Your whole attempts to disprove the statement that Christ gave a simple narrative of facts, of which he had knowledge, rest on your assertion, that "If one part be emblematical, the whole must be interpreted parabolically." This I deny.

Your strained, unnatural paraphrase of the whole account, were it a parable, would be sufficient to discard your scheme, which appears sufficiently ridiculous, without further remarks from your friend,

EZRA STILES ELY.

TO MR. EZRA STILES ELY.

Philadelphia, January 22, 1835. Dear Sir-Were I to answer one of your communications with the sweeping declaration, that your premises are false and your deductions ridiculous, you would most probably inform me, that I had disregarded the principles of controversial courtesy, and rendered myself obnoxious to the rebuke, that he who is at a loss for argument frequently resorts to the assertion that his opponent's reasoning is unworthy of attention. I verily believe that the exposition I have given of the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, is the only true biblical interpretation thereof; and on a subject of so much importance as this, it especially becomes us severally to manifest a disposition fully to investigate the evidences presented in the case. Brevity in composition will not compensate for lack of argument, nor is assertion the equivalent of proof. In replying to your letters, I have invariably proposed the examination of every point which had even the semblance of a bearing on the conjoint question in debate; and I am aware that in so doing, my communications have sometimes occupied more space than yours. If an apology be necessary, it may be found in my fervent desire thoroughly to canvass every position and ar gument introduced into this discussion.

You concede that on the demise of each individual of

our race, the spirit returns unto God who gave it." In view of this concession, Universalism is established beyond the reach of cavil, unless you can prove one or other of the following points: 1st. That spiritually to abide with God in his heavenly court does not necessarily imply unmixed enjoyment; or, 2d. That some of the spirits which return to God will be ejected from his sensible presence. The first point you will not attempt to establish-for it is written, "In thy presence there is fulness of joy; at thy right hand there are pleasures for ever more," Psalm xvi. 11; and the second is not susceptible of proof. On the contrary, it is written, "The Father loveth the Son, and hath given all things into his hands. . . . . All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out," John iii. 35; vi. 37. You say, indeed, "It has been, in my judgment, sufficiently evinced, that the spirit returns to God to undergo a particular and personal adjudication either to endless life or endless death"-but I have not yet seen any testimony equivalent to this declaration. Be sure, you have endeavoured to establish the doctrine of a future general judgment and of endless punishment-but I cannot refer to any part of our correspondence in which you have so much as attempted to prove "a particular and personal adjudication" of the spirit. Besides in your exposition of the parable before us, you suppose that immediately after the death of the rich man, his spirit entered into a state of misery! In this case you intimate nothing concerning "a particular and personal adjudication," nor does it appear from your paraphrase of the subject, that the spirit of either the rich man or Lazarus returned unto God who gave it.

In your remarks in relation to the destruction of hades, you have in some measure abandoned the views advanced in your letter of May 9th, 1834. In that letter, you consider paradise a department of hades; and consequently in whatever sense hades is to be destroyed, paradise

will also cease to be. Yet in the communication before me, you speak of paradise as the immortal abode of the saints with God! Besides you allege that place, meaning position, point, or portion, in infinite space, will never be destroyed." Granted-but on the grounds hitherto assumed by you, hades, meaning a place or state of departed spirits, will, as such, be destroyed. It follows, then, according to your own showing, that hades, with your supposed divisions of it into paradise and gehenna, will, as a place or state of departed spirits, be destroyed. Consequently you must either yield the doctrine of endless punishment, or show that there is another hell of misery in "infinite space." You assume the latter position-but your correspondent respectfully awaits the proof. I desire you to remember that the scriptural use of the word hades will not assist you in your attempt to establish the doctrine of endless punishment -for hades, as a place or state of departed spirits, is to be destroyed. And though it does not hence appear, "that there is no state of misery in which the whole complex persons of the immortal wicked ones will be equitably punished for ever," neither does it follow that there is such a state of misery. I am not required to show that there is not-but you are required to show that there is, or you fail to establish your position.

In special reference to the case of the rich man, I again repeat, that hades, however numerous its divisions may be, will cease to be, as a state or place of departed spirits, according to your own showing; and the inquiry recurs, Can you conceive of endless punishment in a place that is to be destroyed? If you cannot, you must concede that the case of the rich man, even in your own view of the matter, furnishes no proof of interminable wretchedness.

Your remarks on the impropriety of disallowing the use of figurative expressions in historical relations, are in the main correct. But, in my judgment, they touch not the general principles by me advanced, in reference to the parable in discussion. I will attempt an exposition of

the point in question, by noticing the illustrations by you introduced.

"Nelson's cannon breathed out flames and grape-shot." Here the word breathed is obviously a figurative expression, and the historical relation is not invalidated thereby. But suppose you consider the cannon, the thing itself, a figure-how then? Plainly, it would follow that the "flames and grape-shot" must also be understood symbolically; and in this case, the entire account would lose its historical character. Again: suppose you had been an eye-witness of the battle of the Nile, and in your account thereof you should say, "I saw Nelson afar off, and a diamond pin in his bosom." I would understand you to mean, that you really saw Nelson, and really saw the diamond pin, and that said pin was really in Nelson's bosom. This, you perceive, is a case parallel to the one in the parable before us.

You refer to Don Quixote. Suppose his battle with the wind-mill to be a historical relation of fact. In this case, would you suppose that the Don and the proverbloving Sancho were only representatives of characters of corresponding description? Plainly not-for if you view the rencontre with the wind-mill as a real circumstance, you must concede that the Don and his valet were real personages.

And now for the application. You allow that Lazarus, and the rich man, and Abraham, were real personages, and that there was a real dialogue between the two latter. You concede that the rich man really saw Abraham afar off. With what shadow of propriety, then, can you allege that Abraham's bosom is a figure? Look at the language: "And seeth Abraham afar off, AND Lazarus in his bosom." As distinctly as he saw the one, he saw the other. He saw Abraham-he saw Lazarus-he really saw them both; and if this be a relation of facts, the rich man really saw Lazarus in Abraham's bosom. Farther: you contend that the rich man really "lifted up his eyes," and really conversed with Abraham. In this case, every just principle of interpretation requires you to al

low that the rich man's tongue was as real as were his eyes. Now if this be so, the finger of Lazarus and the bosom of Abraham must be understood in a literal sense. If, in any account whatever, several members of the body, whether animal or spiritual, be literally spoken of, we have no right to construe the mention of any other member symbolically. If, in speaking of Nelson's cannon literally, you mention the touch-hole, or the carriage on which the deadly weapon is carried from place to place, we are bound to understand you in the same literal sense. So if we speak literally of Abraham as a man, and then speak of the bosom of Abraham, no one is justified in giving to the latter a symbolical sense. Once granted that the bosom of Abraham is a figure, it is established that Abraham stands but as a parabolic representative; and so also of Lazarus and of the rich man. You are respectfully desired duly to weigh these considerations, and to furnish your reasons, if any you have, why the conclusions consequent of the argument should not be admitted.

You have not attempted to prove that what I term a parable is a literal relation of facts. I have stated many reasons for considering it a parable, and you have stated none for understanding it literally. You have the affirmative of the question, and should therefore present your evidences in the case.

On comparing my exposition of the parable with your reply, you will discover many facts and illustrations to which you have given not the slightest attention. In addition thereto I present the following: On the supposition that the account of the rich man and Lazarus is a literal relation of facts, I wish to be informed of what crime the rich man was guilty? You have given him a very fair, honourable character. He was truly charitable and charity is greater than faith or hope. His riches, sumptuous fare, and gorgeous apparel, are not mentioned as any thing worthy of condemnation. All that is said about him is, that in his lifetime he had received his good things-but that these were the fruits of unjust dealing is not so much as intimated. It is written, "The up