music, which blends with the imagination, long after the instrument is silent.

VII. The use of reason in religion is to enlarge our minds to the amplitude of truth; but the abuse of reason is more common, which would contract truth to the narrowness of our understanding. Men, upon all other subjects save religion, confess their natural ignorance; they come to the first elements of doctrine as learners and not as judges; if they find out any thing incomprehensible, or are startled at any conclusion, they attribute the difficulty not to the master but to the scholar, and never deny any proposition on the mere ground of their not comprehending it. But far different is the case with those who are called rational divines, though confessedly ignorant of the nature of every atom that surrounds them, they can pronounce, a priori, with the utmost confidence, concerning the mode of the divine existence. They dogmatize with as much boldness regarding what is possible and what is impossible to be believed concerning God, as if they carried a model of the Deity within them.

Reason and revelation are thus absurdly set at variance with each other; and with still more absurdity, reason is made the judge of an acknowledged revelation, and the weak and shallow opinions of man are made to limit and modify the communications which the Infinite has given re

lating to Himself. "We neither can nor ought," says Socinus, "to be brought by the plain words of the Holy Spirit himself, to admit any thing which is contrary to nature.” This maxim is not confined

to the Socinians, but common to the "rational" divines. Episcopius lays it down as one of the rules of Arminian theology; "Quicquid ratio humana falsum esse reprehendit, id nullo pacto pro vero in divinis habendum est." And what is this reason which he has so confidently made the judge of the intimations of the divine will, and the discoveries of the divine character proceeding from God himself, ratified by miracles, and invested with the authority of the Deity? Though the latitudinarian divines are constantly appealing to the authority of reason, none seem anxious to define exactly what it is. According to their system of philosophy, however, reason can be little more than the power of deducing inferences from the notices which fall under our senses. Most of the selfentitled rationalists have been advocates for that theory of the mind which was supported by Epicurus, and revived by Gassendi, and which makes sense, not only the origin, but nearly, if not altogether, the judge of truth, and the limit of our intelligence. Thus, rational divinity, furnished only with what collects of information, from those narrow inlets which it believes to be the sources of all the knowledge it can acquire, sits in judgment

on the declarations of the Most High, and boldly rejects whatever surpasses the measure of its shallow capacity. But this is too favourable a view of rational theology, which has not even the support of the few facts relating to God's government which might be gathered by a partial observation of human affairs. When it is said that a doctrine is contrary to reason, it is not any fact in general that is brought forward against it, or even reasoning, but merely an appeal that is made to our preconceived opinions respecting the divine nature. But since preconceived opinions upon all subjects are utterly worthless, and since no valuable truth is discovered by conjecture, but by the patient induction of facts, and by legitimate reasonings grounded upon them, it is evident that the pretended appeal to reason is merely an appeal to ignorance or error. Accordingly, the rational divines, having solely a fictitious standard of judgment, not only vary amongst each other, but each one varies from himself. The self-entitled reason of one rejects what the reason of another receives; and individuals, in the latter part of their life, look back upon truths which they had formerly maintained, as irrational and incomprehensible.

VIII. Thus the doctrines of the Gospel are gradually explained away. A false principle is admited, that no doctrine is to be received that is contrary to reason. This is true in the highest sense.

No doctrine is to be received which is contrary to truth, or unsupported by sufficient evidence. But the principle is false in the sense in which it is usually asserted by the rationalists, where reason stands merely for the preconceived opinions and shallow reasoning of each individual who presumes to determine upon the truth of doctrines, without examining the evidence which may be adduced for them. An Arminian divine judges that the tenet of original sin is contrary to the attribute of divine justice. He thinks, however, that he could admit the doctrine, if proposed in a milder form. He, therefore, tries to soften and mitigate the expressions of Scripture. The same tendency of mind which induces him to place the depravity of human nature more out of sight, leads him to explain away also the nature of the atonement. As he considers original sin to be the transmission of a certain bodily constitution, so he looks upon the atonement in the light of an example, rather than of a vicarious punishment. The Deity of Christ is treated in a more philosophic and rational manner; and the Saviour, instead of being considered as absolutely God, is argued to possess a secondary and derivative divinity.

Thus the first steps of rational Christianity, like the last, are full of absurdity. In attempting to do justice, as they conceive, to the unity of the Deity, the rational divine is so unfortunate as to introduce

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two Gods instead of one,- —a superior and an inferior divinity. The Arian, while he perceives the errors of the Arminian and semi-Arian, and that they are only exchanging mysteries for absurdities, thinks that he escapes from their difficulties, by boldly affirming Christ to be a mere creature. But, in attempting to escape from the polytheism of the semi-Arian, he falls into a gross idolatry, for he still recognises in Christ, a character, and attributes which belong to the Creator, and he is equally discountenanced and condemned by the pretended reason to which he appeals, and by the obvious declarations of Scripture which he in vain attempts to garble and evade. The Arian finds himself in a position where it is impossible to stop; his downfall into Socinianism is precipitous and unavoidable. The Socinian, indeed, throws away all mysteries; according to his system, there is nothing wonderful, except that the sacred writers should have been so miserably ill qualified for the task assigned to them, and should have expressed themselves with a vaguenesss and obscurity which it requires the united efforts of Socinian genius to clear away; while the meanest of their own preachers finds no difficulty in explaining to the illiterate vulgar that Jesus Christ is a mere man. Lastly, the anti-supernaturalist, coming close upon the heels of the Socinian, and treating with merited contempt his wretched efforts, in defiance of Greek and com