While passing the British frigate Talbot, the crew, [ance of their duties more by encouraging self-resneatly dressed, manned the side of that ship and pect and professional pride, than by the exercise of saluted the body, their marines at the same time authority, and carrying on the public duty by that presenting arms. The same respectful attentions most efficient agent, "a happy ship." Of ardent were paid upon approaching La Reine Blanche, and enduring attachments, so far as was in his while her band floated upon the air, as if breathed power, he associated with himself upon duty those by some attendant spirit, appropriately soft and who had won his regard, and making the interests mournful music. Arrived at the Mole, the pro- of a friend his own, he lost no opportunity of sercession was there joined by the civil and diplo-ving them. It was his happiness to enliven the matic functionaries, the Peruvian military, foreign residents and crowds of citizens, who accompanied the honored dead to his final resting-place, where three vollies of musketry closed those external honors which were the least tribute paid his memory.

Commodore Dallas was the son of the Hon. Alexander J. Dallas, secretary of the treasury under the administration of Mr. Madison. Of a family which has occupied distinguished positions in the Cabinet, the Senate, in diplomacy and on the bench, Commodore Dallas was no less distinguished as an ornament of the honorable profession to which his life and talents have been devoted. He was particularly fortunate in that rare combination of character best fitted for high military command, maintaining a steady and systematic discipline in conjunction with a frank and easy association with his subordinate officers, leading them to the perform

toils of service by gathering his officers around
him in friendly and confiding association, when his
own graceful vivacity of conversation gave life
and cheerfulness to the circle. Separated in this,
his last public duty, from those more intimate do-
mestic relations for which none others can form an
adequate substitute, he yet had about him officers
of his own selection, those who had been associa-
ted with him in previous years, and had lived in the
enjoyment of his friendship and confidence; those
who could give to his closing hours the care and
attention springing from attachment and esteem,
softened by a sense of the afflicting loss which was
about to leave his worth a treasured memory, and
the last duty

To mourn the vanished beam, and add our mite
Of praise in payment of a long delight.

Peru, S. A., July 6, 1844.

W. M. W.

YOUNG ENGLAND; CONINGSBY.

Mr. D'Israeli has embodied in this book not only the principles, so far as she has any, of "Young England," but he has taken care to introduce upon the stage her most prominent men. but

The following was intended by its author to appear with

his review of Coningsby in the December Messenger;
it arrived too late. As that review deserved and received
such marked attention, we are not willing to withhold any
portion of it from our readers.

There is a middle ground between that taken by "Young
England" and the reviewer. Grant to Experience all that

the latter claims, still the former may well exult in the numerous examples of the young Great, who almost from the outset of their career have eclipsed the splendor of older heroes. If Genius can not dispense with the light of Experience, how often has it caught it as it were in a moment, and then blending with it its own radiance cast an unwonted effulgence on the page of history!-[Ed. Mess.

In the charac

ter of Coningsby, he has drawn, (it is said to the life,) that of the Hon. George Sidney Smythe, M. P., the son of Lord Strangford. In that of his grandfather, the life, adventures, and debauchery of the late Marquis of Hertford, are detailed with a minuteness that would leave an Englishman no room for mistake. The only point in which the novel does not deserve the name of a history, so far as this character is concerned, is that Hertford was not the grandfather of Mr. Smythe. The Duke of Rutland, of the illustrious house of Manners, is depicted in the character of Beaumanoir; It would be going too far to say, that "Young and his two sons, the Marquis of Granby and England" has founded herself upon any distinct | Lord John Manners, in those of Henry Sydny and basis of ascertained principle. As yet her ideas his elder brother. The Manchester manufacturer are shadowy and indistinct; partaking largely of is Mr. Cobden, well known to England, to America the dim and unintelligible nature of the book which and to the world, by his opinions and exertions we have had under consideration. Certain points upon the subject of the Corn Laws. Mr. Crofton of her creed, however, are intelligible enough. Croker is disguised under the name of Rigby, and She is aristocratic to such a degree, that she be- Lucian Gay is no other than Theodore Hook. lieves the period in France immediately preceding the great Revolution, to have presented the most perfect spectacle of human happiness the world has ever beheld. She believes in the hereditary transmission, not only of titles and estates, but of offices and dignities also. The Marquis of Douro, upon the death of his father, should be according to their creed, not only Duke of Wellington, but field-marshal of England, out ranking, not by virtue of his own deeds, but his father's, older warriors who have won their laurels in the field of battle. She has a supreme contempt for the profes-ble source. sors of the useful arts-regarding them as Rob Roy did, as "base mechanical bodies," born to contribute, by their industry, to the comfort and pleasure of those above them, but having no claim to rank among them. In one respect alone, does she seem to contradict this opinion of the general tendency of her principles. She is decidedly in opposition to the church of England as by law established. Not that she would break down the Hierarchy, but that she would change the form of worship, to one more congenial with her cherished love of aristocracy. In other words, "Young England" is Puseyite or Roman Catholic to the

core.

The Venetian aristocracy, as may be seen by this book of Mr. D'Israeli, is an object of special regard, and is held up as a looking-glass to the nobility of England. Yet what possible resemblance can be traced between the features of that aristocracy and those of the class to which they are likened, it is impossible to perceive. The conception of such an idea is properly ascribed to the walls of a literary institution, and to that period of life, when thought has taken no definite shape.

That there are men of talents among the disciples of this school, it would be useless to deny. But as yet this talent seems to have been utterly wasted, and has resulted in nothing more than the development of a few principles, such as in past ages, would have led their professor to yield up his life on the battle-field, in defence of the Stuarts and the "Divine Right," or to suffer at the stake for the Pope and the Holy Mother Church of Rome, ideas very respectable in Romance, but rather out of date in Politics, not drawn from that respecta

SONNET FROM PETRARCH.

BY M. G. WELLS.

"Da piu begli occhi, e dal piu chiaro viso."

XI.

From brightest eyes, and from the sweetest face
Earth ever saw, and from the shining hair
Whose lustre made the golden sun less fair;
From silvery voice, and softly beaming smile,
From hands and arms that conquered by their grace
E'en those who yielded least to love's sweet guile;
From feet like fairy's, nimble, small and light,
And from a form of heaven's own perfect mould,
My weary spirit took its life of old.

To cheer an angel host these charms are gone,
Whilst I weep here in wretchedness and night:
One hope amid my grief remains alone,
That she who sees my every wandering thought,
Hath by her prayers a pardon for me bought!

HARBOR DEFENCE

BY FORTIFICATIONS AND STEAM-VESSELS.

steam to sea-going vessels, and for this simple reason, that now our steam-batteries, or steam-ships, will have steam-batteries and steam-ships to contend with, while before these improvements were made, sail-vessels were the only antagonist which

Considered particularly in reference to the defence of New could be brought against them.

Orleans.

ago

There is nothing new in the idea of steam-ships

BY CAPT. J. G. BARNARD, U. S. CORPS OF ENGINEERS. and floating batteries for harbor defence: 30 years the Fulton was constructed for this very obThe introduction of steam-vessels into our Na-ject, and the arguments then used as to the probaval service and the modern improvements which bility of her efficiency as a means of harbor dehave placed them on an equality with sailing ves- fence were far better founded than similar argusels as regards sea-going qualities, have given rise ments now are in favor of the employment of the to much controversy as to the efficacy of our pre- Mississippi or Princeton for the same purpose, for sent system for the defence of our large cities, then the Fulton could anticipate no antagonist not Naval depots and harbors; and unfortunately for propelled by wind. At the present day, a vessel the cause of truth and for the dissemination of cor- precisely similar to the Mississippi or Princeton rect ideas among our people, many notions have could be opposed to either of these vessels-and been propagated founded in entire ignorance of whatever number of steam-ships, or steam-battethe nature both of fortifications and steam-vessels.ries we saw fit to employ for the defence of a harIt has been confidently asserted, and the asser-bor-the same or a greater number of ships of pretion is even now heard in our Halls of Congress, cisely the same character could be brought by an that our fortifications are but expensive monuments of national folly-that steam has produced, or is to produce, in some way not explained, an entire revolution in the art of war! that steam-vessels, armed with Paixhan guns, are to enter with impunity into all our harbors-to level our forts with the dust, or to pass them unscathed and appearing before our large cities to destroy them, or lay them under contribution. To guard against all these evils, the sovereign panacea is steam batteries, steam-ships. to be applied in some way not satisfactorily explained—and our fortifications, upon which we have been spending much time and treasure and which are not yet completed, are, under the ban of "obsolete," to be abandoned to decay.

enemy against them. The disparity which must exist between an armed vessel propelled by steam and another propelled by wind in a combat is admitted by every one: there was then good ground for believing that a single steam-vessel might contend with and even destroy, two, three, or even more sailing-vessels !—but when it comes to a contest between steam-ship and steam-ship, the result must depend upon the number of guns and weight of metal.

In advocating then a reliance upon steam-ships, or steam-batteries, alone, or principally, for the defence of our harbors, we fall back upon a ground which has repeatedly been shown to be untenable, viz that Naval means are the proper ones for

This question has been so ably and so thoroughly discussed by the Board of Military and Naval Officers appointed by the Secretary of War in 1840, in conformity to a Resolution of the House of Representatives, requesting him to lay before the House a report of a full and connected system of national defence, &c.," that it would be a work of

Before, however, we abandon as obsolete a sys-harbor defence. tem which is the offspring of the combined efforts of some of the first military men our country has produced-to which French military genius has lent its aid and which has received the approbation of almost every President and Secretary of War, and of every Congress since its commencement, let us make sure that it is obsolete and inefficient, and before we adopt a new system, whether supererogation for one to go over the same ground. of steam-vessels or otherwise, let us know what that system is to be; and it would even be prudent, before abandoning to it the defence of our rich cities, that it should bear the test to which fortifications have so often been put with satisfactory re-gun-boats, &c., designed exclusively for harbor sults-that of experience.

Such experience has not been had, nor can it be had until our nation is involved in a war.

I will, however, advert in general terms to the main arguments against the reliance upon Naval means, (by this I mean to include both the Navy proper and all vessels, such as steam-batteries,

defence,) for the defence of our cities and harbors.

And first, it is a clear point, that if Naval means alone are relied upon for harbor defence, we must I admit the probability that steam will effect be able to muster at the harbor attacked a force great changes in maritime warfare, but at the same superior to that which the enemy can bring against time, I assert, after much consideration, that steam- it; an inferior force will certainly ensure defeatvessels are at this day relatively less efficient as a an equal force may be sufficient, but to trust to it is means of harbor defence than they were before to risk not only the object to be defended but our modern improvements had applied the agency of fleet itself, to the result of a battle on terms of

VOL. XI-4

equality hence, nothing but absolute superiority | former might be considered a match for 2 or 3 of will answer the purpose. the latter, but at present there is nothing which will not apply as well to a defence by steam-vessels as to any other.

2nd. To ensure this superiority, as we cannot predict before-hand which one of our ports the enemy will select for his attack, it is necessary to provide at each and every one a force superior to the means he can bring against it; or, in other words, our means of Naval defence must be as many times as great as the enemy's anticipated force, as we have ports or harbors to defend.

But it is proposed by those who are in favor of steam-ships, or steam-batteries, for harbor defence, to build vessels of a peculiar construction, to carry an immense armament--to have sides shot-proof and to be covered by bomb-proof roofs, to contain furnaces for heating shot and to have, either by steamIt has been clearly proved, that no fleet, however engines within themselves, or by tow boats, the numerous, can, by cruising at sea, protect an exten- means of moving with a speed equal to that of our sive coast from attack. fastest steam-boats. It is doubtful whether such a There are numerous conclusive instances in sup-combination of opposite qualities is practicable; at port of this assertion, to which I will not now ad- any rate none has yet been made. In the first This assertion may seem inconsistent with place, to make a shot-proof side, it is necessary, the common idea, that the Navy is the "right arm not only that the ball should not pass through, but of our defence," but the apparent inconsistency that it should not penetrate at all-for if a hollow arises from ignorance of the real objects and uses shot enters and explodes in the side, the conseof a Navy. quences would be much worse than if it should pass entirely through.

vert.

To protect our own commerce, to destroy that of the enemy, to hover on an enemy's coast ready It is therefore absolutely necessary that it should to strike at any unguarded object it may present, be able to resist all penetration of hollow shot at thus carrying the terror of our arms to his firesides, least. This is a matter of no little difficulty, for the and by thus drawing from our own coasts a large shell from the Paixhan gun is of great weight and portion of his fleets to protect his own commerce strength, and will penetrate all kinds of wood work. and ports-indirectly aiding in the defence of Four inches thickness of sheet iron has been menour own; this is the real object of the Navy-an tioned as proof against penetration. This has not object which could not be fulfilled were it confined been confirmed by experiment, but admitting this in our harbors, or merely allowed to cruise in front of our coasts.

3rd. The expense of a defence of our harbors by Naval means would be enormous-hundreds of times greater than the cost of our fortifications and beyond the means of the nation to support.

as sufficient, we can estimate its weight. The specific gravity of iron is about ten times that of wood and 4 inches of iron are equal to 40 inches, (or 3 feet 4 inches,) of wood. For large batteries it is probable that the side of the vessel will be at least 10 feet high. Hence the weight of the iron I have just shown that our means of Naval de- necessary will be equal to the weight of a solid bulfence must be as many times greater than the ene- wark of wood 3 feet 4 inches thick and 10 feet my's means of attack, as we have ports and har- high. But in addition to this weight of iron we bors to defend. But the question at once arises, must have the ordinary wooden side to which to "what are, or may be his means of attack?" With-attach the iron, or if iron alone is used, we must out knowing this we are utterly unable to say what have a very solid frame work of iron to prevent the must be our means of defence. Suppose, for example, we provide 20 vessels for the defence of New Orleans, (no matter whether steam-ships, steambatteries, or sailing-vessels,) may not the enemy bring 30? If we provide 30 may he not bring 40, 50, or, (if Great Britain is our enemy,) 100? And contact-equal probably in all to a thickness of 5 we have to provide this number of vessels not only at New Orleans but at every other port and harbor in the United States. And all to defend ourselves against this single fleet of the enemy's.

Although, then, it may be considered as theoretically possible to defend our harbors in this way, when we come to consider the enormous means necessary we find it absolutely impracticable.

shot from bending the side out of all shape. But besides these immensely heavy sides it is proposed to have a roof-proof against bombs. Here again we must have our 4 inches at least of iron supported upon a very solid frame of timbers in close

feet of timber. With such a weight of sides and roof is there any probability of constructing a vessel of light draught and of speed. Our steam-ships, owing to the weight of their engines and fuel, are capable of carrying but a small armament, compared with sailing-vessels, but it is expected by those who propose these shot and shell-proof vessels to carry a large armament, in addition to the weight of their bulwarks, roof and engines.

Before the adaptation of steam to sea-going vessels the foregoing arguments might not have But having succeeded in constructing a vessel seemed entirely applicable to a defence by means proof against hollow shot, will it be proof against of steam-vessels-for as nothing but sail-vessels Capt. Stocton's 200 lb. shot? or if made proof could be brought against them, a single one of the' against this, will it be proof against a 500 lb. shot?

for we do not yet know what limit will be attained in the weight of projectiles by the use of wrought iron for the construction of guns.

If we allow 1 per cent on first cost for keeping the system in repair, which will probably suffice, $750,000 will be the annual charge to the nation for this purpose, and our ports being secured in this way, instead of a fleet of 3 or 400 steam-ships shut up in our harbors-30 of them untrammelled by the necessity of remaining constantly at home in expectation of an enemy, may scour the seas-convoying our own merchant vessels-capturing those of the enemy, attacking his fleets and threatening his ports. The relative cost of fortifications, as compared with ships of war, is generally overrated.

In view of the difficulties just mentioned, I think it will be admitted to be impracticable to construct a vessel for defence of our ports materially different from what the enemy may bring to the attack and if so, we find ourselves reduced to the necessity from which we have endeavored to escape, of providing a Naval force at each of our ports superior to what the enemy can bring against us. It would perhaps be well now to glance at what the expense would be of a defence of our principal The Missouri cost nearly as much as Fort Jackports by Naval means, supposing that we know son-the Princeton about the same as Forts Pike, beforehand, (which, however, we cannot do,) ex- Wood and Livingston. actly what force an enemy will bring against them. But it is contended that our fortifications are Let us suppose that an enemy is preparing to inefficient means of defence; that they are unable attack us with a fleet of 20 steam-ships, and let us to prevent the passage of steam-ships, and there is suppose that we have but 11 points, viz: Ports- even a vague idea that they may be blown up or mouth, Boston, Newport, New York, the Dela- battered down by Paixhan guns. It is not my purware, the Chesapeake, Charleston, Savannah, Pen- pose here to demonstrate the immense disparity sacola, Mobile and New Orleans, which we wish to defend. We must provide a superior force at each of them, say 30 steam ships, or their equivalent, making 330 in all.

If we estimate the cost of each at $300,000, (the Missouri cost $

between forts and ships in an actual combat. It cannot be estimated by figures and the instances which prove this disparity are numerous and conclusive, and are stated at length in the Report to which I have before alluded. I will, however, and the Princeton assert, that no military man would hesitate for a moment to try the chances of a cannonade with a single heavy gun properly mounted, in a favorable position, behind a proof parapet and provided with a furnace for heating shot, with any single ship, steam or otherwise, which could be brought against him.

The introduction of Paixhan guns have not diminished, but, on the contrary, have increased this disparity; for they are nearly harmless against masonry, while they are the most formidable gun which can be used against shipping.

$275,000,) the whole would cost $99,000,000, or say $100,000,000. As it would take a long time to build such a force, we could not expect to prepare it in the emergency of a war, but must keep it up permanently, in order to be prepared for war. It is not extravagant to say that our Navy requires to be rebuilt every 15 years; in case then we have such a number of vessels, about $7,000,000 per annum must be spent in keeping them in repair alone. If it is thought that I overrate the number and cost of the vessels necessary, let it be recollected that I am only estimating for the defence of The case of St. Juan de Ulloa has been men11 principal points, while there are upwards of 40 tioned as one in which a fort was destroyed by a others which I abandon to the enemy; and if in- fleet and particularly by the use of the Paixhan stead of regular steam-ships we resort to floating gun. I cannot go at length into a refutation of batteries moved by steam, I doubt whether we this assertion. A full account of the matter is shall save any thing, since, even if we succeed in given in the Report alluded to, and I will only say, making batteries shot and shell proof, (which I have in the words of the Report, that "so far as regards shown to be nearly inconsistent with locomotion,) the levelling of obstacles lying in the way of a and thereby diminish the number of guns required sword-in-hand attack, the 8,250 shot and shells, (fired for our defence, the enormous expense of construct- by the French,) might as well have been fired in the ing such vessels will probably prevent any thing from being saved in the entire cost of our arma

ment.

opposite direction." But it is said that owing to the rapidity with which they can move against wind and stream, and to the suddenness with which they Let us now glance at the cost of the system of can make their appearance, a fleet of steam-vessels fortifications. The cost of the entire system for can, with little injury, run by our forts, and appearing the defence of the Atlantic and Gulf coast is esti- before our towns, destroy or lay them under conmated at about $50,000,000, guns and carriages in-tribution, and withdraw again before efficient means cluded. This system includes the defence not only can be taken to molest them. of the 11 points above mentioned but of more than 40 others, comprising not only every maritime town but every accessible harbor in which an enemy might find shelter for his fleet.

Whatever weight the argument may have in some cases, its application to all shows that our system of defence by fortifications is imperfectly understood. It is a principle of that system, where