2. Loss of freight: right of charterer to throw up charter-party where vessel disabled. - The plaintiff, on the 9th of November, 1871, effected an insurance "on chartered freight valued at 2,900l. at and from Liverpool to Newport in tow, whilst there, and thence to San Francisco," etc. The ship left Liverpool on the 2d of January, 1872, and on the 4th, before arriving at Newport, took the rocks in Carnarvon Bay. She was got off much damaged, and returned to Liverpool on the 12th of April, where she was sold under circumstances which the court held not to be justifiable; there being no satisfactory evidence of a constructive total loss. She was repaired by the purchaser, and was still under repair at the time of the trial, the 16th of April, 1872. By the charter-party the vessel was to proceed with all convenient speed (dangers and accidents of navigation excepted) from Liverpool to Newport, and there load a cargo of iron rails for San Francisco. After the vessel took the rocks, and before she was got off, viz., on the 15th of February, the charterers threw up the charter, and, on the following day, they hired another ship to carry the rails (which were wanted for the construction of a railway) to San Francisco. The plaintiffs sued the underwriters for a loss of the chartered freight. The jury found that the time necessary for getting the ship off and repairing her was so long as to make it unreasonable for the charterers to supply the agreed cargo at the end of such time, and so long as to put an end, in a commercial sense, to the commercial speculation entered upon by the shipowner and the charterers. Held, by Keating and Brett, JJ., that the charterers were absolved from loading the vessel, and that the ship-owner, therefore, might recover for the loss of freight. Held, contra, per Bovill, C. J., that the charterers were not entitled to throw up the charter, and that, consequently, the plaintiff could not recover against the underwriters, and that the findings of the jury were immaterial. Jackson v. The Union Marine Insurance Company, Limited, L. R. 8 C. P. 572.

3. Sea damage to part of goods insured: consequent depreciation in value of remainder.— A policy of marine insurance was expressed to be "on 1,711 packages teas, valued at the sum insured, viz., $31,000," and contained a special warranty in the following terms, viz., “ warranted by the assured free from damage or injury from dampness, change of flavor, or being spotted, discolored, musty or mouldy, except caused by actual contact of sea-water with the articles damaged occasioned by sea perils. In case of partial loss by sea damage to dry goods, cutlery, or other hardware, the loss shall be ascertained by a separation and sale of the portion only of the contents of the packages so damaged, and not otherwise, and the same practice shall obtain as to all other merchandises so far as practicable." The ship met with bad weather, and shipped large quantities of sea-water, by contact with which 449 packages of the tea insured were greatly injured. When teas are sold they are usually sold in the order of the consecutive numbers marked on the packages, and if the numbers be broken by some being omitted, or if some of the chests be marked as damaged, a suspicion is created that the other packages may be damaged, and they do not command such high prices as if none of the shipment had been damaged. In consequence of this the remaining 1,262 packages, which had not been in contact with sea-water, sold for less than they would otherwise have fetched. Held, that the assured could only recover in respect of the damage occasioned to

the packages which had been actually in contact with sea-water, and not in respect of the loss occasioned by injury to the reputation of the remainder; and, semble, that the effect would have been the same even in the absence of the special warranty. Cator v. The Great Western Insurance Company of New York, L. R. 8 C. P. 552.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

Liability of master for negligence of his servant: scope of employment. A stevedore employed to ship iron rails had a foreman, whose duty it was (assisted by laborers), to carry the rails from the quay to the ship after the carman had brought them to the quay and unloaded them there. The carman not unloading the rails to the foreman's satisfaction, the latter got into the cart and threw out some of them so negligently that one fell upon and injured the plaintiff, who was passing by. Held (per Grove and Denman, JJ., Brett, J., dissenting), that there was evidence for the jury that the foreman was acting within the scope of his employment, so as to render the stevedore responsible for his acts. Burns v. Poulsom, L. R. 8 C. P. 563. MEASURE OF DAMAGES.

Contract in the alternative: judgment by default. — The declaration stated that the plaintiff, having shipped certain goods to a place abroad, drew against the shipment, and intrusted the drafts to the defendant for presentment for reward to the defendant, on the terms that the defendant should return the drafts, if not paid after acceptance, to the plaintiff, or pay the plaintiff the amount of them; that all conditions were performed, etc., necessary to entitle the plaintiff to a return of the drafts or to payment of the amount of them, yet the defendant did not return the drafts nor pay the amount of them. Judgment was signed for want of a plea. Held (per Keating, Brett and Grove, JJ., Bovill, C. J., dissenting), that the damages on the contract alleged in the declaration must be the amount of the bills. Per Bovill, C. J.: The contract as alleged in the declaration being a contract in the alternative, it might be performed by performance of either branch of the alternative at the election of the defendant, and, therefore, the damages might be the value of the bills, if of less value than the amount for which they were drawn. Deverill v. Burnell, L. R. 8 C. P. 475.

MATRIMONIAL SUIT.

Alimony pendente lite: allowance under separation deed. Under a deed of separation, executed by the parties many years previously, the husband had covenanted to pay an annuity to his wife in accordance with the amount of his income at that period, which annuity he had continued to pay up to the present time. He subsequently acquired a very large increase of fortune, and finally instituted a suit in this court to dissolve his marriage, by reason of the adultery of his wife. Held, that the wife had no claim to alimony pending suit estimated on the present income of her husband. Powell v. Powell and Jones, L. R. 3 Prob. & Div. 55.

REPLEVIN.

Judgment recovered: special damage: trespass to land mortgagor and mortgagee.—Certain premises were let to the plaintiff by P., who had previously mortgaged them to the defendants, the trustees of a benefit building society, to secure payment of subscriptions, etc., which might become due from him to the society. The mortgage deed gave power to the defendants to distrain the goods of P. on the premises, for arrears of

subscriptions due to the society, as for rent due on a demise. The defendants distrained on the premises for subscriptions due from P., and seized the plaintiff's goods. The plaintiff replevied the goods, and recovered in the action of replevin, in the county court, as damages, the amount of the expenses of the replevin bond. Having sustained further consequential damages by reason of the seizure of his goods, he subsequently brought an action of trespass in the superior court to recover these damages, and also in respect of the trespass to the land. Held, that the judgment in replevin was a bar to the action in respect of trespass to the goods, inasmuch as the special damage was recoverable in the action of replevin. And, with respect to the trespass to the land, that the judgment in replevin was no bar to the action; but that the defendants were entitled to the verdict on a plea of not possessed, inasmuch as they had done no act to recognize the plaintiff as a tenant. Gibbs v. Cruikshank and others, L. R. 8 C. P. 454.

WILL.

1. Capacity: delusions in respect to the conduct of children: will pronounced against: executor's costs: practice. A man, moved by capricious, frivolous, mean or even bad motives, may disinherit wholly or partially his children, and leave his property to strangers. He may take an unduly harsh view of the character and conduct of his children, but there is a limit beyond which it will cease to be a question of harsh unreasonable judgment, and then the repulsion which a parent exhibits to his child must be held to proceed from some mental defect. If such repulsion, amounting to a delusion as to character, is shown to have existed previous to the execution of his will, it will be for the party setting up that document to establish that it was inoperative when the will was made, and the jury, in determining whether or not the delusion was operative, will have regard to the contents of the will and the circumstances surrounding the execution of it. Prima facie, an executor is justified in propounding his testator's will, and if the facts within his knowledge at the time he does so tend to show eccentricity merely on the part of the testator, and he is totally ignorant at the time of the circumstances and conduct which afterward induce a jury to find that the testator was insane at the date of the will, he will, on the principle that the testator's conduct was the cause of litigation, be entitled to receive his costs out of the estate, although the will be pronounced against. Boughton v. Knight, L. R. 3 Prob. & Div. 64.

2. Execution: attestation and subscription. - The deceased executed his will in the presence of two witnesses, one of whom also made a mark in attestation of the signature of the deceased. The second witness then wrote the names of the deceased and the witness opposite their respective marks, and also the word witness, but he did not subscribe his own name. Held, that he did not, by any word he wrote, attest the signature of the deceased, and that the execution was invalid. In the Goods of Eynon, L. R. 3 Prob. & Div. 92.

3. Revocation.-The testator, having executed a will and codicil, signed a second codicil, in which he expressed a desire to cancel his will, and that a document which he described as a will of earlier date, and the first and second codicils, should together stand as his last will and testament. The only document executed at the earlier date was a settlement on his marriage,

which was not of a testamentary character. Held, that the revocation of the will was absolute, and not dependent on the incorporation of the settlement in the papers admitted to probate. In the Goods of Gentry, L. R., 3 Prob. & Div. 80.

4. Revocation, total, partial, or contingent: dependent relative revocation.- The testatrix, having her will in her hand, dictated the alterations she desired to be made in the first part of it to a friend, who wrote them down. Testatrix, feeling unwell, desired her friend to stop there, and then tore off and burnt so much of her will as had been covered by the memorandum written at her dictation. This memorandum, together with the rest of the will, which contained the residuary clause and the signatures of the testatrix and witnesses and the attestation clause intact, was placed in a desk by the testatrix and locked up, and she believed when she did so that these papers constituted a new will, and were not merely instructions for such a will. Held, that it was a case of dependent relative revocation, a revocation dependent on the papers locked up constituting a new will, and probate was granted of the original will as contained in the portion which remained and the draft of the part which was destroyed. Dancer v. Crabb, L. R., 3 Prob. & Div. 98.

5. Revocation on erasure: words erased not apparent: dependent relative revocation: parol evidence.- The principle of dependent relative revocation applies to the case where a testator has so entirely erased the name of a legatee that it is no longer apparent, and has substituted another nanie for it. The court will receive evidence to show what the original name was, and restore it to the probate if satisfied that the testator only revoked the first bequest on the supposition that he had effectually substituted a new legatee. In the Goods of McCabe, L. R., 3 Prob. & Div. 94.

6. Sheet interpolated: presumption.- The will of the deceased had been engrossed by a law stationer on fifteen brief sheets of paper, consecutively numbered. On the sixteenth sheet the testator had written a codicil, and on the eighteenth and last, a schedule of property, referred to in the will. On the death of the testator, it was found that the original fourth sheet had been removed and placed loose in his desk, and that the original seventeenth sheet had been used by the testater in substitution of the fourth. The several sheets were tied together with tape. Held, that the legal presumption that papers bound together and constituting the will, as found at testator's death, were so bound together at the time of execution and attestation was not rebutted by the circumstances of the case. Rees v. Rees and Rees, L. R., 3 Prob. & Div. 84.

GENERAL TERM ABSTRACT.

SUPREME COURT-FOURTH DEPARTMENT, OCTO

BER, 1873.

APPEAL.

Practice.-In an appeal from an order at special term, setting aside a judgment entered upon a remittitur from the court of appeals on account of irregularity in the remittitur, and that it did not conform to law. Held, that this court, at special term, has no right to set aside a judgment regularly entered up upon a remittitur without the request or direction of the court of appeals. Miller v. Eggert. Opinion by E. D. Smith, J.

CHECK.

1. Where in an action on a check against the drawer, the check was made and dated March 8, 1871, to order of H., and left with his attorney to be delivered, and it was delivered on the 2d day of May, 1872, and presented the next day for payment at the bank on which it was drawn and payment refused, and the action was tried at the circuit, where a verdict was directed for the plaintiff, and the case ordered to the general term upon exceptions. Held, that the circuit judge erred in taking the case from the jury and directing a verdict for the plaintiff. Checks are required to be presented immediately, in the sense of and according to the usage of banks; they are payable on demand, and require the drawee to pay forthwith the sum specified therein; they are not intended for circulation. A party taking a check like this, long over due, is put upon inquiry, and is not a bona fide holder. He is in the position of a purchaser of a promissory note over due, and takes it subject to all equities existing between the parties. It is impossible, in a case like this, to hold, as matters of law or fact, that the holder of the check is a bona fide holder, and the question should have been submitted to the jury. Coning v. Altman. Opinion by Smith, J.

2. It appearing that the consideration for the check was an allowance agreed to be paid the payee for services as an assignee in bankruptcy, over and above the fees, etc., allowed by law. Held, that the consideration was illegal and the check void as a violation of section 45 of the general bankrupt act. New trial granted. Ib.

CRIMINAL CONVERSATION.

1. Evidence: marriage certificate.-Where in an action for criminal conversation with the plaintiff's wife, the plaintiff offered himself as a witness to prove the marriage and was objected to by defendant and the evidence excluded; on appeal, Held, that the plaintiff was not a competent witness to prove the marriage in a case like this, being clearly excluded by the act of 1867. Dunn v. Kingdom. Opinion by E. D. Smith, J. 2. Plaintiff called his brother, and offered to prove that he left home with the intention of being married to his present wife, and returned, accompanied by her, and introduced her as his wife and represented that they had been married by one S., a justice of the peace, and that they commenced living together as husband and wife, and so lived until he separated from her on account of the matters involved in this suit. On objection the testimony was excluded. Held, that in actions of this nature an actual marriage must be proved, and that the admissions of parties and their cohabitation is not sufficient. Ib.

3. Plaintiff then offered a certificate of marriage in the following form: "This certifies that the rites of holy matrimony was celebrated between Marcus Dunn, of the town of Hastings, N. Y., and Sarah , of the same place, on the 11th day of October, at Cicero, N. Y. A. SHELDON, justice of the peace. Witnesses." Which was objected to, and excluded on exception. Held, that the certificate was insufficient. It does not comply with the statute; does not state that the magistrate knew the parties, or that they were proven by oath to be the parties, and that he had ascertained that they were of sufficient age to contract marriage, and no witnesses appear on it to have been present, and it fails to state that there appeared no lawful impediment to the marriage. Where a statute makes

ex parte statements evidence, it must be strictly complied with. Ib.

DAMAGES.

Where plaintiff purchased certificates of stock of defendant to be thereafter delivered by defendant, and paid him an agreed price therefor, and defendant failed and refused to deliver the stock upon repeated demands; in an action brought by the plaintiff the circuit judge directed judgment for the plaintiff for the amount of the principle with interest, to which defendant excepted, and defendant offered no evidence, and did not ask to go to the jury, and on a motion for a new trial being denied and judgment entered, the defendant appealed to this court. Held, that it was an action on contract, and the facts not being denied a jury would have been bound to find as above. The refusal of defendant to deliver the stock, implies that it was of more value than the amount of plaintiff's money paid for it, and the recovery simply of the money advanced is certainly not erroneous, as it is for a less amount than the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Judgment affirmed. Graves v. Wait.

Opinion by E. D. Smith, J.

DRAINAGE OF LANDS.

1. Certiorari.- This is a certiorari brought to review the decision of the county court made in a special proceeding, upon appeal from an assessment made by the relators as commissioners, under an act of the legislature passed in 1864, chapter 577, providing for the drainage of certain lands. An appeal was given in these cases, by act of 1868, chapter 180, to the county court of the county where the lands are situated. On appeal, the county court set aside the assessment with costs, on the ground that the rule of apportionment of the assessment, adopted by the commissioners, was erroneous, and the commissioners sued out a certiorari to this court. It appears that the land affected by the drainage and acts of the commissioners embraced a large tract bordering on the banks of a lake and its tributaries. The assessment was levied upon about 300 parcels of land belonging to different owners, and, with several exceptions, was assessed equally upon each acre; portions of the land were arable, and some comparatively worthless, yet nearly all were assessed at a uniform rate per acre. The act authorizing the appeal to the county court provides that "said court is authorized and required to review such assessment on such appeal, upon such proof as may be presented at the hearing, and shall have power to affirm, reverse, set aside, or modify the said assessment, if it shall be found that the lands assessed are not and will not be benefited by the work, or if it shall appear that the rule of the apportionment of the assessment is erroneous." The appeal is brought on the ground that the rule of the apportionment of the assessment is erroneous. The county court found "that the land so assessed is not equally benefited by said work, and that the commissioners, without examination of each parcel of land, assumed that all the land would be equally benefited per acre, and acted accordingly."

Held, that the county court had jurisdiction to review and set aside the assessment of the relators, upon the ground stated in the decision. People ex rel. Parker v. County Court of Jefferson County. Opinion by E. D. Smith, J.

2. That the county court had no authority to review the decision of the commissioners on the facts, but had upon the law or principles governing their action and

proceedings in making the assessments, and that the review in this court is limited to the facts appearing in or upon the return of the county court to the certiorari. Ib.

3. That the findings of the county court, "that such estimate was made without examination of each and every parcel assessed," is not unwarranted by the facts before that court, and that there is nothing before us that would warrant this court in reversing such findings and decision, and that the judgment should therefore be affirmed with costs. Ib.

EJECTMENT.

Equitable defense.- Where plaintiff at the circuit established a legal title to premises, and defendant interposed as a defense and proved that, upon the assurance of the plaintiff's grantor, that he would advance her money to complete the purchase of the premises, she made a contract for the purchase of the same in her own name, and that said grantor advanced her the purchase-money and took the title in his name as security for such advance, and that defendant immediately went into possession, fitted up the house for a residence, with the knowledge and assent of said grantor, and under his advice, and he was a constant visitor there from the time of the purchase until his death, some two years after, and defendant resided on said premises until the commencement of this suit, a verdict was directed for the plaintiff, and defendant excepted, and exceptions ordered to the general term. Held, that the defendant became the debtor of said grantor for the said advances, and he took the title merely as a trustee or mortgagee, for his security, and that the defendant had an equitable title which could not be cut off without foreclosure, and that the facts disclosed made out a complete equitable defense. Plaintiff should have been nonsuited or verdict directed for defendant. New trial granted. Hermans v. Lucy. Opinion by E. D. Smith, J.

EVIDENCE.

1. Where plaintiff and defendant had conversation in respect to a settlement of claims between them and referred the matters to their attorneys to draw up and prepare the proper papers and vouchers; defendant testified that all demands were settled, and plaintiff and his attorney testified to a conversation between themselves

apart from defendant - wherein plaintiff instructed his attorney not to release a certain claim, and defendant's counsel objected to said evidence as improper and inadmissible, but it was received, and, on judgment for plaintiff, defendant appealed to this court. Held, that the evidence was inadmissible. It consisted of the declarations of instructions of the plaintiff given to his attorney, not in the presence or hearing of defendant, but for his private conduct in negotiating and perfecting the settlement. 2. That the rule "that an exception is not good when no ground is stated for it" is not applicable to the objection taken to this evidence. When evidence is offered which is apparently upon its face inadmissible, as in this case, a general objection to it, as improper or inadmissible is sufficient to call upon the party offering it to show upon what 'ground it is offered, if it be only admissible upon some special or particular ground. This evidence, upon general principles, was not admissible upon any grounds. It is not a case of evidence, upon its face, apparently admissible. Being inadmissible generally, plaintiff was bound to show its admissibility to exempt it from the general objection. The evidence was improperly received and

the exception well taken. New trial granted. Childs v. Delaney. Opinion by E. D. Smith, J.

2. Privileged communication: divorce.-Where, in an action for a divorce on the ground of adultery, the defendant answered, denying the allegations of the complaint and setting up adultery of the plaintiff as a defense, and the issue was referred to a referee for trial, who directed judgment for the plaintiff, and judgment was ordered by the court, and defendant appealed to this court. Held, that the evidence of a physician, who was consulted professionally by the plaintiff, that the plaintiff, during the period alleged, had a venereal disease, which he admitted to him he had contracted from a female in his employ, being objected to before its delivery, was a privileged communication, and inadmissible under the statute (3 Rev. Stat., 5th ed. p. 690, § 104). Also, that evidence of plaintiff's going into the hall of a house in which was a saloon, not proven to be of bad repute, with a girl, about eight o'clock in the evening, is not enough to sustain the complaint. Judgment reversed and a new trial granted. Hunn v. Hunn. Opinion by E. D. Smith, J.

(Concluded next week.)

CORRESPONDENCE.

A POINT OF PRACTICE.

SIR-The decision of the Court of Appeals in Ludington v. Miller, though not accompanied by a written opinion, will probably be cited hereafter as authority upon an important point of practice, and is, therefore, deserving of a brief notice. It will be seen by the abstract that the complaint was dismissed at the trial, and that judgment was entered thereon for defendant. After the time limited for appeal had expired, a motion was made at Special Term for a new trial, which was denied. From the order an appeal was taken to the General Term, where the objection was made that it could not be heard while there was a judgment unappealed from. The court overruled the objection, and granted a new trial, from which defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, where the decision is now affirmed, but, pursuant to the statutory provision applying to such cases, judgment absolute is directed instead of a new trial. The decision of the court below (Superior Court, N. Y.) was based wholly upon the case of Tracey v. Altmeyer, 46 N. Y. 598. That case, it will be seen, determined that a motion might be made for new trial after judgment, but the question was not presented whether an appeal from an order granting or denying a new trial is sustainable, without also appealing from the judgment for there was in that case an appeal from both the order and judgment. The present decision, therefore, is, to some extent, an entirely new adjudication- that is, there is no previously reported case on which this distinct question has come up. What the exact grounds of the decision are, do not appear, there being no written opinion of this court, and the opinion of the court below being hardly adequate as an explanation of the views of this court. The following is the abstract:

Ludington v. Miller. This case, which was decided at the last term of this court, presenting the following facts and questions: The custom house placed a storekeeper in charge of a bonded warehouse in the city of New York- a man near 80 years of age, and subject to serious infirmity. By the regulations of the Secre

tary of the Treasury, pursuant to a statute of the United States, the warehouse cannot be opened, nor any goods be received or delivered, but in the presence of the storekeeper, and all the work done is to be under his supervision. Hatches were used in this, as in other warehouses, for hoisting or letting down goods, with which the storekeeper was fully made acquainted. No artificial light was allowed in the building, by the custom-house regulations, except a lantern. The storekeeper met with an accident by falling down one of these hatches while it was in actual use for the hoisting of goods, which accident resulted in his death. No one saw him fall. The testimony was not positive whether the hatch could have been seen by the ordinary light-the deceased had no lantern. At the trial, upon proof of these facts, the complaint was dismissed, and judgment entered accordingly for defendants. Two months afterward a motion was made for a new trial, which was denied. Plaintiffs appealed to the General Term from the order, but not from the judgment. A divided court by a majority ordered a new trial, and from this order defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The questions presented to this court were: First. Whether the storekeeper was or was not the principal, and the warehousemen his subordinates. Second. Whether the warehousemen were guilty of negligence, and if so, whether the deceased was chargeable with negligence contributing to the injury. Third. Whether, after judgment, a motion could be made for a new trial, and an appeal taken from the order denying such motion, without appealing from the judgment, and after the time allowed for appealing from such judgment had expired.

The Court of Appeals decided all these questions against defendants, and ordered judgment absolute for plaintiffs, and assessment of damages, and this decision was made without a written opinion of any one of the judges.

*

In United States v. Vermilye (p. 280) it was held that a seven-thirty" note, issued under the act of March 3, 1865, payable to the order of and not having

the name of any person filled into such blank, is payable to bearer and negotiable, and that the writing of any thing on the back of such note (the blank being unfilled), does not amount to an indorsement, nor restrict its negotiability.

Freedman v. Sigel (p. 327) held that the United States cannot impose a tax on the salary of a judge of the Superior Court of New York.

COMMISSION OF APPEALS.

The attention of members of the bar is called to the following order made at the late term of the Commission of Appeals. The next term will commence on the first Tuesday of January, 1874:

IN COMMISSION OF APPEALS,
ALBANY, October 3, 1873.

Ordered as follows: 1. The clerk will make up a calendar for the January term, 1874, on which shall be put, without further notice, all the causes, not previously disposed of, which have been on either of the printed calendars of the present year; and also all other causes pending before the commission which shall be noticed for argument by either party.

2. All other causes pending before the commission shall be put upon a special calendar, which shall also be printed and brought into court at the beginning of the January term, 1874. This special calendar will be called over at the next succeeding term, beginning on a day to be hereafter fixed, and to be announced at the January term. Cases upon it which shall be answered to when called, shall be transferred to the foot of the general calendar; cases not answered to will be dismissed. W. H. BENJAMIN, Clerk.

BOOK NOTICE.

Blatchford's Reports. Vol. X. New York: Baker, Voorhis & Co., 1873.

This volume contains the cases argued and determined in the Circuit Court of the United States for the second circuit, from March, 1872, to March, 1873. This circuit is particularly fruitful in litigation, especially of bankruptcy, collision and patent questions, and this volume contains a large number of decisions on each of those subjects some of them important. We have space to note only a few of the decisions. In Fraloff v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co. (p. 16), valuable laces were held to be proper baggage for a lady to carry, reference being had to her social position and wealth, and to the object of her journey.

In re Sacci, a bankrupt (p. 29), it was held that, in general, a mortgagee, holding a mortgage on real estate of a bankrupt, should not be permitted to foreclose in a State court.

In Clark, assignee, v. Iselin (p. 204), it is held that the mere giving of security on a loan of money is not an illegal preference under the bankrupt act.

Martin v. Criscuola (p. 211) holds that the United States Practice Act of June 1, 1872 (17 U. S. Stat. at Large), does not authorize the commencement of an action at law in the Circuit Court by a summons issued in the name of the plaintiff's attorney, according to the mode of commencing actions in the courts of the State of New York.

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. The following decisions of the Court of Appeals were announced on Tuesday last:

Order reversed and motion for mandamus granted with costs People ex rel. Church v. Hopkins, Comptroller. Judgment affirmed with costs to all parties to be paid from the estate-Dupuy v. Wurtz.Judgments affirmed with costs - Filike v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co.; Prendergast v. Borst; Ritter v. Phillips; Hackford v. New York Central and Hudson River R. R. Co.; Bosworth v. Vandermaker; Dugan v. Champlain Transportation Co.; Sands v. Hill; Long v. Western R. R. Corporation; Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. McCall; Rogers v. King; Merchants' National Bank v. Comstock.- Order affirmed with costs-Waring v. Loder. Judgments reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide event - Gray v. Barton; Hewlett v. Wood.- Order reversed and application denied with costs.- In the matter of the Boston and Albany R. R. Co.- Order reversed and motion granted with costs People ex rel. Rolton v. Albertson.- - Re-argument ordered of the following questions - First: Was the title to the money the subject of the controversy in the county of New York. Second: If the money was the money of the county, can the Board of Supervisors maintain an action for the cause stated in the complaint in behalf and for the benefit of the county? - People, etc., v. Ingersoll, impleaded, etc.— Motion denied with $10 costs - Barber v. Coleman.- Judg