ing ordinances, was added to the prohibited territory, was and is a district devoted almost exclusively to manufacturing enterprises. Within its boundaries there is a large amount of vacant and unoccupied land which is and will continue to be useless except for the erection of manufacturing establishments; within which were located. at that time a soap factory, a wool-pulling factory, three wineries, numerous oil wells in operation, iron foundry, brass foundry, oil refinery; immediately east of said tract, railroads and an extensive tannery; immediately north, the oil tanks and refinery of the Standard Oil Company. That the works being constructed for the plaintiff in error are to be built upon concrete foundations with a superstructure of noncombustible material, so that there can be no danger from explosion, bursting, or leaking. The machinery is to be of the most approved pattern; and that there can be no leakage or escape. of odors or any interference with the health, comfort, or safety of the inhabitants of the city. The plaintiff in error relying upon the protection of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, prays that the permit granted by the board of fire commissioners be declared to be a valid and subsisting contract between the city of Los Angeles and herself, and that all ordinances passed by the city council in contravention thereof be declared void; that the defendant be enjoined from enforcing said ordinances against the plaintiff, from delaying or interfering with the action of the plaintiff in erecting the said works, from interfering with the maintenance and operation of the same, and for general relief. DAY, J. As this case was decided upon demurrer to the complaint, the allegations thereof must be taken as true. The question presented involves the right of the plaintiff in error to invoke the protection of the fourteenth amendment against alleged infraction of her rights by the action of the city council in passing and enforcing the ordinances which prevent the carrying on of the business of making and selling gas to the people of the city. * * * In this case we think the allegations of the bill disclose such character of territory, such sudden and unexplained change of its limits after the plaintiff in error had purchased the property and gone forward with the erection of the works, as to bring it within that class of cases wherein the court may restrain the arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the police power which amounts to a taking of property without due process of law and an impairment of property rights protected by the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution. It is also urged by the defendants in error that a court of equity will not enjoin prosecution of a criminal case; but, as we have seen, the plaintiff in error in this case had acquired property rights which, 11 Only a portion of the opinion is printed. by the enforcement of the ordinances in question, would be destroyed and rendered worthless. If the allegations of the bill be taken as true, she had the right to proceed with the prosecution of the work without interference by the city authorities in the form of arrest and prosecution of those in her employ. It is well settled that, where property rights will be destroyed, unlawful interference by criminal proceedings under a void law or ordinance may be reached and controlled by a decree of a court of equity. Davis & F. Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U. S. 207-218, 23 Sup. Ct. 498, 47 L. Ed. 778-780, and cases therein cited. Upon the whole case, we are of opinion that the demurrer should have been overruled and the city of Los Angeles put upon its answer. For the reasons herein stated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of California is reversed, and the cause remanded to that court for further proceedings not in conflict with this opinion.12 12 "We cannot agree with counsel for the appellee that a court of equity has no jurisdiction to restrain the appellee [mayor and city council of Baltimore] in the enforcement of the ordinance in question, even though it may be conceded to be invalid, and that its execution would affect injuriously the rights of the appellant and others. In Page's Case, 34 Md. 558 (1871), and in Holland's Case, 11 Md. 189, 69 Am. Dec. 195 (1857), and in other cases, we have said that 'where an ordinance is void, and its provisions are about to be enforced, any party whose interests are to be injuriously affected thereby may, and properly ought to, go into a court of equity and have the execution of the ordinance stayed by injunction.'" Deems v. Baltimore, 80 Md. 164, 30 Atl. 649, 26 L. R. A. 541, 45 Am. St. Rep. 339 (1894). An injunction will not be granted against the enactment of an ordinance. McQuillin, Municipal Ordinances, § 163; Stevens v. St. Mary's Training School, 144 Ill. 336, 32 N. E. 962, 18 L. R. A. 832, 36 Am. St. Rep. 438 (1893). See State ex rel. Rose v. Superior Court of Milwaukee County, 105 Wis. 651, 677. 678, 81 N. W. 1046, 48 L. R. A. 819 (1900). Injunctions to restrain boards of health and other sanitary authorities have been granted: (1) Where the proposed action of the board threatened to create a nuisance. Baltimore v. Fairfield Improvement Co., 87 Md. 352, 39 Atl. 1081, 40 L. R. A. 494, 67 Am. St. Rep. 344 (1891); Upjohn v. Richland Bd. of Healtà, 46 Mich. 542, 9 N. W. 845, 41 Am. St. Rep. 178 (1881); Thompson v. Kimbrough, 23 Tex. Civ. App. 350, 57 S. W. 328 (1900). (2) Where the sanitary authority proposed to act beyond its jurisdiction. Hoffman v. Schultz, 31 How. Proc. (N. Y.) 385 (1866). (3) Where the summary abatement of property was threatened. Babcock v. Buffalo, 56 N. Y. 268 (1874); Rogers v. Barker, 31 Barb. (N. Y.) 447 (1860); Clark v. Syracuse, 13 Barb. (N. Y.) 32 (1852). (4) Where jurisdictional requirements have not been observed, especially that of notice and hearing. Eddy v. Bd. of Health, 10 Phila. (Pa.) 94 (1873); Weil v. Ricord, 26 N. J. Eq. 169 (1873). (5) Where they act fraudulently or oppressively. Chase v. Middleton, 123 Mich. 647, 82 N. W. 612 (1900). On the other hand, it has been said that there is no power to inquire into the question whether there is a nuisance, and to enjoin the board of health if it should turn out that in the judgment of the court there is none. Stone v. Heath, 179 Mass. 385, 60 N. E. 975 (1901). SECTION 46.-SAME-TO RESTRAIN THE ASSESSMENT AND COLLECTION OF TAXES PITTSBURG, ETC., RY. v. BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS OF WEST VIRGINIA. (Supreme Court of United States, 1898. 172 U. S. 32, 19 Sup. Ct. 90, 43 L. Ed. 354.) Mr. Justice GRAY delivered the opinion of the court.13 The collection of taxes assessed under the authority of a state is not to be restrained by writ of injunction from a court of the United States, unless it clearly appears, not only that the tax is illegal, but that the owner of the property taxed has no adequate remedy by the ordinary processes of the law, and that there are special circumstances bringing the case under some recognized head of equity jurisdiction. Dows v. Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 20 L. Ed. 65; Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, 15 Wall. 547, 21 L. Ed. 231; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S. 575, 23 L. Ed. 663; Union Pacific Ry. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516, 5 Sup. Ct. 601, 28 L. Ed. 1098; Milwaukee v. Koeffler, 116 U. S. 219, 6 Sup. Ct. 372, 29 L. Ed. 612; Shelton v. Platt, 139 U. S. 591, 11 Sup. Ct. 646, 35 L. Ed. 273. In Dows v. Chicago, a citizen of the state of New York, owning shares in a national bank organized and doing business in the city of Chicago, filed a bill in equity, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, to restrain the collection of a tax assessed by the city of Chicago upon his shares in the bank, alleging, among other things, that the tax was illegal and void, because the tax was not uniform and equal with taxes on other property, as required by the Constitution of the state, and because the shares were taxable only at the domicile of the owner, and therefore were not property within the jurisdiction of the state of Illinois. This court, speaking by Mr. Justice Field, without considering the validity. of the objections to the tax, held that the bill could not be maintained, saying: "Assuming the tax to be illegal and void, we do not think any ground is presented by the bill justifying the interposition of a court of equity to enjoin its collection. The illegality of the tax and the threatened sale of the shares for its payment constitute of themselves alone no ground for such interposition. There must be some special circumstances attending a threatened injury of this kind, distinguishing it from a common trespass, and bringing the case under some recognized head of equity jurisdiction, before the preventive 13 Only a portion of the opinion is printed. FR.ADM.LAW-27 remedy of injunction can be invoked. It is upon taxation that the several states chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be interfered with as little as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes, may derange the operations of the government, and thereby cause serious detriment to the public. No court of equity will, therefore, allow its injunction to issue to restrain their action, except where it may be necessary to protect the rights of the citizen whose property is taxed, and he has no adequate remedy by the ordinary processes of the law." 11 Wall. 109, 110, 20 L. Ed. 65. "The party of whom an illegal tax is collected has ordinarily ample remedy, either by action against the officer making the collection or the body to whom the tax is paid. Here such remedy existed. If the tax was illegal, the plaintiff protesting against its enforcement might have had his action, after it was paid, against the officer or the city to recover back the money, or he might have prosecuted either for his damages. No irreparable injury would have followed to him from its collection. Nor would he have been compelled to resort to a multiplicity of suits to determine his rights. His entire claim might have been embraced in a single action." 11 Wall. 112, 20 L. Ed. 65. In the State Railroad Tax Cases, this court, in a careful and thorough opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Miller, stated that "it has been repeatedly decided that neither the mere illegality of the tax complained of, nor its injustice nor irregularity, of themselves, give the right to an injunction in a court of equity," referred to section 3224 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 2088), which provides that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court,” and said that, "though this was intended to apply alone to taxes levied by the United States, it shows the sense of Congress of the evils to be feared if courts of justice could, in any case, interfere with the process of collecting the taxes on which the government depends for its continued existence." The court then quoted from Dows v. Chicago and Hannewinkle v. Georgetown, above cited, and proceeded as follows: "We do not propose to lay down in these cases any absolute limitation of the powers of a court of equity in restraining the collection of illegal taxes. But we may say that, in addition to illegality, hardship or irregularity, the case must be brought within some of the recognized foundations of equitable jurisdiction, and that mere errors or excess in valuation, or hardship or injustice of the law, or any grievance which can be remedied by a suit at law, either before or after payment of taxes, will not justify a court of equity to interpose by injunction to stay collection of a tax. One of the reasons why a court should not thus interfere, as it would in any transaction between individuals, is that it has no power to apportion the tax or to make a new assessment, or to direct another to be made by the proper officers of the state. These functions are wholly beyond the power of the court when so acting. The levy of taxes is not a judicial function. Its exercise, by the Constitutions of all the states, and by the theory of our English origin, is exclusively legislative. A court of equity is, therefore, hampered in the exercise of its jurisdiction by the necessity of enjoining the tax complained of, in whole or in part, without any power of doing complete justice by making, or causing to be made, a new assessment on any principle it may decide to be the right one.14 In this manner, it may, by enjoining the levy, enable the complainant to escape wholly the tax for the period of time complained of, though it be obvious that he ought to pay a tax if imposed in the proper manner." 92 U. S. 613-615, 23 L. Ed. 663. In Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Cheyenne, in which the Union Pacific Railway Company obtained an injunction against the levy of a tax by the city of Cheyenne, the facts were peculiar. The plaintiff, owning many lots of land in that city, had paid a tax assessed on all its property by a board of equalization under a general statute of the territory of Wyoming, and had also been taxed by the city of Cheyenne under provisions of its charter which had been repealed by that statute; and the bill showed, as stated in the opinion, that the levy complained of "would involve the plaintiff in a multiplicity of suits as to the title of lots laid out and being sold, would prevent their sale, and would cloud the title to all its real estate." 113 U. S. 526, 527, 5 Sup. Ct. 601, 606, 28 L. Ed. 1098. * * * 15 14 Compare remarks of Cooley, J., on advantages of injunction in tax proceedings, in Whitbeck v. Hudson, 50 Mich. 86, 88, 14 N. W. 708 (1883). 15 In the case last cited (Union Pacific Railway Co. v. Cheyenne, 113 U. S. 516, 5 Sup. Ct. 601, 28 L. Ed. 1098 [1885]) the court says: "It cannot be denied that bills in equity to restrain the collection of taxes illegally imposed have frequently been sustained. But it is well settled that there ought to be some equitable ground for relief besides the mere illegality of the tax; for it must be presumed that the law furnishes a remedy for illegal taxation. It often happens, however, that the case is such that the person illegally taxed would suffer irremediable damage, or be subject to vexatious litigation, if he were compelled to resort to his legal remedy alone. For example, if the legal remedy consisted only of an action to recover back the money after it had been collected by distress and sale of the taxpayer's lands, the loss of his freehold by means of a tax sale would be a mischief hard to be remedied. Even the cloud cast upon his title by a tax under which such a sale could be made would be a grievance which would entitle him to go into a court of equity for relief. Judge Cooley fairly sums up the law on this subject as follows: To entitle a party to relief in equity against an illegal tax, he must by his bill bring his case under some acknowledged head of equity jurisdiction. The illegality of the tax alone, or the threat to sell property for its satisfaction, cannot, of themselves, furnish any ground for equitable interposition. In ordinary cases a party must find his remedy in the courts of law, and it is not to be supposed he will fail to find one adequate to his proper relief. Cases of fraud, accident, or mistake, cases of cloud upon the title to one's property, and cases where one is threatened with irremediable mischief may demand other remedies than those the common law can give, and these in proper case, may be afforded in courts of equity.' This statement is in gener |