taking and asportation, though the consent is given for the 'purpose of apprehending the criminal: State v. Adams, 20 S. E. Rep. 722. It is well settled, that there can be no larceny with the consent of the owner, even if that consent is given for the sole purpose of entrapping the person suspected, and the doer of the act does not know of the existence of the circumstances which prevent the criminal quality from attaching: Connor v. Pro., 18 Colo. 373. The same is true in the case of extortion: Peo. v. Gardner, 73 Hun, 66. Libel, According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan, when, in an action for libel for publishing a newspaper article, stating that plaintiff was arrested for Person Meant larceny, and giving the number of his residence, evidence is given that another person of the same name as plaintiff was arrested, it does not show, as matter of law, that defendant intended in good faith to refer to such other person : Davis v. Marxhausen, 61 N. W. Rep. 504. See 2 AM. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 21. License Tax, In the opinion of the Supreme Court of South Carolina, a person who solicits orders, by sample, for sewing machines and their parts and attachments, for a foreign Hawkers and Sewing machine company, which has a store and Peddlers stock of goods in the state, from which such orders are filled, is not a "hawker or peddler," though he occasionally sells a sample machine out of his wagon: State v. Morehead, 20 S. E. Rep. 544. Malicious Advice of The Supreme Court of Iowa holds, with good reason, that the fact that the defendant in an action for malicious prosecution consulted an attorney before prosecuting the Prosecution plaintiff for opening his mail, is not admissible as Attorney proof of probable cause, when it also appears that the attorney gave defendant no advice, but referred him to the United States officers: Holden v. Merritt, 61 N. W. Rep. 390. There is an annotation on this subject in 1 Am. L. Reg. & REV. (N. S.) 591. The Supreme Court of Mississippi has recently decided, that when a note made in another state by a married woman is sued on in Mississippi, the liability of her sepaMarried Women, Separate Estate, rate estate therefor will be determined by the Liability laws of the latter state; and will be held to charge her separate estate there, though it could not do so under the laws of the place of contract: Read v. Brewer, 16 So. Rep. 350. Master and Servant, Contractor The Court of Appeals of Maryland, in City & Suburban Ry. Co. v. Moores, 30 Atl. Rep. 643, has reasserted some of the familiar principles of the law concerning the liability of an employer for the act of an indeIndependent pendent contractor; holding, that though a person who owes a duty to the public in the execution of any work, cannot relieve himself from liability for a breach of that duty by committing the work to an independent contractor, yet neither (1) A railway company, which permits an engine to be run on its tracks by a contractor in performing his contract with third parties, nor (2) A turnpike company, which lawfully permits an independent contractor to operate an engine over railway tracks laid on the pike, in performing his contract with the company, is liable for an injury caused by the negligent operation of the engine. As a general rule, the employer will not be liable for the negligence of an independent contractor, if he has selected one who is competent, and the work to be done is safe, when ordinary care is used: Engle v. Eureka Club, (N. Y.), 32 N. E. Rep. 1052. (1) But the contractor must be independent, that is, left to use his own discretion as to the manner of executing the work, and the choice of laborers and agencies; a mere power of control, however, if not actually exercised, will not make the master liable for the acts of the contractor: Norwalk Gas Light Co. v. Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495; S. C., 28 Atl. Rep. 32. The direction of what shall be done, also, if not connected with control over the manner and means of doing it, does not alter the relation: Morgan v. Smith, 159 Mass. 570; S. C., 35 N. E. Rep. 101. (2) It is not enough that the master should not knowingly employ one who is incompetent; he must exercise duc care to select one who is competent and skilful: Norwalk Gas Light Co. v. Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495; S. C., 28 Atl. Rep. 32. If he employs a person known to be negligent, or to be in the habit of carrying on his work in a dangerous manner, he is liable: Brannock v. Elmore, 114 Mo. 55; S. C., 21 S. W. Rep. 451. (3) If the work to be done is in its nature dangerous, or injurious to others, the master cannot relieve himself from liability by delegating the performance of it to an independent contractor: Colegrove v. Smith, (Cal.), 36 Pac. Rep. 411; Williams v. Fresno Canal & Irr. Co., 96 Cal. 14; S. C., 30 Pac. Rep. 961; Brennan v. Schreiner, 20 N. Y. Suppl. 130; Ketcham v. Cohn, 22 N. Y. Suppl. 181; S. C., 2 Misc. Rep. 427 ; Pye v. Faxon, 156 Mass. 471. Nor can he so delegate the performance of any duty he owes to the public, or to private individuals, as to escape liability: Carrico v. West Va. Cent. & P. Ry. Co., (W. Va.), 19 S. E. Rep. 571; Spence v. Schultz, (Cal.), 37 Pac. 220; Hanover v. Whalen, 49 Ohio St. 69. (4) If the work done by an independent contractor is accepted and used when in an imperfect condition, the owner is liable for any injury caused by its defects: Donovan v. Oakland & Berkeley Rapid Transit Co., (Cal.), 36 Pac. Rep. 516. There is a long annotation on this subject, in 31 Aм. L. REG. 352. Municipal Corporations, Penal Ordinances The Supreme Court of Florida, in Theisen v. McDavid, 16 So. Rep. 321, has very clearly stated the principle which control the right of a municipal corporation to enact penal ordinances, as follows: (1) That, unless forbidden by the constitution, the legislature can clothe municipal governments with power to prohibit and punish by ordinance any act made penal by the state laws, when done within the municipal limits. (2) Such an ordinance is not invalid, merely because it prescribes the same penalties as the state law for the commission or omission of the same act. (3) It is no valid objection to such an ordinance, that the offender may be tried and punished for the same act under both the ordinance and the state law. (4) A conviction or acquittal by the municipal courts, under such an ordinance, is no bar to a prosecution under the state law. (5) Such an ordinance is not invalid, merely because the trial thereunder is without a jury. (6) Nor is it invalid, because it excepts from its operation certain business pursuits that are not excepted from the operation of the state law on the same subject. To the same effect is Hunt v. City of Jacksonville, (Fla.), 16 So. Rep. 398. See I AM. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 669, 869. Negligence. Child The question of the imputation of contributory negligence is one of frequent discussion; and presents itself in an unceasing variety of circumstances and relations. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in a very long and Parent and carefully considered opinion, has lately held, in Atlanta &C. Air-Line Ry. Co. v. Gravitt, 20 S. E. Rep. 550, that (1) When a father entrusts his minor son of tender years to the care and custody of another, that person becomes the legal representative and agent of the father in discharging the duty which the law imposes upon the latter of guarding and shielding the child from injury; and accordingly, if the child, by reason of the gross negligence of his custodian, is run over by a passenger train and killed, such negligent conduct is, in law, imputable to the father himself; (2) Such a custodian cannot, however, be properly regarded as also the representative or agent of the mother of the child, since, in that state, the father is, by express statute, invested with the control of his minor children, and the mother is not accountable for the conduct of the custodian chosen for them by the father; and (3) In a suit by the mother in her own right as authorized by special statute, she is not chargeable with the negligence of the father, merely because of the conjugal relation existing between them. See 1 AN. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 314, 870; and an annotation in 32 Ax. L. REG. 763. According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court Negotiable Instrument, Coupons, ' of Florida, which follows the general rule on the subject, coupons payable to bearer, attached to a railroad bond, and representing the semi-annual instalments Interest of interest accruing thereupon, are, in legal effect, promissory notes, and possess all the attributes of negotiable paper; they may be detached and negotiated separately by simple delivery, and may be sued on separately from the bond, after the bond itself has been paid and satisfied, as well as before; and when once detached and negotiated, they cease to be mere incidents of the bond, become independent claims, and carry interest after their maturity: Trustees of Internal Imp. Fund v. Lewis, 16 So. Rep. 325. Instrument The Supreme Court of Iowa has ruled, that when a person induces another to sign a paper containing no writing, and which is to be used merely as a means of identifying the signer, who does not intend to execute a note or contract of any kind, and then fills out the blanks so as to make the paper a note, the note will be void, even in the hands of an innocent holder; and such evidence is sufficient to warrant a finding that the note was forged: First Nat. Bk. of Grand Haven v. Zeims, 61 N. W. Rep. 483. Partnership According to the Court of Appeals of Maryland, an agree ment between two parties to farm on shares, one of whom is to expend a certain sum in the farming operations, does not constitute a partnership, though one of the parties spoke of it as such: Rose v. Busher, 30 Atl. Rep. 637. Perjury, Testimony of Defendant The Supreme Court of North Carolina is of opinion, that a defendant in a criminal prosecution, who testifies in his own behalf and of his own accord, is guilty of perjury if he testifies falsely. He is to be treated the same as any other witness: State v. Hawkins, 20 S. E. Rep. 623. To the same effect are Murphy v. State, (Tex.), 26 S. W. Rep. 395; Hutcherson v. State, (Tex.), 24 S. W. Rep. 908. |