violent or malicious act is done to a man's occupation, profession, or way of getting a livelihood, then an action lies in all cases." Lord HOLT, in Keeble v. Hickeringill [ante, No. 843]. . . . To this forcible statement of plaintiff's case, defendant's answer in effect is: "We have a right to employ, or not to employ, when and whom we choose. We may discharge our employees, all or singly, whenever we choose; with or without reason; because they trade with plaintiff or do not trade with him; and, if the employees are injured or wronged thereby, they may sue; but plaintiff cannot. .. Malice does not furnish ground for civil action. Wrongful acts alone are actionable." . . . The first question is: Is it unlawful for one person, or a number of persons in a conspiracy, to threaten to discharge employees if they trade with a certain merchant? Would it be unlawful to discharge them for such reason? If not, it surely would not be unlawful to "threaten" it. If the employees are engaged for fixed terms, it may be assumed that a discharge by the employer for such a reason would be unwarranted and would give the employee an action for breach of contract. But no one else, except a privy, could complain of the breach of contract, and the ground of the employee's action would be the refusal of the employer to pay him for the period promised in the contract of service. . . If the act is unlawful, it must be on other grounds than breach of contract, as that it unjustly deprives plaintiff of customers and trade to which his fair dealing entitles him, and thus destroys his business. For any one to do this without cause is censurable and unjust. But is it legally wrong? Is it unlawful? May I not refuse to trade with any one? May I not forbid my family to trade with any one? May I not dismiss my domestic servant for dealing, or even visiting, where I forbid? And, if my domestic, why not my farm-hand, or my mechanic, or teamster? And, if one of them, then why not all four? And, if all four, why not a hundred or a thousand of them? The principle is not changed or affected by the number. And, if it were, who should say how many it would be lawful and how many unlawful to forbid? Nor can it be better determined by effect than by number. To keep away one customer might not perceptibly affect the merchant's trade; deprived of a hundred of them, he might fail in business. On the contrary, my own dealings may be so important that, if I cease to trade with him, he must close his doors. Shall my act in keeping away a hundred of my employees be unlawful, because it breaks up the merchant's business, and yet it be lawful for me to accomplish the same result by withholding my own custom? Obviously, the law can adopt and maintain no such standards for judging human conduct; and men must be left, without interference, to buy and sell where they please, and to discharge or retain employees at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause, without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which an employee may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the same cause or want of cause as the employer. He may refuse to work for a man or company that trades with any obnoxious person or does other things which he dislikes. He may persuade his fellows, and the employer may lose all his hands and be compelled to close his doors; or he may yield to the demand and withdraw his custom or cease his dealings, and the obnoxious person be thus injured or wrecked in business. . . . ... Loss alone gives no right of action. Great corporations, strong associations, and wealthy individuals may thus do great mischief and wrong, may make and break merchants at will, may crush out competition and foster monopolies, and thus greatly injure individuals and the public; but power is inherent in size and strength and wealth, and the law cannot set bound to it unless it is exercised illegally.. ... But plaintiff says that the defendants wickedly and maliciously combined and confederated for the unlawful purpose of causing plaintiff's customers, by means of threats and intimidation, to leave off trading with him. . . . The question then is: Is an act not unlawful rendered actionable to the one suffering injury therefrom, because it is committed wilfully, wickedly, and maliciously, and in pursuance of a conspiracy to do the injury suffered? . . . Baron PARKE said in Stevenson v. Newnham, 13 C. B. 285, "An act which does not amount to a legal injury cannot be actionable because it is done with a bad intent." . . . To determine, then, whether a "malicious act" is "wrongful," in the legal sense, and therefore actionable, we must first determine whether it is unlawful. But, if unlawful, and injurious, it is actionable, irrespective of the motive; and whether malicious or not, if not unlawful and injurious, then it is not actionable, even though malicious and wicked. . . . Neither is shown here. Defendants have merely warned their employees not to trade with plaintiff; if they do, they must give up their employment. They had the right to discharge them on this ground. . . . No legal wrong has been done; therefore there is no legal remedy. . . . A majority of the Court, therefore, conclude that the act done, . . . though done wickedly and maliciously and in pursuance of a wicked design, is still not actionable, because it was not an unlawful act nor an act done in an unlawful manner. The report of the referees will therefore be set aside, and the judgment of the Circuit Court affirmed. FREEMAN, J., delivered the following dissenting opinion, TURNEY, J., concurring: . . . The sound principle, I think, is stated by Mr. Addison--a writer of accredited reputation-in his work on Torts, page 20: "Injuries to property, indirectly brought about by menaces, false representation or fraud, create as valid a cause of action as any direct injury from force or trespass. Thus if the plaintiff's tenants have been driven away from their holdings by the menaces of the defendant, damages are recoverable for the wrong done." ... It is argued that a man ought to have the right to say where his employees shall trade. I do not recognize any such right. . . . This is not in any way to interfere with the legal right to discharge an employee for good cause, or without any reason assigned if the contract justifies it, but only that he shall not do this solely for the purpose of injury to another, or hold the threat over the employee in terrorem to fetter the freedom of the employee, and for the purpose of injuring an obnoxious party. Such conduct is not justifiable in morals, and ought not to be in law, and, when the injury is done as averred in this case, the party should respond in damages. 846. TUTTLE v. BUCK SUPREME COUrt of MinnesoTA. 1909 107 Minn. 145, 119 N. W. 946 ACTION in the District Court for Wright County to recover $10,000 damages. Defendant demurred to the complaint on the ground it did not state a cause of action. From an order of BUCHHAM, J. overruling the demurrer, defendant appealed. Affirmed. This appeal was from an order overruling a general demurrer to a complaint in which the plaintiff alleged: That for more than ten years last past he has been and still is a barber by trade, and engaged in business as such in the village of Howard Lake, Minnesota, where he resides, owning and operating a shop for the purpose of his said trade. That until the injury hereinafter complained of his said business was prosperous, and plaintiff was enabled thereby to comfortably maintain himself and family out of the income and profits thereof, and also to save a considerable sum per annum, to wit, about $800. That the defendant, during the period of about twelve months last past, has wrongfully, unlawfully, and maliciously endeavored to destroy plaintiff's said business, and compel plaintiff to abandon the same. That to that end he has persistently and systematically sought, by false and malicious reports and accusations of and concerning the plaintiff, by personally soliciting and urging plaintiff's patrons no longer to employ plaintiff, by threats of his personal displeasure, and by various other unlawful means and devices, to induce, and has thereby induced, many of said patrons to withhold from plaintiff the employment by them formerly given. That defendant is possessed of large means, and is engaged in the business of a banker in said village of Howard Lake, at Dassel, Minnesota, and at divers others places, and is nowise interested in the occupation of a barber; yet in the pursuance of the wicked, malicious, and unlawful purpose aforesaid, and for the sole and only purpose of injuring the trade of the plaintiff, and of accomplishing his purpose and threats of ruining the plaintiff's said business and driving him out of said village, the defendant fitted up and furnished a barber shop in said village for conducting the trade of barbering. That failing to induce any barber to occupy said shop on his own account, though offered at nominal rental, said defendant, with the wrongful and malicious purpose aforesaid, and not otherwise, has during the time herein stated hired two barbers in succession for a stated salary, paid by him, to occupy said shop, and to serve so many of plaintiff's patrons as said defendant has been or may be able by the means aforesaid to direct from plaintiff's shop. That at the present time a barber so employed and paid by the defendant is occupying and nominally conducting the shop thus fitted and furnished by the defendant, without paying any rent therefor, and under an agreement with defendant whereby the income of said shop is required to be paid to defendant, and is so paid in partial return for his wages. That all of said things were and are done by defendant with the sole design of injuring the plaintiff and of destroying his said business, and not for the purpose of serving any legitimate interest of his own. That by reason of the great wealth and prominence of the defendant, and the personal and financial influence consequent thereon, he has by the means aforesaid, and through other unlawful means and devices by him employed, materially injured the business of the plaintiff, has largely reduced the income and profits thereof, and intends and threatens to destroy the same altogether, to plaintiff's damage in the sum of $10,000. Hall & Kolliner, for appellant. . . . Defendant's act was "damnum absque injuria.” . . . The motive of competition is immaterial. F. E. Latham and Daniel Fish, for respondent. The rule of fair play is more and more enforced by the Courts. ELLIOTT, J. [after stating the facts as above]. It has been said that the law deals only with externals, and that a lawful act cannot be made the foundation of an action because it was done with an evil motive. In Allen v. Flood (1898), A. C. 1, 151 [supra, No. 845], Lord WATSON said that, except with regard to crimes, the law does not take into account motives as constituting an element of civil wrong. In Mayor of Bradford v. Pickles (1895), A. C. 587, Lord HALSBURY stated that if the act was lawful, “however ill the motive might be, he had a right to do it." In Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219, 35 Atl. 53, the Court said that, "when one exercises a legal right only, the motive which actuates him is immaterial." In Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa. St. 308, Mr. Justice BLACK said that "malicious motives make a bad act worse, but they cannot make that wrong which, in its own essence, is lawful." . . . Such generalizations are of little value in determining concrete cases. They may state the truth, but not the whole truth. Each word and phrase used therein may require definition and limitation. Thus, before we can apply Judge BLACK's language to a particular case, we must determine what act is "in its own essence lawful." What did Lord HALSBURY mean by the words "lawful act"? What is meant by “exercising a legal right"? It is not at all correct to say that the motive with which an act is done is always immaterial, providing the act itself is not unlawful. Numerous illustrations of the contrary will be found in the civil as well as the criminal law. We do not intend to enter upon an elaborate discussion of the subject, or become entangled in the subtleties connected with the words "malice" and "malicious." We are not able to accept without limitations the doctrine above referred to, but at this time content ourselves with a brief reference to some general principles. It must be remembered that the common law is the result of growth, and that its development has been determined by the social needs of the community which it governs. It is the resultant of conflicting social forces, and those forces which are for the time dominant leave their impress upon the law. It is of judicial origin, and seeks to establish doctrines and rules for the determination, protection, and enforcement of legal rights. Manifestly, it must change as society changes and new rights are recognized. To be an efficient instrument, and not a mere abstraction, it must gradually adapt itself to changed conditions. Necessarily, its form and substance have been greatly affected by prevalent economic theories. For generations there has been a practical agreement upon the proposition that competition in trade and business is desirable, and this idea has found expression in the decisions of the Courts as well as in statutes. But it has led to grievous and manifold wrongs to individuals, and many Courts have manifested an earnest desire to protect the individual from the evils which result from unrestrained business competition. The problem has been to so adjust matters as to preserve the principle of competition and yet guard against its abuse to the unnecessary injury to the individual. So the principle that a man may use his own property according to his own needs and desires, while true in the abstract, is subject to many limitations in the concrete. Men cannot always, in civilized society, be allowed to use their own property as their interests or desires may dictate without reference to the fact that they have neighbors whose rights are as sacred as their own. The existence and well-being of society require that each and every person shall conduct himself consistently with the fact that he is a social and reasonable person. The purpose for which a man is using his own property may thus sometimes determine his rights. . . . In Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N. E. 1011, Mr. Justice HAMMOND said: "It is said also that, where one has the lawful right to do a thing, the motive by which he is actuated is immaterial. One form of this statement appears in the first headnote in Allen v. Flood [ante, No. 844], as reported in (1898) A. C. 1, as follows: 'An act lawful in itself is not converted by a malicious or bad motive into an unlawful act so as to make the doer of the act liable to a civil action.' If the meaning of this and similar expressions is that where |