Argument for Appellant.

been divided into Supervisor districts-two, three, four, five, and some as high as twelve Supervisor districts-and the members of the Board are elected by the electors of different districts, and yet they pass upon valuations of property in other districts. If the argument be a sound one, that the valuation must be fixed by an officer clected by the people of the district-and cannot be changed by any but an officer so elected-it must be admitted that the whole practice of the State for twenty years has been wrong, and that this Court has during all that time upheld that wrong in the various cases that have been brought here involving the question.

But, turning again to this clause of the Constitution, we see that not only is the Legislature authorized to create a State Board of Equalization, but that the very provisions of the Constitution which are invoked against the power requires the Legislature to establish a tribunal of that character. There are four propositions contained in that section. One of them, that the Assessors and Collectors must be elected by the people, I have already noticed. That is the last clause of the section. A preceding clause requires that all property in the State shall be taxed in proportion to its value; and another clause prescribes that the value is to be ascertained as directed by law.

Now it is a principle well settled in the construction of Constitutions, as of statutes, that the Court must give force and effect to every clause-every word in a given section. If it be true, that under this Constitution the Assessors are to fix the value of property, and that their action to that end is final, what effect can be given to the provision which declares that its value shall be ascer(428) tained as directed by law? "All property in this State shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law." If the action of the Assessor was to be final, what office would any law, directed toward ascertaining the value of the property, have to perform? We say

none.

Argument for Appellant.

But there is another clause yet-the first clause, which appears to be the leading idea in this whole matter-and that is, "that taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State." Now I assert here, that if you apply to the State Constitution the same rule which you apply in the construction of the Federal Constitution-that it is a grant of power-you will still be able to find in this provision the power to establish such a Board. "Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State," says the Constitution. It does not prescribe the rules by which that uniformity shall be reached, nor how the valuations shall be equalized. It leaves those matters to the Legislature; and we say, that here is a mandatory provision of the Constitution binding upon the conscience of the legislator, which requires him, in his capacity as a lawmaker, to establish some tribunal by which the end sought may be attained. "Taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State." How would it be possible to attain that equality and uniformity which this Constitution seems to contemplate, if the assessments made by the Assessors are to be final? It would not be possible. The experience of the past has shown that even with the aid of the County Boards of Equalization it could not be attained. So far from having equality and uniformity in taxation, we have had inequality without uniformity. We have had as many bases of taxation, as many different methods of valuation and equalization, as there have been Assessors and Boards of Equalization in the various counties. So that we have learned that a State Board, with power to supervise and harmonize the subordinate agents (129) is indispensable, in order to carry out the mandate of our fundamental law.

The power to assess does not include the power to equalize. Assuming, for the sake of the argument, what we deny in fact, that the Constitution requires a valuation to be made by an Assessor elected by the people, yet it will not follow that the powers and duties devolved upon the State Board of Equalization are obnoxious to the constitutional provis

Argument for Appellant.

It is true that'

ions. Section thirteen of Article XI of the Constitution, among other things, requires, in relation to the revenue, the exercise of at least three distinct powers: assessment, equalization, and collection. The mode and manner in which these several and distinct powers are to be exercised -with, at most, the exception that the particular officers who exercise in part the first and last named powers must be elected, etc.—are left to the discretion of the Legislature. The power to assess is one thing; the power to equalize is another; and the power to collect, still another. But all must be exercised if we are to carry out the provisions of the Constitution. The definition of the word "equalize," given by Webster, is "to make equal; as to equalize accounts; to equalize taxes or burdens." Now this power was never vested in the Assessor in any State. It is a separate and distinct power from the power to assess. a knowledge of some of the facts necessary to make an assessment may be necessary to make an equalization, but it does not follow that they are one and the same thing. It is only after the duty of the Assessor has been fully performed that the exercise of the power to equalize commeuces. It is a power intervening between the assessment and collection of taxes-a power the existence of which is recognized by almost every State in the Union. This very question has been passed upon in the State of Illinois, and the power has been affirmed. I refer to the case of The (130) People of the State of Illinois ex rel. O. II. Minor, Auditor, etc., v. Edward S. Salomon, County Clerk of Cook County, reported in 46 Illinois Reports, 333. The provision of the Illinois Constitution, corresponding to ours, is as follows (Art. IX, sec. 2):

"The General Assembly shall provide for levying a tax by valuation, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in proportion to the value of his or her property; such value to be ascertained by some person or persons to be elected or appointed in such a manner as the General Assembly shall direct, and not otherwise."

Argument for Appellant.

It will be seen that the Constitution of Illinois, like the Constitution of our own State, provides that property shall be valued, in the first instance, by persons elected or appointed for that purpose-both Constitutions in that respect being substantially the same. On the 8th of March, 1867, an Act to amend the revenue laws, and to establish a Board for the equalization of assessments, was passed by the Legislature of Illinois. The leading features of that Act do not vary from our own law. The reasons which led to the enactment of the statute in that State are similar to those which led to the enactment of our own statute. The validity of the Illinois statute was attacked, and the power of the Legislature to pass it was challenged on the precise grounds urged against our statute.

It will be seen by reference to the provision of our own Constitution that it does not require that property shall be taxed at its actual cash value, but the requirement is that it shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as directed by law.

It was in order to carry out this provision that the State Board of Equalization was created, and power, given it to equalize the values as between the counties so that uniformity might be obtained. A State Board does not fix the value upon property; the value is fixed in the first instance (431) by the Assessors of the respective counties or districts; but the State Board does reduce the rates to an equal standard, so that the same amount of property in Alpine County shall bear the same burden of taxation as a like amount of property in San Francisco. If authority be needed to sustain the proposition which we maintain is sustained by the very language of the Constitution, that authority will be found in the Illinois case cited, for it is there clearly held that the right to create a State Board of Equalization, with power to review the valuations of the Assessors, is vested in the Legislature; that not only does the power exist, but it is the duty of the Legislature, in order

Argument for Appellant.

to carry into operation the provisions of the Constitution. itself, to create such a Board.

The next point made in this case, and to which the Court seems to attach a great deal of importance, arises, if it arise at all, under section three thousand six hundred and ninetysix of the Political Code:

"At the same time the Board must determine and transmit to the Board of Supervisors of each county the rate of the State tax to be levied and collected, which, after allowing for delinquency in the collection of taxes, must be sufficient to raise the specific amount of revenue directed to be raised by the Legislature for State purposes."

I believe it is admitted upon all sides that it would be competent for the Legislature to say that there should be raised for any given fiscal year a specified sum, and to delegate, if I may so call it, the power to make the computation upon the return of the Assessors, so as to ascertain the rate per centum necessary to raise that amount. But it is contended that the provision in this section which allows the State Board of Equalization to take into consideration the fact that there might be a delinquency, in computing the rate of tax necessary to produce the sum specified by the Legislature, is unconstitutional, because it is a delegation of (432) legislative power. We are not here to deny the proposition, broadly asserted upon the other side, that the legislative power cannot be delegated. We admit that a power conferred upon an agent, because of his fitness and because of the confidence reposed in him, cannot be delegated to another. That Legislatures stand in this relation to the people whom they represent, cannot be doubted.

We maintain, in the first place, that in the section under consideration there is no delegation of legislative power to the State Board of Equalization. The legislative power is the authority under the Constitution to make laws, and to alter or repeal them. Is there any delegation of such an authority here? Was not this law perfect and complete when it emanated from the law-making power? Does this