A DISCOURSE

CONCERNING

The Unalterable Obligations of NATURAL RELIGION,

AND

The Truth and Certainty of the CHRISTIAN REVELATION.

HA

THE INTRODUCTION.

AVING in a former difcourfe* endeavoured to lay firmly the first foundations of religion, in the certainty of the exiftence and of the attributes of God, by proving feverally and distinctly,

That fomething muft needs have exifted from eternity: and how great foever the difficulties are, which perplex the conceptions and apprehenfions we attempt to frame of an eternal duration; yet they neither ought nor can raife in any man's mind any doubt or fcruple concerning the truth of the affertion itself, that "fomething has "really been eternal."

That there must have exifted from eternity fome one unchangeable and independent being; because, to suppose an eternal fucceffion of merely dependent beings, proceeding one from another in an endlefs progreffion without any original independent cause at all, is fuppofing things, that have in their own nature no neceffity of exifting, to be from eternity caufed or produced by nothing; which is the very fame abfurdity and exprefs contradiction as to fuppofe them produced by nothing at any determinate time.

That that unchangeable and independent being, which has exifted from eternity, without any external cause of its existence, must be felf-exiftent, that is, neceffarily-exifting.

That it muft of neceffity be infinite or every where present; a being moft fimple, uniform, invariable, indivifible, incorruptible, and infinitely removed from all fuch imperfections as are the known qualities and infeparable properties of the material world.

That it muft of neceffity be but one; because, to fuppofe two, or more, different felf-exiftent independent principles, may be reduced to a direct contradiction.

That it must neceffarily be an intelligent being.

* Demonftration of the being and attributes of God.

That

That it must be free and voluntary, not a neceffary agent.

That this being muft of neceffity have infinite power; and that in this attribute is included, particularly, a poffibility of creating or producing things, and alfo a poffibility of communicating to creatures the power of beginning motion, and a poffibility of enduing them with liberty or freedom of will; which freedom of will is not inconfiftent with any of the divine attributes.

That he muft of neceffity be infinitely wife.

And, laftly, that he must neceffarily be a being of infinite goodnefs, juftice, and truth, and all other moral perfections; fuch as become the fupreme governor and judge of the world.

It remains now, in order to complete my defign of proving and eftablishing the truth and excellency of the whole fuperftructure of our most holy religion; that I proceed, upon this foundation of the certainty of the being and attributes of God, to demonstrate in the next place the unalterable obligations of natural religion, and the certainty of divine revelation; in oppofition to the vain arguings of certain vicious and profane men, who, merely upon account of their incredulity, would be thought to be ftrict adherers to reason, and fincere and diligent inquirers into truth; when indeed, on the contrary, there is but too much caufe to fear, that they are not at all fincerely and really defirous to be fatisfied in the true state of things, but only feek, under the pretence and cover of infidelity, to excufe their vices and debaucheries, which they are fo ftrongly inflaved to, that they cannot prevail with themselves upon any account to forfake them; and yet a rational fubmitting to fuch truths, as juft evidence and unanfwerable reafon would induce them to believe, muft neceffarily make them uneafy under thofe vices, and felf-condemned in the practice of them. It remains therefore (I fay) in order to finish the defign I propofed to myfelf, of cftablishing the truth and excellency of our holy religion, in oppofition to all fuch vain pretenders to reafon as thefe; that I proceed, at this time, by a continuation of the fame method of arguing by which I before demonstrated the being and attributes of God, to prove diftinctly the following propofitions.

I. That the fame neceffary and eternal different relations, that different things bear one to another; and the fame confequent fitnefs or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another, with regard to which the will of God always and neceffarily does determine itfelf to choose to act only what is agreeable to juftice, equity, goodness, and truth, in order to the welfare of the whole univerfe; ought likewife conftantly to determine the wills of all fubordinate rational beings, to govern all their actions by the fame rules, for the good of the public in their refpective ftations. That is; thefe eternal and neceffary differences of things make it fit and reasonable for creatures fo to act; they cause it to be their duty, or lay an obligation upon them fo to do, even feparate from the confideration of thefe rules being the pofitive will

or

or command of God, and alfo antecedent to any respect or regard, expectation or apprehenfion, of any particular, private, and perfonal advantage or difadvantage, reward, or punishment, either prefent or future, annexed either by natural confequence, or by pofitive appointments, to the practifing or neglecting thofe rules.

II. That though thefe eternal moral obligations are indeed of themselves incumbent on all rational beings, even antecedent to the confideration of their being the pofitive will and command of God; yet that which moft strongly confirms, and in practice most effectually and indifpenfably enforces them upon us, is is; that both from the nature of things, and the perfections of Cod, and from several other collateral confiderations, it appears, that as God is himfelf neceffarily juft and good in the exercife of his infinite power in the government of the whole world, so he cannot but likewife pofitively require that all his rational creatures fhould in their proportion be fo too, in the exercife of each of their powers in their refpective fpheres. That is; as these eternal moral obligations are really in perpetual force merely from their own nature and the abftra&t reafon of things; fo alfo they are moreover the exprefs and unalterable will, command, and law of God to his creatures, which he cannot but expect fhould in obedience to his fupreme authority, as well as in compliance with the natural reafon of things, be regularly and conftantly obferved through the whole creation.

III. That therefore, though these eternal moral obligations are alfo incumbent indeed on all rational creatures, antecedent to any respect of particular reward or punishment; yet they muft certainly and neceflarily be attended with rewards and punishments. Becaufe the fame reafons, which prove God himfelf to be neceffarily juft and good; and the rules of juftice, equity, and goodnefs, to be his unalterable will, law, and command, to all created beings; prove alío that he cannot but be pleafed with and approve fuch creatures as imitate and obey him by obferving thofe rules, and be displeased with fuch as act contrary thereto; and confequently that he cannot but fome way or other make a fuitable difference in his dealings with them; and manifeft his fupreme power and abfolute authority, in finally fupporting, maintaining, and vindicating effectually the honour of thefe his divine laws; as becomes the juft and righteous governor and difpofer of all things.

IV. That confequently, though in order to establish this suitable difference between the fruits or effects of virtue and vice, fo reasonable in itself, and fo abfolutely neceffary for the vindication of the honour of God, the nature of things, and the conftitution and order of God's creation, was originally fuch, that the obfervance of the eternal rules of juftice, equity, and goodnefs, does indeed of itself tend by direct and natural confequence to make all creatures happy; and the contrary practice, to make them miferable: yet fince through fome great and general corruption and depravation (whencefoever they may have rifen, the particular original whereof could hardly have been known now without revelation); fince, I fay, the con

dition of men in this prefent state is fuch, that the natural order of things in this world is in event manifeftly perverted, and virtue and goodnefs are vifibly prevented in great measure from obtaining their proper and due effects in establishing men's happiness proportionable to their behaviour and practice; therefore it is abfolutely impoffible, that the whole view and intention, the original and the final defign, of God's creating fuch rational beings as men are, and placing them in this globe of earth, as the chief and principal, or indeed (may we not fay) the only inhabitants, for whofe fake alone this part at leaft of the creation is manifeftly fitted up and accom modated; it is abfolutely impoffible (I fay) that the whole of God's defign in all this fhould be nothing more than to keep up eternally a fucceffion of fuch fhort-lived generations of men as at prefent are; and those in such a corrupt, confused, and diforderly state of things, as we fee the world is now in; without any due obfervation of the eternal rules of good and evil, without any clear and remarkable effect of the great and moft neceflary differences of things, and without any final vindication of the honour and laws of God in the proportionable reward of the beft, or punishment of the worst of men. And confequently it is certain and neceflary (even as certain as the moral attributes of God before demonftrated), that, inftead of continuing an eternal fucceffion of new generations in the prefent form and ftate of things, there must at fome time or other be fuch a revolution and renovation of things, fuch a future ftate of existence of the fame perfons, as that, by an exact diftribution of rewards and punishments therein, all the prefent diforders and inequalities may be fet right; and that the whole scheme of providence, which to us who judge of it by only one fmall portion of it feems now fo inexplicable and much confused, may appear at its confummation to be a defign worthy of infinite wisdom, juftice, and goodness.

V. That, though the indifpenfable neceffity of all the great and moral obligations of natural religion, and alfo the certainty of a future ftate of rewards and punishments, be thus in general deducible, even demonftrably, by a chain of clear and undeniable reasoning; yet (in the present state of the world, by what means foever it came originally to be fo corrupted, of which more hereafter) fuch is the careleffnefs, inconfideratenefs, and want of attention of the greater part of mankind; fo many the prejudices and falfe notions imbibed by evil education: fo ftrong and violent the unreasonable lufts, appetites, and defires of fenfe; and fo great the blindness, introduced by fuperftitious opinions, vicious cuftoms, and debauched practices through the world; that very few are able, in reality and effect, to discover these things clearly and plainly for themselves; but men have great need of particular teaching, and much instruction, to convince them of the truth, and certainty, and importance of these things; to give them a due sense, and clear and just apprehenfions concerning them; and to bring them effectually to the practice of the plainest and most neceffary duties.

VI. That,

VI. That, though in almost every age there have indeed been in the heathen world fome wife and brave and good men, who have made it their bufinefs to ftudy and practife thefe things themselves, and to teach and exhort others to do the like; who feem therefore to have been raised up by providence, as inftruments to reprove in fome measure and put fome kind of check to the extreme fuperftition and wickedness of the nations wherein they lived; yet none of these have ever been able to reform the world, with any confiderably great and univerfal fuccefs; because they have been but very L few, that have in earnest set themselves about this excellent work; and they that have indeed fincerely done it have themselves been entirely ignorant of fome doctrines, and very doubtful and uncertain of others, abfolutely neceffary for the bringing about that great end; and thofe things which they have been certain of and in good measure understood, they have not been able to prove and explain clearly enough; and those that they have been able both to prove and explain by fufficiently clear reafoning, they have not yet had authority enough to inforce and inculcate upon men's minds with fo ftrong an impreffion, as to influence and govern the general practice of the world.

VII. That therefore there was plainly wanting a divine revelation, to recover mankind out of their univerfally degenerate eftate, into a state fuitable to the original excellency of their nature: which divine revelation both the neceffities of men and their natural notions of God gave them reasonable ground to expect and hope for; as appears from the acknowledgments which the beft and wifeft of the heathen philofophers themfelves have made, of their fenfe of the neceffity and want of fuch a revelation; and from their expreffions of the hopes they had entertained, that God would fome time or other vouchlafe it unto them.

VIII. That there is.no other religion now in the world, but the Chriftian, that has any just pretence or tolerable appearance of reafon to be efteemed fuch a divine revelation: and therefore, if Chriftianity be not true, there is no revelation of the will of God at all made to mankind.

IX. That the Christian religion, confidered in its primitive fimplicity, and as taught in the holy fcriptures, has all the marks and proofs of its being actually and truly a divine revelation, that any divine revelation, fuppofing it was true, could reasonably be imagined or defired to have.

X. That the practical duties which the Chriftian religion enjoins are all fuch as are most agreeable to our natural notions of God, and moft perfective of the nature, and conducive to the happiness and well-being of men. That is; Chriftianity even in this fingle respect, as containing alone and in one confiftent system all the wife and good precepts (and thofe improved, augmented, and exalted to the highest degree of perfection), that ever were taught fingly and fcatteredly, and many times but very corruptly, by the feveral schools of the philofophers; and this without any mixture of the fond, VOL. IV. I

abfurd,