after a perception of moral rules independent of established law. With such views, it is no wonder that our author should have commended so highly a practice which he has ascribed to the "ancient Romans," to wit: that of inculcating upon children," in the earliest years of life," the Laws, and the Maxims and Formule of Laws." This is a theme on which he delights to dwell,

"The familiarity with the Law," he continues," thus generated, joined with a belief that the Roman Law was the perfection of justice, constituted a moral education for the Romans. In like manner, the habitual use of expressions implying moral qualities and moral sentiments, calls up moral notions and moral sentiments in those who thus learn the language of morality. But moral notions and moral sentiments can have no definiteness and fixity, except the rules by which their objects are determined are definite and fixed; AND THESE RULES ARE LAW AND CUSTOM. Each successive generation, deriving its education from the existing Laws and Customs of the Nation, and being imbued with a belief that these Laws, and the Maxims which they imply, are right and just, will

transmit the same education to the next generation. And thus the stability and consistency of the state will be preserved." -p. 151.

of Civil Society, and that man cannot exist as man except he exist in Civil Society, under the sway of Rules of Action really enforced by some of the Members of the community.”—p. 143-4. This is a legitimate consequence of the doctrine already noticed; for if the moral sentiments of man are generated, in the way described, by the operation of the laws of civil society, it follows that without such laws, he would be devoid of moral sentiments, and consequently not an accountable being. In one word, he might exist independently of civil society, but not as man; for he

would have no moral sentiments. Lord

Monboddo has told us how the monkey became a man; our author has given another process by which we, existing as mere animals, have been raised to the rank of human beings. It is by the operation of the law of the land, which establishes Rights; these beget "Jural Sentiments," which are gradually developed into a Moral Sense, or Sense of Duty!

In strict accordance with his favorite doctrine, he tells us, that—

"Moral rules must be expressed by reference to men's rights; and thus they necessarily depend upon rights actually existing. Further, it has been stated, (94) that Men's Actual Rights are determined by Positive Law; Men's Rights in each Community are determined by the Positive Law of that Community. But the Laws of different Communities are different; and the determination of Men's Rights by vari ons States are different. Personal Security, Property, Contract, Marriage, are regulated by very different rules in one State and in another. Private war, Slavery, Polyg Concubinage, have been permitted by the Laws of some States, and many other practices which are forbidden by our Laws. And it seems to follow from this, that Mo

ygamy,

rality, which depends on the Laws, must prescribe different Rules in the States in which such practices are permitted, and in those in which they are forbidden."—

Now, before we proceed to notice the author's extraordinary attempt to reconcile this language with the doctrine that "moral rules are universal and unchangeable," we shall present our own views of the manner in which the honor and glory of moral science are to be preserved from the influence

of such assumptions. If moral rules must be expressed by reference to rights existing under the law of the land, we shall not deny, that they are as fluctuating and changeable as those rights. Thus, it not only "seems" to follow it clearly and irresistibly follows, from the position in question. We would maintain the immutability of moral rules, therefore, by denying the proposition from which such an inference is fairly deduced. Indeed, it is scarcely possible to construct a more wild and reckless proposition than that on which the author has based so much of his reasoning. We are utterly amazed and confounded, that any teacher of morality should have the unparalleled hardihood to assert, that "moral rules must be expressed by reference to men's rights," as established by the laws of the community.

Let us look at this assertion in the light of the author's own teaching. Mr. Whewell has given various moral rules such, for example, as that "we should love man as man;" that "we should always speak the truth;" that "we should act in conformity with the higher principles of our nature rather than the lower, whenever they come into conflict." Now, not one of these moral rules is expressed with any reference to the law of the land, or to any right existing under it. In innumerable instances we may act in opposition to the dictates of conscience, without violating any right secured by human law. The moral law binds us to tell the truth; but yet we may, in many ways, violate this principle, without interfering with any right established by the civil code. The same remark is perfectly true of other moral precepts laid down by Mr. Whewell; such as, "Be not angry; bear no malice; do not lie; do not deceive; do not lust," and various others. They are expressed without the least shadow of reference to the law of the land.They relate to the inmost recesses of the heart; the law of the land has nothing to do with them. How is it possible that our author could, in view of such things, assume the atrocious dogma in question, and send it forth to the world with an air of oracular authority as if it were not to be questioned?The truth is, that he was so earnestly

engaged in glorifying the laws of the land, that he seems to have forgotten all he had ever said and all he had ever known.

46

Of our author's five great moral rules, there are only two which are expressed with reference to the law of the land; namely, the principle of justice and the principle of order.These two principles, as they are explained by him, do, indeed, make only one. We may state this also as a Moral Principle," says he, "that each man is to have his own; and this we may term the Principle of Justice.”— And he also says, “Justice requires us to give each man his own, and Law alone determines what is each man's own. If we draw inferences from the notion of Justice without taking account of the traditions of Law and History, we shall be led to contradiction and confusion." His great principle of justice, then, requires us to give each man his own, as it has been ascertained by "the traditions of Law and History." Hence, it is included in his principle of order, which “implies a conformity to positive Human Laws.”—p. 193. Now, in his learned attempts to show that moral rules cannot be expressed except in relation to human laws, he draws his illustrations from the rules of justice, and then adds, that by "the like reasonings we should be led to other Moral Ideas.”—p. 153. It is in this very satisfactory and philosophical manner that our author demonstrates that not only the rules of legal justice, but all moral rules whatever, must be expressed with reference to the law of the land.

Let us now notice the manner in which he attempts to reconcile his dogma, that moral rules must be expressed with reference to legal rights, with the fact that moral rules are immutable.— He admits, that "it seems" to follow from this dogma, that moral rules are as variable as the legal rights upon which they depend; and he even asserts, over and over again, that "the morality of the individual depends on his not violating the law of his nation." -p. 83. Now, in order to reconcile his scheme with the immutability of moral rules, which does he deny--the dogma or the conclusion which "seems to flow from it? He neither denies

the premises nor the conclusion.Surely, then, he must deny the immutability of moral rules? No, he does not deny that either; he holds them all together, and reconciles them in a manner peculiar to himself. Let us look at this specimen of logic:

"Moral rules" (says he) "exist necessarily; they are necessary to the action of man; they result necessarily from the possession of Reason. From this it seems to follow, that Moral Rules must be necessary truths, flowing from the moral nature of man; and that, therefore, like other necessary truths, they must be universal and unchangeable. And accordingly, moralists have constantly spoken of Morality as a body of fixed, immutable, universal truths."-p. 77.

Thus, moral rules depend on legal rights; and hence it follows that they must vary with those rights; and yet they flow from the moral nature of man, from the bare possession of reason, and, therefore, it follows that they are universal and unchangeable! Now, he demands of himself, "How are these two opposite doctrines to be reconciled?" and he answers

"They are thus reconciled. The Conceptions of the fundamental rights of man are universal, and flow necessarily from the Moral Nature of man: the Definitions of these rights are diverse, and are determined by the laws of each State. The Conceptions of Personal Security, Security, Property, Contract, Family, exist everywhere; and man cannot be conceived to exist in a social condition without them. The Rules by which Personal Safety, Property, Contract, Families are maintained and protected, are different in different communities, and will differ according to the needs and purposes of each community. The Rules of Morality are universal and immutable, so far as they are expressed in terms of these Conceptions in their general form: it is always our duty to respect the Personal Safety, the Property, the Contracts, the Family Ties of others. But if we go into those details of Law by which these conceptions are in different communities differently defined, the Rules of Morality may differ. In one country the wayfarer may morally pluck the fruits of the earth as he passes, and in another he may not; because when so plucked, in one place they are, and in another they are not, the Property of him on whose field they grew. The Precept, Do not Steal, is universal; the Law, to pluck is to steal, is partial."-p. 77.

It is very remarkable, that in treating of the rules of right we should so often hear of "rights," and of "rights" only. Now, it may be true, if you please, that our notions of "the fundamental rights of men" are exceedingly vague, and that we can know the "rights" any man has only by looking at the law, and seeing what it guaranties to him. No one pretends to deny, that all the rules in relation to the rights of men "must be expressed with reference to the law of the land," so far as those rights are established by the law. The question is not whether legal rules respecting our legal rights must be so expressed, but whether "moral rules" concerning what is right, must be ex pressed with reference to the law of the land. It must be confessed, that in setting out with rights, instead of the morally right, the learned author has most skilfully adapted his premises to his foregone conclusion. We would remind him that morality is something and that the good man has something more than an observance of contracts; more to do in this life than merely to abstain from infringing upon the legal rights of his neighbor. The precept, "thou shalt not steal," is only one of the ten commandments; - it by no means embraces the whole moral law.

The question is not, we repeat, about "rights," but about right. Let the author show that we can have no notion of what is right, independent of legal enactments, and he will show something to the purpose; but while the point in hand relates to "moral rules," it is flying wide of the mark to lay one's premises on "fundamental rights."When" moralists have spoken of morality as a body of fixed, immutable, universal truths," they have not referred to men's rights, but to that which is right in itself, absolutely, and independent of all law. On this subject we beg leave to read the learned author a lesson out of Hobbes himself:-"The laws of nature," says the philosopher of Malmsbury," are immutable and eternal; for injustice, ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity, acception of persons, can never be made lawful."Leviathan, Part i., Chap. xv. is a generous and noble sentiment, when compared with the low and despicable philosophy of Mr. Whewell.

This

It is the worst feature of this philoso

BARREN and desolate as yonder isle appears now, it once was the favorite spot of nature, where, with a prodigal hand, she scattered her sweetest and brightest flowers, and blessed the soil with richness and fertility. The stranger on the shore would pause in admiration of its beauty; and, as his eyes wandered from the enamelled carpet of flowers which sloped to the edge of the water, and blushed in its silver depths, to the arched vistas of trees, Jaden with the fruits of summer, and flinging their perfume on its breeze as it passed, he could have deemed that paradise was given back to earth again, its avenues guarded by the spirits of the lake, and every flower and tree nurtured by the breath of an eternal

summer.

Nor is it as a lovely garden alone, sleeping in the embrace of nature, and resplendent with her brightest gifts, that we are to view yonder island. Its exceeding beauty awakened the desire of possession, and it became the seat of royalty and power. A stately cas tle rose among the trees, inhabited by a powerful monarch of that period. No way-worn minstrel ever passed that castle, without sharing its hospitality and shelter; and though centuries have swept over that island, blasted and deserted, the time has been, when the harp pealed forth its melodious strains, and from the lips of the hoary minstrel rose the inspiring deeds of the ancient day, the praises of warriors, and those legends of enchantment, which lent the feats of war and the vows of love the charms of supernal influence. But vanished, like the mist of morning, are the grandeur and beauty of the isle; the harp of the minstrel is silent now as the tongue which once responded to its strain; the curse of a spirit hath withered every flower, and shorn every tree of its beauty; and the castle, which once towered in pride and strength, hath not left a trace be

hind, but lies in ruin beneath the waters.

The king had but one child, a daughter, the dearer to him for that she was his only one. Ethnea was the pride of his youth and the gladness of his old age; he loved her with even more than the strength of a father's heart, with a fondness which sought her happiness alone, and a tenderness which partook of the softer character of maternal love. Nor in beauty as in goodness, was Ethnea undeserving of her father's affection. Every harp, which sounded at the banquet, forgot its stirring tale of war and knight, and sent forth its strains in praise of that beauty, which entranced the gaze of the minstrel even while he sang. Princes and warriors sued for her hand in marriage; and a successful rival was he, who obtained the favor of Ethnea even for the dance. She was, indeed, the fairest flower of the isle; but love, in his pilgrimage, paused in his flight to rest upon so sweet a spot, and while he sojourned there, the eye, which sparkled with the light of youth, became dim, and the cheek, on which nature had breathed her brightest hue, became pallid, as though touched by the finger of death.

Among the various suitors who pressed for the hand of the princess, was one favored by Ethnea above all. The predilection of the maiden was confirmed by the king, who regarded Morni as a warrior brave and skilful beyond his years. The hand of his daughter was betrothed by the king to the young prince, and the day was appointed for their nuptials. But, ere the hour arrived to stand before the altar, the arm of death hung, like a pall, above the fated youth; and the love of Ethnea left to the unhappy maiden but the tear, the sigh, and the murmur of despair.

But a few days previous to that appointed for the bridal, Morni, in com