dom of the Working Class), popularly known as the mujahidin.

The mujahidin organization was founded in the early 1960's and was suppressed a number of times by the Shah. Later, at the beginning of the 1970's, the fedayin emerged, with an apparent early stronghold in the Caspian Sea province of Siakhal. The two movements were responsible for a grand total of some 250 deaths between 1970 and 1976. In 1975, however, a rift developed between the two groups over the compatibility of Marxism and Islam. The mujahidin, labeled "Islamic Marxists" by the Shah, clearly rejected at this time the eclectic ideology of the fedayin and emphasized the critical importance of the Koran for contemporary Iranian society. The fedayin grew correspondingly more secular in their Marxist orientation. Neither of these guerrilla bands grew very much after the split, and at the end of December 1978, neither had more than about 300 members. Of these, however, several had received military training in Lebanon and Syria from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Immediately after the departure of the Shah, both movements began to operate openly, and their banners and recruiting posters were much in evidence in Tehran during this author's visit in January 1979.

The other major party on the Iranian left is the Tudeh Party, but it is a pale shadow of its former self and is largely discredited among its logical constituencies. Its Central Committee, which is in exile in the German Democratic Republic, has remained committed to following the line laid down by Moscow, and its opportunism over the last 18 months has alienated many potential supporters. During that period the party has changed course three times in attempts to capitalize on various twists and turns of the domestic crisis. At first it supported the united front tactic employed against the Shah; then it switched to a call for armed struggle; and since January it has declared itself in favor of the establishment of an Islamic republic. As of this writing, support for the party is still limited and localized among the ethnic minority populations of Kurdistan and Azerbaydzhan. If the Tudeh Party is to become a major force in Iran, it will have to be reorganized, strengthened, and vigorously directed by the USSR itself.10

In the past, the Soviet Union has sacrificed local Communists in the interest of maintaining or improving normal state-to-state relations with Iran.

10. On the current situation of the Tudeh Party, see Le Monde (Paris), Feb. 21, 1979.

Workers stage a sit-in strike at an Iranian refining plant in October 1978.

-Philippe Ledru/SYGMA.

But the existence of local Communists has also offered the USSR the opportunity to use them for tactical purposes. In this regard, a US Central Intelligence Agency report released in February 1979 detailed "the stealth and hypocrisy" of the Soviets during the Iranian revolution. Clandestine radio stations operating from Soviet territory and clearly Soviet-controlled preached revolution and in the Persian, Kurdish, and Azerbaydzhani tongues urged a national jihad (holy war) and offered detailed instructions on how to organize riots and make grenades and gas bombs. There was also evidence, according to the report, that in October 1978 the Soviet Union directed its underground agents in Iranian security forces and religious groups to seize the leadership of major opposition organizations. The report concluded that "a study of the record reveals a hypocritical attempt to pose as a responsible superpower while promoting subversion on a grand scale as a tactic of world revolution."11

But if the evidence suggests that a Communist bid for power is conceivable and that objectively Iran is ripe for revolution, the obstacles in the path. of revolution are also enormous. There is strong separatist sentiment among the Kurds, Turks, and Azerbaijanis in the country, but it is by no means pro-Soviet. The northern minorities-the Kurds and Azerbaijanis-have been used to achieve Soviet ends in the past, as already discussed, but never with conclusive results. All arrangements

11. The New York Times, Feb. 12, 1979.

The main lock at Lake Tharthar on the ThartharEuphrates canal, completed in 1976. Built with Soviet aid, the canal is important for flood control and for modernization of Iraq's agriculture.

-ADN-Zentralbild from Eastfoto.

In fact, the relationship between the CPI and the Ba'thist regime in Iraq has always been one of "blood and vengeance." The Ba'thists do not trust the Communists for three fundamental reasons: (1) because they could be competitors for power; (2) because they represent an alien ideology; and (3) because they are seen as tools of a superpower conspiracy. As a state with considerable regional influence, Iraq wants to preserve a free hand in implementing its own regional policy, and as an integral part of its policy, the government is anxious to turn Iraq into the granary of the Persian Gulf, and has turned to Western agrobusiness consultants for advice. The CPI has deplored this move, however, declaring that ". . . the agrarian revolution cannot make progress without a clear-cut class policy in the countryside expressing the interests of the rural poor and the middle poor."18 To the

17. Author's interview with Dr. Abbas Kelidar, School of Oriental and African Studies, London, March 1975.

extent that CPI aims differ from those of the ruling Ba'thists on this and other matters, the party is vulnerable. Already it is not consulted on major issues, and it is clear that the regime has the oil wealth, the political toughness, and the security system to destroy any incipient Communist plot if the party turns to violence.19

For the Soviet Union, the implications of this situation are clear. To the extent that public opposition by the CPI or subversion in the armed forces, in the civil service, and among the Kurds endanger the goals of the Ba'thist regime, they intensify Iraqi distrust and weaken the Soviet position in the country.

Afghanistan. When the Khalq (People's) party seized power violently in Afghanistan in April 1978, the party's strongman and the new foreign minister, Hafizullah Amin, stated that the ultimate goal of his party was to create a modern, socialist society, and it soon became evident that the new government was willing to use Soviet aid to achieve that goal. In addition to the party's estimated hardcore membership of about 2,000,20 the party's leader and the new President of the country, Nur Mohammad Taraki, can now also count on the support of approximately 5,000 Soviet civilian and military advisers. Afghanistan even signed a friendship treaty with the USSR in December 1978.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union faces problems in this country. Although Soviet influence has been present there since the 1950's, and Soviet aid amounting to US$1.5 billion over the last 25 years (more than the USSR has provided to any other country) has given the USSR critical leverage over Afghan development plans, the Soviet advisers in the country are not well regarded by the population. Moreover, the staunchly pro-Soviet party in the country, Parcham (Flag), is not in power and is regularly purged by Khalq.

The Taraki government itself is fighting Islamic guerrilla movements in the north and east and has provoked violent local clashes with its land reform and literacy policies. In January 1979, the government moved against some of the country's main religious leaders after months of trying to win them over. Since then, about 70 people have been ar

18. On CPI agricultural policy, see Jasem Muhammed Al Helawi, "Rural Iraq: Changes and Problems," World Marxist Review (London), July 1978, p. 83-89.

19. For a fuller account of Iraqi communism, see John K. Cooley, "The Shifting Sands of Arab Communism," Problems of Communism (Washington, DC), March-April 1975, pp. 34-38.

20. Financial Times, Oct. 31, 1978.

rested in two coordinated sweeps against the clergy, and the government has emphasized that "... those who use religion as a means to serve the enemies of the people will face repercussions."21 Until recently the opposition was scattered and uncoordinated and an easy target for the government. But even if sullen and passive, it has shared a common discontent with and distrust of the left-wing regime, and in March there were signs that a coordinated Islamic opposition movement was being planned. Three groups-Hizbe Islami (Islamic Party), Mnyn Inglabe Islami (Movement for Islamic Revolution), and Jamatei-Islami (Islamic Society)-met in exile in Islamabad, Pakistan, and stated that they were engaged in a struggle to remove the present government."22 The land reform program seemed well-intentioned at first, but recent reports indicate that the redistribution, which is being handled by 100 separate party committees, has been turned into a reward system for individuals who show the greatest loyalty to the party.

Every recent Afghan government has been extremely protective of Soviet interests in Afghanistan, and the Khalq regime has done little to enhance the Soviet position despite the expansion of the Soviet physical presence in the country. The Russians were embarrassed in Afghanistan, in fact, by the murder in February 1979 of US Ambassador to Kabul Adolph Dubs, which brought them into unwelcome conflict with the US and gave the impression that they were supporting a savage and callous Afghan regime. The real potential gains for Moscow, if Taraki can stay in power, lie beyond his country's borders, in the tribal frontier regions of Iran and Pakistan. But all depends on the stability of the Khalq regime, and recent turbulence indicates that it may be undone unless concessions are made to the Islamic movement. If they are, though, Soviet freedom of maneuver is likely to be restricted.

People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. Unlike the Khalq party in Iraq, the ruling Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), which declared the PDRY the first Marxist republic on the Arabian peninsula in 1978, is closely modeled on the CPSU and clearly proSoviet. In fact, the Soviet-Cuban-East German presence is probably more extensive in the PDRY than anywhere else in the Persian Gulf. Currently, there are 700 Cubans, 116 East Germans, and more than

21. Ibid., Mar. 6, 1979.

22. Arab Times (Kuwait), Mar. 4, 1979.

Nur Mohammad Taraki (right), President and then also Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, is welcomed in Moscow by Soviet Communist Party General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev on December 4, 1978, during a visit that resulted in the signing of a friendship treaty between the two countries.

-TASS from Sovfoto.

1,000 Soviet citizens in the country, all serving either as military advisers or as instructors in ideological training centers.

Cuban involvement in the PDRY began in 1973 as a direct result of the continuing Sino-Soviet conflict within the Communist world. Since 1967, the Soviet Union had been losing its revolutionary credibility among Middle Eastern leftist guerrilla movements, especially among those which had come under Chinese influence. In an attempt to stop the ideological shift in the region away from the Moscow line, Moscow arranged for Cuban paramilitary advisers to go to the PDRY. The first 150 arrived in early 1973, and apart from instructing PDRY forces, they were also involved in training Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) guerrillas at Hauf, Mukalla, and al-Gheidha on the Gulf of Aden. Some of the Cubans flew MIG aircraft along the PDRYOman border, and in late 1974 the writer, on a visit to Dhofar, could see PDRY/PFLO artillery positions across the border in South Yemen manned and directed by Cubans. Although the PFLO insurgency was defeated in 1975, the Cubans have remained in the PDRY as a result of the increased Soviet commitment generally in southern Arabia and the Horn of Africa. In the event of hostilities breaking out in

the future between the PDRY and Saudi Arabia, the Yemen Arab Republic, or Oman, the Cubans can be expected to play a direct role, as they did in Angola in 1975 and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in 1978.

As for the Soviet personnel in the PDRY, they are by no means less active than the Cubans militarily, though they may be less visible. They already have port facilities in the country at Aden and on the strategic island of Socotra at the mouth of the Gulf of Aden; and they are building a vast harbor in the bay of Turbah on the Bab el Mandeb strait which will compensate them for their loss of facilities at Berbera, Somalia, in late 1977 and give them a strategic advantage in the Bab el Mandeb area.23

To the north, on the opposite shore of the Red Sea, the Soviet navy may also soon have port facilities at Massawa, Ethiopia; and to the south of the Persian Gulf, they already enjoy them in Mauritius.

Facilities of this sort in and around a strategic area like the Gulf help the navy "vividly demonstrate the economic and military power of a country beyond its own borders," to quote Admiral Sergey G. Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy.24 In support of this view, Gorshkov visited

23. Witness the fact that the straits are only 30 miles wide, while the Soviet surface-to-surface STYX missile alone has a range of 26 miles.

24. S. G. Gorshkov, "The Navy in War and Peace," Morskoy sbornik (Moscow), No. 12, 1972, p. 16.

-Rosy Rouleau from Gamma/Liaison.