In taking leave of the able gentleman who has presided for four years over this department of government, we can only express the hope that his successor will prove as efficient and energetic, and carry out the good works that have been begun.

We take the following interesting tables, &c., from Mr. Burke, who says: "This office is under great obligation to the intelligent gentlemen who have so promptly and fully responded to its inquiries. And particularly is it indebted to J. D. B. De Bow, Esq., of New Orleans, Charles Cist, Esq., of Cincinnati, B. P. Johnson, Esq., of Albany, M. B. Batchem, Esq., of Columbus, Ohio, J. Delafield, of Seneca county. N. Y., T. Marshall Painter, Esq., of Lucerne, Pa., and N.J. Wythe, Esq., of Cambridge, Mass., for interesting and valuable communications."

In the pursuit of its statistical investigations, this office has keenly felt the want of means for obtaining accurate and reliable information concerning the great industrial interests of the country. No provision has been made by the general government for obtaining such information, except in relation to the foreign commerce of the country; and but very few of the States have adopted measures for obtaining authentic information in relation to their industrial interests. Massachusetts and Louisiana are in advance of most other States in their legislation upon these subjects. In the former State, very full returns are obtained, in small periods of a few years, if not annually, of its industry and resources; and in the latter, a bureau of statistics has been established, at the head of which has been placed one of her most intelligent and talented citizens.

A most interesting view of the vast resources of this great republic, would be annually exhibited, if all the States should follow the example of Louisiana and Massachusetts. The statesman and legislator, to whom the people commit the destinies of their common country, would then have at their hands ample material to aid them in the intelligent discharge of their momentous and responsible duties, without which they are like blind men feeling their way in the dark.

Cultivation of Sugar Cane, etc.

As a commencement of this system of investigation, I employed an intelligent and able gentleman, Charles L. Fliechmann, Esq., to visit Louisiana during the last season, to make inquiry into the condition and progress of the sugar culture in that State. He has accomplished, in part, the object for which he was sent, and has presented to me a most valuable report, which will be found in the appendix to the agricultural report, marked No. 2.

As the time which was allotted to him for the execution of the investigation committed to his charge, was not sufficient to enable him to complete his inquiries, it will be necessary for him to resume his labors during the approaching season. His report, although necessarily incomplete, it is believed contains much valuable information which will be interesting to the public at large, and particularly useful to the intelligent and enterprising citizens who are engaged in the sugar culture in this country. The circulars sent out from this office, soliciting information upon the subject of agriculture, were very full and minute in the inquiries which they embodied, and the replies to them. Many of them, equally minute, contain a large amount of valuable and interesting information, which will be found embodied in the agricultural report and appendix.

4. SEA AND RIVER SHORE OF UNITED STATES.

Col. Abert, of the Topographical Engineers, thus answers to the questions of government:

Question 1. "The extent of shore line of each of the rivers of the United States, as far as navigable for steamboats of the lightest draft now used, designating the extent of shore line of each principal river and its tributaries."

Answer. Shore line of rivers, to head of tide water, from Maine to Texas. The head of tide water is assumed as the limit of steamboat navigation, as impeding falls or rapids are usually encountered at that point, above which many of our rivers are adapted to steam navigation, but to what extent is not sufficiently known

Shore line of rivers of Texas....

Mississippi (lower) islands and bayous.

Mississippi (upper) and tributaries..

Big Black, Yazoo, and bayous

Red river and tributaries..

Arkansas river and tributaries..

Missouri river and its tributaries.

Ohio river and tributaries.

Total miles, including both banks of rivers..

10,501 miles.

1,210 16 8,372 66

Question 2. "The extent of frontier of the United States, bordering on the British possessions."

Answer. From the mouth of the St. Croix to the Pacific ocean, by treaty lines, 3,303 miles.

Question 3. "The extent of frontier of the United States, bordering on Mexico." Answer. From the mouth of the Rio Grande to the Pacific ocean, by treaty lines, 1,456 miles.

Question 4. Extent of shore line of the northern lakes, including bays, sounds, and islands."

Answer. American coast, or shore line...

British coast, or shore line...

Total miles....

.3,620 miles. .2,620 66 6,240

PROGRESS OF THE SOUTHERN STATES.

1. SLAVE AND FREE NEGRO LAWS OF THE SOUTHERN STATES. SOUTH CAROLINA.-We have had various inquiries for such a publication, from a great many quarters, and are determined to commence it. It will be seen by the letter in our present number, from an intelligent gentleman of Cuba, how anxious the people of that island are now to obtain information upon the subject, so as to regulate their own systems,

We shall ourselves prepare an abstract of the Louisiana slave laws, unless some other legal gentleman will relieve us of the task. We also invite contributions upon the slave laws of the other southern states from the Profession, and feel assured, they will in this way greatly serve our southern country.

We publish now a few pages, from an able pamphlet on the negro laws of South Carolina,

sent us by our distinguished friend, Hon. J. Bellon O'Neall, the author. It was prepared by request of" Carolina Agricultural Society." Our intentions are to publish the pamphlet in parts, in successive numbers of the Review, if the proprietor, Mr. John G. Bowman, of Columbia, who has the copyright, will permit. It will not certainly injure his sale, and will extend the usefulness of Judge O'Neall's labors.

The Status of the Negro, his Rights and Disabilities.

Section 1. The act of 1740, sec. 1, declares all negroes and Indians (free Indians in amity with this Government, negroes, mulattoes and mestizoes, who now are free, excepted) to be slaves: the offspring to follow the condition of the mother and that such slaves are chattels personal.

Sec. 2. Under this provision it has been uniformly held, that color is prima facie evidence, that the party bearing the color of a negro, mulatto or mestizo, is a slave but the same prima facie result does not follow from the Indian

color.

Sec. 3. Indians, and descendants of Indians, are regarded as free Indians in amity with this Government, until the contrary be shown. In the second proviso of sec. 1, of the act of 1740, it is declared that "every negro, Indian, mulatto and mestizo is a slave, unless the contrary can be made to appear"-yet, in the same it is immediately thereafter provided-" the Indians in amity with this government excepted, in which case the burden of proof shall lie on the defendant," that is, on the person claiming the Indian plaintiff to be a slave. This latter clause of the proviso is now regarded as furnishing the rule. The race of slave Indians, or of Indians not in amity to this Government (the State), is extinct, and hence the previous part of the proviso has no application.

Sec. 4. The term negro is confined to slave Africans (the ancient Berbers) and their descendants. It does not embrace the free inhabitants of Africa, such as the Egyptians, Moors, or the negro Asiatics, such as the Lascars. Sec. 5. Mulatto is the issue of the white and the negro.

Sec. 6. When the mulatto ceases, and a party bearing some slight taint of the African blood ranks as white, is a question for the solution of a jury.

Sec. 7. Whenever the African taint is so far removed, that upon inspection, a party may be fairly pronounced to be white, and such has been his or her previous reception into society, and enjoyment of the privileges usually enjoyed by white people, the jury may rate and regard the party as white.

Sec. 8. No specific rule, as to the quantity of negro blood which will compel a jury to find one to be a mulatto, has ever been adopted. Between one-quarter and one-eighth seems fairly to be debatable ground. When the blood is reduced to, or below one-eighth, the jury ought always to find the party white. When the blood is one-quarter or more African, the jury must find the party a mulatto. Sec. 9. The question of color, and of course of caste, arises in various ways; and may, in some cases, be decided without the intervention of a jury. As when a party is convicted and brought up for sentence, or a witness on the stand objected to as a free negro, mulatto, or mestizo, in these cases, if the color be so obvious that there can be no mistake about it, the judge may refuse to sentence, or may exclude the witness; still, if the party, against whose color the decision may be made, should claim to have the question tried by a jury, it must, I apprehend, be so tried.

Sec. 10. There are three classes of cases, in which the question of color, and of course, of caste, most commonly occurs. 1st. Prohibition against inferior courts, or the tax collector. 2d. Objections to witnesses offered to testify in the superior courts. 3d. Actions of slander for words charging the plaintiff with being a mulatto.

Sec. 11. In the first class, free negroes, mulattoes and mestizoes, are liable to be tried for all offenses, by a magistrate and five free holders (except in Charleston, where two magistrates must sit), and of course, any person claiming to be white (over whom, if that be true, they have no jurisdiction), charged before them criminally, may object to their jurisdiction, and if they persist in trying him or her, may apply for, and on making good the allegation, is entitled to have the writ of prohibition. It seems if the party submits to have the question of jurisdiction tried by the Inferior Court, he will be concluded.

Sec. 12. The writ of prohibition is generally granted, nisi, on a suggestion sworn to by the relator, by any judge at Chambere, on notice being given to the court claiming jurisdiction; but if the fact be uncontroverted, or so plain as not

to admit of doubt, that the relator is white, the judge may at once grant an absolute prohibition. Generally, however, an issue is ordered to be made up on granting the prohibition, nisi, in which the relator is plaintiff, and on the jury finding the relator to be a free white person, the prohibition is made absolute.

Sec. 13. In this class, too, the tax collectors frequently issue tax executions for capitation taxes, against persons whom they suppose to be free negroes, mulattoes, or mestizoes ("free persons of color," as they are sometimes loosely called). If the person or persons against whom they be issued, be not liable to the tax, they may, on a suggestion, move for and have the writ of prohibition. Sec. 14. In such cases, where, from the affidavits accompanying the suggestion, it appears that the relator or relators has or have been received in society as white, and has or have enjoyed the privileges of a white person, or of white people, 1 have uniformly made the order for prohibition to become absolute, if the tax collector did not within a given time, le his suggestions contesting the status of the relator or relators. This course has been adopted, because the tax collector has no jurisdiction over the person of the relator, and has no judicial authority whatever, to decide the question of caste. His execution is predicated of an assumed fact. He is, therefore, bound to make that good, before he can collect the tax. This course has been found extremely convenient, as it has cut off an immense amount of litigation. For, generally, the tax collectors exercise a sound and honest discretion, in pursuing only those cases where there seems to be no room to doubt the degraded caste of the relator or relators.

Sec. 15. Where, however, there is to be a question as to the color of the relator or relators, the court may, in its discretion, cast the burden of proof on the tax collector, or the relator. Generally, I think, it should be cast on the tax collector, as his execution is the first allegation of the color of the relator. As the issue may result, the writ of prohibition is made absolute or dissolved.

Sec. 16. In all the cases of the first class, the decision is conclusive; in all subsequent cases, civil or criminal. For the prohibition is in the nature of a criminal proceeding, operating in rem, and binds not only the parties, but also all the people of the commonwealth. So it seems, that any decision made in favor of the caste of the relator, as white, may be given in evidence in his favor. Sec. 17. In the second class, the objection to the competency of the witness, makes the issue collateral, and it is tried instanter, without any formal issue being made up, and the finding is upon the record on trial. The verdict, in such a case, concludes nothing beyond the question of competency in that case. It, however, might be given in evidence for or against the witness, not as conclusive, but as a circumstance having weight in settling the question of status, in all other cases.

Sec. 18. In the third class, where jurisdiction is pleaded and found, it would seem to forever conclude the plaintiff from re-agitating the question. But, where the defense is as usual, that the defendant had good reason to suspect and believe that the plaintiff was, as he alleged, a mulatto, in such case, a finding of nominal damages sustains the defense, yet it concludes not the plaintiff from afterward averring and proving that he was white.

Sec. 19. Free Indians and their descendants, unmixed by African blood, are entitled to all the privileges of white men, except that of suffrage and office. The former, and of consequence the latter, has been denied to a pure Indian, living among the whites. The foregoing principle resulting from the case cited in the margin, is, I am persuaded, wrong. The term white ("free white man"), used in our constitution, is comparative merely: it was intended to be used in opposition to the colors resulting from the slave blood. The case should be reviewed, and I trust the decision will be reversed; for the case in which it was made, will always condemn it. The relator, the Rev. John Mush, was an Indian, of the Pawmunki tribe of Indians, in Virginia; he was a soldier of the revolution, he had as such, taken the oath of allegiance. He was sent out as a missionary to the Catawbas. He. however, did not reside among them; he lived among the white inhabitants of York District, where he had resided for many years. He was a man of unexceptionable character. Yet, strange to say, he was held not to be entitled to vote. If that decision be right, how long is the objection to prevail? When is the descendant of an Indian to be regarded as white? Is it, that he is not to be so regarded, until a jury shall find him to be white, on account of the great preponderance of the white blood? But the Indian blood, like that