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where the people are not sufficiently refined to use wheat as an article of food, their wants in all respects are circumscribed, and they do not require, in exchange for the wheat they raise exclusively as an article of export, those articles of British manufacture which constitute the means of England to pay for food, and which are of first necessity to the well-being of the American agriculturists, the refinements and attainments of whose families are superior to many of the rural lords in Europe. It It is this community of interests between the Anglo-Saxons of England and those of the United States, that under a free system, will ensure to the latter the supply of all the grain of which England may be deficient, and the interchange of commodities reduces the cost of transportation. If a vessel leaves the port of New-York with grain, she charges 9d. sterling or 18 cts. per bushel freight, and she cannot carry less, because she is almost sure to come back empty, and that 18 cts. covers the expense of two passages. If she had a return cargo, the same profit would accrue from 9 cts. freight on a bushel of grain out, which item alone would reduce the cost of the wheat delivered in England 3s. 6d. per quarter. The want of this intercommunion is the great source of distress at this moment both in England and the states. The chief products of the former are manufactures, and of the latter, agricultural produce. In both countries there is an over-production of the staples of each, a glut of markets and a most unparallelled depression in prices; while in each country there is a great want of the surplus products of the other. Manufactured goods were never so abundant or so low as in England, and produce, particularly wheat and wheat flour, scarcely ever presented in any country such quantities for so little money, as is now the case in the United States.
The farmers of America cannot buy goods, either foreign or domestic, because they cannot dispose of their produce. The operatives of England cannot buy a sufficiency of that produce, because the glutted market for goods suspends their labors and wages at the same time. This unnatural separation of interests and mutual injury inflicted
upon each other, has been the result of government jealousies kept alive by parties who have sought special privileges to themselves, at the expense of the remaining portion of the people at home and abroad. It has been supposed that the welfare of the state required its "independence," as it has been called, of other countries for its supplies. Yet the nation that has a great deal to sell, is as much dependent upon the buyer as the latter is upon the producer. The transaction of sale and purchase is a mutual benefit. Special privileges have only served to make the government and certain classes rich and powerful at the expense of the mass of the people. England is an eminent example of the working of this theory. Her government and aristocracy combine power and wealth in an extraordinary degree, but the condition of her people is far from enviable. Her power itself is fast becoming nominal. In an actual war she would indeed inflict great and serious injuries upon her opponent; but her commercial interests, on which that power rests, makes the existence of the war impossible. The people of England have discovered that peace and commerce are the means of their welfare, and not taxes and glory. To extend commerce they have successfully demanded free trade in corn. The idea that to depend upon foreign nations for corn is injurious to the national welfare, has been pronounced by the popular leaders in Parliament, an absurdity, and the national voice has declared for entire freedom in the trade in that article. The United States are eminently fitted by resources habits, industry, and position, to supply the wants of England; and the people of this country have demanded an abandonment of the obsolete notion of protective duties, which, in their operation, mean, practically, an embargo on sales of corn to England, by forbidding the entry of the returns in products of British industry. The state of Texas, in its independent condition, could not successfully carry on its government, and it asked to be annexed to the Union. It was so annexed, and prohibitive duties on both sides abolished, leaving absolute free trade between it and the other states; and this freedom of trade is the only manner in which
annexation brings itself home to the
hands of the mill-owners, but there will
according to the admitted principles of trade, be enhanced here and in England. Why, under that increased demand, will the manufacture be diminished? The pretence is evidently without foundation in fact. The only effect will be to lessen the profits of the factory monopolists. The demand for an increased quantity of goods must increase the number of operatives, and, as a consequence, improve their wages. Michelet,* the able historian of France, describes this operation as follows:
"All who can do nothing else, take to the tending of machines, and in proportion to their number, their wages lower, and their articles, thus cheaply manufactured, are wretchedness increases. On the other hand, brought within the reach of the poor, so that the misery of the machine workman lessens in some degree the misery of the workmen and peasants, who are, probably, some seventy times the more numerous.
sale. The terrified manufacturer neither
"We had experience of this in 1842. The cotton mills were at their last gasp; the warehouses full to bursting, and no dared work nor stop with these devouring machines of his; interest on the money he has borrowed does not stop. He kept his mills going half days, and heaped goods on goods. Prices fell; to no purpose.They went on falling, until cotton fell to three-pence a yard. A miracle into an "open sesame." followed; that word three-pence operated Millions of purchasers of poor folks, who never bought,
It is, however, not true that any. diminution of manufactures will take place in consequence of European competition; on the contrary, the consumption of goods must be vastly increased, and, as a consequence, the quantity to be made must swell in an equal ratio. The free import of corn into England will ensure cheap bread in England, and every practical person is aware that in England cheap food is accompanied by a larger consumption of goods. The same cause will produce a steady market for produce, and enhance the means of the farmers to buy goods; while the low prices of those goods will ensure an extensive consumption. By a double process, therefore, the demand for manufactured goods must,
This was the wonder-working magic of that cheapness of price which protectionists held up as a bug-bear to the people. This cheapness, by which goods are placed within the reach of all, is carefully guarded against by the protective policy. Grave statesmen and Christian philanthropists raise an outcry against the "pauper labor" of
"The People." By M. Michelet, author of the History of France. D. Appleton & Co. New-York.
Europe, which hackneyed phrase, if it means anything, means that the products of industry and frugality jeopardize the profits of indolent possessors of capital. It is not alone against the foreign artizan resident abroad that this cry is directed, but it is applied to the adopted citizen, who, seeking our shores that he may enjoy the whole fruits of his own industry, is assailed because his habits of rigid frugality and persevering industry are destructive of corporate privileges and paper money profits. In relation to English manufactures, the wages of operatives are higher than in the United States. The report of the Parliamentary factory commissioners state, that the average labor in England is 69 hours per week for 11s., or $2 64. In the United States, 78 hours for 10s., or $2 40. The average in Lowell is $1 50 per week, and $125 board, being $2 75, or 11s. 6d. per week. These figures show that England has no advantage over the United States in cheapness of labor. In the last two years a very great reduction has been made in the prices paid for weaving. The manner of it has been thus:-Prior to 1842 a girl tended two power looms, and she received 16 cents per piece for cotton cloth produced; these looms are driven by steam or water-power. In 1841-2, the speed at which these looms were propelled was reduced, and the girl required to tend three. The most healthy and active girls were selected, and the others discharged. As soon as habit enabled her to tend the three looms with comparative facility, the speed was increased, and still further exertion on her part became necessary. This process continued until the old speed was restored, and an active strong girl became
taxed to the utmost of her physical powers, to tend three where before two was considered a great task. These three looms then would produce three pieces in the same time that two were formerly produced. The price allowed the girl was reduced from 16 cents to 11 cents per piece; she therefore received 33 cents for the same length of time employed as when she received 32 cents for producing two pieces. Her extra exertion in producing the third piece is the increased profit of the millowner, who memorialises Congress for protection against British "pauper labor," because he has increased the wages of his own operatives; that is, he pays her 33 cents where he paid 32 cents before! This increased production does not lower the price here, because, as soon as the United States' markets are overloaded, the goods are exported to China and India, where they undersell the English goods at a discrimination of 10 per cent. duty in favor of the latter. This system is secure in the hands of monopolists as long as the large capital of England is debarred from competing with the corporate capital here. It is impossible for individuals here to compete with vested capitals of a million dollars and upwards each, and the protection of the people against this oppression is to be found only in the aid of the large capital of Lancashire, whose people are now asking our farmers to sell them their surplus flour for their goods. The practical annexation of the manufacturing interests of England to the agricultural interests of the United States through free trade, again unites the Anglo-Saxon race in an indissoluble bond, and gives a new impulse to the prosperity of this glorious Union.
MODERN ARMS AND ARMIES.
In modern times the maturity of the art military has been productive of singular effects in the concentration of great power in a small body of men. A handful of troops, drilled, disciplined and armed according to scientific rules, and guided by experienced and skilful officers, may be productive of the most important results, and even change the destiny of nations. A marked example of this has been exhibited during the last few years in the case of China. That nation, some two centuries since, was overrun by the warlike Tartars of the north, and the Manchow dynasty established. Under the policy adopted by that government, she remained secluded from the rest of the world down to 1843, and the population had reached 300 million souls; at that time the British government having difficulties with China, sent 4000 soldiers under Sir Gordon Bremer to blockade Canton. A nation occupying the islands of the North Sea, and numbering some 26 million of inhabitants, attacked the ancient nation of China, outnumbering them 13 times, with a force of a few thousand men, and that little army was sufficient to enable its leaders to dictate terms to so mighty a nation. A small polished axe in the hands of a skilful woodman, will at a few well applied strokes bring down the sturdiest oaks. In a similar manner, that small highly disciplined band of Englishmen, in a few weeks shook a power that had been undisturbed for ages, and by bringing it within the intercourse of nations, laid the foundation of a mighty revolution. So great are the results flowing from the application of science to the direction of force. Nor are all armies alike. We have recently seen an army composed of 2000 Americans, utterly defeat, in two successive engagements, three times their number of Mexicans, under skilful leaders. These great results flow from the superiority of skill and intellect in the direction of masses. Napoleon, in his memoirs, informs us that two Mamelukes kept three
Frenchmen at bay, because they were better armed, better mounted and better exercised; but a hundred Frenchmen were a match for a like number of Mamelukes, and 1000. French could easily beat 1500 Mamelukes. The cavalry generals, Murat, Leclerc, and Lasalle, formed in three lines; when the Mamelukes attacked the first line, the second came to its assistance on the right and left. The Mamelukes wheeled to turn the flanks of the new line; at that moment the third charged them, and they were always broken. Such is the effect of tactics and evolutions.
The difference between tactics and strategics was but indifferently well understood until fully developed by Napoleon. The difference between them may be stated in saying that the mixing of colors, preparing canvass and choosing brushes, are the tactics of a painter. Strategics are how to paint. The former received great improvement as connected with modern weapons, from the king of Prussia. The true principle of the latter was the discovery which Napoleon was born to make, and he conquered the European continent in developing it. It had always been assumed that what was true of the relative position of troops in actual combat, was also true of armies at a great distance from each other. That is to say, since the invention of fire-arms forces have necessarily been drawn up in long thin lines; therefore, if an army was attacked upon one or both of its flanks it was almost sure to be defeated. The reason was, that in such a position no effectual resistance could be offered until a change in front was made to correspond with that of the enemy, and making this change under the pressure of his attack was impossible without disorder. It was always assumed, therefore, that an army between two others, no matter how distant, was also in a dangerous position. Napoleon saw at once that if the armies were distant from each other, this central position was the strong and not the
weak point. As long as the central army had time to concentrate upon one enemy before the other arrived, the chances were all in favor of the central position. This general principle, combined with other causes, was the source of his success, and he was in the latter years combatted by the allies in the only manner that he could be resisted successfully, which was by systematically retiring when he advanced upon any one force. It was the application of the highest order of intellect to military affairs, at a time when the combinations of Europe against republican France offered the broadest field for the developement of genius. The progress of the art of war was illustrated by the conquest of Europe. It was the exclamation of Wellington, on hearing of the masterly operations of Napoleon around Ratisbon, in 1809, that "the art of war never was perfected until then." Subordinate to the vast field of strategics are the tactics of armies, or the organization and preparation of those different arms which, in a master hand, are the instruments of great results. There are many able tacticians, who have but little notion of strategy. Thus Napoleon remarked of the heroic Lannes, that "no officer could so skilfully handle 20,000 men in the field;" but at the time of his death at Essling, he was just beginning to have a notion of strategics. Again, the great genius of the French emperor was displayed as much in following up a victory as in gaining it. To this end he extended those branches of military force that are most efficient in improving victory. At one time the French cavalry numbered 90,000 men; of these in one instance 30,000 men, after helping to defeat the enemy as infantry, were mounted on horses taken from him, to complete his defeat. This subsequently caused a controversy to spring up among the martinets, tacticians and adjutants, as to whether a cavalry recruit was better or not for having learned to act on foot. The great principle by which the best application of force to suit the occasion was made never occurred to them. The success which the undisciplined armies of revolutionary France obtained over neighboring states was not because of the excellence of their materials, but because, as Napoleon expressed it, "Carnot had organized
victory." The great war minister had so arranged the campaigns that the armies were of necessity victorious.
The new principles of war illustrated by the French arms, and the terrible vehemence with which they were executed, occasioned many changes in old notions; among others, the truth became apparent that fortified places had lost very considerably of the value they formerly held either in the imagination of mankind or in reality. In modern war the use of fortresses is reduced nearly to their simple effects upon communications. A fortress which secures exclusively to the possessor a certain passage of a river or a mountain pass, is valuable, as a gate is valuable which keeps one man out and lets another in. In this sense a fort is called a “key," and like a key is of importance only when it is the key to something. The idea that fortresses in an open country will check an invading army for fear of the operations of the garrison on its rear, is obsolete. If a force retires before a larger one, it will, by throwing garrisons into forts, weaken itself still further. The effect of fortresses, in the present state of affairs, is reduced to the degree in which they may promote operations against men, and therefore the importance of them has become secondary to the organization of the army.
The countries of Europe have all large standing armies kept up in time of peace, from the supposed necessity of being always prepared for war, in order to avert attack. Whenever diplomacy takes an angry turn, a great expenditure is usually incurred in arraying and raising men, building ships, &c. To assist diplomatic bargains, movements of troops and a great clatter in the arsenals is thought necessary. It would appear that a nation is not thought strong unless her people are hept always with arms in their hands, as if those men would be incapable of becoming soldiers when occasion calls for their services. Thus the United States have been sneered at because their army is small and their government economical. The leading journals of Europe scarcely regard us as a power, because there are but 8000 men in the army. Yet recent events have shown that one-fourth of that army was sufficient to protect our southern