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we not further limit the consequences of war by lessening the objects of its attack; in other words, by narrowing the arena of strife upon the sea as well as upon the land; by making war a duel between combatants and not a devastation of neutrals? If we narrow the theatre of war on land to the camp and beleaguered fort or city, why on the water should it not be narrowed to the ocean armament and the blockaded port or assailed fort? If upon land we do not infest the tranquil home with violence, and if the graces of art and the libraries of knowledge are free from the spoiler, why destroy the peaceful occupations of commerce on the sea in the hot passions of war? Why place in jeopardy the immense trading interests of nations? Why expend immense sums in insuring cargoes from the "king's enemies"? Why place before the cupidity of men or nations the golden freightage of California and Australia, and the steamers and packets which connect Europe with America, and both with the Orient? Why offer up to a worse than heathen fury the peaceful craft which, at great peril, supply our daily wants, and waft to us the teas and spices, sugars and silks, of the world? Why arouse the ardors of war in despoiling neutral commerce under suspicions of hostility? Why not forever banish from that common of the world-the free seathe prying, avaricious, and revengeful belligerent, whether he sail under a letter of marque or a legal commission as a public cruiser? Why compel the neutral to arm, or what is worse, to profit slyly by the restrictions of war and the chances of immunity? Why embroil the commerce of mankind with the difficulties and dangers of a quarrel between two monarchs, or a punctilio between two ministers, resulting in war, and a war too which would inflame other nations in a general conflagration? Why not imitate the benign example of Providence, by ruling the raging of the seas; or the more beautiful example of the Saviour, who said to the tempestuous waves, "Peace, be still!" How eminently desirable, therefore, it is to prevent such calamities by fixed and authoritative rules of international conduct! How desirable for belligerents! How much more so for neutrals! Such reforms as I have indicated must be the product of public opinion. In this age, the empire of opinion is only divided by the reign of that universal conscience which is informed and inspired by its teachings. When these influences rule in the cabinets and councils of nations, we may hail their supremacy as the "instauratio magna" of juridical reason in the world of nations. For the purpose of contributing to that opinion and conscience, which is the source of the law of nations, and of expressing the judgment of the American Congress and people, the Committee will report back the resolutions last referred to them, with an amendment, thanking the other Powers besides France, for their liberal sympathy in behalf of neutral rights. I trust that the American Congress will adopt them, and thus vindicate and elevate into its proper place the great American doctrine, which would enfranchise commerce, guarantee peace, and give an impulse to civiliza

tion.

IV.

SECESSION.

SECESSION REFUTED AND DENOUNCED-PLEA FOR COMPROMISE-WARNINGS

TO NORTH AND SOUTH-WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES PREDICTED-THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER-APPEAL FOR NATIONALITY.

THIS speech was delivered in the midst of the excitement of actual secession. It was a difficult duty for a Representative, who stood between the extremes and appealed to them for moderation, to reach a class of men whose characteristics were immoderation and violence. Anxious to keep the peace and avert war, and at the same time unyielding as to the Union, I was compelled to weigh carefully each word, lest what was intended for oil on the waters, might be oil on the flames. This speech was delivered January 6, 1861.

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I speak from and for the capital of the greatest of the States of the great West. That potential section is beginning to be appalled at the colossal strides of revolution. It has immense interests at stake in this Union, as well from its position as its power and patriotism. We have had infidelity to the Union before, but never in such a fearful shape. We had it in the East during the late war with England. Even so late as the admission of Texas, Massachusetts resolved herself out of the Union. That resolution has never been repealed; and one would infer, from much of her conduct, that she did not regard herself as bound by our covenant. Since 1856, in the North, we have had infidelity to the Union, more by insidious infractions of the Constitution, than by open rebellion. Now, sir, as a consequence, in part, of these very infractions, we have rebellion itself, open and daring, in terrific proportions, with dangers so formidable as to seem almost remediless.

From the time I took my seat this session, I have acted and voted in every way to remove the causes of discontent and to stop the progress of revolution. At the threshold, I voted to raise the committee from each State; and I voted against excusing the members who sought to withdraw from it, because I believed then that such a committee, patriotically constituted, had in it much of hope and safety; and because, to excuse members from

serving on it, upon the ground of secession, was to recognize the heresy. I am ready to vote now for any salutary measure which will bring peace and preserve the Union. Herodotus relates that when Mardonius was encamped in Bootia, before the battle of Platea, he and fifty of his officers were invited to meet the same number of Thebans at a banquet, at which they reclined in pairs, a Persian and a Theban upon each couch. During the entertainment one of the Persians, with many tears, predicted to his Theban companion the speedy and utter destruction of the invading army, and when asked why he used no influence with Mardonius to avert it, he answered:

"When one would give faithful counsel, nobody is willing to believe him. Although many of us Persians are aware of the end we are coming to, we still go on, because we are bound to our destiny; and this is the very bitterest of a man's griefs, to see clearly, but to have no power to do any thing at all."

I believe, sir, that the events now transpiring are big with disaster to my country. I have done my humble part for years to prevent them; but I do not see now that any effort on my part can avail; and this is the bitterest of a man's grief. It is in such a peril as this that the heart spontaneously prays for a nearer communication with a divine prescience. We long for some direction from a superior power, in whose great mind the end is seen from the beginning. At least, one might wish for some magic mirror of Merlin, in which to see the foes of our country approach, so as rightly to guard against them.

Four States have, in so far as they could by their own act, separated from our Federal Union. This is one of the stern facts which this Congress has to encounter. The Government is passing through one of those historic epochs incident to all nationalities. Our prosperity has made us proud, rich, intolerant, and self-sufficient; and therefore prone to be rebellious. We have waxed fat-are doing well, "tempestuously well." Ascending to the height of national glory, through national unity, we are in danger of falling by our own dizziness. We are called upon to break down and thrust aside the very means of our ascent-the Constitution itself.

In such a time, the bitter crimination and vain threats of party and of sections are out of place. They should not turn the people of the North from doing their whole duty to the South; nor the South from a more deliberate review of its past, and a more prudential view of its perilous future. No man has the right to say or do aught that will further exasperate the public sentiment of the South. No good man in the North can oppose any measure of honorable recession from wrong. I cannot speak of South Carolina in the tone and temper of some. She has been a part of our national life. Her blood is in our veins; her Marions, Sumters, and Pinckneys are ours. Eutaw, Cowpens, and Camden; are they not a part of that glory, which can no more be separated from the Union than the dawn from the sun! Whatever may be our indignation against her, or our duty to ourselves, let us remember that public sentiment is not to be reached by threat or denunciation. Our Government depends for its execution on public sentiment. To that sentiment alone, in its calmer mood, are we to look for a restoration of a better feeling. When that feeling comes, it will be hailed like the sea-bird which visited

the sea-tossed caravel of Columbus-as the harbinger of a firm-set footing beyond. Other facts of a similar perilous character will soon transpire. Georgia, Texas, and Louisiana will assuredly follow the erratic course of South Carolina. This fact must soon be encountered. South Carolina has been singing her Marseillaise, and the waves of the Gulf make accordant music in the revolutionary anthem. It but echoes the abolitionism of the North and West; for scarcely had the song died away on the shores of Lake Erie, before South Carolina took it up with a wilder chorus! Extremes thus meet. Extremes north have aided, if not conspired with, extremes south, in the work of disintegration.

That work will go on. I know that we are very slow to believe in any sign of dissolution. We have faith in our luck. We have trust in a certain inventive faculty, which has never yet failed us, either in mechanical or political expedients. Our politics are plastic to emergencies. Still I must warn the people that it is the well-grounded fear, almost the foregone conclusion of the patriotic statesmen here, that the work of breaking up will go on, until the entire South shall be arrayed against the entire North.

In view of these facts, I will discuss these propositions: 1. That se cession is not a right in any possible relation in which it can be viewed; to tolerate it in theory or practice is moral treason to patriotism and good government. 2. That while it may not involve such direful consequences as other revolutions, still it is revolution. 3. That every effort of concil iation should be exhausted to check it, before force is applied. 4. That if the North does not do her part fully in recession from aggression, it will be impossible to unite the northern people, or any portion of the southern people, in repressing secession. 5. That if the South will make a patient endeavor, equal to the great occasion, to secure her rights in the Union, I believe that she will succeed; and if she is then repulsed, it will be impossible for her to receive any detriment from the North; but she will depart in peace. 6. If she go inconsiderately, as some States are going, the country may incur the fearful hazard of war. 7. If the South press the one hard overmastering question upon the North, and follow it up with seizure of forts and revenue, cannonading of our vessels, and other aggressive acts, without giving an opportunity for conciliation, there will be no power in the conservatism of the North to restrain the people. No sacrifice will be considered too great to make in the protection and defence of the Union. 8. That, in the present state of facts, so long as the revenues can be collected on land or sea, and the forts and harbors can be commanded by the Federal Government, that Government must be, as to these matters, the Government de facto, as well as de jure; and that so long as this status can be maintained by the Executive, it should be done by all the legal forces of the Government.

I would not exaggerate the fearful consequences of dissolution. It is the breaking up of a Federative Union ; but it is not like the breaking up of society. It is not anarchy. A link may fall from the chain, and the link may still be perfect, though the chain have lost its length and its strength. In the uniformity of commercial regulations, in matters of war and peace, postal arrangements, foreign relations, coinage, copyrights, tariff, and other Federal and national affairs, this great Government may

be broken; but in most of the essential liberties and rights which Government is the agent to establish and protect, the seceding State has no revolution, and the remaining States can have none. This arises from that refinement of our polity which makes the States the basis of our instituted order. Greece was broken by the Persian power; but her municipal institutions remained. Hungary has lost her national crown; but her home institutions remain. South Carolina may preserve her constituted domestic authority; but she must be content to glimmer obscurely remote, rather than shine and revolve in a constellated band. She even goes out by the ordinance of a so-called sovereign convention, content to lose, by her isolation, that youthful, vehement, exultant, progressive life, which is our NATIONALITY! She foregoes the hopes, the boasts, the flags, the music, all the emotions, all the traits, and all the energies, which, when combined in our United States, have won our victories in war and our miracles of national advancement. Her Governor, Colonel Pickens, in his inaugural, regretfully "looks back upon the inheritance South Carolina had in the common glories and triumphant power of this wonderful Confederacy, and fails to find language to express the feelings of the human heart as he turns from the contemplation." The ties of brotherhood, interests, lineage, and history, are all to be severed. No longer are we to salute a South Carolinian with the "idem sententiam de republica," which makes unity and nationality. What a prestige and glory are here dimmed and lost in the contaminated reason of man!

Can we realize it? Is it a masquerade, to last for a night, or a reality to be managed with rough, passionate handling? It is sad and bad enough; but let us not overtax our anxieties about it as yet. It is not the sanguinary regimen of the French revolution; not the rule of assignats and guillotine; not the cry of " Vivent les Rouges! A mort les gendarmes !" but as yet, I hope I may say, the peaceful attempt to withdraw from the burdens and benefits of the Republic. Thus it is unlike every other revolution. Still it is revolution. It may, according as it is managed, involve consequences more terrific than any revolution since government began.

If the Federal Government is to be maintained, its strength must not be frittered away by conceding the theory of secession. To concede secession as a right, is to make its pathway one of roses, and not of thorns. I would not make its pathway so easy. If the Government has any strength for its own preservation, the people demand it should be put forth in its civil and moral forces. Dealing, however, with a sensitive public sentiment, in which this strength reposes, it must not be rudely exercised. It should be the iron hand in a glove of velvet. Firmness should be allied with kindness. Power should assert its own prerogative, but in the name of law and love. If these elements are not thus blended in our policy, as the Executive purposes, our Government will prove either a garment of shreds or a coat of mail. We want neither.

Our forts have been seized; our property taken; our flag torn down; our laws defied; our jurisdiction denied; and, that worst phase of revolution, our ship sent under our flag to the relief of a soldier doing his duty, fired upon and refused an entrance at one of our own harbors. Would that were all! The President informs us, in his last message, that

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