equal parts and knowledge, but unaccustomed to those scenes of public life, is quite disconcerted when first brought into them. His thoughts are put to flight, and he cannot rally them.

420. Feats of Imagination may be learned by application and practice, as wonderful and as useless as the feats of balancers and rope-dancers. (Art. 131.)

Illus. 1. When a man can make a hundred verses standing on one foot, or play three or four games at chess at the same time, without seeing the board, it is probable he hath spent his life in acquiring such a feat. However, such unusual phenomena show what habits of Imagination may be acquired.

2. When such habits are acquired and perfected, they are exercised without any laborious effort; like the habit of playing upon an instrument of music. There are innumerable motions of the fingers upon the stops or keys, which must be directed in one particular train or succession. There is only one arrangement of those motions that is right, while there are ten thousand that are wrong, and would spoil the music. The musician thinks not in the least of the arrangement of those motions; he has a distinct idea of the tune, and wills to play it. The motions of the fingers arrange themselves, so as to answer his intention. (Illus. 2. Art. 138.)

3. In like manner, when a man speaks upon a subject with which he is acquainted, there is a certain arrangement of his Thoughts and words necessary to make his discourse sensible, pertinent, and grammatical. In every sentence, there are more rules of grammar, logic, and rhetoric, that may be transgressed, than there are words and letters in the sentence. He speaks without thinking of any of those rules, and yet observes them all, as if they were all in his eye.

4. This is a habit so similar to that of a player on an instrument, that both seem to be acquired in the same way, that is, by much practice, and the power of habit. (Art. 126.)

5. When a man speaks well and methodically upon a subject without study, and with perfect ease, I believe we may take it for granted that his Thoughts run in a beaten track. There is a mould in his mind, which has been formed by much practice, or by study, for this very subject, or for some other so similar and so analogous, that his discourse falls with ease into this mould, and takes its form from it.

The

III. Of the Means of improving a Train of Thought. 421. We have now considered the operations of Fancy that are either spontaneous or regular; and have endeavored to account for their regularity and arrangement. natural powers of Judgment and Invention, the pleasure that always attends the exercise of those powers, the means we have of improving them by our imitation of others, and the effect of practice and habit, sufficiently account for this phenomenon, this Train of Thought, without supposing any

unaccountable attractions by which our Ideas arrange themselves. (See Art. 127 and 128.)

Illus. 1. But we are able to direct our thoughts in a certain course, so as to perform a destined task.

2. Every work of art has its model framed in the Imagination. Here the Iliad of Homer, the Republic of Plato, the Principia of Newton, were fabricated. Shall we believe, that those works took the form in which they now appear of themselves? That the sentiments, the manners, and the passions, arranged themselves at once in the mind of Homer, so as to form the Iliad? Was there no more effort in the composition, than there is in telling a well-known tale, or singing a favorite song? This cannot be believed. (Example, Art. 413.)

3. Granting that some happy Thought first suggested the design of singing the wrath of Achilles, yet, surely, it was a matter of Judgment and choice where the narration should begin, and where it should end.

4. Granting that the fertility of the poet's Imagination suggested a variety of rich materials; was not Judgment necessary to select what was proper, to reject what was improper, to arrange the materials into a just composition, and to adapt them to each other, and to the design of the whole? (Art. 244.)

5. No man can believe that Homer's ideas, merely by certain sympathies and antipathies, by certain attractions and repulsions inherent in their natures, arranged themselves according to the most perfect rules of epic poetry; and Newton's according to the rules of Mathematical composition. (See Art. 275. Example 2.)

Corol. The Train of Thinking, therefore, is capable of being guided and directed, much in the same manner as the horse we ride. The horse has his strength, his agility, and his mettle, in himself; he has been taught certain movements, and many useful habits that make him more subservient to our purposes, and obedient to our will; but to accomplish a journey, he must be directed by the rider.

422. In like manner, Fancy has its original powers, which are very different in different persons; it has, likewise, more regular motions, to which it has been trained by a long course of discipline and exercise; and by which it may, ex tempore, and without much effort, produce things that have a considerable degree of beauty, regularity and design. (Art. 264.)

Illus. But the most perfect works of design are never extemporary. Our first Thoughts are reviewed; we place them at a proper distance; examine every part, and take a complex view of the whole by our critical faculties, we perceive this part to be redundant, that deficient; here is a want of nerves, there a want of delicacy; this is obscure, that too diffuse things are marshalled anew, according to a second and more deliberate judgment; what was deficient is supplied; what was dislocated is put in joint; redun

dancies are lopped off, and the whole polished. (See Art. 270. and Ilus.)

2. Though poets, of all artists, make the highest claim to inspiration, yet, if we believe Horace, a competent judge, no production in that art can have merit, which has not cost such labor as this in the birth. (See Art. 277. and Illus.)

Corol. The conclusion we would draw from all that has been said upon this subject is, That every thing that is regular in that Train of Thought, which we call Fancy or Imagination, from the little designs and reveries of children, to the grandest productions of human genius, was originally the offspring of imitation, judgment, and taste, applied with some effort, greater or less. (Corol. 1. and 2. Art. 264.) What one person composed with art and judgment, is imitated by another with great ease. What a man himself at first composed with pains, becomes by habit so familiar, as to offer itself spontaneously to his Fancy afterwards; but nothing of merit that is regular, was ever conceived without design, nor executed without attention and care. (See the Illus. and Examples to Art. 275.)

CHAPTER VII.

OF PREJUDICES.

423. THE perfection of judgment is, to compare our ideas fairly and candidly, either by juxtaposition, as in the case of intuitive propositions, or by the intervention of intermediate ideas, when proof is requisite, and to pass a decision on that comparison, according to truth and justice, unbiased by partiality or prejudice, unseduced by fallacious appearances in things, by ambiguities in words, or by a disposition to deceive, or to be deceived. (See Art. 278. and 358.)

Illus. As, then, the purpose of all our inquiries is, to discover truth and knowledge, and as the completion of this discovery consists in discerning the agreement or disagreement of our ideas, it is plain that we cannot proceed one step without having constant recourse to the operation of judgment. We exert it immediately in cases of intuition; we exert it at the conclusion of every process of reasoning, in determining whether two principal ideas agree or disagree; and we exert it in every step of that process, in deciding concerning the agreement or disagreement of each couple of intermediate ideas. (Illus. Art. 279.) The candid inquirer, therefore, should study to preserve his mind in a state fitted to perform this operation in a proper manner, and to divest it of all obstructions or encumbrances which may interfere with its success. Without this precaution, it is vain to pretend to discover truth, because we shall only perplex and discompose our minds, spend our time in irksomeness to ourselves,

in disturbance to others, and sink deeper in falsehood and in error. After all the candor and patience we can exercise, the investigation of knowledge is a painful and laborious task; but our labor and time are totally thrown away, without a legitimate exertion of judgment. (See Art. 285.)

Corol. It is, therefore, a matter of the highest importance, in searching for truth, to know those impediments which obstruct the rectitude of our judgments, and to learn the rules we must observe, in order to conduct them with justice and expedition. This is a subject deserving most serious attention, and must not be omitted in a system of logic.

424. ERRONEOUS JUDGMENTS are denominated prejudices, or rash judgments, that is to say, judgments passed before we have duly examined all the circumstances of the case on which we intend to decide. Prejudices generally relate to opinions; prepossessions to attachments; the former refer chiefly to things, the latter to persons. (See Art. 358.)

Obs. The term Prejudices, as here used, comprehends all the impediments which interfere with our forming judgments of every sort, whether of things or of persons. (Corol. 2. p. 100.)

425. Prejudices are arranged by Lord Bacon under four heads, which he calls, in the language of the schools, 1. IDOLA TRIBUS, the Prejudices of the species; 2. IDOLA SPECUS, the Prejudices of the individual; 3. IDOLA FORI, the Prejudices of language; and, 4. IDOLA THEATRI, the Prejudices of authority.

Obs. These terms, though scholastic, are extremely significant. It is seldom we find the language of the schoolmen so replete with meaning. Prejudices are not improperly distinguished by the title of Idola; because they occupy the place of truth in the mind, in the same manner as the idol attracts, in the grove or the temple, the devotion which belongs to the Author of nature.

I. Prejudices of the first Class, or Idola Tribus.

426. The first class, the idola tribus, are such Prejudices as beset the whole human species; so that every man is in danger from them. They arise, says Dr. Reid, from principles of the human constitution, which are highly useful and necessary in our present state; but, by their excess or defect, or wrong direction, may lead us into error. (See Art. 237. and Illus.)

Obs. As the active principles of the human frame are wisely contrived, by the Author of our being, for the direction of our actions, and yet, without proper regulation and restraint, are apt to lead us wrong; so it is also with regard to those parts of our constitution

that have influence upon our opinions. Of this we may take the following instances :

427. (1.) First, Men are prone to be led too much by authority in their opinions. (See Art. 235. and Illus.)

Illus. 1. In the first part of life, we have no other guide; and without a disposition to receive implicitly what we are taught, we should be incapable of instruction, and incapable of improvement. (See Ilus. Art. 234.)

2. When judgment is ripe, there are many things in which we are incompetent judges. In such matters, it is most reasonable to rely upon the judgment of those whom we believe to be competent and disinterested. The highest court of judicature in the nation relies upon the authority of lawyers and physicians in matters belonging to their respective professions. (See Art. 313. Illus.)

3. Even in matters to the knowledge of which we have access, authority always will have, and ought to have, more or less weight, in proportion to the evidence on which our own judgment rests, and the opinion we have of the judgment and candor of those who differ from us, or agree with us. The modest man, conscious of his own fallibility in judging, is in danger of giving too much to authority; the arrogant, of giving too little.

4. In all matters belonging to his cognizance, every man must be determined by his own final judgment, otherwise he does not act the part of a rational being. Authority may add weight to one scale; but the man holds the balance, and judges what weight he should allow to authority.

Corol. As, therefore, our regard to authority may be either too great or too small, the bias of human nature seems to lean to the first of these extremes; and it is perhaps good for men in general that it does so.

Iilus. 5. When this bias concurs with an indifference about truth, its operation will be the more powerful. The love of truth is natural to man, and strong in every well-disposed mind. But it may be overborne by party-zeal, by vanity, by the desire of victory, or even by laziness. When it is superior to these, it is a manly virtue, resulting from the exercise of industry, fortitude, self-denial, candor, and openness to conviction.

6. As there are persons in the world of so mean and abject a spirit, that they rather choose to owe their subsistence to the charity of others, than by industry to acquire some property of their own, so there are many more who may be called mere beggars with regard to their opinions. Through laziness and indifference about truth, they leave to others the drudgery of digging for this commodity; they can have enough at second hand to serve their occasions. Their concern is not to know what is true, but what is said and thought on such subjects; and their understanding, like their clothes, is cut according to the fashion. (Illus. 1 and 2. Art. 87.)

7. This distemper of the understanding has taken such deep root in a great part of mankind, that it can hardly be said that they use their own judgment in things that do not concern their temporal interest; nor is it peculiar to the ignorant; it infects all ranks.

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