Imagens das páginas
PDF
ePub

ation of the note, although it made the note void, did not operate to destroy the original contract, which could be enforced without using the note as evidence of the same. If the note had been the note of a third party, or had other names on it than the original parties to the contract, it could not be surrendered under such circumstances, because such surrender would not place the parties in the same condition they were in before the note was given. Here, however, the note never was of any value beyond the original contract. Its surrender at any time was of no moment in changing the rights and liabilities of the parties. The destruction of the note in any way, whether voluntary or involuntary, might be shown, and the right to recover on the original contract would be perfect. The alteration of the note may or may not have been a criminal act, but that would have no effect on the original contract. A case similar in its relations is where a note is given for a pre-existing debt, and the holder takes usurious interest for the extension of the time of payment. Such note, although void for the usury, does not destroy the original cause of action. Farmers and Mechanics' Bank v. Joslyn, 37 N. Y. 353; Winsted Bank v. Webb, 39 N. Y. 325, cited. There can be no doubt of the right of the plaintiff to recover on the original security if the note had been surrendered without any alteration. That right is not taken away by the supposed alteration of the note. Judgment affirmed. Meyer v. Huneke. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J.

5. Recission of contracts-defined: right of party to recover back deposit on contract of sale. - Plaintiff had a contract to purchase land of defendant, on which he made a payment. When the time fixed for delivering the deed arrived the plaintiff objected to take it on account of an assessment upon the property, but said he was willing to take the same when the defendants could give a deed according to the contract. The assessment was paid and the deed tendered on the next day. Plaintiff refused again to take the title on account of leases which he said were on the property. The justice found that such leases were known to plaintiff at the time of the purchase. Held, that the tender of performance by the defendant, and refusal of plaintiff to accept the deed, terminated the contract on the part of the defendant if there were no incumbrances on the property at the time. It was not a recission of the contract on their part which required a repayment of the purchase-money to make such recission valid. It was a discharge by the plaintiff of the defendant's obligation, and did not entitle him to a repayment of the money paid on making of the contract. If neither party seeks to enforce the contract on the day fixed for performance equity will give relief afterward; but where the vendor tenders the deed and demands performance on the day, and the vendee refuses, he cannot afterward seek in equity to be relieved from his own voluntary refusal to perform his contract. Ketchum v. Eversen, 13 J. R. 359, cited. Judgment in favor of defendants affirmed. Page v. McDonnell et al. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J.

Also see Evidence and Specific Performance.
DAMAGES. See Statutes, construction of.
EQUITY PRACTICE. See Specific Performance.
EQUITY OF REDEMPTION. See Mortgages.

EVIDENCE.

Contracts of service: evidence of accounts: testimony to vary written contract: costs. This action is to recover for services rendered by the plaintiff as attorney

and counselor, and for money advanced. The answer sets up the rendering of accounts by plaintiff from time, and that prior to this action defendant had a full settlement and paid all claims against him. Several objections to the admission or rejection of evidence were taken on the trial, and are reviewed in the opinion of the general term. Appeal from judgment in favor of plaintiff, entered upon the report of the referee. Held, the plaintiff's evidence consisted mainly of testimony as to the various suits, and services rendered in each. He testified to disbursements in going to Washington for defendant. This was objected to because the items were not furnished before defendant was compelled to pay the account. There was no objection to stating the amount of the disbursements. Defendant had the right on crossexamination to inquire into the items. There is no rule which requires the items of an account to be furnished before plaintiff can bring his action to compel payment. There was no objection to plaintiffs stating what the taxable costs would have been in an action, as a piece of evidence, from which with other matters a judgment might be formed of the value of the services rendered. It was also proper to allow plaintiff to state what a certain receipt produced was for, and the statements of the defendant when it was given to him. Where a party gives parol testimony as to a written contract, he cannot prevent the other party from making a similar statement because it varied the contract. Judgment affirmed. Foster v. Newbrough. Opinion by Ingraham, P. J.

Also see Contracts; Landlord and Tenant and Specific Performance.

INTEREST. See Statutes, construction of.

LANDLORD AND TENANT.

Surrender of premises must be completed: evidence: rights of sub-tenants.- Appeal from judgment in favor of defendants. This action is brought to recover rent from defendants as assignees of a certain lease. Defendants allege that the premises were rendered untenantable by fire, and the surrender thereof. Held, that it was incumbent on the defendants to show a a substantial surrender of the whole of the premises. They failed to show that one Osborn, who had an office in the building, for which he had paid the rent for six months in advance to defendants, had ever surrendered to them or to the landlord, or consented that defendants might surrender his term, as well as their own, to the landlord. Osborn's tenancy had not expired when the repairs to the building were completed, and there was nothing to hinder him from claiming and enjoying the remainder of his term. New trial ordered. Smith v. Sonnekold et al. Opinion by Davis, J. LIENS. See Mortgages.

MORTGAGES.

1. Effect of tender on the mortgage lien: who may make tender: cases reviewed: rights of owner of equity of redemption. This is an action for the foreclosure of two bonds and mortgages executed in 1858 by the defendant Poillon. Poillon subsequently conveyed the mortgaged premises to the defendant Jex. The conveyance was expressly subject to the mortgages, but Jex did not personally assume them. Jex and wife alone defended. The defense proved was, that before the commencement of the action Jex tendered the amount due, in legal tender notes. Judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiff, that he was entitled to the

amount of the mortgages in gold coin, and for a sale of the premises to raise enough to pay the gold coin and premium. Subsequently the plaintiff remitted the part of the judgment giving him the premium, and consented to a reduction thereof accordingly. Held, that the case of Kortright v. Cady, 21 N. Y. 343, should not be pressed beyond its strict limits. The familiar doctrine upon which it rests, that the bond is the principal and the mortgage the collateral, has been met with a contrary view in the common understanding. It is the security on the land and not the responsibility of the debtor to which men look in taking'mortgages. To hold that a mere tender, without actual payment, is a discharge of the lien may sometimes operate very unjustly, as in transfers of mortgages the original mortgagor is frequently ignored, and the land alone regarded as of real value. The learned judge then inquires who has the right to make a tender which shall have the effect to discharge the mortgage lien. He examines the cases of Jackson v. Crafts, 18 Johns. 110; Merritt v. Lambert, 7 Paige, 344; Edwards v. Loan Co., 21 Wend. 467; 26 id. 541; Arnot v. Post, 6 Hill, 65 (reversed 2 Denio, 344), and Kortright v. Cady, supra, and concludes therefrom that a tender cannot be made by a mere stranger to the contract so as to oblige the creditor to accept it. The reasoning in the cases cited is based on the right of the mortgagor to pay his debt; and in Kortright v. Cady, it does not appear whether the holder of the equity of redemption had assumed a personal liability to pay the debt. The owner of the equity of redemption who has not assumed the debt, can redeem the land from the mortgage lien not by a mere tender which is not kept good, but by actual payment or by bringing the money into court for the purpose of payment. There is no debt from him, and his mere tender does not discharge the mortgage lien. In the case at bar, Jex took the land subject to the mortgages, and in doing so probably deducted their amount from the price agreed on. The land is then primarily liable for the debt, and Poillon has a right to insist upon the collection of the debt first out of the land. Now if Jex's mere tender has discharged the lien, all the rights of the mortgagee seem to have gone. He cannot sue Jex, for Jex never assumed the debt. He cannot enforce the lien for that, by the supposition is discharged. He cannot sue Poillon for by the discharge of the primary fund, Poillon, who has become a quasi surety must be released. Such a result ought not be reached save on the clearest legal principles. Judgment in favor of plaintiff affirmed. Harris v. Jex et al. Opinion by Learned, J.

2. At the time of the tender, the United States supreme court had declared that such a contract as the one in question was payable in gold. It would be unjust that plaintiff should suffer for following the law as it was then declared to be. Parties are only required to know the law as it exists at the time, not as it may be declared afterward. Ib.

NEW YORK CITY. See Statutes— construction of. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. See Contracts. Quantum Meruit. See Specific Performance. REAL ESTATE. See Contracts. Specific performance: special issue to try quantum meruit in equitable action.-Action by an attorney at law for a specific performance of an agreement in writing, executed by the defendant to convey to the plaintiff, who is therein described as defendant's attorney in certain actions, and as having "incurred

responsibilities in the employment of additional counsel in said suits," "one-third of all property or money recovered" in said actions, the consideration as stated in the agreement being "the services of said B. (the plaintiff), rendered and to be rendered, and to enable him to discharge said responsibility to counsel and others." The evidence shows that after the agreement plaintiff called upon defendant for money, and she paid him $625, part of which he applied toward his own compensation. And that when the cases were settled the sum of $1,200 was paid by defendant to counsel therein employed by plaintiff. Held, This was withdrawing from the defendant all benefit of the agreement, superseding its mutuality, and ignoring it altogether, so far as the plaintiff's obligations were concerned. Equity would say that if the defendant must, under the agreement, surrender one-third of the property she acquired in the settlement, she should have back the $625 which the plaintiff received; and should also have allowed to her the $1,500 which the plaintiff was to provide for, but did not. These sums are of the consideration of the agreement.

In order to invoke the aid of a court of equity to enforce an agreement, plaintiff must show that he has fully and particularly performed the agreement on his part, which was the consideration supporting the agreement.

This the plaintiff failed in this case to show.

2. Another question remains. Has the plaintiff been reasonably compensated for his services? That he rendered valuable services is proved. Several witnesses whose professional experience and intelligence qualified them to speak on the subject, were asked as to the value of the plaintiff's services, but the court excluded their testimony. This was error. The plaintiff is entitled to present his evidence on that point, and to have the judgment pronounced on that evidence.

Although this was an action in equity for specific performance which was refused, yet the case may be retained to do complete justice, and by an assessment of damages to inquire whether any further compensation is due plaintiff.

Judgment of special term, so far as specific performance was refused, should be affirmed, in all other respects reversed, and a special issue directed to be tried at the circuit as to whether, on a quantum meruil, the plaintiff is entitled to further compensation. Burling v. King. Opinion by Fancher, J.

SURRENDER.

SURETIES. See Undertakings.

See Contracts and Landlord and Tenant. STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION OF.

1. Act of April 9, 1813, and chap. 196, laws 1818, construed: New York city: interest on damages awarded for property taken in opening streets. - Appeal from judgment in favor of plaintiffs. In pursuance of a petition to this court in March, 1865, commissioners were appointed to assess the damages sustained by the owners of the land taken in the widening of Church street in New York city. They assessed plaintiffs' damages at $93,180. Their report was confirmed on 30th December, 1867. On 7th December, 1868, plaintiffs petitioned the common council to pay said damages, with interest from 7th January, 1868, the day on which the report was filed. On 12th June, 1869, the damages were paid, but the defendants refused to pay interest. This action is brought to recover the same. Held, the effect of the act of 1813 (April 9th), and chap. 196, laws 1818, taken together, is that the corporation, after the con

firmation of the commissioners' report, are to appoint, by affirmative action, a time for carrying the improvement into effect; that this appointment must be made within fifteen months at most, and until such appointed time proceedings are suspended, and the fee and right of possession are taken subject to such suspension and the restrictions it imposes. The requirement of the act of 1813, to pay within four months from the confirmation of the report, is changed to an obligation to pay four months after the expiration of the time appointed for carrying the improvement into effect. Until the arrival of the time appointed, or the expiration of the fifteen months, the possession and enjoyment of the lands remain undisturbed in the former owner and his tenants. There is no constitutional difficulty in this system. Strang v. The New York Rubber Co., 1 Sweeney, 78; Detmold v. Drake, 46 N. Y. 318. The presumption that these statutes make, that the continued use is equal in value to the interest on the award is more just, than a rule, which makes the city pay interest on an award for premises of which, during the time claimed for, the owner has the undisturbed enjoyment and possession. Judgment reversed. Hammersley et al. v. The Mayor, etc.. of New York. Opinion by Davis, J. Affirmed by court of appeals. See 8 A. L. J., p. 256.

2. Ib. Though there is some difficulty in reconciling the two acts, equity will not permit the plaintiffs to have the land and the fruits of its possession, under the act of 1818, and at the same time receive interest after the four months named in the act of 1813, as if no act of 1818 existed. They waived any objection to the constitutionality of the latter act, by collecting rents from their tenants for some time subsequent to the confirmation of the commissioner's report. They cannot stand upon both statutes and claim the benefits of both, for the two positions are inconsistent and incompatible with justice. Judgment should be reversed. lb. Opinion by Fancher, J.

3. Ib. Dissenting opinion. -The learned judge, in dissenting, says that the suspension must be made by an affirmative and definite action of the common council, within four months from the confirmation of the report. If not then done the owner may demand and sue for his damages. In this case it cannot be inquired whether the plaintiffs were in possession, or received the rents down to the time of the payment of the award. lb. Opinion by Mullin, J., dissentiente.

STREETS. See Statutes, construction of.
TENDER. See Mortgages.

UNDERTAKINGS.

Liability of sureties on undertaking to discharge attachment. - Appeal from judgment in favor of defendants. The question presented on this appeal is whether an action can be maintained against sureties on an undertaking given to discharge an attachment which provided for the payment of the judgment, which may be recovered against the defendants, when the judgment recorded is against some of them only. The undertaking was given under §§ 240, 241 of Code. Held, the case of Kifling v. Turner, 5 B. & Ald. 261, is decisive of this question. The persons are described by character. The obligation is to pay the judgment in the action in which the undertaking was given, and two of them against whom the judgment was rendered, are of that character. Although the question is not free from doubt, the failure to recover against all the defendants does not, from the nature and object of the agreement, seem an indispensable prerequisite to the liability of

[blocks in formation]

The New York Supreme Court Reports: October, 1873, vol. 1, part 1. Albany; John D. Parsons, Jr.

That the reporting of the decisions of the Supreme Court of this State has, for sometime, been hopelessly bad, is very generally conceded. Wherein it has failed to meet the reasonable requirements of the profession, we have too often pointed out to justify a repetition of it at this time. The object of the new series is to do what the reporters, neither separately nor collectively, have heretofore done, that is, to report the decisions of the General Terms of the Supreme Court, promptly, accurately and completely.

The first part contains, either in brief or in full, a report of all the cases in which opinions were delivered. determined at the June terms in the third and fourth Departments. There are in this first part of some two hundred and fifty pages, fifty-six cases reported in full, and abstracts of eleven others, the opinions in which were not of sufficient importance to require publication in extenso. None of the cases are of any great importance, excepting, perhaps, two or three relating to bonding towns in aid of railroads, but the fact that all cases are reported in one form or another, is an assurance that we shall find in it whatever important cases the court shall decide. The next part will contain the decisions of the September terms, there being no general terms either in July or August. As there are only eighteen General Terms per year in the State, and as this part contains the decisions of two of them, quite as important and heavy as the average, and as three of the parts are expected to make a volume, it is more than probable that three volumes a year will be sufficient to include all the work of our general terms. It might be found advantageous and useful to include the more important decisions of the special terms.

The cases are well reported, and the number is excellent in mechanical execution.

Titles to Real Estate in the State of New York. A Digested Treatise and Compendium of Law, applicable to Titles to Real Estate in the State of New York. By James W. Gerard, Jr. Second edition. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1873.

This is an amplification of the author's useful little work on the same subject published several years ago. The author's aim in its compilation "has been the exposition of the principal features of the real estate law of this State in a practical shape, under clearly distinguishing heads, and within the compass of a single volume." Among the subjects treated more or less fully are: Eminent domain; what persons may hold and convey land; the various estates in land; uses and trusts in realty; powers; joint interests; title by descent, devise, deed, possession, dedication, prescription, easement, etc., through partition proceedings, escheat and forfeiture, sale on execution, etc; assignments and transfers under the insolvent law and under the bankrupt law; lien of judgments; ejectment and summary proceedings; lien of taxes and assessments; mechanics' lien, etc., etc. To enable the author to include in one volume all the subjects per

taining to titles to realty, he has been compelled to condense the great mass of material, and has done it very successfully. His statements are clear and concise, and his arrangement compact and generally good. The work is rather a handy-book than a treatise. It is an eminently practical work, intended for practical lawyers and conveyancers, and we do not doubt that they will find it of great utility.

WAIVER OF TORTS.

The case of Smith v. Baker (L. R., 8 C. P. 350), was a somewhat novel application of the principles of law relating to the affirmance of a tortious act and consequent waiver of the tort. The cases in which the question of waiver of a tort has been raised have most frequently been cases where the proceeds of a wrongful sale of the property converted have been received by the injured party, or recovered by him in an action for money had and received against the wrongdoer. It may be doubted whether there have not been expressions used in the cases on this subject which tend to place a principle that is in itself most sound and expedient on a dangerously narrow and technical ground. The case of Smith v. Baker was this. The trustee of a bankrupt's estate applied under the 72d section of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, to the Court of Bankruptcy to declare a bill of sale, made by the bankrupt previously to his bankruptcy, fraudulent, and void as against himself as trustee, and to order the assignee under the bill of sale, who had, previously to the bankruptcy, sold the goods comprised therein to pay over the proceeds of the sale to himself as such trustee. The Court of Bankruptcy having made the order prayed for, the assignee under the bill of sale accordingly paid over the proceeds of the sale to the trustee. The trustee afterward brought an action of trover against the assignee under the bill of sale to recover the difference between the value of the goods and the amount realized by the sale.

It was held that the action would not lie, on the ground that, by the proceedings in bankruptcy to recover the proceeds of the sale, the plaintiff had affirmed the sale and waived the tort. It was argued by the counsel for the defendant that the proceedings in bankruptcy were analogous to an action for money had and received, and that the law was clear that, by bringing an action for money had and received in respect of a tortious sale, the plaintiff waived the tort, and could not afterward recover in trover. The doctrine that by bringing an action of money had and received the tort is waived, is generally supported by reference to the case of Smith v. Hodson (2 Sm. L. C. 6th ed. 119). In that case it was held that where the assignees of a bankrupt brought assumpsit to recover the proceeds of goods fraudulently delivered to a creditor by the bankrupt on the eve of bankruptcy, they affirmed the contract, and the creditor might set off his debt. The decision in this and similar cases is sometimes supported by reasoning of this sort. The plaintiff can only be entitled to recover the proceeds of the sale on the footing that the defendant was his agent to make it. He cannot therefore be allowed to blow hot and cold, to say in one action that the defendant was his agent, and then in another to turn round and say that he was a tort feasor. It seems to us that this is an unnecessarily narrow and technical ground on which to put the case. It is a way of looking at the matter which savours too much of legal subtlety, and

does not correspond to the substantial realities of the case. There is probably no sort of intention in the mind of the party proceeding to waive the tort or any contemplation of the defendant as his agent. The defendant was not his agent in fact, nor did he mean to treat the defendant as such. His whole case is that the sale was a tort. He claims, in substance, to be entitled to the money as representing the property of which he has been wrongfully deprived, and, as representing such property, the defendant is obliged by the law to pay over the proceeds. A. having wrongfully taken and changed the form of B.'s property to some extent, why is not B., according to any sound general principle of jurisprudence, entitled to recover his property in its changed form without being held in any way to have affirmed A.'s act in changing the form in which it existed.

And why should he be barred from recovering any loss to which he may have been put by reason of the change of form? The real reason for the soundness of the decisions appear to be founded upon an application of the maxim nemo pro eadem casuâ debet bis vexaria. If a man, having it in his power to bring an action in which he might recover, not only the amount of the proceeds of the tortious sale, but the full value of the goods, chooses to proceed in a form of action in which he can recover the former only, justice and expediency alike dictate that he should, by the fact of so proceeding, be held to have waived the right to take any other mode of proceeding. What occasion is there to have recourse to the fiction that he has treated the defendant as his agent? It is submitted that the form of action is what constitutes the waiver, not any election to treat the tort feasor as agent.

In Smith v. Baker the decision appears to be manifestly a correct one, because it is clear that the plaintiff might have equally well applied to the Court of Bankruptcy to make the defendant responsible for the full value of the goods under the 72d section as to make him responsible for the proceeds. The section says nothing about the proceeds of the sale, but it gives the Court jurisdiction to apply any remedy which the justice of the case demands for the purpose of a proper distribution of the estate. The distinction above drawn may not appear very material in its application to the effect of bringing an action for money had and received as a waiver of a tort, inasmuch as it is admitted that such an action is a waiver of the tort for whatever reason it may be so; but the question is not without its importance in relation to other modes of waiver.

If bringing an action for money had and received were a waiver for the reason that the plaintiff thereby must be considered as making the defendant his agent, it would very nearly follow, as a matter of logic, that the mere receipt of the proceeds of the goods by the party injured would have the same effect: If you cannot claim the proceeds of your goods that have been wrongfully taken from you and sold in an action for money received without thereby being taken to make the defendant your agent, it may be argued that you cannot claim them at all without the same effect being produced. Now, though receipt of the proceeds of goods converted may, in some cases, and under some circumstances, amount to waiver of the tort, as in the case of Brewer v. Sparrow, 7 B. & C. 310, we cannot think that it can be the law that it would do so in all cases and under all circumstances. The plaintiff may have received them merely as representing the prop

erty which was his, and in mitigation of future damages, and not with the least intention of giving up his right of recovering any further damage he may have sustained. In such case the question of waiver is a question of intention-meaning by intention not so much the purpose which may have actually existed in the mind of the injured party as the purpose which, judging of his intention by the ordinary conduct of mankind, the tort feasor was entitled to presume from his conduct. Bovill, C. J., in his judgment in Smith v. Baker, speaks of the action for money had and received as amounting to a conclusive election in point of law to waive the tort, but he says, "There is another class of cases in which an act is of an ambiguous character, and may or may not be done with the intention of adopting and affirming the wrongful act; in such cases the question whether the tort has been waived becomes a matter rather of fact than of law."

It seems a very strong measure to hold that mere receipt of the proceeds which, ex æquo et bono, belong to the owner of the property converted as representing that property in its converted state, should deprive the owner of any further remedy for the depreciation in value which such property has suffered by the process of conversion. The case of Lythgoe v. Vernon (5 H. & N. 180), which seems to go to the full length of the proposition we venture to controvert, seems to have been very hastily decided on the authority of Brewer v. Sparrow. The latter case does not go any thing like the length to which it seems to have been assumed to go in Lythgoe v. Vernon; there was much more than mere receipt of moneys, for the balance of an account was there received after an account had been rendered by the defendant of his dealings with the bankrupt's goods without any objection or difficulty raised by the plaintiffs. This was clearly good evidence of an intention to affirm the tortious act. The case of Burn v. Morris (4 Tyr. 485) was not cited in Lythgoe v. Vernon, in which case it was held that receipt of part of the proceeds of a tort did not waive the tort. It is to be observed that the plea in Lythgoe v. Vernon alleged a waiver of the tort; possibly this allegation may be read as implying a receipt of the money under such circumstances as to waive the tort, though it would seem a sounder construction to treat it only as an allegation of a conclusion of law arising out of the facts stated in the plea. The decision appears to us to be far from a satisfactory one, and with reference to the future decision of the question, if it should again be raised, it has seemed to us of some interest to discuss the exact principle upon which the action for money had and received is a waiver of a tort.- Solicitors' Journal.

LEGAL OBITUARY.

NOTES.

Messrs. Little, Brown & Company have in preparation and will next month issue the first volume of a new edition of the United States Digest-first series. The new series of annual volumes began with the year 1870, and numbers three volumes. The first series reached over thirty volumes, most of them annuals, so that they were not only expensive but inconvenient, it being necessary to examine some twenty-seven volumes in investigating any one subject. The new edition is to be comprised in twelve volumes, is under the editorial charge of Benj. Vaughan Abbott, and is to include a digest of all the decisions of the American courts, from the earliest time to the year 1870. The value of such a work to the profession can hardly be over estimated.

In the United States circuit court for Virginia, on the 31st ult., in the cases of Dillard and others bankrupts, Judge H. L. Bond rendered an important decision. The creditors, having docketed judgment, obtained decrees in the State court directing the sale of Dillard's property. Afterward Dillard filed a petition in bankruptcy and claimed the homestead exemption of $2,000, which exemption was allowed in the United States district court by Judge Underwood. The creditors then carried the case before Judge Bond by petition, and he decided the following points, which entirely reverse the ruling of Judge Underwood:

First. When suits are pending in State courts before the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, if there be no suggestion of fraud, and no interests of the general credit will be prejudiced, the bankruptcy court ought not to interfere with the jurisdiction of the State court.

Second. When the bankrupt has made a deed of trust to secure creditors he is not entitled to any exemption out of the property conveyed until the deed is satisfied; adjudged fraudulent as to creditors by the State court.

Third. When the proceedings in bankruptcy were commenced before the passage of the amendatory act of March 3, 1873, the bankrupt is entitled to such exemption only as allowed by the laws existing at the time the proceedings commenced.

Fourth. The amendatory act, so far as it is declaratory of the intentions of the act of 1867, is void.

Fifth. The rights of the bankrupt and the creditors are fixed according to the laws in force when the bankruptcy proceedings commenced, and no subsequent legislation can affect them.

LEGAL NEWS.

It is now reported that Senator Conkling, during a recent visit to Washington, denied that he had said to Senator Cameron that he should not accept the ap

him, and said that, as a matter of fact, he had not conversed in regard to that office since the death of Mr. Chase.

The Hon. Wm. A. Porter, Chief Justice of the Supe-pointment as Chief-Justice, even if it were offered to rior Court of Cook county, Illinois, died suddenly of apoplexy, on the 27th ult., in Chicago. Judge Porter was born in Schoharie county, in this State, and after his admission to the bar became a partner of the late Judge Hogeboom. In 1852 he was elected District Attorney of Columbia county. In 1858 or 1859 he removed to Chicago, and was not long after elevated to the bench, the Chief Justice of which he was at the time of his death. The bar of Chicago esteemed him highly, and the meeting held to take action in reference to his death is said to have been the largest and most solemn ever held in that city.

Commissioner Drummond, of the General Land Office at Washington, in his fourth annual report, renews his recommendation for the repeal of the Preemption Land laws. He is more than ever satisfied, by the experience of the last year, that these laws afford the means to speculators to secure lands in direct opposition to the land policy of the government, and that they are a cover for the commission of many frauds.

« AnteriorContinuar »