LORD G. SACKVILLE to [MR. MARTIN].

1759, June 22. The Camp at Ritberg. Has received his letter of the 12th, is always ready to obey the commands of the Lords of the Treasury, and will endeavour to undertake the service relating to the prisoners of war. Baron Munchausen, the only person who understands the affairs of the Chancellerie de Guerre, is away. Suggests methods for managing the business. Copy.

LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE to LORD [HOLDERNESSE ?].

1759, June 23. Camp at Ritberg.-The troops have come from Brencken to this place by way of Lipstadt. The Duc de Broglie had joined Marshal Contades, but they made no attempt to obstruct the march. The French are now at Brencken, and may begin operations by besieging Lipstadt. "The Prince seems by his dispositions to intend gaining time, and not put the fate of these countries to the decision of a battle without an absolute necessity. The French are either not prepared for advancing or are waiting fresh orders from Court." Copy.

BARON MÜNCHHAUSEN.

1759, July 5. London.-Memorial from Baron Münchhausen, complaining of Mr. Intendant General Hunter's refusal to indemnify the Chancellerie de Guerre of Hanover for the advances made the French prisoners of war, and demanding, by order of the King, that Mr. Hunter be authorized to re-imburse the advances made and to provide money for the future. Copy.

LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE to LORD HOLDERNESSE.

1759, July 6 and 7. Camp at Dissen.-The French are said to be at Belefeld, and the outposts of the two armies are so near that they are continually skirmishing. Our Hussars have been dislodged from Halle and driven in upon Ravensberg Castle. The French, about a thousand strong, came up with great spirit to the Castle, but were soon obliged to retire with the loss of about twenty men. The Prince at once re-inforced this post, upon which the French abandoned Halle. General Wangenheim is on his march from Munster, and we hope shortly, with this re-inforcement, to be in a condition more openly to obstruct the designs of the enemy. Draft.

PRINCE FERDINAND to LORD GEORGE "SACKVIL."

Cela

1759, July 11. Bomte.-"L'ennemi est maitre de Minden. Je crains qu'il ne me prenne aussi Niembourg sans que je le puisse empêcher. Mes magazins sur le Weser sont donc par la en danger. J'ai voulu voler au secours de Minden. m'a manqué. Dois je continuer au hazard si Niembourg est pris, ou non voler pour secourir le dit endroit, et tacher d'y prevenir l'ennemi; ou, voiant l'impossibilité de ne plus reuissir avec

probabilité, dois je abandonner entierement le Weser, pour me raprocher de mes magazins d'Osnabruck, de Münster et le long de l'Embs, en marchant au secours de Münster, qui se trouve pareillement investi. Je m'attends, du zele que vous portés au bien de la cause commune et aux interets du roi, que vous me dirés votre sentiment sur une affaire aussi importente. Il se pourait même qu'au moment que j'ecris celle-ci, que Münster ne fut plus a notre pouvoir. Cela est probabel. Aiant representé en gros le tableau de ma situation presente, j'ose vous prier de me donner votre avis en consequence. Il faut que cela soit decidé tout de suite, puis que demain il faut que je me porte ou par ma gauche ou par ma droite, en consequence de l'un ou l'autre cas." Holograph.

LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE to PRINCE FERDINAND.

[1759, July 11.]-If it was absolutely in your Serene Highness's power to secure Munster, I should strongly advise your abandoning the Weser, and confining yourself to keeping those countries which would best enable us to carry on the war, as I do not conceive that the enemy would venture to establish their winter quarters in Hanover, whereas if they were once in possession of Munster, &c., it would be most difficult to dispossess them. But as your Highness doubts whether Munster is yet in your power to save, I do not hesitate to declare it as my opinion "that it is most for the King's service and the good of the common cause first to attempt the saving our magazines at Nienburgh, &c., as by that means a battle may ensue, and, if le bon Dieu nous aide, I should hope your Serene Highness, in consequence of a victory, would remain master of Westphalia likewise. But if, from further intelligence, your Serene Highness sees it impracticable with any degree of probability to succeed in securing the Weser, and in bringing the enemy to a decisive engagement, what I have said in regard to Munster must weigh down all other considerations, especially as we shall by that means preserve our communication with England and Holland.” Draft.

LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE to LORD [HOLDERNESSE].

1759, July 18. Camp at Oberstadt.-"I have not had an opportunity of writing to your lordship since the 7th of this month from the camp at Dissen. I did then imagine . . . that a general engagement was unavoidable, and I believe the Prince. marched with that intention from Dissen to Osnabrugh, in his way to Minden, near which place we expected to have found the enemy, but when we were at Bomte, we received the account of the French having attacked and possessed themselves of Minden, a blow so unexpected and so fatal to the Prince's plan of operations that it immediately reduced him to the necessity of giving up Munster, Osnabrugh and Westphalia and the whole course of the Emms, and by forced marches attempting to save Nienburgh

and keep the Lower Weser as the chief source of his subsistence, or else to return to the Bishoprick of Munster, and by preserving those countrys and the great magazines there, abandon, at least for the summer, the Weser and all his Majesty's Electoral dominions. The Prince, I dare say for the best reasons, preferred the plan of protecting the Lower Weser, and by the quickness of his march and his able dispositions, saved Nienburgh and possessed himself of Bremen." He then marched to the enemy, but found them in a position too strong to be forced, especially as the corps under the Duc de Broglie, which had been detached for the siege of Hamelin, had, by a forced night march, rejoined Marshal Contades. The army has undergone great fatigue lately, yet "we hear no grumbling or complaint, but the truest spirit and cheerfulness appear upon every occasion." Draft.

LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE to LORD [BUTE ?].

[1759, July 18.]-I cannot recollect whence I last wrote to your Lordship, but since then our situation is so changed for the worse that I did not imagine it could have happened to us without loss of a battle. Prince Ferdinand's plan seemed to be the preserving Munster, Osnabrugh, Westphalia, &c., as long as possible without risking a decisive engagement, until we reached Bomte, a march this side Osnabrugh, where our whole force was collected, and we were on the point of marching to the enemy, when the French unexpectedly attacked and carried Minden by assault. "This news found us at Bomte in the most disagreeable and critical position possible. It was necessary however to come to an immediate decision; the Prince, who seldom asks opinions, was pleased upon that occasion to call upon General Sporcken, General Imhoff and myself to give our thoughts upon the party he was to take. It is not very easy to form opinions without hearing all that the person knows who puts the questions to you however, I never will make difficultys, and I instantly returned my answer. I enclose to you copys of the paper the Prince gave me and what I wrote in answer after putting it into French.

"I need not beg your Lordship to keep this entirely to yourself, as it is an affair I think it improper for me to write to the Ministry upon, as it is a sort of private transaction. General Sporcken was absolutely for coming hither, Imhoff for returning to Munster, upon a supposition that the enemy must have taken Nienburgh, as we had three marches and they only one forced march to get thither. We were afterwards called upon to talk the affair over . . . and I joined entirely with General Imhoff and was for returning instantly to secure Munster, but however, the other part was taken, and by it we have given up immense magazines, lost winter quarters in a country that would have supply'd us with forrage &c. without expense to the publick, and our nearest communications with England and Holland cut off. The Prince however so far has succeeded as by forced marches to have saved Nienburgh; he has likewise seized

Bremen, and yesterday marched up to the enemy at Minden, found them so strongly posted as made an attack impossible," and has therefore returned to this camp. I fancy the chief reason which led Prince Ferdinand to prefer keeping the Weser to all other considerations was preserving his communications with the King of Prussia. "I only wish we may ever see assistance come from that quarter. We certainly must not expect it without some great previous success on that side."

"As for the Electoral dominions, I sincerely pity the subjects of them, for I am sure the distress that will be brought upon them by having their country the seat of war will be infinitely greater than what they would have suffer'd by the contributions that would have been regularly and equally levell'd upon them by the enemy.

"I see little hopes of mending our situation. The enemy will not fight as long as they can carry all their points without risking a battle, and I confess, in my poor opinion, Marshal Contades has fairly outwitted us. It would be presumption in me to think we could have done better, but I own, when we were at the camp of Dissen, the enemy did seem to have given us an opening which I then wish'd and expected would have been taken by possessing ourselves of a camp between them and Paderborn.

Prince Ferdinand, in his conversation with us at Bomte, said that he did not know but he should have done wiser had he risk'd the taking the camp at [blank], and added the Hereditary Prince was strongly of that opinion; but then, said he, I should have exposed my magazines at Osnabrugh." Draft.

LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE to LORD [HOLDERNESSE]. 1759, July 27. Camp at Petershagen.-About six thousand Imperial troops are in Brunswick, raising contributions, and it is feared there are no troops there to oppose their progress. The Prince keeps his army very alert. Every morning the cavalry saddle, the infantry dress, and the pickets are advanced, so there is no danger of a surprise, and if the enemy gives the least opening for an attack, the Prince will be ready to take advantage of it. Copy.

LORD HOLDERNESSE to LORD G. SACKVILLE.

1759, July 31. Whitehall.-Has received his letter of the 17th (218) inst. and laid it before the King, who laments the untimely loss of Minden. The enemy still continue to threaten an invasion of England. Signed.

THE SAME to THE SAME.

1759, August 10. Whitehall.-Congratulates him on the glorious success of his Majesty's arms on the 1st inst., and rejoices that their losses were not considerable. On Capt. Ligonier's arrival the earliest notice possible was given to those who had relations at the army. The arrival of Colonel Fitzroy is awaited with the utmost impatience. Signed.

PAPERS RELATING TO THE BATTLE OF MINDEN AND THE

TRIAL OF LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE.

These papers include the King's warrant for the trial, dated 27th January, 1760; the Attorney General's and the Solicitor General's report to the Earl of Holderness, dated 12th January, 1760, and observations thereon; opinions, questions to various officers present at the Battle of Minden and their answers, and questions put to witnesses in cross-examination by Lord George Sackville: declarations of witnesses: list of officers to be summoned from Germany and in England: Lord George Sackville's reply to the Judge Advocate: his defence and notes on the evidence, &c., in his handwriting: memorandum in French of the orders given by Prince Ferdinand, and other correspondence, observations and papers.

LORD GEORGE SACKVILLE to PRINCE FERDINAND.

1759, August 2. Camp at Minden.-" Pardonnes que j'avoue a V. A. S. que j'ai recu comme un coup de foudre les ordres qu'il lui a plût à donner aujourdjui; j'y suis si sensible et je m'y vois si fortement interressé qu'il faut pour mon repos que je prens la liberté de lui conter le fait simplement comme il est arrivé.

"J'ai reçu ordre par M. Malhorti de former et d'avancer toute la Cavalerie; peu de tems apres, un autre ordre me vint de faire avancer la Cavalerie Brittanique seulement; ces deux ordres suivirent de si près qu'ils m'embarrassèrent un peu, j'envoiois cependant la faire faire le detour du Bois, et apprennant que V. A. n'etait pas eloigné, je pris le parti d'aller moi même lui faire rapport de ce qui se passoit, et demander ses instructions ulterieures, ce qui ne tarda nullement l'execution des premiers.

"L'ordre que je donnois à mylord Granby de faire halte c'était tousjours dans le dessein d'obeir aux votres en gardant l'alignement, qui ne dura surement que très peu de tems, autant seulement qui etoit necessaire a cet effet. Je lui donnai après pour la même raison le même ordre, il me fit dire qu'il avoit reçu ceux de V. A. de s'avancer et il le fit effectivement, et je me pressai avec la droite pour m'aligner avec lui, jusqu'à ce que nous arrivâmes où nous étions ordonné derrière l'Infanterie, et il le me parût même dans ce moment qu'il ne me devança point; mylord Granby me rendra sur ces articles justice, et m'autorise de lui dire qu'il est prèt a rendre son temoignage làdessus à V. A. en ma presence. V. A. aura la bonté de faire de même, et comme je ne sçaurai me persuader qu'elle voudroit me nuire a un tel point dans l'armée et dans le monde, elle voudra dans les ordres de demain me rétablir dans l'opinion de tous les deux. C'est une grace que je vous demande puisque ceux d'aujourdjui semblent me condamner sans me nommer, et je l'espère d'autant plus, puisque si V. A. avoit vu elle-même ma situation, et tout ce que j'y fis, elle ne m'auroit pas cru coupable. Si je l'ai été, c'étoit surement mon malheur et non mon intention." Endorsed by Lord George. "Copy of letter to P. Ferdinand."