the scope of their authority. The status or condition of being a member of this society was one of a permanent character and recognized by law one in which each member has a valuable interest; and that it was so regarded by the plaintiff is manifest from his effort to obtain a restoration to it by a judgment of this court, by a writ of mandamus. We think it obvious that the subject-matter of the complaint - dishonorable conduct, a fraudulent transaction between the plaintiff and another member of the profession and of the same society was within the scope of the authority conferred by law on the society; and that the direction of the court, that their action was conclusive upon the plaintiff, was correct. As to the legal proceedings set forth in the supposed libel, it was admitted by the plaintiff's counsel that the account there given of those proceedings was substantially true. If then this charge of dishonorable or fraudulent conduct by the plaintiff, in his dealings with Dr. Carpenter, was within the jurisdiction of the medical society, and proceedings were instituted and carried on to their final determination in the expulsion of the plaintiff from his fellowship, then the proceedings might be rightly characterized, as in the case of Farnsworth v. Storrs, as quasi judicial; and then the only remaining question of fact was, whether the publication was a true and correct narrative of such proceedings and determination. This question the judge did leave, or proposed to leave, to the jury; with the direction, that if they should find upon the evidence that that part of the publication was true, the defendant would be entitled to a verdict. We are of opinion that this direction was right. As the verdict was for the defendant, we are to assume that it was found by them; or, if the verdict was taken by consent, it would have been found under the instruction that the publication did present a true and correct narrative of the proceedings before the society, and their determination thereon. The fact, that these proceedings were considered closed and finished, takes away from this publication the objection, that it would have a tendency to prejudice the public mind and prevent the party affected from having a fair trial. Judgment on the verdict for the defendant.1 1 [PROBLEMS: The defendant newspaper published a report of the findings of a fire marshal's inquest, in which a fire at the plaintiff's house was said to be incendiary and set by the plaintiff. The hearings at the inquest were not open to the public, but the record of his findings was by law open to public inspection. Was the report privileged? (1903, Conner v. Standard Publishing Co., 183 Mass. 474, 67 N. E. 596.) At a meeting of citizens of a certain district of Clinch county, a committee appointed to draft suitable resolutions reported that there had been a clandestine burning of property in that district. The resolutions recited that the citizens were firmly of the opinion that Cox was either directly or indirectly connected with it, because of his having been accused of numerous cases of like nature, in the vicinity of Milltown, Berrien county, from whence he came, and because of circumstantial evidence being so strong against him in the pres SUB-TITLE (VI): POLICIES SEEKING JUSTIFICATION IN THE NECESSITIES FOR FREE RESORT TO COURTS BY PARTIES FOR THE VINDICATION OF RIGHTS (1748. 956. CHARLES, Baron DE MONTESQUIEU. The Spirit of the Laws. Book VI, c. I; Book XII, c. XVII. (Appleton ed., vol. I, pp. 87, 240.) Monarchies do not permit of so great a simplicity of laws as despotic governments. For in monarchies there must be courts of judicature. . . . In proportion as the decisions of the courts of judicature are multiplied in monarchies, the law is loaded with decrees that sometimes contradict one another; either because succeeding judges are of a different way of thinking, or because the same causes are sometimes well and at other times ill defended; or, in fine, by reason of an infinite number of abuses, to which all human regulations are liable. This is a ent case; that it was respectfully asked that R. S. Thigpen remove said Cox from his premises, the presence of Cox being detrimental and obnoxious to said citizens in the highest degree; that the Valdosta "Times" be furnished with a copy of the resolutions, together with the names of the citizens signing the same, with a request that the same be published in the “Times," etc. These resolutions were adopted by the meeting, and signed by a large number of persons. They were then published in the Valdosta Times," the defendant's journal. Was this privileged? (1897, Cox v. Strickland, 101 Ga. 482, 28 S. E. 655.) The defendant newspaper published a copy of part of a bill in equity, filed in court on an ex parte motion to a judge in chambers for a preliminary injunction. The bill alleged fraud on the part of M., and the judge granted the motion. Is this privilege available in an action by M. against the newspaper? (1898, Metcalf v. Times Pub. Co., 20 R. I. 679, 40 Atl. 864; 1905, American Publishing Co. v. Gamble, 115 Tenn. 663, 90 S. W. 1005.) At the business meeting of the stockholders of a private corporation, in the discussion of its affairs, stockholders asserted that other members, including the plaintiff, were attempting fraudulently to secure control. The defendant newspaper published these statements. Was this privileged? (1908, Kimball v. Post Pub. Co., 248 Mass. 194, 85 N. E. 103.) At a meeting of the board of trustees of a college, the plaintiff, an appointee, was charged by the defendant with certain misconduct, the statements being defamatory. A report of the proceedings at the hearing before the Board was circulated among the patrons of the college. Was this privileged? (1905, i Gattis v. Kilgo, 140 N. C. 106, 52 S. E. 249.) The defendant newspaper published a report of the testimony taken at an investigation by a committee of the Legislature. The committee held secret and ex parte sessions, after the adjournment of the Legislature, was not bound to report for legislative action, and merely filed the testimony in the AttorneyGeneral's office, whence a copy was obtained. I contained libellous statements on the plaintiff in connection with land frauds. Was the report privileged? (1884, Belo v. Wren, 63 Tex. 686.) The city council of Little Falls passed a resolution containing defamatory statements about the plaintiff, who had criticised the city's mode of dealing with its bonds. The defendant newspaper published the resolution. Was this privileged? (1898, Trebley v. Pub. Co., 74 Minn. 84, 76 N. W. 96.) ESSAYS: Van Vechten Veeder, “Freedom of Public Discussion." (H. L. R., XXIII, 413.) Id., “Absolute Immunity in Defamation." (C. L. R., IX, 463.)] necessary evil, which the legislator redresses from time to time, as contrary even to the spirit of moderate governments. . . . When travellers favor us with the description of countries where arbitrary sway prevails, they seldom make mention of civil laws. All occasions, therefore, of wrangling and lawsuits are here removed. And to this in part is it owing that litigious people in those countries are so roughly handled. As the injustice of their demand is neither screened, palliated, nor protected by an infinite number of laws, of course it is immediately discovered. We hear it generally said that justice ought to be administered with us as in Turkey. Is it possible, then, that the most ignorant of all nations should be the most clear-sighted on a point which it most behooves mankind to know? If we examine the set forms of justice with respect to the trouble the subject undergoes in recovering his property, or in obtaining satisfaction for an injury or affront, we shall find them doubtless too numerous. But if we consider them in the relation they bear to the liberty and security of every individual, we shall often find them too few; and be convinced that the trouble, expense, delays, and even the very dangers of our judiciary proceedings, are the price that each subject pays for his liberty. In Turkey, where little regard is shown to the honor, life, or estate of the subject, all causes are speedily decided. The method of determining them is a matter of indifference, provided they be determined. The Pasha, after a quick hearing, orders which party he pleases to be bastinadoed, and then sends them about their business. There it would be dangerous to be of a litigious disposition; this supposes a strong desire of obtaining justice, a settled aversion, an active mind, and a steadiness in pursuing one's point. All such tendencies must be suppressed in a despotic government, where fear ought to be the only prevailing sentiment, and in which popular disturbances are frequently attended with sudden and unforeseen revolutions; in such a country every man ought to know that the magistrate must not hear his name mentioned, and that his security depends entirely on his being reduced to a kind of annihilation. But in moderate governments, where the life of the meanest subject is deemed precious, no man is stripped of his honor or property until after a long inquiry; and no man is bereft of life till his very country has attacked him an attack that is never made without leaving him all possible means of making his defence. ... In republics, it is plain that as many formalities of justice at least are necessary as in monarchies. In both governments they increase in proportion to the value which is set on the honor, fortune, liberty, and life of the subject. . . . In popular governments it often happens that accusations are carried on in public, and every man is allowed to accuse whomsoever he pleases. This rendered it necessary to establish proper laws, in order to protect the innocence of the subject. At Athens, if an accuser had not the fifth part of the votes on his side, he was obliged to pay a fine of a thousand drachmas; Aeschines, who accused Ctesiphon, was condemned to pay this fine. At Rome a false accuser was branded with infamy by marking the letter K on his forehead. 957. JEREMY BENTHAM. Constitutional Code. (1827. Book I, c. V.) Principles of Judicial Procedure. (1820. c. 18.) (Works, ed. Bowring, vol. IX, p. 25, vol. II, p. 97.) The law of judicial procedure constitutes the adjective branch of law. This adjective branch has, for its object and occupation, the giving execution and effect to the aforesaid substantive branch. For the production of this effect, the requisite means are right decision and conformable execution. . . . But as above, in the field of law, no benefit can have place without its attendant burthen. The burthens inseparably attendant on judicial procedure stand comprised, the whole assemblage of them, within the import of three words vexation, delay and expense. To give to the benefit the utmost practicable extent, to confine the burthen within the narrowest practicable limits to these two perfectly distinct, but intimately connected, modes of promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the one positive, the other negative, it belongs to the legislator to direct his operations. Here, then, we have two conjunct ends of judicial procedure: main or direct end; right decision, or, say, avoidance of misdecision; collateral end, avoidance of vexation, expense and delay. . . . ... There will, on each occasion, be a need, that either things, or persons, or both, should be forthcoming at the seat of judicature. Here, accordingly, one main problem presents itself for solution at the hands of the legislator - how to secure forthcomingness on the part of persons and things for the purpose of evidence . . . a claim of this sort cannot be preferred without experiencing, at the hands of some other person or persons, more or less reluctance. . . . The benefit required at the hands of the judge by the claimant, cannot be granted but in so far as, upon some other person or persons, a correspondent burthen is imposed. For the attainment of this benefit, to cause this burthen to be imposed, will throughout be the object and continual endeavor of the one party; to avoid the imposition of it, that of the other party, who will act on the occasion the part of a defendant. Where punishment is out of the question, at the commencement of any course of judicial procedure, the natural state of things is, in the first place, on the part of the claimant, voluntary appearance at the seat of judicature, for the purpose of preferring his demand; thereupon, from the judge, if upon hearing the claim, a sufficient ground has been made for subjecting the other party to the vexation inseparable from defence, summons to that party either to do that which the claim requires him to do, or to appear at a certain day and hour at the same seat of judicature, to defend himself against it. This is the most obvious, and, upon the face of it, the least vexatious mode of giving commencement to a suit. But there are various circumstances by which a departure from it, in some way or other, may be rendered matter of convenience, or even of necessity. These may be comprised in two rules: Rule 1. Of all modes of securing forthcomingness, immediate or eventual — of all modes that promise to be alike effectual, choose that which, with reference to the individual in question, at the time in question, promises to be the least vexatious. Rule 2. In each case, where the most efficacious is at the same time the most vexatious, weigh against the evil of vexation from execution the evil from the diminished probability of ultimate execution, and embrace that mode which promises to be the least vexatious. For this purpose, the circumstances of the individual will in each case require to be taken into account. . . . For thus obtaining and securing compliance respecting forthcomingness, the means employable are either such as operate on the body, or such as operate only on the mind: in the first case they may be styled prehensive; in the other case, accersitive. To employ the prehensive means is to cause the person in question to be secured wherever he is, and (as a thing movable might be) brought to the place at which the operation, whatever it be, which it is decreed to perform on him, may be performed: in the case here in question, that of causing him to speak in relation to the subject in question. The prehensive is always the most vexatious; it ought, therefore, never to be employed but under the expectation that the accersitive will not suffice. To things, the prehensive is the only one of the two means which the nature of the case admits of. . . . § 3. Prehension applied to persons. Antecedently to the definitive decree, by necessity alone is arrestation of the person justifiable or permitted. The cases in which arrestation is ordained or permitted are those in which, but for the security thus afforded, a preponderant probability has place, that the giving execution and effect to the ordinances of the substantive law which are in question would not be practicable. . . § 4. Conditions necessary to justify the issuing of a warrant of arrestation. On the part of him, who for the purpose of securing payment for debt, or the performance of any other service beneficial to himself, at the hands of the individual proposed to be arrested, requires arrestation to be made of any person by a warrant from the judge, a judicial declaration in writing to the following effect is necessary: “I, A. P., do solemnly and judicially declare as follows: - I, A. D., in virtue of . . . stands bound to render to me a certain service, the value of which, over and above that of any service claimed by him at my hands, is not less than (...). 2. It is my sincere apprehension and belief, that unless without delay his person be arrested, and placed at the disposition of this or some other judicatory, he will, by withdrawing his person or property, or both, out of the reach of this or any other judicatory belonging to this State, effectually, in the whole or in part, evade the performance of the aforesaid service. 3. I acknowledge myself informed, that in the event of my being convicted of wilful falsehood or culpable rashness in respect of this my declaration, I shall, by the sentence of the law, be compelled to make full compensation to the individual thus injured by me, as also to undergo such ulterior punishment under the name of punishment as the law ordains; and in the event of my not being able to render such compensation, to undergo any such punishment as in lieu thereof the law has provided. 4. Moreover, that whatever may be the value of any service really due to me at the hands of the aforesaid A. D., still, if for the belief, that the arrestation hereby prayed for is necessary to prevent such evasion as above, there be not seen sufficient ground, I stand exposed to the burthen of compensation or punishment, or both, as the case may be. In case of mere rashness, the burthen will not go beyond the full amount of compensation: in case of wilful falsehood, punishment added to the above burthen will be severe." ... 958. ADAMS v. LISHER. (1833. 3 Blackf. 241, 244.) STEVENS, J. . . . It is a rule of law which seems to be founded on principles of policy, convenience, justice, and necessity, that the prosecutor of a wrong that affects the public shall be protected, provided he has probable cause, however malicious his private motives may have been; for although he may have intended ill, still good may arise to the public. Topic 1. Arrest, Attachment, etc., as the Damage SUB-TOPIC A. No LEGAL PROCESS RESORTED TO 959. Sir FREDERICK POLLOCK and FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND. A History of English Law before the Time of Edward I. (1895. vol. II, p. 576.) . . . We have now to speak of the various processes which the law employs in order |