Memory an original Faculty.. Of Imagination in its Relation to some of the Fine Arts... 120 The Relation of Imagination and of Taste to Genius..... 122 Of the Influence of Imagination on Human Character and On the Culture of the Imagination. Prejudices of the third Class, or Idola Fori. A GRAMMAR OF LOGIC AND INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY. BOOK I. CHAPTER I. TERMS DEFINED AND EXPLAINED. 1. THE professed end of LOGIC is to teach men to think, to judge, to reason, and to communicate their thoughts to each other with precision and accuracy. Observation 1. This, then, being the design of logic, it has justly been styled the history of the human mind; inasmuch as it traces the progress of our knowledge from our first and simple perceptions, through all the different combinations, and all those numerous deductions, which result from variously comparing these perceptions one with another. 2. It is thus that we are let into the frame and contexture of our own minds, and learn in what manner we ought to conduct our thoughts, in order to arrive at truth and avoid error. We see how to build one discovery upon another, and, by preserving the chain of reasoning uniform and unbroken, to pursue the relations of things through all their labyrinths and windings, and at length exhibit them to the mind with all the advantages of light and conviction. 2. By the MIND of man, we understand that in him which thinks, and feels, and wills, and which is conscious of its actions or operations. 3 The essence of body, as well as that of mind, is unknown to us. We know certain properties of the first, and certain operations of the last, and by these properties and operations we define or describe both body and mind. 4. We define body to be that which is extended, figured, colorable, movable, divisible, hard or soft, rough or smooth, hot or cold; that is, we define it in no other way than by enumerating its sensible qualities. 5. In like manner we define mind to be that which thinks. We are not immediately conscious of its existence, but we are conscious of sensation, thought, and volitionoperations which imply the existence of something that feels, thinks, and wills. Every man, too, is impressed with an irresistible conviction, that all these sensations, thoughts, and volitions, belong to one and the same being, which he calls himself; a being which he is led, by the constitution of his nature, to consider as something distinct from his body, as not liable to be impaired by the loss or mutilation of any of his organs; and this being, this principle of intelligence, we call the mind or soul of man. 6. When we witness the effects of similar operations or actions performed by our fellow-men, we have sufficient evidence that all human beings have minds. Obs. 1. The conduct of brute animals, too, proves that they have a thinking principle, though of a nature very inferior to that of man, insomuch that its principal qualities are included in those of the human intellect. 2. The proofs of intelligence and of superintending providence, which are amply furnished by a survey of nature's works, lead us to a firm belief in the existence of a supreme and all-governing Mind, of a nature infinitely superior to that of the minds of men. 3. Many speculative men, both ancient and modern, have conjectured that those natural phenomena which cannot be easily explained by mere matter and motion, are the operations of various orders of intelligent beings, in the universe, of various rank and dignity. Others have been inclined to explain these phenomena by the agency of beings that are active without intelligence, so as to perform their destined work without any knowledge or intention. But we may safely say, that, whatever may be the result of future investigations or discoveries, we have, as yet, no certain evidence with respect to either of these conjectures. 7. By the OPERATIONS of the mind, we understand every mode of thinking of which we are conscious. In all languages, as far as we know, the various modes of thinking have always been called operations of the mind, or by names of the same import. 8. We ascribe to body various properties, but not operations it is extended, divisible, movable, inert; it contin ues in any state in which it is put; every change of its state is the effect of some force impressed upon it, and is exactly proportional to the force impressed, and in the precise direction of that force. These are the general properties of matter, and these are not operations; on the contrary, they imply its being a dead, inactive thing, which moves only as it is moved, and acts only as it is acted upon. 9. But the mind is, from its very nature, a living and active being. Every thing we know of it implies life and active energy; and the reason why all its modes of thinking are called its operations, is, that in all, or in most of them, it is not merely passive, as body is, but is really and properly active. 10. In all ages, and in all languages, ancient and modern, the various modes of thinking have been expressed by words of active signification; such as seeing, hearing, reasoning, willing, and the like. Corollary. It seems, therefore, to be the natural judgment of mankind, that the mind is active in its various ways of thinking; and for this reason they are called its operations, and are expressed by active verbs. 11. Every operation supposes a power in the being that operates; for to suppose any thing to operate, which has no power to operate, is manifestly absurd. But, on the other hand, there is no absurdity in supposing a being to have power to operate, when that being does not operate. Illustration. Thus, I may have power to walk, when I sit; or to speak, when I am silent. Corol. Every operation, therefore, implies power; but the power does not imply its being always exerted to produce an operation. 12. The terms faculty and power, as applied to the mind, are not exactly synonymous, though they are often taken in the same radical meaning. The latter is of more extensive import than the former, since it may be used in relation to material as well as mental objects. 13. From observing the changes which are made, or the effects which are produced, by one external object upon another, as well as by these objects upon the mind, through the medium of the senses, we derive our first notion of power. Illus. 1. Thus, if a needle be placed on a table, standing horizontally, it lies at rest; but if a magnet be brought within a certain distance of the needle, motion instantly commences, and the needle rushes to the magnet. You have witnessed the change; you contemplate the effect-the two objects are conjoined. Remove the mag |