PRACTICE. CHAPTER I. PRACTICE IN GENERAL. THE practice of courts, by which the proceedings in actions are governed, is founded on ancient and immemorial usage, regulated from time to time by rules and orders, judicial decisions, and legislative enactments. The practice is the law of the court, and as such is the law of the land.1 The The rules and orders of court are either such as are made for the regulation of its general practice, or such as apply only to proceedings in particular cases. former are agreed upon or adopted by the whole court; the latter depend upon the individual discretion of the judge, who may preside in any particular case. The former are unalterable, except by the power that made them; the latter may be enlarged, revoked or altered in any manner that the circumstances and nature of the case may require.2 The rules regulating the admission of attornies, the entry of actions, the filing of pleas in abatement, the taking and opening of depositions, and the like, 1 Tidd's Pract. Introd. p. 11. Per Aston, J. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. Rep. 2572. * Vide Thompson et al. v. Hatch and Trs. 3 Pick, Rep. 512, 516. 1 which are to be found in the code published by the court, constitute the former class. Rules of the second class, which with us are more frequently, and perhaps more properly termed orders, are those particular decrees, which are made from time to time, in the progress of a cause, for the purpose of bringing it to a rightful termination. They are often passed in relation to the application of the general rules of court, although they more frequently refer to subjects independent of them. Besides these two classes, there is an intermediate one, general in its application, like the former, but unwritten, and in some measure discretionary like the latter. They depend upon common usage, and may be called the Common Law of the courts. The practice of the courts in Westminster is generally considered as furnishing the outline of practice, in all those courts in which the Common Law is administered.1 In many respects, however, our practice differs widely from theirs. The powers of the several courts to make and enforce these several rules and orders, is derived partly from statutes, and is partly inherent in their very nature. The statute creating the Supreme Court, authorizes them to punish at discretion, all contempts committed against the authority of the same. Contempt is a technical word, and is by no means confined to indignities put upon the court, but includes any kind of disobedience or disregard to its reasonable orders, or any omission of duty on the part of its officers. There is no statute conferring such a power as this 1 Fowler et al. v. Miller, 3 Dallas' Rep. 411. 2 Stat. 1782, ch. 9. s. 2. |