Page 1020, $8... Page 1022, §§ 5, 25..............
1845, ch. 150, § 1 (4 Edm. St. 375)..454, 456, 551
251, 610-612 | 1880, ch. 269.
1848, ch. 40, §§ 12, 15...43, 44, 431, 672, 790-794 1848, ch. 319, § 6 (Amend. Laws 1860, ch. 360).
1880, ch. 486. 1880, ch. 515.
1850, ch. 140, p. 211, §§ 15, 22, 25, 28, 44... 280-282, 285, 286, 614, 684, 688, 690
1882, ch. 409, §§ 312, 314, 315.
1882, ch. 410, §§ 86, 123.
1854, ch. 400. 1855, p. 376
274 1882, ch. 410, $$ 1346, 1384, 1390.
785 1882, $$ 1104, 1594-1632, 1841, 1866, 1882-1884 775
1873, ch. 335
1873, ch. 549, § 5.
64 1874, ch. 149
1874, ch. 351
1874, ch. 430
339 1874, ch. 446, § 31...
741 1874, p. 697..
1875, ch. 267... 1875, ch. 371, § 25.
553 1875, ch. 379..
599 1875, ch. 510.
1875, ch. 595. 1875, ch. 606, § 36.. 1875, ch. 611, § 21................ 1875...
1883, ch. 175, §§ 1, 4, 5, 18........81, 82, 612, 613 | chaser take his seat, or formally to resign 1883, ch. 319
1883, ch. 354, §§ 2, 7, 8, 14, 15..............327, 761, 762 1884, ch. 57..
1884, ch. 202, § 4.. 1884, ch. 237, p. 298.. 1884, ch. 272..
1884, ch. 312..
1884, ch. 328..
1884, ch. 381.
1884, ch. 410, § 4..
1885, ch. 181, §§ 20, 22, 23, 28. 1885, ch. 248, §§ 2, 6.
1885, ch. 261, §§ 1-4, 6, 9..... 1885, ch. 342, §§ 4, 25..
116 his seat and nominate the purchaser as his successor, as the sale and purchase is equiv alent to a resignation and nomination, though the rules of the institution require such written consent to be signed by the seat-holder on the change of membership, 507 but the debtor will be required to sign a 761 consent that the purchaser be vested with 45, 673-675 the privileges inuring to his membership. .325, 327, 760, 761-Roome v. Swan, (City Ct. N. Y.)614.
..560, 561 650
.268, 271-273 .876, 877
1885, ch. 448, § 85 (Amend. Laws 1855, § 65) 254 1885, ch. 483, §§ 1, 4, 6, 13, 16, 17... .429-431 1886, ch. 29, § 1....
1886, ch. 314...
1886, ch. 563, §§ 1, 2.
1886, ch. 572.
1887, ch. 713, §§ 1, 4, 6, 13, 16, 17..
1888, ch. 29, §§ 1-4..
324 Sunday sales, see Intoxicating Liquors.
429-431, 631, 632 See Constitutional Law, 6, 7; Railroad Com
STOCK AND PRODUCE EX- CHANGES.
Expulsion of members.
1. The constitution of the New York Stock Exchange provides for suspension of 1. The Bank Clerks' Mutual Benefit As- insolvent members, and that, within a year sociation, incorporated under the act of from the time of suspension, such mem- 1848, for the incorporation of benevolent bers may apply for readmission on show-societies, "to relieve the necessities of the ing a settlement with their creditors; also aged and disabled, and benefit the families that members guilty of obvious fraud, of of deceased" bank clerks, which provides which the governing committee shall be the for the admission of members, the fees and judges, shall, on vote of two-thirds of the assessments to be paid, and a forfeiture of members of said committee present, be ex-membership for non-payment of assess- pelled. Plaintiff was suspended for insolv-ments, is simply a mutual benefit associa ency, and charged with obvious fraud. He tion, and, not being exempted from taxa- asked for and was granted an adjournment tion by its charter, takes a legacy subject of the hearing, examined the testimony to the collateral inheritance tax.-In re taken, appeared, and was heard and inter- Jones' Estate, (Sur. N. Y Co.) 671. rogated, and given a full opportunity for Assessment. self-defense, and was adjudged guilty by a two-thirds vote, and expelled. He did not settle with his creditors within a year, nor apply for readmission, nor did he object to any of the proceedings. Held, that the court would not declare his suspension null and void.-Kuehnemundt v. Smith, (Super. Ct. N. Y.) 625.
Consent of debtor to transfer of his rights.
2. A debtor, whose right to a seat in a stock exchange has been sold by a receiver in supplementary proceedings, will not be required to sign a consent that the pur-
2. The failure of the county supervisors to add to the annual levy of taxes the ex- pense of supporting the insane for the past year, as prescribed by Laws N. Y. 1874, c. 446, § 31, does not prevent the subsequent imposition of such tax.-People v. Super- visors, (Sup.) 142.
to the dissolution of corporations, author- 3. Code Civil Proc. N Y. § 1788, relating izes the court to appoint a temporary re- ceiver, who, by section 1789, may, by inter- locutory order, be continued as a perma- nent receiver. 1 Rev. St. p. 389, § 1, pro- vides that "every person shall be assessed
in the town or ward where he resides when the assessment is made, for all lands then owned by him within such town or ward and occupied by him. Section 2 provides that "lands occupied by a person other than the owner may be assessed to the oc- cupant, as lands of non-residents. or. if the owner resides in the county in which such
lands are located, to such owner." Held,
that the interlocutory order vested the re- ceiver with title to the property in his hands by virtue of his office, in trust for stockholders and creditors, and that it must be assessed to him. In re Mallery, (Sup)
4. 1. Rev. St. N. Y p. 395, § 31, provides that the board of supervisors of each county, in equalizing assessments. may in- crease or diminish the aggregate valua- tions of land in any town by adding or de- ducting such sum, on the hundred, as may in their opinion be necessary to produce a just relation between all the valuations of land in the whole county Held, that they cannot adopt a scale for equalizing the ag. gregate valuation among the towns, based upon the assessment of both real and per- sonal estate, and by which the valuation of personalty is changed in some towns, though the total for the county remains the same. People v. Board of Supervisors, (Sup.) 555.
5. Such method is not justified by its recognized use in the county for several previous years, nor is the supervisor of a town estopped thereby in an action to have the assessment corrected -Id.
6. The county is not liable to a township
for the unauthorized act of its treasurer in paying over to the state certain taxes, as the treasurer, in receiving and paying over state taxes, does not act as the agent of the county; and the county is not the debtor to the state for such taxes, though 2 Rev St. p. 1020, § 8, p. 1022, § 25, requires the comptroller to charge the treasurer with their amount, and charges the county with losses occasioned by the treasurer's de- fault. Wood v. Board of Supervisors, (Sup.) 369.
TELEGRAPH COMPANIES. Limitation of liability.
shipped, which, on receipt, read "horses, and which the receiver made some attempt to have repeated. Bennett v. Western Union Tel. Co., (Sup.) 365.* Notice of claim.
2. Plaintiff informed the operator of a mistake in transmitting a message, and was by him referred to the principal office, where a clerk told him the manager was busy, and took down his complaint in writ- ing, and handed it to a person in another the company, which attorney promised to room, whom he introduced as attorney of investigate the matter, and afterwards, in reply to plaintiff's inquiry, wrote a letter rejecting the claim, using paper and an en- velope with printed headings representing him to be attorney of the company. Held, that it sufficiently appeared that complaint was made to the proper authorities.-Id.
TENANCY IN COMMON AND JOINT TENANCY.
Liability of co-tenant for rent.
Code Civil Proc. N. Y. § 1589, providing for the settlement, in an action for parti- tion, of the rights of co-tenants, where one has received more than his proportion of the rents, and section 1666, allowing one tenant to recover his just proportion from his co-tenant, do not render a tenant in common liable to account for the rent of the joint property occupied by himself.— Rich v. Rich, (Sup.) 770.*
Effect of conditional tender, see Specific Performance, 3.
Theaters and Shows.
Rescission of performer's contract, see Contracts, 5.
See Death by Wrongful Act; Negligence; Nui- sance; Trespass; Trover and Conversion; Waste.
Complaint in tort, see Action, 1.
1. The contract printed at the top of a telegraph blank limiting liability for negli gence or delay in transmitting an unre- peated message to the amount paid for its transmission, and a repeated message to 50 times the amount paid, is reasonable and binding on one accustomed to use such Actions-Evidence. blanks, and it is error to refuse to limit re- covery to $12.50 for error in a 25-cent mes- sage requesting a certain horse to be
Act legalizing board proceedings, see Con- stitutional Law, 1, 3.
Estoppel of town supervisor, see Taxa- tion, 5.
In an action by the contractor for build- ing a bridge, under an act validating ir- regular proceedings of the town officers
for its erection, evidence of the proceed-whiskey is diluted with water, and that ings of the town authorities referred to in the act were admissible to show on what the ratification by the legislature was founded. Wrought-Iron Bridge Co. v. Town of Attica, (Sup.) 359.
TRADE-MARKS.
What will be protected.
the packages containing it bear only one stamp, while high proof whiskey bears two stamps, so as to deprive plaintiffs of relief for infringement; it not appearing that the whiskey does not possess com. mercial purity.-Id.
7. The use by plaintiffs, on their regis- tered label, of the words, "Pat. Aug. 13th, 1872," that being the date of the registry 1. The words "compressed yeast" indi- of their trade-mark, cannot be regarded as cate the character and composition of an a false affirmation, that the goods were pat- article, and are not the subject of a trade-ented, so as to deprive them of relief from mark. Fleischmann v. Newman, (Sup.) infringement.-Id. 608.*
2. The form of a package of a manu- factured article cannot be appropriated so as to exclude others from using packages of the same character.-Id.
3. The words "Maryland Club Whiskey," arbitrarily chosen by plaintiffs as a desig- nation by which a particular whiskey was to be known, and not in themselves indi- cating any particular kind, quality, or com- position of whiskey previously well known to the trade. are a proper subject for a trade-mark, and the fact that such words have been applied only to a certain grade of whiskey manufactured by them. there- by necessarily distinguishing that from other grades of goods of their own manu- facture, does not invalidate plaintiff's right to their use as a trade-mark.-Cahn v. Gottschalk, (C. P. N. Y.) 13.
4. The words "Maryland Club," as used in plaintiffs' trade-mark, "Maryland Club Whiskey," being the name of an institu- tion and not a place, the rule excluding the use of geographical names as trade marks is not applicable.-Id.*
8. Where plaintiffs' agent, resident in the their trade-mark for five years before ac- state, knew of the alleged infringement of tion brought, plaintiffs are not entitled to an accounting of profits, by reason of laches.-Id. Injunction.
9. On a bill to restrain the use of a trade- mark consisting of words merely, it is not necessary to prove that any one has been deceived by defendant's acts, or that he even intended to deceive or defraud.—Id.
10. Plaintiffs were publishers of a picto- rial journal called "Life," and for some time had been reproducing in book form some of its pictures and literary matter, with the name of "The Good Things of Life." Defendants, who had been con- nected with plaintiffs in the reproduction, commenced to print a book similar in ap- pearance and character. containing pictures and matter from another journal, whose name was not given, calling it "The Spice of Life." by which people were deceived, thinking that the matter was from plain- tiff's journal. Held, that defendants used the word "life" not in its ordinary sense. belief that the matter in "The Spice of Life" but with intent to deceive people into the was from the journal "Life," and plaintiffs having established the right to use the duction, defendants will be enjoined from name "Life," as applicable to their repro- using it.-Stokes v. Allen, (Sup.) 643.
TRESPASS.
What amounts to.
5. In 1872, plaintiffs registered in the patent-office, as a trade-mark, the words "Maryland Club Rye Whiskey, C., B. & Co., Special Trade-Mark," surrounding the seal of Maryland, a monogram, and a represen- tation of a clover leaf, a copy of which, printed on white paper about six inches square, their initials forming part of this design, they placed on each barrel of their Maryland Club whiskey. In 1882, defend- ant began the sale of a whiskey, painting his barrel-heads yellow, and stenciling 1. Under Laws N. Y. 1883, providing for thereon in black the words "Maryland compensation for injuries resulting from Jockey Club Rye Whiskey, so that the the construction of the new aqueduct, com- words "Maryland" and "Whiskey" formed pensation for killing a horse, and for dam- a circle around the barrel-head in letters ages to buildings, struck by stones from one and one-half inches high, "Club" ap blasting, is not allowable, as these injuries pearing in letters two and one-half inches are trespasses, for which an action will lie. high, and "Jockey "in letters seven-eighths-In re Thompson, (Sup.) 35. of an inch high. Held, that defendant Pleading. was liable for an infringement.-Id.*
6. A representation upon plaintiffs' trade- mark that the article is "pure old rye whiskey" is not falsified by proof that the
2. In an action for failure to maintain an opening to an hotel across a strip of land leading thereto, the complaint alleged that the damage was caused by defendant main-
taining a fence across such strip. Defend- ant had the right to maintain such fence. but was required to keep open a gateway through the same. Held that, as the com- plaint included the space which was to be kept open, and alleged a breach, and as no application to make the complaint more specific was made, no amendment was nec- essary to support a recovery for failure to keep open such gateway, and that the court properly refused to direct a verdict for de- fendant.-Avery v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., (Super. Ct. Buf.) 109.
3. The complaint alleged that defendant had constructed a fence across a strip of land leading to the hotel, which both plain- tiff and defendant were entitled to use in common, but that it was defendant's duty to maintain a gateway through the fence. It further alleged that defendant had con- structed a fence across an alley leading to the hotel, with the use of which it appeared defendant had no right to interfere. Held that, though the theory of the complaint was that defendant had no right to erect either fence, it was broad enough to em- brace a failure to maintain the required gateway, and should be amended to con- form to the proof.-Avery v. New York Cent. & H. R. R. Co., (Super. Ct. Buf.) 101. Evidence.
4. In an action for injury to a leasehold in real estate, a witness who has known the property for 42 years, has been familiar with it for 32 years, and was its owner for 13 years, may express an opinion as to the rental value both before and after the in- jury.-Id.
8. It appeared that a gateway opened by defendant did not lead upon a certain strip of land as was required, but to defendant's depot. Defendant's evidence showed that there was no travel over such strip, unless trains stopped opposite the hotel, which they had ceased to do, but passed on to the depot, from which there was a passage to the hotel. Plaintiff's evidence was that the opening should be opposite the en- trance to the hotel, where it could be ob- served; that for years many passengers had passed through such opening, ceasing only when the fence was erected. Held, that the evidence being conflicting, the question of damages was properly submit- ted to the jury.-Id.
See. also, Appeal; Certiorari; Judgment; New Trial; Witness.
Objections to evidence.
1. In an action for plaintiff's interest in a piano and diamond ring, plaintiff's hus- band testified that defendant had redeemed the ring from pawn, and used it, with plain- tiff's consent, and that the sum paid by de- fendant had afterwards entered into an oral agreement for the purchase of land by plaintiff, a conveyance of which had been demanded of defendant, and that he failed to execute it; that a like agreement was made by defendant to purchase the piano, and convey to the plaintiff other property, taking a mortgage as security for bal- ance due, which mortgage had been ten- dered and refused, and that defendant re- fused to execute that deed. Held that, as defendant had to object to the mortgage, when tendered him, on account of its form or conditions, he could not be heard to as- sert such objections on the trial as a de- fense to the action.-Young v. Hebberd, (Sup.) 828.
5. A witness was allowed to state what the rental value of an hotel would have been if defendant had maintained a sufficient gateway to the hotel over a certain strip of land, as it was required to do. A point in issue was whether a gate established by defendant was sufficient. Held, that the allowance of such statement was error, as it was the province of the jury to determine 2. Striking out testimony subsequently the question of sufficiency; but as all the appearing irrelevant, as being an opinion facts were before the jury, and as the at- of the witness, is discretionary with the tention of the witness was particularly The proper remedy in such case is called to the condition of the gateway as to request an instruction to disregard the established, such error was harmless. Id. testimony.-Harrington v. City of Buffalo, 6. Where a witness had stated that he (Sup.) 333. knew what such rental value was, he was properly allowed to state the same, as the inquiry called for a fact within his knowl- edge, and not for his opinion.-Id. Damages.
7. In an action for injury to a leasehold interest in an hotel, where there is evidence that defendant's wrongful acts have de- creased plaintiff's business, and thus di- minished the rental value of such lease- hold, the measure of damages is the depre- ciation of the rental value.-Id.
3. In an action for personal injuries plaintiff gave evidence that on other days the driver started his car suddenly, and used intoxicants while on duty. The court, of its own motion, ordered this evidence to be stricken out, so far as defendant's ob- jection applied, and it was not again re- ferred to during the trial. Held, that any error in its reception was cured.-Ganiard v. Rochester City & B. R. Co., (Sup.) 470.
4. An objection to a question, in itself competent, is not sufficient to give the trial court an opportunity to rule upon the com-
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