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remittitur until March 4th. Plaintiff's attorney received this order February 15th, and on that day it was served on the deputy clerk, in the office of the clerk of the Supreme Court, whose duty it was to file remittiturs. The managing clerk of defendants' attorney swears that he handed the remittitur to the deputy for filing just prior to such service. Upon service of the order, the deputy refused to file the remittitur, and offered it back to the clerk who declined to receive it, claiming it had been filed. The order was served on defendants' attorney November 17th; notice of motion accompanied it. On that day an order was entered, making the judgment of this court the judgment of the Supreme Court. Subsequent to February there had been no filing of the remittitur, a judgment was subsequently entered thereon. Held, that this court has control over its own remittitur, in whosesoever hands it may be, until it is actually and regularly filed in the court below, and an order of any one of the judges temporarily staying the filing thereof is valid and operative, although unaccompanied by motion papers or notice of motion. Rule 16 of this court does not apply to such a case, but refers to regular stays in causes pending here. The handing of the remittitur to the clerk was not, under the circumstances, a filing, and therefore this court had not lost jurisdiction of the case. Cushman et al., Exrs., etc. v. Hatfield et al. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION.

Proceedings were instituted to acquire title to lands for Washington Park, Albany, under the provisions of the act amending "An act in relation to a public park in the city of Albany" (§ 2, chap. 45, Laws of 1872), which requires, that the real estate sought to be taken shall be fully described in the petition, and that the names and places of residence of those owning or claiming an interest in the lands shall be stated therein. The real estate was described in the body of the provision as "hereinafter fully described and set forth," and the petition stated, that "hereafter is stated the names and places of residence of the parties who own," etc.; schedules were annexed and firmly attached, giving full descriptions of the several parcels of the real estate sought to be taken, with the names and places of residence of the owners and claimants, and also a notice, addressed to each and all the owners and claimants by name, stating the time and place when the petition would be presented, etc., all folded and indorsed "Petition, description, notice," etc. Held, that the schedules formed part of the petition, and that there was a sufficient compliance with the provisions of the statute, and a substantial compliance was sufficient. Also, held, that a paper, so referred to in a written instrument that it may be identified beyond a reasonable doubt, is thereby made a part of the instrument, the same as if it was incorporated therein. No particular mode of reference is necessary for that purpose, any language indicating the intent that the two shall make one instrument, or a physical annexation of the one to the other, in a manner or under circumstances showing clearly such intent, is sufficient.

A provision in an act authorizing the taking of lands for a public park, which in terms gives power to the commissioners to sell such parts of the land thus vested in them, or which they shall thereafter acquire, does not render the whole act unconstitutional, or detract from the power conferred to take lands required for the park. If an intent can be spelled out fairly

from the words of a statute, although it is inartificially drawn, effect will be given to it. In re application Board of Commissioners of Washington Park of Albany. Opinion by Allen, J.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

This action was for the conversion of four bonds. The defense was a general denial, and the statute of limitations. There was evidence showing that plaintiff's assignor asked defendant several times for the bonds, and was put off by evasive answers. In June, 1861, a formal demand was made, when defendant, for the first time, absolutely refused to give them up. The action was commenced within six years thereafter.

Held, that until such refusal, no conversion was shown. That the cause of action arose there, and, therefore, the statute of limitations had not run. Roberts v. Berdell. Opinion by Allen, J.

GENERAL TERM ABSTRACT.

FOURTH DEPARTMENT-OCTOBER TERM.

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ADMINISTRATORS- ACCOUNTING.

In 1864, one C. N. Mead entered into partnership with the defendant, for the purpose of manufacturing lumber in the State of Pennsylvania. The firm owned a large tract of land and some saw-mills. The firm name was C. N. Mead & Co. Mead died in 1865, leaving certain heirs at law. On Mead's death, his son, under a certain agreement with defendant, continued the partnership with defendant until 1867, when the effects of the partnership passed into the hands of defendant. Plaintiff, as the administrator of the estate of C. N. Mead, brings this action for the appointment of a receiver and an accounting.

Held, that on the death of Mead, the copartnership was dissolved, and the arrangement between defendant and the son was unauthorized, and plaintiff's rights, as representative, must be determined as of the death of Mead. The continuance of the business was at the risk of defendant.

That plaintiff, as representative, is entitled to maintain an action for an accounting, and it is not necessary to show that there will be something found due the estate on such accounting; it would be impossible to ascertain this until an accounting is had. For the purposes of an accounting, the heirs are not necessary parties in the first instance. But, if a sale of the land is necessary, application can be made to bring in the heirs, and thus render a conveyance of the fee of the land.

This action was referred, and the referee orders the appointment of a receiver and an accounting. The defendant appeals from the referee's report.

Held error; there should have been a motion at general term for a new trial. Judgment affirmed. Cheeseman v. Wiggins. Opinion by Mullen, P J.

BEQUEST.

Law of domicile.-One T died leaving a will, and by which he gave and bequeathed to the town of Palmer, Hampshire county, State of Massachusetts, the sum of $1,000, to be kept invested by the proper authorities of the town, and the interest thereof paid for the support of the poor of said town.

Held, that the town of Palmer having capacity to take the bequest by the laws of Massachusetts, the bequest is valid. That the validity of a bequest is to be

governed by the law of the domicile of the legatee, and not by that of the testator. That, although if we assume the bequest in this case void, on the ground that it created a perpetuity under the law of this State, if not void under the laws of Massachusetts, it must be upheld. That the bequest took effect immediately on the death of the testator, and the title vested absolutely in the corporation, and the direction as to the mode of management of the principal after that, did not affect the validity of the bequest. It did not create a perpetuity. Judgment affirmed. Kennedy v. The Town of Palmer. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE.

Tender. On default in the payment of an installment, due on a chattel mortgage, as in default in the payment of the whole debt, the mortgagee's title to mortgaged property becomes so instanti absolute at law, and the equity of redemption is barred by a sale; and, in order to redeem, the mortgagor must, before sale, pay or tender the whole debt. The tender of the installment due is not sufficient. The proper damages in a case like this would be the value of the canal boat at the time of the sale, and the value of the use prior thereto. The defendant sold the boat to one H, but H afterward re-sold back to defendant, and some time after defendant sold to H and D.

Held, that although the sale to H was fraudulent, on the re-sale, defendant still held the title and plaintiff could have redeemed, but plaintiff relied on his tender. The sale to H and D barred plaintiff's right of redemption, and a court of equity only can relieve plaintiff. Judgment reversed. Halsted v. Swartz. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

EVIDENCE.

1. Where commissioners were appointed to assess the damages of an owner, on account of laying gas pipes through his land.

Held, that although it was incompetent for a witness to give his opinion as to the amount of the owner's damages, it may be competent for a witness to give the value of certain materials of work and labor, etc., for the information of the commissioners; such evidence does not substitute the witness in the place of the commissioner; it simply furnishes them with the data, to enable them to fix the amount of compensation.

Held, that the evidence in relation to the effect of escaping gas on vegetation was proper, on cross-examination of the petitioner's witnesses. They had testified that laying the pipes did not injure the land, and it was competent for the owner to inquire whether they took into account injury from escaping gas, etc. Report affirmed. In the Matter of Calkings. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

2. This was a proceeding before the surrogate of Cattaraugus county, for the settlement and distribution of the estate of one C. On the hearing before the surrogate, the question arose as to the legitimacy of certain children of C's by two different women, with whom he lived, one woman named Effie, the other, Sally.

The counsel for the appellants offered to prove the admissions of Effie, that "she was the wife of said C, and that Simon (appellant's intestate) was the fruit of that marriage, and other admissions. The evidence was objected to, and the surrogate rejected it, and found in favor of the legitimacy of the children of Sally.

Held, that the admissions of said Effie were competent, or at least they should have been received contingently, and acted upon or rejected as other facts should or should not be found. Decree of the surrogate reversed. Alexander v. Chamberlain. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

LICENSE- ESTOPPEL.

The plaintiff is the owner of a farm in the county of Monroe. The defendant is a gas company, authorized to convey gas from a natural gas well, in Ontario county, to the city of Rochester and other places, and is authorized to acquire land by commissioners, etc. The said company constructed its ditch for its pipes along the land of the plaintiff, but no right to lay the pipes and construct the ditch on plaintiff's land, had ever been required by the company, their only right was founded on a license as claimed from plaintiff, and is founded on the following evidence.

The defendant's servants entered upon the plaintiff's land and commenced to dig the ditch in which to lay the pipes. They had dug some forty or fifty rods before plaintiff learned of it; one of the defendant's servants went to plaintiff and inquired what the workmen should do with certain rails belonging to plaintiff, in a fence, and plaintiff told them to put them in a pile near the road-side, and after the ditch was dug to put them up again in the fence. Plaintiff also said that if they filled the ditch right up so he could get across, they need not put the rails up, as he would draw them away with his team. On one or two occasions plaintiff consented that the filling up of the trench, at the crossing, might be delayed for a while. Plaintiff told one of the servants of defendant that all he wanted was a passage to get into his orchard. These conversations constitute the license insisted on by defendant.

Plaintiff brings this action for an injunction to restrain the construction of said work.

Held, that there was no license from plaintiff to construct this work. The conversations above stated did not constitute a license. The plaintiff was not estopped from asserting his title and restraining the construction of the trench. It is one of the essential elements of an estoppel in pais, that the party insisting on the estoppel would be misled to his injury, if the other party should be permitted to admit the right or deny the admission as to which the estoppel is insisted upon. A party cannot be misled when he knows the truth as fully as the party sought to be estopped.

Held, the act of the defendant in laying the pipe and digging the trench was a trespass, and was known to be so by the defendant, and plaintiff's silence did not mislead defendant. The evidence does not prove a license.

Held, that the fee of the land in the highway being in the plaintiff, the defendant had no right, under the act of the legislature, to enter on and appropriate part of plaintiff's land, without making compensation therefor. The public have a right of passage merely. The defendant had no right to lay his pipes without compensating the owner. Judgment affirmed. Calkings v. The B. & R. National Gas Company. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

PLEDGE-INTEREST.

Plaintiff pledged his watch with defendant for $82, under the agreement that he could redeem the watch on payment of $87 in a certain time. Held, that the tender of the $87, without any interest, was good. In

the absence of any proof to the contrary the $5 bonus must be held to be in lieu of interest. Judgment affirmed. Hines v. Strong. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS.

One Johnson is the owner of a house in the city of Syracuse, which he rents. There being a default in the payment of rent summary proceedings were instituted. The affidavit on which the proceedings were instituted was made by the agent of said Johnson, and did not state the fact of the agency in any form. Held, that the fact of agency, if an agent makes the affidavit, it must be stated affirmatively in it. It is not enough to state it by way of recital. An appearance by a party for the sole purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the officer, or the regularity of the proceedings, does not waive the defects in the proceedings preliminary to such appearance. Proceedings reversed. Weyman v. Johnson. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

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TOWN BONDING.

Non-residents. This is a certiorari to review the proceedings of the county judge of Yates county, allowing the prayer of a petition to bond the town of Italy in said county. On the petition were the names of forty-one persons assessed on the assessment roll of said town as non-residents. The assessments on the roll are in the names of the non-residents, and the land is described as "swamp," or by the use of certain letters, as "ss," or "bsep," etc., and the number of acres is then given, and the tax. There was no other description. The description required by statute was not followed.

Held, that in order to entitle the non-residents to be counted as petitioners, their land must be assessed as non-resident land; that the assessment as to nonresidents in this case was defective, and, therefore, void, and the non-residents who signed the petition cannot be counted; that the non-residents on the roll must be counted in ascertaining the number of tax payers. The statute makes them tax payers and the record discloses the number. Had the non-resident land been properly assessed the record would not have shown the number of owners, except by the number of lots, and as one person might have owned several lots, resort to evidence would be necessary; and there is none in this case, except as to the forty-one on the petition. In ascertaining the amount of taxable property in a town it is not necessary that the assessment should be legally binding on the persons assessed. It is sufficient if it appear that the property is taxable in the town. The aggregate valuation of the taxable property can be arrived at in no other way. The People ex rel. Clark v. Oliver. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

WITNESS.

Cross-examination - The defendant's counsel commenced the cross-examination of a witness, and after continuing it some time suspended, and he told the witness in open court, and in the hearing of the plaintiff's attorney, that he desired the witness to be present on the morrow, as he wished to further cross-examine him. After this, other witnesses were called, and the trial proceeded. On the next day the defendant's counsel desired to continue the cross-examination of the witness, the witness was called, but did not appear, the defendant's counsel then moved to strike out the direct examination of the witness, but the court refused to strike it out, and defendant's counsel excepted.

Held, that if a party desiring to cross-examine a witness does so, and he is not prevented by the plaintiff or by the adjournment of the court, from completing it, and if he defer it to another day for his own convenience, the opposite party is not obliged to detain the witness, and if the latter absent himself, it is not the fault of the party calling him.

To entitle the party to have evidence on the direct examination stricken out, because the witness does not appear to be cross-examined, the loss must be chargeable in some way to the misconduct or neglect of the party calling him, and unless it is, the other party is not entitled to relief. Judgment affirmed. Burden v. Pratt. Opinion by Mullin, P. J.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

AN ANSWER TO AN ANSWER.

To the Editor of the Albany Law Journal: Permit me to say that I am greatly astonished at the "Answer" of the Hon. Judge Joachimsen to my articles on Jewish Law (see A. L. J., page 325). I believe every unbiased reader will bear me witness that my articles were free from all personalities; that, on the contrary, whenever I alluded to the author of the Desultory Remarks" I spoke of him with the utmost regard and politeness. And yet, in his "Answer," he descended to vulgar ideas and vulgar modes of expressing himself. Is the judge infallible? Is it a crime against the majesty of the judge to say politely, that he made erroneous statements, and to correct them in a gentlemanly manner? I will not follow him into the arena selected by him. If he thinks to strengthen his position by his undignified manner of throwing dirt at me, and if he can persuade himself that he thereby has demolished me, all right! Let him proceed. It may afford him pleasure, and I am not hurt thereby.

The honorable judge charges me explicitly with plagiarism. Believe me, dear sir, that the fact that Rev. Dr. Hübsch, of New York, published some articles on Jewish divorce more than four years ago in a New York weekly had been totally forgotten by me, and after so long a time I cannot recall to my mind any thing of those articles. About the same time I published my views on divorce in the Jewish Times, and I am certain that the views there expressed by me are fully coincident with those lately forwarded by me in your journal. But suppose I should also coincide with the statements of Dr. Hübsch, what then? I said lately to a child that twice two is four. Let now the judge desultorily remark: This saying bears closest resemblance to a statement made by my learned friend H. when he went to an infant school. He is welcome to such pettifogging.

I could have further analyzed the indissoluble muddle in which the judge's mind is to be found whenever he attempts to speak of Talmudical law, his false analogies, his misunderstood quotations, and so forth. But after the coarse and overbearing tone the judge has seen fit to assume, he has lost the right to a respectful answer. Moreover, his puerile articles on Jewish law do hardly deserve any consideration. My task with the Hon. Judge Joachimsen is ended.

To the readers, however, I owe a few words more. First, in regard to divorce. About three years ago I had quite a lengthy correspondence with a Rabbi in a Prussian town, not far from the Polish frontier. I had

been written to that I should induce a certain man in Chicago to send a Jewish letter of divorce (Get) to his wife whom he had left in the old country, and who had been divorced from him for good cause by a Prussian court. In her conscience the wife believes herself to be bound to the man until she has received a "Get" from him. She and all her relatives and the whole Jewish population, in whose midst she has grown up, look upon the Talmudical laws in this respect as inviolable. My endeavors with the man were in vain; he refused to send out the desired writ, and thereby to release his wife. Finally, the wife herself came over to this country. But her entreaties, her tears, all had not the desired effect; the man did not issue the Get. This is no fancy sketch; this is a real fact. What means offers now the Talmudical law to emancipate such a woman from the chains which bind her éternally to such a man? Can any "Saneigor" of the Talmudical law point out such means in the Talmud or in the codes extracted therefrom? There are no such means. The woman must remain in her thraldom all her life long. Here is a case where a female cannot obtain a divorce for cause under the Talmudic law.

Secondly. Every beginner in the history of Jewish law knows that the Prosbul was first instituted by Hillel. When Hillel perceived that the people neglected many commands of charity on account of the Sabbatical year, he instituted the Prosbul (Shebiith, x, 3). Previous to H. there was no Prosbul. The Prosbul-document has not the least mentioning of a conveyance of real estate, either by the grantor or the grantee, or somebody else. It is nothing else except a reserval of the right to claim debts after the seventy year which had been contracted before the seventh year. The court, before whom the Prosbul was executed, took a memorandum of the fact that the debtor, or his bondsman, owned some real estate, and upon this real estate the creditor had a lien until his debt was paid. This lien was understood by itself, and no documentary evidence thereof was necessary. The readers of this journal will readily find many analogies to such liens in modern codes. Whatever now the Talmud says in regard to Prosbul, has invariably reference to the Prosbul as instituted by Hillel, and as defined here, and must be understood accordingly.

B. FELSENTHAL.

THE HONOR AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION. Doctor Nott, in his lectures to the senior class at Union College, used to say that different results were produced on the minds of persons engaged in the same business or profession, according to the motives with which they engaged in them.

Howard visited the jails of Europe, and the more he saw of imprisonment and suffering, the more sympathy he had for those imprisoned, and the more anxious be was to relieve them. Another individual visits the same prisons, and sees the same suffering which Howard saw. His object in doing so, is to see that the sentences are carried into full and complete execution. He finds the food of one better than he thinks it ought to be; another ought to do more work than is required of him, and another might have his hair shaved closer, and in various other ways more effectually debased and degraded. Such a person soon begins to take delight in human suffering. All species of cruelty which he witnesses is to him a source of real pleasure. He loves to attend executions and he delights to see men whipped at the whipping post.

The same principle applies to members of the legal profession. Those who enter it as a means of doing good, and out of love of the principles which the study of it inculcates, are purer and better the longer they remain in it. Those who enter it merely as a means of making money, become baser and more corrupt and dishonest the longer they continue in it. The Code gave full scope to this corrupting influence when it allowed attorneys to become interested, by way of compensation in the subject-matter in litigation.

Unfortunately, some of the most respectable counsel in the State have got themselves apparently in a false pecuniary position, in appearing as attorneys for towns in suits growing out of the bonding act in aid of railroads, as though their sole object in doing so was to make money. When they ask for their pay, they are told to present their bills to the town auditing board and to attach to it an affidavit. The town board examines it, and cuts it down one-half more or less, thus showing their appreciation of the integrity of the attorney they have employed by accusing him substantially of swearing false. This is a most effectual and cruel way of destroying the honor and dignity of the legal profession. Considering the vast amount of money invested in town bonds, and the number of suits in which towns are likely to become parties on the record, the members of the profession ought to have their attention called to the position they occupy in becoming attorneys for towns, and the ordeal through which they may have to pass in attempting to obtain compensation for their services.

A blacksmith would not submit to such degradation in order to collect a bill for horse-shoeing-swear to the correctness of it, and then have the other party pay it or not, or such parts of it as he might think proper. Such degradation, however, is attempted in more instances than one, to be reserved for the legal profession.

ADOPTION.

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NEW YORK, Dec. 8, 1873. DEAR SIR:-I have read with interest the article on adoption in your JOURNAL for December 6. It may interest your readers to know that the bill, as at first passed, included the right of inheritance, but was altered at the request of Gov. Dix. Perhaps he had good reasons; but he thereby defeated the object proposed, which was this, to compel persons of property, who adopt children, either to provide for them in some way, or, if they don't want to do that, to formally say so by will. It is a case of not unfrequent occurrence, that a child is trained up tenderly and in luxury, and then left in utter poverty, because the adopted parent has made no will. In the case of a daughter it works much hardship.

Yours respectfully,

J. B. VARNUM.

COURT OF APPEALS.

Ordered, that a term of this court, for the year 1874, will commence at the capitol, in the city of Albany, on the third Monday of January next. Notices of argument, with proof or admission of service, must be filed with the clerk on or before the 5th day of January, 1874. Only such cases will be put on the calendar as shall be regularly noticed for said term.

E. O. PERRIN, Clerk.

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. The following decisions were announced in the Court of Appeals on Tuesday, the 9th inst.:

Judgments affirmed with costs - Goelet v. Spofford; Goelet v. Spofford; Blancke v. Bryant; The National Bank of Commerce v. The National Mechanics' Banking Association; The New York Guaranty and Indemnity Company v. Flynn; Bryce v. The Lorillard Fire Insurance Company; Dening v. Puleston. Judgments reversed and new trials granted, costs to abide event Van Zandt, executrix v. The Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company; Collender v. Dinsmore; Hughes v. The Mercantile Insurance Company.- Orders affirmed with costs-The People ex rel. Martin v. Brown; The People ex rel. Board of Supervisors of Westchester County v. Fowler; Lenahan v. Haman. Order granting new trial reversed, and judgment on report of referee affirmed with costs - Cowdin v. Gottgetren. -Order granting a new trial reversed and exceptions overruled, and judgment for the defendant on nonsuit at circuit with costs-McClure v. The Mutual Insurance Company.

NOTES.

In the law books published on this side of the Atlantic there are seldom to be found appeals to the tender emotions. Jarman on Wills, or Williams on Executors, are as cold and unsympathetic as a treatise on the integral calculus. We observe that an American writer on the "Probate Jurisdiction and Practice in the County Courts " has attempted to introduce a reform in the mode of treating these subjects. In speaking of probate jurisdiction he says:

"A jurisdiction so often invoked by those involved in intense sorrow demands that they should manifest their sincere affection for

Hearts from which 'twas death to sever,
Eyes this world can ne'er restore,

not only by a faithful observance of the will of the ancestor or the law of descent, but by closely following in the execution of their trusts and discharge of duties, the custom and practice of the County Court, according to the statute in such case made and provided."

And on the following page the author, under the head of the care requisite in developing such a subject,

says:

"In view of such trusts we approach our subject with feelings of awe. Such feelings are nowhere better expressed than in the Forest Hymn," from which he proceeds to quote. This reverent spirit is very delightful, but would it not be better to put the poetry into the foot notes.-Solicitors' Journal.

SOME curious statistics of the work done by Gray'sinn have been published. The entire number of calls from Hilary Term, 1870, inclusive, is as follows: In 1870, Hilary 0, Easter 1, Trinity 0, Michaelmas 1; in 1871, Hilary 2, Easter 2, Trinity 1, Michaelmas 0; in 1872, Hilary 1, Easter 1, Trinity 3, Michaelmas 1; in 1873, Hilary 0, Easter 0, Trinity 0. Total calls in 15 terms, 13. Thus, if the annual income of the society is £7,000, £28,000 have been expended in calling thirteen gentlemen to the bar, at a cost of upward of £2,150 each.

IF "LEX, JR.," will turn to page 340 of this volume of the LAW JOURNAL, he will find a report of the case of Baker v. Drake, which he desires us to "publish in full."

FOREIGN NOTES.

The evidence in the Tichborne case closed on the 2d inst., and Dr. Kenealey, counsel for the defense began his speach. Sir John Duke Coleridge,

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Lord Chief Justice of the English Court of Common Pleas, is to be raised to the peerage. He will become Baron Coleridge. -During the last ten years nine judges of the English Court of Equity have died, viz., Lords Westbury and Cransworth, Sir John Holt, Sir C. J. Selwyn, Sir J. Knight Bruce, Sir G. M. Gifford, Sir James Wigram, Sir George Turner and Sir John Wickens. -The Italian Chambers on the 24th ult. unanimously adopted a resolution recommending the introduction of the arbitration clause in future treaties with foreign powers. At a meeting recently held in Rome, at which David Dudley Field, Esq., of New York, and M. Richard, Secretary of the Paris Peace Society, were present, it was decided that an Italian Committee should be organized in connection with the Judicial Congress of Brussels. Count Sclopis and Gen. Garibaldi were appointed honorary members of the Committee. A public dinner was given in honor of Messrs. Field and Richard on the 27th ult., when Signor Mancini and others made speeches, in which the Virginius affair was alluded to, and the hope expressed that the question which has arisen between Spain and the United States would be referred to arbitration. The death is announced of Hon. Arthur Peel, Chief Justice of Antigua, W. I.

LEGAL NEWS.

Judge M. W. Delahay, of the United States District Court for Kansas, has resigned.

The prison system of Ohio is said to be the best in the United States.

It is proposed to place busts of the late Chief Justices Taney and Chase in the room of the United States Supreme Court.

Hon. Lyman Tremain has become a partner with the Hon. Henry E. Davies, of New York city, in the place of the Hon. Noah Davis, raised to the bench.

General Lewis T. Wigfall, formerly United States senator from Texas, on the first applied for admission to the Baltimore city bar. The customary oath of allegiance to the United States, the constitution, laws and government thereof was administered, and exSenator Wigfall was admitted to practice as an attor

ney.

In the United States senate, on Tuesday, Mr. Parsons, of Ohio, gave notice of a bill to repeal the bankruptcy laws, and Mr. Poland, of Vermont, offered a resolution, which was adopted, directing the judiciary committee to examine the statistics in regard to bankruptcy, and prepare and report such amendments thereto as will simplify and expedite proceedings thereunder and diminish the expenses thereof.

The United States senate has confirmed the following nominations: Martin Welker, to be district judge for the Northern District of Ohio, vice Charles T. Sherman, resigned; Nathaniel Shipman, district judge for Connecticut, vice Wm. D. Shipman, resigned. George P. Sanger, United States district attorney for Massachusetts; W. S. Lurty, for the Western District of Virginia; Wm. W. Bellson, for the District of Minnesota; Rufus Mallory, for the district of Oregon. Robert N. McLaren, United States marshal, for the District of Minnesota; George R. Maxwell, United States marshal, for the Territory of Utah.

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