yet neither can this opinion be fettled on any certain principles, nor defended by any confiftent reafoning; nor can the natural attributes of God be fo feparated from the moral, but that he who denies the latter may be reduced to a neceffity of denying the former likewife. For fince (as I have formerly proved) there cannot but be eternal and neceflary differences of different things one from another; and from thefe neceffary differences of things there cannot but arise a fitness or unfitness of the application of different things or different relations one to another; and infinite knowledge can no more fail to know, or infinite wifdom to choose, or infinite power to act according to these eternal reasons and proportions of things, than knowledge can be ignorance, wisdom be folly, or power weakness; and confequently the juftice and goodness of God are as certain and neceflary, as his wifdom and power: it follows unavoidably, that he who denies the justice or goodness of God, or, which is all one, denies his exercife of these attributes in inspecting and regarding the moral actions of men, muft alfo deny, either his wifdom, or his power, or both; and confequently must needs be driven into abfolute Atheifm. For though, in fome moral matters, men are not indeed to be judged of by the confequences of their opinions, but by their profeffion and practice; yet in the prefent case it matters not at all what men affirm, or how honourably they may seem to speak of fome particular attributes of God; but what, notwithstanding fuch profeffion, muft needs in all reafon be fuppofed to be their true opinion; and their practice generally appears answerable to it. PROFANE AND DEBAUCHED DEISTS, NOT CAPABLE OF BEING ARGUED WITH. For, concerning these two forts of Deifts, it is obfervable, that as their opinions can terminate confiftently in nothing but downright Atheism; fo their practice and behaviour is generally agreeable to that of the most openly profeffed Atheifts. They not only oppofe the revelation of Christianity, and reject all the moral obligations of natural religion, as fuch; but generally they defpife alfo the wifdom of all human conftitutions made for the order and benefit of mankind, and are as much contemners of common decency as they are of religion. They endeavour to ridicule and banter all human as well as divine accomplishments; all virtue and government of man's felf, all learning and knowledge, all wisdom and honour, and every thing for which a man can juftly be commended or be efteemed more excellent than a beaft. They pretend commonly, in their difcourfe and writings, to expofe the abufes and corruptions of religion; but (as is too manifeft in fome of their modern books, as well as in their talk) they aim really against all virtue in general, and all good manners, and against whatfoever is truly valuable and commendable in men. They pretend to ridicule certain vices and follies of ignorant or fuperftitious men; but the many "Quafi ego id curem, quid ille aiat aut neget: illud quære, quid ei confentaneum "fit dicere, qui, &c." Cic. de Finib. lib. II. I 4 very very profane and very lewd images, with which they industriously affect to dress up their difcourfe, how plainly that they really do not so much intend to expofe and deride any vice or folly, as on the contrary to foment and pleafe the debauched and vicious inclinations of others as void of fhame as themfelves. They discover clearly, that they have no fenfe at all of the dignity of human nature, nor of the fuperiority and excellency of their reafon above even the meaneft of the brutes. They will fometimes in words feem to magnify the wifdom, and other natural attributes of God; but in reality, by ridiculing whatever bears any refemblance to it in men, they fhow undeniably that they do not indeed believe there is any real difference in things, or any true excellency in one thing more than in another. By turning every thing alike, and without exception, into ridicule and mockery; they declare plainly, that they do not believe any thing to be wife, any thing decent, any thing comely or praife-worthy at all. They feem not to have any esteem or value for thofe diftinguishing powers and faculties, by induing them wherewith God has taught them more than the beafts of the field, and made them wifer than the fowls of heaven." Job XXXV. II. In a word: "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever "things are honeft, whatsoever things are juft, whatsoever things "are pure, whatfoever things are lovely, whatfoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, if there be any praise;" these things they make the conftant fubject of their mockery and abuse, ridicule and raillery. On the contrary; whatfoever things are profane, impure, filthy, difhonourable, and absurd; thefe things they make it their bufinefs to reprefent as harmless and indifferent, and to laugh men out of their natural fhame and abhorrence of them, nay, even to recommend them with their utmost wit. Such men as these are not to be argued with, till they can be perfuaded to ufe arguments inftead of drollery. For banter is not capable of being aniwered by reafon; not because it has any ftrength in it; but because it runs out of all the bounds of reafon and good fenfe, by extravagantly joining together fuch images, as have not in themfelves any manner of fimilitude or connexion; by which means all things are alike eafy to be rendered ridiculous, by being reprefented only in an abfurd drefs. These men therefore are first to be convinced of the true principles of reafon, before they can be difputed with; and then they muft of neceffity either retreat into downright Atheism, or be led by undeniable reasoning to acknowledge and fubmit to the obligations of morality, and heartily repent of their profane abuse of God and religion. 3. OF THE THIRD SORT OF DEISTS. Another fort of Deifts there are, who, having right apprehenfions concerning the natural attributes of God, and his all-governing providence, feem to have fome notion of his moral perfections alfo. That is; as they believe him to be a being infinitely knowing, powerful, and wife; fo they believe him to be alfo in fome fense a being of infinite juftice, goodness, and truth; and that he governs governs the univerfe by thefe perfections, and expects fuitable obedience from all his rational creatures. But then, having a prejudice against the notion of the immortality of human fouls, they believe that men perifh entirely at death, and that one generation fhall perpetually fucceed another, without any thing remaining of men after their departure out of this life, and without any future reftoration or renovation of things. And imagining that juftice and goodness in God are not the fame as in the ideas we frame of thefe perfections when we confider thein in men, or when we reafon about them abftractly in themfelves; but that in the fupreme governor of the world they are something transcendent, and of which we cannot make any true judgement, nor argue with any certainty about them; they fancy, though there does not indeed feem to us to be any equity or proportion in the diftribution of rewards and punishments in this prefent life, yet that we are not fufficient judges concerning the attributes of God, to argue from thence with any affurance for the certainty of a future ftate. But neither does this opinion ftand on any confiftent principles. For if justice and goodness be not * the fame in God, as in our ideas; then we mean nothing, when we fay that God is neceffarily juft and good; and for the fame reafon it may as well be faid, that we know not what we mean, when we affirm that he is an intelligent and wife being; and there will be no foundation at all left, on which we can fix any thing. Thus the moral attributes of God, however they be acknowledged in words, yet in reality they are by thefe men entirely taken away; and, upon the fame grounds, the natural attributes may alfo be denied. And fo, upon the whole, this opinion likewife, if we argue upon it confiftently, muft finally recur to abfolute Atheism. 4. OF THE FOURTH SORT OF DEISTS. The laft fort of Deifts are thofe, who, if they did indeed believe what they pretend, have just and right notions of God, and of all the divine attributes in every refpect: who declare they believe, that there is one, eternal, infinite, intelligent, all-powerful, and wife being, the creator, preferver, and governor of all things: that this fupreme caufe is a being of infinite juftice, goodness, and truth, and all other moral as well as natural perfections: that he made the world for the manifeftation of his power and wisdom, and to communicate his goodness and happiness to his creatures that he preferves it by his continual all-wife providence, and governs it according to the eternal rules of infinite juftice, equity, goodness, mercy, and truth: that all created rational beings, depending continually upon him, are bound to adore, worship, and obey him; to praise him for all things they enjoy, and to pray to him for every thing they want: that they are all obliged to promote, in their proportion, and according to the extent of their feveral powers and abilities, the general good and welfare of those parts of the world, wherein they are placed; in like manner as the divine goodness is Καθ ̓ ἡμᾶς γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή ἐσι τῶν μακαρίων πάντων ώςε καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ ἀνθρώπω wal Sex. Orig. contr. Celf, lib. IV. continually continually promoting the univerfal benefit of the whole that men in particular are every one obliged to make it their business, by an univerfal benevolence, to promote the happiness of all others: that, in order to this, every man is bound always to behave himself fo towards others, as in reafon he would defire they should in like circumftances deal with him: that, therefore, he is obliged to obey and fubmit to his fuperiours in all juft and right things, for the prefervation of fociety, and the peace and benefit of the public; to be juft and honeft, equitable and fincere, in all his dealings with his equals, for the keeping inviolable the everlasting rule of righteoufnefs, and maintaining an univerfal truft and confidence, friendship and affection amongst men; and, towards his inferiors, to be gentle and kind, eafy and affable, charitable and willing to affift as many as ftand in need of his help, for the prefervation of univerfal love and benevolence amongst mankind, and in imitation of the goodness of God, who preferves and does good to all creatures, which depend entirely upon him for their very being and all that they enjoy: that, in refpect of himself, every man is bound to preferve, as much as in him lies, his own being, and the right ufe of all his faculties, fo long as it fhall pleafe God, who appointed him his station in this world, to continue him therein: that therefore he is bound to have an exact government of his paffions, and carefully to abstain from all debaucheries and abufes of himself, which tend either to the deftruction of his own being, or to the difordering of his faculties, and difabling him from performing his duty, or hurrying him into the practice of unreasonable and unjust things: laftly, that accordingly as men regard or neglect thefe obligations, fo they are proportionably acceptable or difpleafing unto God; who, being fupreme governor of the world, cannot but teftify his favour or difpleasure at fome time or other; and confequently, fince this is not done in the prefent ftate, therefore there must be a future ftate of rewards and punishments in a life to come. But all this, the men we are now fpeaking of pretend to believe only fo far, as it is difcoverable by the light of nature alone, without believing any divine revelation. Thefe, I fay, are the only true Deifts; and indeed the only perfons who ought in reafon to be argued with, in order to convince them of the reasonablenefs, truth, and certainty of the Chriftian revelation. But alas there is, as I before faid, too much reason to believe, that there are very few or none fuch Deifts as these among modern deniers of revelation. For fuch men as I have now defcribed, if they would at all attend to the confequences of their own principles, could not fail of being quickly perfuaded to embrace Chriftianity. For, being fully convinced of the obligations of natural religion, and the certainty of a future state of rewards and punishments; and yet obferving, at the fame time, how little ufe men generally are able to make of the light of reafon, to discover the onc, or to convince themfelves effectually of the certainty and importance of the other; it is impoffible but they must earneftly * Page 115. defire God would be pleafed, by fome direct difcovery of his will, to make these things more clear and plain, more eafy and obvious, more certain and evident to all capacities; it is impoffible but they must with, God would be pleafed particularly, to fignify exprefsly the acceptableness of repentance, and his willingness to forgive returning finners; it is impoffible but they must be very folicitous, to have fome more particular and certain information concerning the nature of that future ftate, which reafon teaches them in general to expect. The confequence of this is, that they must needs be poffeffed beforehand with a ftrong hope, that the Chriftian revelation may upon due examination appear to be true. They must be infinitely far from ridiculing and defpifing any thing that claims to be a divine revelation, before they have fincerely and thoroughly examined it to the bottom. They must needs be beforehand very much difpofed in its favour; and be very willing to be convinced, that what tends to the advancing and perfecting the obligations of natural religion, to the fecuring their great hopes, and afcertaining the truth of a future ftate of rewards and punishments, and can any way be made appear to be worthy of God, and confiftent with his attributes, and has any reasonable proof of the matters of fact it depends upon; is really and truly, what it pretends to be, a divine revelation. And now, is it poffible that any man, with thefe opinions and these difpofitions, fhould continue to reject Chriftianity, when proposed to him in its original and genuine fimplicity, without the mixture of any corruptions or inventions of men? Let him read the fermons and exhortations of our Saviour, as delivered in the gofpels; and the difcourfes of the apoftles preferved in their acts and their epiftles; and try if he can withstand the evidence of fuch a doctrine, and reject the hopes of fuch a gloricus immortality so discovered to him. THAT THERE IS NOW NO CONSISTENT SCHEME OF DEISM IN THE WORLD. The heathen philofophers, thofe few of them who taught and lived up to the obligations of natural religion, had indeed a confiftent fcheme of Deifm fo far as it went; and they were very brave and wife men, if any of them could keep fteady and firm to it. But the cafe is not fo now. The fame fcheme of Deifm is not any longer confiftent with its own principles, if it does not now lead men to embrace and believe revelation, as it then taught them to hope for it. Deifts, in our days, who obftinately reject revelation when offered to them, are not fuch men as Socrates and Tully were; but, under pretence of Deism, it is plain, they are generally ridiculers of all that is truly excellent even in natural religion itself. Could we see a Deift, whofe mind was heartily poffeft with worthy and just apprehenfions of all the attributes of God, and a deep fense of his duty towards that fupreme author and preferver of his being: could we fee a Deift, who lived in an exact performance of all the duties of natural religion; and by the practice of righteoufncfs, justice, equity, fobriety, and temperance, expreffed in his actions, as well as words, |