prosecuting officer by the procurement of the defendant's attorney, his discharge, not being ordered by the court, is not such a termination of the prosecution as will enable him to maintain an action for malicious prosecution: Langford v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 144 Mass. 431; S. C., 11 N. E. Rep. 697. So, when the justice, instead of committing the prisoner, decided that, though “no wrong was intended, the act was wrong and unlawful," and discharged the prisoner on the latter paying a fine of one dollar and costs, and expressing regret for what he had done, declaring that he intended no wrong, and asking for mercy, the discharge is not sufficient to disprove probable cause: Hergenrather v. Spielman, (Md.), 22 Atl. Rep. 1106. If a prosecution for a penalty is settled by agreement of the parties, it is a sufficient termination of the prosecution to found an action: Sutton v. McConnell, (Wis.), 50 N. W. Rep. 414. Master Kekewich, J., of the Chancery Division, has lately made an interesting ruling on the question of the enforcement of a contract for personal services, in Davis v. Foreand Servant, man, [1894] 3 Ch. 654. In that case, an agreeInjunction ment for the employment of a manager of a business house contained a clause providing that the employer would not, except in the case of misconduct or a breach of the agreement, require the manager to leave his employ. The employer, however, gave the manager a notice, purporting to determine the agreement and the service created thereby; and the manager thereupon brought an action for an injunction to restrain the employer from acting on the notice But the court held, that though the clause above mentioned was negative in form, it was affirmative in substance, being equivalent to a stipulation by the employer that he would retain the manager in his employ, and an injunction ought not to be granted. This case is almost unique, the complaint usually coming from the master. Perhaps the only parallel instance to be found is in Booth v. Brown, 62 Fed. Rep. 794, which, however, was decided without reference to this question, the court seeming to admit that it possessed the power, in a proper case, to relieve the complainants, (strikers discharged from a railroad operated by receivers), though this may be questioned. The circumstances in Johnson v. Shrewsbury & Birmingham R. R. Co., 3 De G., M. & G. 914, were somewhat similar, but not parallel. The analogy with the cases where the master seeks to enforce the service of his employé is complete, nevertheless, and the same rules apply. The general rule is, that a contract for services cannot be specifically enforced: Stocker v. Brockelbank, 3 MacN. & G. 250; nor can this be done indirectly, by an injunction restraining the employé from leaving the service: Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed. Rep. 310, reversing, pro tanto, Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 60 Fed. Rep. 803. See 1 AM. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 865. But if the contract of service contains a negative stipulation, not to perform services for another during the period of employment, that stipulation may be enforced by injunction: Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De G., M. & G. 604, affirming 5 De G. & Sm. 485; Grimston v. Cuningham, [1894] 1 Q. B. 125; Duff v. Russell, 133 N. Y. 678; S. C., 31 N. E. Rep. 622, affirming 16 N. Y. Suppl. 958, & 14 N. Y. Suppl. 134; Hoyt v. Fuller, 19 N. Y. Suppl. 962. If, however, the contract contains no negative stipulation, none will be inferred, and an injunction will not be granted. when the manager of a manufacturing company merely agreed to give his whole time to the company's business during a specified term, the company was held not entitled to an injunction to restrain him from giving, during the term, a part of his time to a rival company: Whitwood Chemical Co. v. Hardman, [1891] 2 Ch. 416; disapproving Montague v. Flockton, 16 L. R. Eq. 189, which asserted the contrary. See Fechter v. Montgomery, 33 Beav. 22. The true distinction would seem to be, as suggested in Whitwood v. Chem. Co.. supra, that the injunction will only be granted when the employé is one who has a special qualification for the service, and cannot be readily replaced, so that his performing similar services for another would occasion great and irreparable damage to the employer; otherwise not. A sensible middle Thus, course was taken in Webster v. Dillon, 3 Jur. (N. S.) 432. where an injunction was granted to restrain an actor from acting at any other theatre during the time that the employer's theatre was ordinarily open for public performances. Secrets The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in Fralich v. Despar, 30 Atl. Rep. 521, has held, that when an employé has entered Trade into an agreement, prior to entering the service, not to divulge or use any secrets of the business the employer might make known to him, but subsequently leaves the plaintiff's employ and begins the manufacture of similar goods, using plaintiff's secret processes, he will be restrained from so doing by injunction. To the same effect are Peabody v. Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452; Salomon v. Hertz, 40 N. J. Eq. 400; S. C., 2 Atl. Rep. 379. Mechanics' Liens . The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has also decided, that when the husband contracts in his own name for the erection of a building on his wife's land, and she, with full knowledge of her husband's contract, converses with the contractors in regard to the work, and makes no objection at any time during its progress, she is liable to a scire facias sur mechanics lien : Jobe v. Hunter, 30 Atl. Rep. 452. Partition, In the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois, a tenant in common of a reversion, subject to a life estate, may maintain a suit for partition against his co-tenant before Life Estate the expiration of the life estate: Drake v. Merkle, 38 N. F. Rep. 654. It has been held that there can be no partition in praesenti between a life tenant and a remainderman: Stansbury v. Inglehart, 19 Wash. Law Repr. 594; but in Alabama lands may be sold for partition among tenants in common, though the surviving husband of a deceased tenant in common has a life estate in his wife's undivided interest: McQueen v. Turner, 91 Ala. 273; and in Missouri the life tenant and a remainder-man may maintain partition against the other remainder-men, though there are contingent estates in the land which may afterwards be vested in persons not in esse: Sikemeier v. Galvin, 27 S. W. Rep. 551. The same court also holds that the wives of tenants in common are not necessary parties to suits for partition, since their inchoate dower rights are subject to the expectant liability of the loss of their husbands' seisin by partition sale: Davis v. Lang, 38 N. E. Rep. 635. Parties Partnership. The House of Lords, in Lovell v. Beauchamp, [1894] App. Cas. 607, has decided an interesting point in regard to partnership, viz.: That in an action against a firm, of Infant which it appears that one partner is an infant, for goods supplied to the firm, judgment cannot be recovered against the firm simply, but may be recovered against the "defendants other than " the infant partner. Patents The Supreme Court of the United States, with a display of erudition worthy of a better cause, and even suspiciously elaborate, has solemnly laid down the principle that the United States is at liberty to appropriate and use a patented invention, without any compensation to the inventor: Schillinger v. United States, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 85. Verily, it is not strange that we are a nation of defaulters and swindlers, when both Congress and the Supreme Court seem to thus disregard the national honor. It is only just to those gentlemen, however, to state that Justices Harlan and Shiras dissented. According to the Supreme Court of California, an exhibit attached to a complaint, and referred to therein, becomes. a part thereof, though the complaint does not Pleading expressly make it a part: Savings Bank of San Diego Co. v. Burns, 38 Pac. Rep. 102. There is an annotation on this subject in 1 Aм. L. Reg. & REV. (N. S.) 307. The Supreme Court of Kansas has lately decided, that when a railroad company procures competent surgeons to attend a brakeman, injured in its employ, and proceeds to transport him to a hospital, in pursuance of the advice and direction of such surgeons, and com Railroads, plies with all their directions as to his safety and care, it is not liable for any mistake, error in judgment, or want of foresight on the part of the surgeons: Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Zeiler, 38 Pac. Rep. 282. Replevin The Supreme Court of Michigan has lately settled a curious complication of affairs in a replevin suit. Both parties were mortgagces, the plaintiff having the prior lien. The jury found the value of the property, and that it was wrongfully detained by the defendants. The plaintiff had taken the property into possession, under the writ. The court below directed a verdict to be entered for the defendants to the amount of their lien. This was held error, and that the defendants were not entitled to a money judgment against the plaintiff for their lien, without first tendering to the plaintiff the amount of his prior lien: Olin v. Lockwood, 60 N. W. Rep. 972. The Supreme Court of North Carolina is of opinion, that a statement that a person is a "forger," is not per se actionable, when coupled with a charge of some specific act, which of itself does not constitute forgery: Barnes v. Crawford, 20 S. E. Rep. 386. Slander Statutes, The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in State v. Mayor of Newark, 30 Atl. Rep. 543, holds, that if an amendatory statute changes a section of the prior statute, by Amendment merely eliminating one of its provisions, the recital at length of the section so amended, in compliance with the constitutional direction, will not be deemed a re-enactment of the provisions which are retained, so as to repeal all laws which are then inconsistent with them. This seems hardly consistent with the ruling in Peo. v. Wilmerding, 136 N. Y. 363; S. C., 32 N. E. Rep. 1099, that an amended statute is wholly merged in the amending statute, and if the latter is repealed, the former is not revived, but falls with it. It would be a better statement of the last proposition to say that the amending statute is merged in the one amended, so that the |