviction been granted a full and unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or by the Governor of any of the several States, or (2) if the court sentencing such alien for such crime shall make, at the time of first imposing judgment or passing sentence, or within thirty days thereafter, a recommendation to the Attorney General that such alien not be deported, due notice having been given prior to making such recommendation to representatives of the interested State, the Service, and prosecution authorities, who shall be granted an opportunity to make representations in the matter. It is the position of the Service that in view of the specific reference to subsection (a) (4) of section 241 of the Immigration 1Perkins v. United States ex rel. Malesevic, (supra); Rasmussen v. Robinson, (supra); Matter of H- and Y, (supra). and Nationality Act (which provides for the deportation of aliens convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within 5 years after entry and sentenced or confined to imprisonment for a year or more, or who at any time after entry are convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude), the forgiveness aspect of pardons and recommendations against deportation must be confined to this particular ground of deportability. It is true that we have given effect to the change in statutory language so as to make the pardon feature not applicable in certain situations. Thus in Matter of R, (supra), we held that in view of the limitation in section 241 (b) to full unconditional pardons by the President of the United States or by a Governor of any of the several States, a legislative pardon under the law of Pennsylvania was no longer effective to prevent deportation under a charge laid under the provisions of section 241 (a) (4) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; likewise we held in Matter of I—, (supra), that a recommendation against deportation upon a charge predicated upon a narcotic violation was not a bar to deportation under section 241 (a) (11) because narcotic violations were not referred to in section 241 (b). We have also concluded that conditional pardons were not effective under section 241 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act because this section specifically refers to full and unconditional pardons. However, we do not believe that these references are necessarily dispositive of the question in this case since the disposition of those cases rested upon other terminology in section 241 (b). It is to be remembered that the respondent in the present case is deportable under section 241 (a) (1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act on the ground that at the time of entry she was within one or more of classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at the time of such entry because of the commission and admission of a crime. It is to be noted that section 241 (b) refers to the deportation of an alien convicted of a crime or crimes. Thus, in both instances, the subject matter is in pari materia. We are aware of no congressional intent to be more lenient to a person convicted of a crime in the United States subsequent to an entry than to a person convicted in the United States subsequent to an original entry and prior to a reentry. We are not here dealing with a foreign pardon, or a legislative pardon, or a conditional pardon. The important feature is that a governor of a state has granted a valid pardon of a crime committed in the United States. Previously such a pardon was effective to "immunize" the offending alien from being expelled from this country because of that criminal conduct. Paraphrasing an analogous situation under the 1917 Immigration Act respecting a recommendation against deportation, it is not inconsistent with the legislative pattern for the enforcement of the immigration laws to hold, that the relief from expulsion granted under the pardoning clause should be extended to immunize the same alien for the same offense when he seeks to reenter the United States, where such an alien committed his offense in the United States and a valid pardon has been granted to prevent his expulsion; essentially, it does not matter whether the alien is the subject of exclusion proceedings or warrant proceedings. An examination of the legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act fails to disclose any intent to change the prior administrative and judicial holdings that pardons were equally effective in exclusion or in expulsion proceedings. Mr. Walter M. Besterman, Legislative Assistant, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, in his commentary on the Immigration and Nationality Act,3 stated that an alien deportable because of conviction of a crime or crimes involving moral turpitude will not be deported if, subsequent to his conviction, he has been granted a full and unconditional pardon by the President of the United States or by the Governor of any State. The substance of section 241 (b) is that deportation shall not be undertaken against a convicted alien who has been pardoned upon the basis of the crime or crimes which constitute the subject matter of the pardon. There is no sound basis in logic or in reason to hold that this pardoning forgiveness or immunity applies to an alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude within 5 years after entry, and not to the case of the instant respondent, who has resided in this country since 1912 and who committed a crime prior to her last entry as a returning resident in 1943. To adopt such a construction would in effect negate a clearly expressed congressional intent to immunize the pardoned criminal from the consequences of his criminal act. It is concluded therefore that the pardoning provision contained in section 241 (b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act includes not only the criminal who is deportable under section 241 (a) (4), but also the criminal who is deportable under section 241 (a) (1) because a member of a proscribed criminal class, section 212 (a) (9), at time of entry. As long as there is a full and unconditional pardon granted by the President or by a Governor of a State covering the crime which forms the ground of deportability, whether in exclusion or in expulsion, the immunizing feature of the pardon clause applies, and such a crime no longer forms a 2 Matter of H- - and Y 3. I. & N. Dec. 236, 243. 8 U. S. C. p. 63 (1952 edition). basis for deportability. The motion to reconsider will accordingly be denied. Order: It is ordered that the motion to reconsider and withdraw our prior order affirming the decision of the special inquiry officer terminating the proceedings be and the same is hereby denied. IN THE MATTER OF B In DEPORTATION Proceedings A-5164327 Commissioner's Motion April 21, 1954 Decided by Board July 14, 1954 Crime involving moral turpitude-"Loan sharking”-Conspiracy to violate sections 340 and 357 of the Banking Law of New York not a crime involving moral turpitude-Not unlawful commercialized vice within section 212 (a) (12) of the Immigration and Nationality Act-Alien engaged in unlawful commercialized vice after entry not deportable under section 241 (a) (12) of the act. (1) Conspiracy to violate sections 340 and 357 of the Banking Law of New York is not a crime involving moral turpitude since those sections are only a licensing and regulatory enactment. Statement in the conspiracy count relating to intimidation and threats is immaterial since not necessary for conviction. (2) An alien who has engaged in unlawful commercialized vice after entry is not deportable under section 241 (a) (12) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as a member of a class specified in section 212 (a) (12) of the act since the latter section requires that the individual be coming to the United States to engage in such unlawful commercialized vice and does not proscribe conduct subsequent to entry. (3) "Loan sharking" (usury) is a crime by statute in most jurisdictions and, while of a commercialized nature, it cannot be regarded as "any other unlawful commercialized vice, whether or not related to prostitution" within the meaning of section 212 (a) (12) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, since there is a clear distinction between "crime" and "vice." CHARGES: Warrant: Act of 1952 After entry, became member of class specified in section 212 (a) (12), namely, alien who has been supported by or received proceeds of an unlawful commercialized vice (Loan Sharking). Lodged: Act of 1952 Convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude Petty larceny; conspiracy to commit crime of violation of banking law. BEFORE THE CENTRAL OFFICE Discussion: On the 19th day of April 1954, the Board of Immigration Appeals entered an order for the termination of the |