THE existing war with Mexico, although it is one of many now being prosecuted by the nations of the earth, has this distinctive feature, viz., that it requires for its prosecution an increase in the expenditure of a nation peculiarly commercial. It is true, that Russia wages war with the Circassians, France with the Algerines, England in India, and France and England jointly in the Rio Plata. These are four wars carried on by the leading nations of Europe, each against smaller states, and for purposes of aggrandizement; but a feature common to them all is, that each nation is engaged with one so much less in strength, that the ordinary military peace establishments of the greater powers are sufficient to cope with the utmost exertions of those they engage. Hence the people of the respective countries are not called upon to pay much, if any, additional for the prosecution of hostilities, nor are their mercantile pursuits disturbed. The theatres of action are so remote from the ordinary circles of trade, as scarcely to alarm even the sensitiveness of commercial men. Wars thus conducted, without enhancing the national expenditure or interrupting trade-no matter how atrocious soever they may be in their nature, derive little sympathy from the people at large. When the United States were attacked by the Mexican troops, and the vigorous movement of the army of occupation served in two days to hurl back upon Mexican soil the utterly broken remnant of the invading army, a speedy termination of hostilities was looked for. Without wishing to prosecute a ceaseless and wasteful war, like that of France in Algiers, or England in India, the United States seized the moment of victory to proffer the olive branch. One of those political paroxysms which periodically overtake a state like Mexico, approaching its dissolution, suddenly shook the feeble despot from his seat, and brought Santa Anna again to the head of affairs. The exertions of the VOL. XIX-NO. CI.

5

United States, which had been somewhat relaxed pending_the_progress of events that deposed Paredes and restored Santa Anna, were suddenly, on the consummation of the latter event, reinvigorated. The seaboard, from its remotest north, was stript of its most efficient companies to reinforce the army of invasion, indicating that the healthy season on the gulf coast is to be availed of to prosecute the war with the utmost vigor, and perhaps with a change of policy in relation to the treatment of the conquered people. The events which have transpired thus far show pretty conclusively that the people of Mexico take little or no interest in the change of individuals at the head of affairs. The mutations are mostly conceived and effected by a few officers, in whose intrigues the people have no sympathy. As far as the armies of the United States have yet come in contact with the people, the utmost leniency has been shown them, and the effect seems to be different from what might reasonably be expected. The persons of wealth and influence finding themselves rather relieved from burthens and benefited by the war, by no means exert themselves to effect a peace. They are to be negotiated with, it appears, only under the prick of the bayonet. The occupation of the large towns and cities, followed by severe requisitions upon all the property in the country, is apparently the only means by which that popular sentiment, to which Santa Anna pretends implicitly to submit, can receive a peaceful bias. If Mexico cannot furnish provision for a large army she can supply the means of purchasing it, and the steam marine of the United States can keep all her seaports stocked with an abundance of food and munitions of war. Under these circumstances, the hopes that were indulged of a speedy restoration of peace have subsided, and the contest will probably be prolonged for some months at least.

The war in Mexico is of a character

similar to those in which the powers of Europe are engaged, inasmuch as that in its operation the pursuits of commerce are not interfered with. The fears in relation to letters of marque, which were entertained when hostilities first took place, have been removed. The expenses of this war are, however, large, and the influence which these may have upon financial affairs, is the chief ground for the inquietude to which the continuance of the war gives rise. On the 22d of July a law was approved, giving the Treasury Department authority to issue $10,000,000 of treasury notes, for one year, not bearing a higher rate of interest than per cent. At that time there was in the treasury $9,890,006. The two sums made, therefore, an aggregate of $19,890,006 applicable to extra war expenditures. The law of July authorised the issue of notes subject to the restrictions and limitations of the act of 1837. That act requires the notes to be reimbursed and redeemed after the expiration of one year, when the interest is to cease.The law of July also made it optional with the secretary, instead of issuing the notes, to borrow the money on a 6 per cent. stock having ten years to run, or to borrow part of the $10,000,000 on such a stock, and issue the balance in treasury notes at his option. The issue of notes took place in moderate amounts, mostly at New-Orleans, in the discharge of government debts to individuals. They bear one mill per cent. per annum interest, are payable in 12 months, and receivable for all public dues. It appeared, however, that some opposition to the issue manifested itself. The collector at the port of New-Orleans hesitated to receive them, on the ground that it was not expressed whether they were receivable for dues before or after maturity, and instructions from the department on this point were waited for. In the mean time, needy holders pressed them on the market, and they fell to a discount, from which they recovered when the doubts were allayed by a circular from the secretary. About $2,500,000 of these notes were issued, and some $150,000 worth were returned through the custom-house of New York in the month of September, being taken for customs. It is evident that, in availing itself of the authority to issue treasury notes, a demand for

$10,000,000 is created for the redemption of those notes at the end of the year; whereas, if the option authorized by the law, of borrowing on a stock redeemable in 10 years at 6 per cent., is adopted, no new legislation will be necessary at the next session to meet the debt. The treasury notes are doubtless the most convenient mode of contracting a debt, both for the department and the public, and the speedy settlement of the war would, in the operation of the new tariff, afford ample means in excess of ordinary expenditure, of meeting the notes as they mature. Should the war continue, the quantity of stock to be issued would be large and indefinite, and its price would be very low in the market. If peace should suddenly take place, money could be easily borrowed at 4 per cent. on a United States stock. In such a state of affairs treasury notes are clearly the best mode of borrowing. The banks of New-York offered to take a stock at par, bearing 53 per cent. interest. This was declined by the department, and the issue of 5 per ct. treasury notes continued.

The surplus in the treasury at the close of September was, as compared with former statements, as follows:

AMOUNT AND LOCATION OF U. STATES DEPOSITS.

The

The reduction has been mostly at New-York and New-Orleans. banks of New-York have for five years held on an average $5,000,000 of government money free of interest, and have not failed to embarrass the action of the department in carrying out the people's Independent Treasury law.

The large expenditure of the government on account of the war has not, however, as yet, affected the moneymarket, which is easy at 6 per cent. per annum, with every prospect of a further abundance of money. The fall business has been disastrous to importers; sales of goods have been at prices which do not reimburse the importer for his outlay, and considerable lots have been sacrificed at auction to raise

England. The impulse given to produce by the failure of the English and European harvests, to which we alluded in our last No., continued to exercise a favorable influence. The facts, as developed are, mostly, that the potatoe crop in all quarters has proved greatly deficient-almost a total failure -so much as to lead to serious apprehensions that the root will become extinct as an article of food. Beans, peas and barley, in England, and rye in the north of Europe are seriously deficient. In England the wheat crop is nearly an average in quantity or number of bushels, but deficient in weight. In France and Belgium a scarcity of wheat exists, and also in the Mediterranean. The latter is so great as to task the capacity of Odessa to supply it; and the United States appear to be the only place whence considerable supplies can

92,975 258,771

788,222 719,191 745,148

depress prices. It appears to be now established, that Indian corn will become an article of great export to England and Ireland. In fact, should the fears in relation to the permanent decay of the potatoe be measureably confirmed, Ireland must depend chiefly on the western states of America for food, a species of "annexation" the most efficient and indissoluble. It follows, however, that if large exports of corn take place, "returns" must be made, and the import of those returns must be facilitated by the United States government in still further ameliorating the tariff laws. for corn in Liverpool, is 38 a 43s sterling per quarter of 480 lbs., which is equal to $1.21 per bushel of 60 lbs., and the New-York price is 70 cts., leaving a margin of 51

The quotation

cts., mostly owing to the scarcity of freight. Buyers having no freight engaged, choose rather to take the chance of a fall in the price of grain when freight offers, and there is but little speculation. A price of 70 cts. for an article so prolific and of such general growth as corn, is of incalculable importance to the farming interest; and every species of encouragement should be given to its transportation, and the return of its proceeds. The English practice is to measure maize, or Indian corn, by the quarter-a quarter containing 8 Winchester bushels of 60 lbs. each, which amounts to 480 lbs. net weight, and by this standard are prices regulated. The last highest quoted prices in Liverpool was 48s. per quarter, which is equivalent to $10 661⁄2 U. S. currency.

The average weight of a bushel of corn in our market is assumed by common consent to be 53 lbs. ; hence about 9 bushels are considered equivalent to an English quarter, as 9x53=477, which is only 3 less than the required weight of 480 lbs., but which it probably sometimes exceeds by that amount. The following, then, is assumed as cor

rect:

Shawmut..

State...

$15,000.. .3

21,000......3.... 21,000

30,000......3

..3... 17,500......3

.4

.3 .... 30,000.. .31

.41.

17,500.. 17 500

..3

25,200......4.

24,000......3

4,800......4

....

(new)

30,000

15,000

17,500

25,200

24,000

4,800

105,000

30,000

.3

30,000......3

22,500 ...3

15,000......3