the custom of watch manufacturers so to mark their watches, but nevertheless found that such an injunction ought to issue. He also found that the use of the word "Waltham," in its geographical sense, upon the dial, is not important, and should be enjoined. The defendant's position is that, whatever its intent and whatever the effect in diverting a part of the plaintiff's business, it has a right to put its name and address upon its watches; that to require it to add words which will distinguish its watches from the plaintiff's in the mind of the general public is to require it to discredit them in advance; and that, if the plaintiff by its method of advertisement has associated the fame of its merits with the city where it makes its wares instead of with its own name, that is the plaintiff's folly, and cannot give it a monopoly of a geographical name, or entitle it to increase the defendant's burdens in advertising the place of its works. In cases of this sort, as in so many others, what ultimately is to be worked out is a point or line between conflicting claims, each of which has meritorious grounds and would be extended further were it not for the other. Boston Ferrule Co. v. Hills, 159 Mass. 147, 149, 150. It is desirable that the plaintiff should not lose custom by reason of the public mistaking another manufacturer for it. It is desirable that the defendant should be free to manufacture watches at Waltham, and to tell the world that it does so. The two desiderata cannot both be had to their full extent, and we have to fix the boundaries as best we can. On the one hand, the defendant must be allowed to accomplish its desideratum in some way, whatever the loss to the plaintiff. On the other, we think the cases show that the defendant fairly may be required to avoid deceiving the public to the plaintiff's harm, so far as is practicable in a commercial sense. It is true that a man cannot appropriate a geographical name, but neither can he a color, or any part of the English language, or even a proper name to the exclusion of others whose names are like his. Yet a color in connection with a sufficiently complex combination of other things may be recognized as saying so circumstantially that the defendant's goods are the plaintiff's as to pass the injunction line. New England Awl & Needle Co. v. Marlborough Awl & Needle Co., 168 Mass. 154, 156. So, although the plaintiff has no copyright on the dictionary or any part of it, he can exclude a defendant from a part of the free field of the English language, even from the mere use of generic words unqualified and unexplained, when they would mislead the plaintiff's customers to another shop. Reddaway v. Banham, (1896) A. C. 199 [post, No. 867]. So the name of a person may become so associated with his goods that one of the same name coming into the business later will not be allowed to use even his own name without distinguishing his wares. Brinsmead . Brinsmead, 13 Times L. R. 3; Reddaway v. Banham, supra. See Singer Manuf. Co. v. June Manuf. Co., 163 U. S. 169, 204 [post, No. 868]; Allegretti Chocolate Cream Co. v. Keller, 85 Fed. Rep. 643. And so, we doubt not, may a geographical name acquire a similar association with a similar effect. Montgomery v. Thompson, (1891) A. C. 217. Whatever might have been the doubts some years ago, we think that now it is pretty well settled that the plaintiff, merely on the strength of having been first in the field, may put later comers to the trouble of taking such reasonable precautions as are commercially practicable to prevent their lawful names and advertisements from deceitfully diverting the plaintiff's custom. We cannot go behind the finding that such a deceitful diversion is the effect and intended effect of the marks in question. We cannot go behind the finding that it is practicable to distinguish the defendant's watches from those of the plaintiff, and that it ought to be done. The elements of the precise issue before us are the importance of indicating the place of manufacture and the discrediting effect of distinguishing words on the one side, and the importance of preventing the inferences which the public will draw from the defendant's plates as they now are, on the other. It is not possible to weigh them against each other by abstractions or general propositions. The question is specific and concrete. The Judge who heard the evidence has answered it, and we cannot say that he was wrong. Decree for the plaintiff. 863. PILLSBURY-WASHBURN FLOUR MILLS Co. v. EAGLE. (1898. C. C. A., 86 Fed. 608, 618, 623.) BUNN, J. Since the case of Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U. S. 460 [ante, No. 177, Vol. I], was decided, holding that the word "Columbia" placed upon flour sacks could not constitute a proper trade-mark word so as to give the person using it an exclusive right, no one would be so hardy as to claim that an exclusive right to the use of a geographical name could be acquired as a [registered] trade-mark. Indeed, the doctrine of that case was not new in 1893, but has been the leading doctrine on the subject both in this country and England for many years, as is clearly shown by the cases already cited. There is no inconsistency between that case and the previous decisions of the State and Federal Courts in this country, including the decisions of the United States Supreme Court before cited, to the effect that "wrongs of this description, whereby, through an artifice of any sort, the goods of one manufacturer become confused in the public mind with goods of some other manufacturer, may be redressed in a court of equity." Merriam v. Clothing Co., 47 Fed. 411. . . . The distinction, both in the English and American cases, is between those where a geographical name has been adopted and claimed as a [registered] trade-mark proper, and those where, as in the case at bar, it has been adopted first as merely indicating the place of manufacture, and afterwards, in course of time, has become a well-known sign and synonym for superior excellence. In the latter class of cases, persons residing at other places will not be permitted to use the geographical name so adopted as a brand or label for similar goods for the mere purpose by fraud and false representation of appropriating the good will and business which long-continued industry and skill and a generous use of capital has rightfully built up. 864. SHAVER v. H. & M. Co. (1901. C. C. A., 108 Fed. 821.) SANBORN, J. The issue in this case finally narrows to the question whether or not one has the right to use the word "American" to sell the property of one manufacturer as that of another. From the facts that "American" is a geographical term, that it may not constitute a trade-mark, that no one may have a proprietary interest in it, counsel for the appellants draw the conclusion that every one has the right to use it to palm off the goods of one vendor as those of another. Does the conclusion necessarily follow from the premises? Every one has the right to use and enjoy the rays of the sun, but no one may lawfully focus them to burn his neighbor's house. Every one has the right to use the common highway, but no one may lawfully apply it to purposes of robbery or riot. Every one has the right to use pen, ink, and paper, but no one may apply them to the purpose of defrauding his neighbor of his property, of making counterfeit money, or of committing forgery. The partner has the right to use his firm's name, but he may not lawfully employ it to cheat his copartner out of his property. Every one has the right to use his own name, but he may not lawfully apply it to the purpose of filching his property from another of the same name. The use of a geographical or descriptive term confers no better right to perpetrate a fraud than the use of any other expression. The principle of law is general, and without exception. It is that no one may so exercise his own rights as to inflict unnecessary injury upon his neighbor. . ... Topic 3. Common Materials or Process 866. SINGLETON v. BOLTON KING'S BENCH. 1783 3 Dougl. 293 THOMAS SINGLETON, the plaintiff's father, sold a medicine called "Dr. Johnson's yellow ointment." The plaintiff, after his father's death, continued to sell the medicine, marked in the same way. The defendant also sold the medicine, with the same mark, and for that injury the present action was brought. It was tried before Lord MANSFIELD, when the plaintiff was non-suited. A rule having been obtained for a new trial, Lord MANSFIELD said, that if the defendant had sold a medicine of his own under the plaintiff's name or mark, that would be a fraud for which an action would lie. But here both the plaintiff and defendant use the name of the original inventor, and no evidence was given of the defendant having sold it as if prepared by the plaintiff. The only other ground on which the action could have been maintained. was that of property in the plaintiff, which was not pretended, there being no patent, nor any letters of administration. Rule discharged. 867. REDDAWAY v. BANHAM HOUSE OF LORDS. 1896 L. R. (1896) App. Cas. 199 THE following statement of the facts is taken from the judgment of Lord HERSCHELL:- The appellant, Frank Reddaway, has been for many years a manufacturer of machine belting. In October, 1892, the company, the other appellants, was incorporated; and the business has since been carried on by it. In 1877, Reddaway began to make belting from yarn, which consisted principally of wool or hair, and sold it under the name of "Woollen Belting." About the year 1879 he began to call the belting which he manufactured "Camel Hair Belting," for the purpose of distinguishing it from the belting of other manufacturers. A large proportion of his trade has been with India, the Colonies, and foreign countries. The belting consigned to these countries was stamped with a "Camel," or with the word "Camel," or "Camel Hair," and cometimes with both. The yarn of which the appellant's belting shiefly consists is, for the most part, made of camel hair. I gather from the evidence that, although the wool or hair of which the yarn was made was commonly called "camel hair," it was not generally known (at all events until recently) that it really consisted of the hair of the camel. The respondent, Banham, was formerly in the employment of the appellant Reddaway. He ceased to be so employed in 1889, and began to manufacture belting on his own account. He made belting from yarn of the same description as that used by the appellants, which he sold and advertised as Arabian Belting. The respondent company was formed in 1891, and in April or May of that year began to call their belting "Camel Hair Belting," those words, and those words only, being in most cases stamped on the belting. Many other manufacturers had made, for many years past, belting, the principal ingredient of which was camel hair yarn, and which they sold and described by such names as yak, buffalo, llama, crocodile, etc. The appellants having learned that the respondents were selling belting described as "Camel Hair Belting," and with those words stamped upon it, brought this action for an injunction, which was tried at Manchester before COLLINS, J., and a special jury. The learned judge directed the jury that if the plaintiff had succeeded in so identifying his name with those words as that on the market "Camel Hair Belting" would mean Reddaway's belting, and if the defendant so described his particular belting as to be likely to deceive purchasers, it would not matter in point of law for the decision of this case whether he intended to deceive purchasers by so doing or Upon the findings of the jury COLLINS, J., entered judgment for the plaintiffs with costs; and he granted an injunction. . . . The Court of Appeal (Lord ESHER, M. R., LOPES and RIGBY, L. JJ.) reversed the decision of COLLINS, J., and entered judgment for the defendants with costs. Against this decision the plaintiffs brought this appeal. Feb. 18, 20, 21, 24. Asquith, Q. C., and Moulton, Q. C. (J. C. Graham with them), for the appellants. The principle applicable to cases of this class is stated by Lord KINGSDOWN in Leather Cloth Co. v. American Leather Cloth Co. (11 H. L. C. at p. 538) that a man has no right to put off his goods for sale as the goods of a rival trader, and cannot therefore be allowed to use names or marks by which he may induce purchasers to believe that the goods he is selling are the manufacture of another person. There is no exception in the case of a name which is verbally and in its primary meaning a true description of the goods, but which has acquired the meaning in the trade that the goods are those of a particular maker, so that purchasers ask for them exclusively by that name and buy them in the belief that they are getting that trader's goods. The Court of Appeal treated this case as an exception to the general rule because the defendants in using the name "camel hair belting" only told "the simple truth." But there is no exception to the rule. ... Bigham, Q. C., and J. K. F. Cleave (McCall, Q. C., with them), for the respondents. The plaintiffs have tried to fix a secondary meaning on a plain English expression composed of ordinary words, and seek to prevent the whole world from using that expression without some distinguishing words. There is no authority for such a contention: authority is the other way. There is an inherent right to describe one's goods in plain terms which are a true description, and not the less so because other people have used the same description. . . . March 26. Lord HALSBURY, L. C. My Lords, I believe in this case that the question turns upon a question of fact. . . . For myself, I believe the principle of law may be very plainly stated, and that is, that nobody has any right to represent his goods as the goods of somebody else. . . . My Lords, for these reasons I move that the judgment of the Court of Appeal be reversed, and that the respondents do pay to the appellants the costs both here and below. Lord HERSCHELL, (after stating the facts set forth above:) My Lords, the Master of the Rolls expressed the view that a manufacturer might obtain the right to prevent a person using a name, which would be understood as his, and the use of which would thus interfere with his trade, but that, though this was the fundamental proposition, you could not restrain a man from telling the simple truth; and that this was all the defendants had done when they called their belting "Camel Hair Belting." It must be taken, if the findings of the jury are to stand, on which I shall have a word or two to say presently, that the description by the defendants of their belting as "camel hair belting" would deceive purchasers into the belief that they were getting something which they were not getting, namely, belting made by Reddaway. If they would be thus deceived by the defendants' statement there |