Smee, L. R. 5 P. Div. 84. For example, a monomania on the subject of eating was held not to affect testator's capacity to make a will: Jenckes v. Smithfield, 2 R. I. 255. Where, however, a testator believed that he was a son of George IV, and under that delusion, made a will leaving his property to a library at Brighton, a favorite resort of that king, the will was set aside as the offspring of delusion: Sme‹ v. Smee, L. R. 5 P. Div. 84. So, also, where testator had delusions of persecution: Society v. Hopper, 43 Barb. 625; Ballantine v. Proudfoot, 62 Wis. 216; Edwards v. Davis, 30 W. L. B. (O.) 283. That his family were trying to poison or injure him: Riggsv. The Society, 95 N. Y. 503. That his wife was unfaithful: In re Gannons' Will, 2 Misc. Rep. 339; Barbo v. Rider, 67 Wis. 398. Or his child illegitimate: Haines v. Hayden, 54 N. W. (Mich.) 911. And where deceased had şuddenly conceived an intense and unreasoning hatred of a member of the family: Miller v. White, 5 Redf. 320; Merrit v. Rolston, 5 Redf. 220.

In the matter of Lockwood's Will, testator executed an instrument giving all his property to charity, except a sum to his executor, 'as high as one quarter of the estate, large enough to be above any bribe that may be offered by my brothers and sisters for the redemption of this will and the heirship to my estate." The court said, "I am persuaded that the alleged will must be rejected, that it is unnatural, unreasonable and strange on its face." 8 N. Y.S. 345. In Carter's Estate, 11 Pa. C. C. 140, testator, an accomplished man, fell into a hypochondriacal condition and excluded from participation in his estate two daughters, one because of her marriage to a man against whom he had conceived a sudden, groundless and unreasoning antipathy, and the other because of her presence at the ceremony, at the same time reducing the shares of other children present to life estates. An issue devisavit vel non was granted on the ground that the evidence, if believed, was sufficient to establish an insane delusion.

On the other hand, if there are facts, however, insufficient, from which a prejudiced narrow or bigoted mind might derive a particular idea or belief, it cannot be said that the mind is unsound in this respect. The belief may be illogical or pre

posterous, but it is not, therefore, evidence of insanity. In re

White's Will, 121 N. Y. .406; Coit v. Patcher, 77 N. Y. 533 ; Estate of Carpenter, 94 Cal. 406. In Martin v. Thayer, 37 W. Va. 38, it was developed that testator missing his will from his papers and unjustly suspecting his grandchild of taking it excluded her from a later will. The original will was subsequently founded enclosed in a deed in his box. A verdict for the contestants was set aside, the court saying, that if the testator had testamentary capacity, it was none the less his will, although he may have been influenced to exclude parties from sharing in his bounty under a mistaken apprehension of facts. This question frequently arises where it is alleged that deceased was subject to a delusion as to the illegitimacy of his children. "It is conceded," said the court in Potter v. Jones, “that the conclusions he (the testator) drew from the facts are .wholly unwarrantable and without any justification, indicating at least an unrelenting jealous disposition, but unjust and absurd, as they may bc, they were not the pure creation of a perverted imagination without any foundation in reality:" 20 Ore. 245; In re Smith's Will, 24 N. Y. S. 928; Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 196; Coit v. Patcher, 77 N. Y. 533; Cole's Will, 49 Wis. 179; Philips v. Chater, 1 Dem. 533. The speculative belief of an individual concerning things natural or supernatural, no matter how irregular, is not to be regarded as insanity: Smith's Will, 543; Chafin's Will, 32 Wis. 557; Bonard's Will, 16 Abb. Pr. 128; Hartwell v. McMaster, 4 Redf. 389. It is within very narrow limits that any such belief can be confidently pronounced a delusion. "The ques tion," it was remarked in Taylor v. Trich, "is not so much what he believed on these subjects as what effect had his beliefs on his mental condition :" (165 Pa. 586 at p. 600.) If such beliefs unsettle the judgment and leave the subject under the influence of a delusion that usurps the reason and controlls the will, then such person has not a sound, disposing mind and memory: Robinson v. Adams, 62 Me. 369.

As already stated, injustice and inequality in the distribution of property may be considered in connection with other facts showing incapacity, as a circumstance tending to show

unsoundness of mind: Pooler v. Christman, 34 N. E. 57; Tawney v. Long, 76 Pa. 106; Bitner v. Bitner, 65 Pa. 347; Knox v. Knox, 11 S. 125; McFadden v. Catron, 25 S. W. (Mo.) 506. To take the question of alleged unreasonableness from the jury is reversible error: Simms v. Russel, 57 N. W. (la.) 601; Sherley v. Sherley, 81 Ky. 240. At the same time it is improper to single it out from the other facts of a case and instruct specially as to it, thus giving it undue prominence and tending to mislead the minds of the jury from the real issue of capacity: Blesdoe v. Blesdoe, 1 S. W. 10; Burney v. Torrey, 14 S. W. (Ala.) 685. It is only a circumstance and never regarded as sufficient alone to invalidate a will: Gamble v. Gamble, 39 Barb. 373. This is particularly true where the facts suggest a reason for such discrimination as from motives of gratitude or personal attachment: In re Snelling, 136 N. Y. 515; In re Mondorf, 110 N. Y. 450; or to secure peace at home, Peery v. Pecry, 29 S. W. (Tenn.) 1. Or a preference for children who formed part of the household, or for the younger children: In re Murray's Estate, 11 Pa. C. C. 263; Nicewander v. Nicewander, 37 N. W. (Ill.) 698. Or a statement that a child has already been provided for: King v. Holmes, 84 Me. 819. Family discord, unfilial conduct of children, the separation of husband and wife, are all circumstances to be carefully considered: Chandler v. Jost, 11 S. 636; In re Suydam's Will, 32 N. Y. S. 449. "A person will be influenced in the formation of his attachments and prejudices by his associations, relationship, benefits or injuries. This is natural and he may, in the exercise of his discretion, dispose of his property according to his predilections thus formed:" Mitchell v. Mitchell, 43 Minn. 73; Trumbull v. Gibbons, 2 Zab. 117; Lee v. Lee, 4 McCord, 183; McDonaldson's Estate, 130 Pa. 480; Blair v. Cline, 33 P. (Ore.) 542; Barnes v. Barnes, 66 Me. 286; Collins v. Brazil, 63 Ia. 432; Austen v. Graham, 8 Moo. P. C. 493; White v. Driver, 1 Phill. 84; Foster's Estate, 142 Pa. 62. A will cannot be termed inofficious, which disregards the claims of collaterals in favor of a wife: McCann's Estate, 2 Pa. Dist. 181; Barlow v. Waters, 28 S. W. (Ky.) 785; Harwood v. Baker, 6 Moo. P. C. 282. Nor the passing

over of collaterals in favor of others less needy: Conway v. Vizard, 122 Ind. 266, particularly where the deceased never regarded them as probable objects of his bounty: In re Skaat's Will, 26 N. Y. S. 494.

It will be seen from the cases cited, as well as from many others excluded from want of space, that while the number of these contests is great the proportion of the successful is small. This is as it should be, for in most instances they are undertaken through personal animosity or in the hope of extorting a compromise from the beneficiaries under the will. Even in cases of seeming hardship it is seldom that success can be predicted with any degree of confidence. As a means of enforcing parental authority as a protection to the aged, and the friendless from indifference and neglect, the courts firmly maintain the testator's right to freely dispose of his property. WM. HENRY LOYD, JR.

Acceptance of a Guaranty-Concealment of Facts by Guarantee. A contract of suretyship or guaranty, like other contracts, requires the concurrence of intention in two minds, one of whom promises something to another who accepts. Consequently, a mere offer to guaranty is not binding until acceptance by the person to whom it is made, and until acceptance it is revocable.

Of the acceptance of an absolute guaranty notice is not requisite; but of a mere offer of guaranty, the guarantee's acceptance must be notified to the guarantor, such notification being of the essence of the agreement.

Unless interrogated, a creditor is under no obligation to disclose facts in no manner connected with the business which is the subject of the 'Reported in 15 So. Rep. 649 (46 La. Ann.).

suretyship, though such facts would probably have a decided influence on the surety in entering into the contract; and the current and weight of authority supports the proposition, that unless inquiry be made by the guarantor, it is not obligatory upon the guarantee to volunteer a disclosure of the debtor's previous embezzlement, and his failure to make such a disclosure will not constitute a fraudulent concealment that will operate the surety's discharge.

Requisites of Contracts of Suretyship and GuaraNTY.

The contract of suretyship or guaranty is said to have been "coeval with the first contracts recorded in history."

The Proverbs of Solomon, contain more than one allusion to suretics and suretyship, declaring it not only unwise, but as indicating a lack of understanding, to enter into such an obligation (Prov. 11, 17, 22). (See note, Story on Contracts, § 1107.)

However inconsistent it may be with the laws and teachings of Solomon, selfishness and prudence have yielded to friendship and to the demands of social and commercial affairs, and we find the contract of a guarantor or surety to be an important factor in commercial transactions, and an important fcature of commercial law. It has long been established that "sureties are favorites of the law:" Lafayette v. James, 92 Ind. 240. "Nothing can be clearer," says Mr. Justice STORY, "both upon principle and authority, than the doctrine that the liability of a surety is not to be extended by implication beyond the terms of his contract. To the extent, and in the manner and under the circumstances pointed out in his obligation, he is bound, and no farther. It is not sufficient that he may sustain no injury by a change in the contract, or that it may even be for his benefit. He has a right to stand upon the very terms of his contract; and if he does not assent to any variation, and a variation is made, it is fatal. And courts of equity, as well as of law, have been in the constant habit of scanning the contracts of sureties with considerable strictness: " Miller v. Stewart, 9 Wheat. 680.

Not only has it been the inclination of the common law to preserve to the fullest extent the rights of guarantors and sureties in the construction and enforcement of their contracts, regarding them as strictissimi juris, but the statute law also