regard to the feelings, which I here reduce into their original elements, namely:

(1.) That there are such "things" as feelings.

(2.) That these feelings are distinct from one another.

(3.) That they are not elements, but compounds of elements.

(4.) That each feeling has a principal element, or essence, which imparts to it its peculiar character; and

(5.) That such elements are the elements of Mind. (Some metaphysicians would use the word "Soul.")

With regard to the first of these conclusions, little need be said, since the existence of feelings is too obvious for any doubt to be entertained about it; indeed, if there be in life anything which can rightly claim to be real, it surely must be a feeling.

The second conclusion, like its predecessor, also requires but small consideration, as the distinctive nature of the feelings leaves no room for question, as love, hate, anger, compassion, and so on.

With regard to the third conclusion, very few persons now suppose that the feelings are separate entities, or elements; the different aspects they present, and their manner of merging from one phase into another, necessarily precluding any such belief.

To the fourth conclusion, greater importance attaches. The three previous conclusions having resulted in the hypotheses that there are such phe

nomena as feelings; that such feelings are distinct from one another, and that they are compounds, it follows that each feeling has one or more of those elements from which it obtains its distinctive character.

Whatever is elementary in nature must have real existence every mental conception employs some elementary unanalysable entity. Hence every conception of the mind carries with it some real existence in nature; otherwise the conception would represent a creation of mind, which is inconceivable.

Therefore every name of anything which appears to contain some element peculiar and distinctive to itself, must be assumed to stand for some reality in nature; consequently, if feelings, such as love, hope, awe, veneration, &c., each possesses these distinctive characteristics, there must be some natural element from which this feeling has in each instance been derived.

The fifth conclusion is the hypothesis which we are about to examine, and endeavour to prove.

What I consider to be the elements of life are not wholly mental, nor wholly material, nor wholly physical-for the elements of mind only partly constitute the elements of life.

The elements of mind are not ideas, feelings, units of consciousness, nor souls, nor monads, nor atoms, nor molecules; they have nothing to do with spiritualism; they are not cells, and therefore have not an arch cell; they are not protoplasm, nor cor

puscles, nor are they the grey and white matter of the brain, nor are they nerves: but all these may represent various combinations of some of these elements.

So far as I am aware, the elements of mind, as technical substances, have never in any way been even remotely suggested in any previous work, psychological or other, and as this theory has these elements for its foundation, the initial question is simplified into: Are these elements of mind existent? and if so, do they constitute one of that group of three, mind, matter, and force, which, as all scientists agree, form the substance we call life?

As it has been pointed out, a theory which is not founded upon successful experiment can be of very little value. I claim for the Greater Mind theory that it is founded upon successful experiment, and that the matters which have been experimented in the interest of its foundation, are common to every human being.

upon

Although the Greater Mind theory rejects the dogma that feelings, virtues, and vices, are distinct entities, it maintains that there is a separate definite emotion for every virtue and vice, and (to repeat a part of the Prolegomena) every emotion, when traced back, becomes less and less complex, until we arrive at the unconscious mind, where we find the emotion being evolved by the various elements comprising the emotion, the dominant, and distinctive element gathering to itself its affiliated elements, and becoming a compound. This being the basis of my experiments,

I submit that a feeling is as much a distinctive compound substance as is the grey matter of the brain, than which it is certainly no more difficult to analyse.

The distinctive feeling of a thief in the act of stealing, is analytically different from the distinctive feeling of a person who is lying, which again analytically differs from the feeling of a person who is bestowing charity; and I submit that the elementary substances of these various distinctive feelings may be distinguished by experimental analysis.

There is no reason why experimental analysis. should be confined to physics, and I differ from those who believe that the elements of mind can be discovered by psychologists who confine themselves to analytically experimenting upon the physical part of it the which, indeed, may be likened to attempting to discover the elements of steam by analytically examining the mechanism of a steam engine.

As in order to discover the elements of steam it will be necessary to analyse the steam itself, so, if we would discover the elementary substances of Mind, we must subject the mind itself to analysis, and not its machinery only. To be sure, objection to this has been raised by the remark that, “With mind you have nothing to take hold of." “If,” the argument proceeds, "mind were physical substance, it would be different, as you can take hold of that." My reply is that mental substances are even more easy to handle than are their co-ordinate physical substances. Compare, for instance, the results of

the examination of such definite mental composite substances as love and hate, or avarice and generosity, being the elements of life from their mental aspect, with those of the grey and white matter of the brain, and the composite substance of protoplasm. The two latter have defied the efforts of analysts to discover the differentiations which are known to exist in them, while the former mental compounds can be reduced by analysis into their original elements.

Herein, then, begins the claim of the Greater Mind theory to the initiation of a new departure, the which is the discovery of a method of analysing the mental compounds into the elementary substances of mind, and hence, having come to the elements of mind, all of which may be numbered and named, one of the most difficult obstacles to psychological research has been overcome.

The experimental part of my theory of mind begins with those abstract nouns which express, or describe, some particular feeling in the subject, although, of course, I do not suggest that an abstract noun is anything more than a name; each of these abstract nouns has generally but one meaning applied to it; and even when it has two, or more, meanings, as a rule only one of them is in common use, the other, or others, usually becoming obsolete.

Another characteristic of these nouns and their feelings, is that they can hardly be described in their various degrees of strength otherwise than by adjectives. Some of the exceptions-and even