or animal, except one poor priest. The enemy had driven off all the cattle, and we were like to be all starved, as in truth we were always in danger and afraid of during our last residence in the dominions of the most Christian King. We immediately marched to a village called St. Lunaire, near which we encamped. After two days' reconnoitring, the attempt to be made by the frigates of going up the river was judged by the Commodore impracticable from the rocks, even if no batteries were in the way, and even could they effect it, the possibility of carrying the troops across was doubted, and if they could, the time it would take was too long. The Commodore then proposed our marching to Dinant, crossing there, and then marching to St. Servans, from thence we were to attack St. Malo. You will ask how? I answer, by scaling the walls, for by this time it was well known the roads we were to march were not practicable for any cannon. The two advisers could not carry this point, the General was positive in saying he would not stir without his cannon, so that attempt for the destruction of a parcell of naked, starved, sick soldiers failed.

"During this time a party was sent to St. Briac to burn the two hundred ships. When they got thither they found fifteen fishing boats which they burnt; although Thierry, the pilot, told me. qu'il se trompoit diablement s'il n'y avoit cent cinquante vaisseaux marchands pour le moins. The third day after we were on shore a violent storm arose which drove all the ships to sea, and there we were left without provisions and in all sorts of distress, our men and officers falling sick, no means of taking care of them, nor no convenience of carrying them with us, should we be obliged to march. Next day the ships got safe to anchor under Cape Frehel. Every body seemed greatly alaurmed at this time, and we all expected to embark as soon as the weather would permit.

"As soon as the ships were safe the Commodore wrote to the General to let him know that he could not answer for the safety of the ships in such doubtfull weather, and therefore if he did not choose to proceed towards St. Malo by land, or had no other object in view, he desired to know when he would embark the troops. The General returned for answer he was ready to embark imediately. The Commodore proposed our marching to an island near us, which we could get to at low water, where we could be safe from the whole force of France, and from whence we could embark with the greatest safety to the ships and the troops. This we all understood was to be executed, but to our great astonishment when we began to march we found ourselves going from the coast into the countrey. The [Subaltern] Generals began to enquire into this and were told that the best place to embark at was a bay about four leagues off, which this was the best road to. They represented against the length of the march, the wretched state of the troops, their nakedness, no shoes, litterally none even in the Guards, that is several men had none, no provisions, the men that might be called fighting men worn out, and several of them must be employed to carry the sick, the number of which on shore was now considerably encreased, in so much that one battallion had but fifty-six files under arms,

exclusive of grenadiers. I had but five hundred men, and the regiments in general run to about that number. The General hearkened to these reasons, approved of them, but after consulting with others prosecuted his intention. We marched in one collumn, which consisted of fifty light dragoons, being all that was (or indeed could be) landed, two light six pounders, which was all our artillery, and they were like to be lost coming on shore, and the twelve poor weakened battallions. The Quarter Master General advanced with 300 grenadiers and the Camp Colour men, came to a river close to a village called Gildo. As soon as he approached about sixty Gardes des Côtes fired on him. The Quarter-Masters and Camp Colour men offered to pass and drive them away; the Grenadiers pressed extreamly to cross the river. He refused them, and marked out a camp on our side of the river. As soon as we came on our ground we were fired on by those on the other side, and Head Quarters being within muskett shot was fired on the whole evening and all next day. We gave them twenty-four hours to get more people and to avail themselves of their hedges and some trenches they made for themselves, and under pretence that we could not pass till low water waited till next evening to go over. It is true we could not pass but at low water, but it was low water in the morning after day light.

"Lord Fred. Cavendish passed first, he received a contusion, his lieutenant, Jones, was wounded, some of his and other grenadiers wounded and killed, and we all passed over assisted and covered by our two field pieces, which did the enemy some mischief. We encamped about a mile on the Morlaix side of the river, at or near a small village called St. Jagüe. Next day we marched to a town called Matignon, in going to which our front and flanks were attacked by small parties of the enemy with some loss on their side and some wounded on ours. We encamped near Matignon, all men wondering whither we were going and dragging our sick people to, and what we were going for. There we received, from deserters and prisoners, intelligence that eleven battallions of Regulars with as many field pieces and a large body of millitia were within five miles of us at Lomballe, and would probably attack us that night, that the Duc d'Aiguillon had marched from Brest and gathered what troops he could by the way in order to out number us at present, and either attack us at night or get between us and the coast. All the Subaltern Generals thought this matter very serious; by reconnoitring it was judged to be true. I have already said we had no provisions, yet the Quarter Master and Adjutant General proposed attacking the enemy and marching to Lomballe for that purpose. You know what an enclosed country that is; I forgot to remind you of that ever since I began to march. The Subaltern Generals were called upon, and after shewing the bad conduct of the Quarter Master General from first to last, in particular the camp we were that moment in, where we were from situation not only liable to a surprise but to be cut to pieces, whereas a little more riding would have shown him (the Quarter Master General) a

spot that could not easily be attacked, they then refered themselves to the youngest to speak, who represented with great freedom and knowledge our present state to the General, showed that the enemy would not suffer us to attack them, but would stir heaven and earth to get troops to cut off our retreat; that it was now plain troops sufficient might be got, and from our uncertainty of a fit place to embark at, their scheme might be effected.

"These reasons prevailed; a despatch was sent to the Commodore, and the General declared that 'Young people had a mind 'for an action, that he should be as ready as any of them if he 'could foresee any good from a victory, or any chance of bringing 'the army off if we should be defeated.' So it was resolved to march to our place of embarkation. At night our advanced posts were frequently attacked, we heard the enemy's drums, yet we beat ours (I mean the general and assemblée) though it was dark night before we marched. On our march our rear was attacked, and some few people wounded. By nine o'clock we got to the only place we could then embark at. The Commodore had got the ships as near as he could, and the boats ready. I must observe that the whole army (some of the guards and the rear guard excepted) had seen the road to and place of embarkation before the Quarter Master General, and when we came there we found lines thrown up by the enemy to prevent our landing. Had these been thrown down we might have used them for our defence instead of leaving them to be made use of against us, which they were. Behind the lines were sand hills and hollows, which formed so many breast works for the enemy. We were hardly got on the beach when their advanced guard appeared, and before the last regiment of the youngest brigade began to embark, they opened a battery upon us, soon after another, and advanced upon us in three collumns. Our frigates fired upon them and we threw abundance of shells with little or no effect; it only stopped them for a little while, and then they formed behind the hollows. Before the Guards were half embarked they began the attack, and many of them (as there had been before of other regiments) were killed in the boats. No disposition having been made they were soon thrown into confusion, and the eyes of every soldier was turned to the sea, and his thoughts to the hopes of saving himself by swiming to the boats. All the officers behaved remarkably well, and did all that brave men could do to keep the men together till boats arrived, but nothing could. restore order when once it was broke. The sea officers did everything in their power to expedite the embarkation, and exposed themselves very bravely. The Commodore himself went in his boat to pick up all the men he could, and had all his boatmen killed or wounded, and notwithstanding the account in the Gazzette, the slaughter amongst the seamen was very great, as you may judge when of one ship the killed and wounded amounted to twenty-nine, and of others in proportion. I find by the land account in the Gazzette the numbers greatly lessened, and no notice taken of the wounded that did escape. For instance, our Grenadiers have suffered greatly. We have the captain and one

lieutenant, two serjeants, and twenty-one prisoners, and twentynine killed or missing, but there is no notice taken of one lieutenant and twenty more wounded that have escaped. The first Regiment of Guards has 12 officers, 9 sergeants, and 225 men wounded and missing, and in a word every regiment has a number of wounded not taken notice of. Every company of grenadiers is about cut in two, and almost all the arms of those companies lost. Some officers have since died of their wounds. Such is the account of our last landing in France to the melancholy day of our re-embarkation in St. Cast Bay. When I landed I was told by those about the General that this landing would throw disgrace on our former commander. I was lucky enough to keep my temper, and unfortunate enough to foretell exactly what did happen.

"Since our return I am told that in London they blame us for not marching to the enemy and attacking them. I have all the reason in the world to believe we might have marched, but we should not have attacked them. A French officer who came with a message from M. d'Aiguillon told me as much. The intention of the enemy was to cut off our retreat to our ships. Provisions we had none, cloaths we had none, the men worn out and dispirited, and our numbers lessening every day; whereas the enemy had plenty of everything, and were encreasing in numbers every day.

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"I must not omit to add that the General picked up about three thousand pounds contribution money at Cherburgh. In this he shewed himself a more capable general than our former commander.

"I hope you will excuse the hurry this is wrote in, and whatsoever inconsistencies there may be in the wording of it, owing to that hurry and to my not being well. I have got the scurvy and, what is worse to me, a return of that disorder in my stomach I had last year. May I beg of your lordship to let my friend Hotham see this letter as I have not time to write to him."

Postscript. "I must not forget to tell you that we were all short of ammunition, and on applying for some was told there was none on shore nor none could be brought, and yet we were to go further into the country to attack the enemy.

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The French officer told me the force of the enemy was fourteen battallions of the King's forces, near three thousand militia, four squadrons of dragoons, two of dismounted dragoons, two hundred voluntaires etrangeres, fourteen pieces of cannon and eight mortars."

XI. THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR.

Bundle of letters written in 1758 and 1759 relating to the war on the Lower Rhine, and to the battle of Minden. The collection includes letters from Prince Ferdinand to Lord G. Sackville, from Lord G. Sackville to the Prince and to Lord Holdernesse, and from the Ministers to Lord G. Sackville, of which all of any

importance are calendared below. Among the miscellaneous papers are the following:

1758, September 23. Merveldt.-Plan of the country from Coesfeldt to Halteren, with the successive camps of the English and Hanoverians at or near Coesfelt, Lette, Merveldt and Dulmen, from August 14 to the present date.

1758, October 31.-Instructions for Lord George Sackville, Lieutenant General of the British Forces on the Lower Rhine. Signed by the King.

1759, April 13.-Plan of the battle of Bergen, near Frankfurt, fought on this date, between the French under the Duc de Broglie and the Allies under Prince Ferdinand.

LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE to LORD [HOLDERNESS?]

1758, November 21. Munster.-A courier from Berlin brings the news that the Austrians have retreated towards Peterswald in Bohemia. Marshal Daun has rather blockaded than besieged Dresden. The Austrians continued near the town till the 16th and then decamped, the King of Prussia having that day reached Gorlik. The troops about Leipsic have retired and Count Dohna attacked with success the detachment of General Haddick, who was obliged to retreat precipitately. The French are still on their march to re-pass the Rhine. The Prince of Soubise's movements are so contradictory that his true intentions are not known, but it said that his left is to be placed to the Rhine and his right along the Lahn, to keep in communication with M. de Contades' army, cantooning from Cleves to Coblentz. "The country hereabouts is so eat up that I fear we shall be much distressed for forrage and provisions." Copy.

PRINCE FERDINAND to "LORD SACKVILLE."

1758, December 31. Munster.-Is glad to hear of his safe arrival in London. As regards the augmentation of the army, has no doubt but that the necessity for it will turn the balance in the end, but fears that the time which should be given to preparations will be spent in deliberations. Urges in particular the increase of the light horse, which is so important that if it can be done in no other way, he would even decrease the infantry to augment the cavalry. Talent and zeal will do much, and he knows no one so capable as his Lordship of vanquishing even greater difficulties. French. Signed.

LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE to PRINCE FERDINAND.

1759, January 19.-Is overcome by the kindness of his serene Highness's letter, and has the pleasure of announcing to him that the augmentation of the light troops, both Hessian and Hanoverian, is resolved upon, in spite of great difficulty in regard to the increased expense. The King, moreover, has held out hopes of 300 Irish troops as an additional recruit for the infantry, but it is to be feared that the Viceroy may upset this project. Is pleased to be able to steal a march on the Duke of Newcastle in