Another defect is a hasty or impetuous temper.*

Another defect is that of being swayed by any personal or constitutional prepossession. Almost every man-not excepting even the banker-has a sin by which he is most easily beset; a constitutional defect, against which it is necessary he should be upon his guard.

It is a great advantage to a banker, and indeed to every one else, to know himself. He should know wherein he excels, and wherein he is deficient. He ought to know whether he is disposed from his temperament to be excessively cautious, or excessively liberal-whether his manners are courteous or abrupt-whether he is apt to view matters on their gloomy or on their bright side-whether social intercourse renders him more or less fit for his official engagements-whether the presents and civilities he receives from his customers do, or do not, affect his transactions with them in matters of business. When he has made a loss, he should examine whether the loss was occasioned by the ordinary operation of events, or produced by any little weaknesses of his own character. He should record all those instances in which he has shown a want of firmness, of discretion, of discrimination, or of perseverance; and should guard in future against the exhibition of any similar defect:

"Man, know thyself; all wisdom centers there."

But while a banker should make himself acquainted with his own defects, he ought not to let his customers become acquainted with them. All wise men know their own defects; none but fools publish them. Crafty men, who often have occasion to borrow money, are quick in perceiving the weaknes of their banker. And if they find that by coaxing, or flattering, or gossiping, or bribing, or threatening, they can influence his conduct, he will always be at their mercy. On this account it is, perhaps, advisable that a banker should not have too much social intercourse with those of his customers who have occasion to ask him for any large amount of accommodation.

The section on "A Season of Pressure," (page 96,) which is full of interest and instruction, cannot be appreciated by an extract, it should be read entire.t

With the History of Banks and Banking Operations, treated of in the second part, our American bankers, and our shipping and importing merchants, who have so much to do with the bankers of Europe, ought to be well acquainted. We have no space for extracts; but we cannot leave the work without commending to the special attention of all who are "making haste to be rich," the eighth section of the second part-on the Moral and Religious Duties of Banking Companies.

We admire the moral heroism and Christian independence which dictated that section, and wish the examples may become much more frequent, of accomplished men of business carrying the religion they profess at home to their counting-houses and stores, and wearing it in their every day concerns, not as a cloak, but as a garment.

We regret that time and space will not permit us to make further extracts from this work. We trust, however, that the almost random passages quoted will induce all who desire to become accomplished in the practice of banking to make themselves perfectly familiar with the contents of this admirable treatise.

"He that answereth a matter before he heareth it, it is folly and shame unto him." "He that is slow to wrath is of great understanding, but he that is hasty of spirit exalteth folly." "A wise man will hear and will increase learning; and a man of understanding shall attain unto wise counsels."

We hope to find room for this section in some future number of our Magazine.

Art. VIII-COMMERCIAL CODE OF SPAIN.

NUMBER XI.

CONCERNING THE INTERPRETING BROKERS OF SHIPS.

ARTICLE 729. In all the ports of the sea open for foreign commerce, there shall be such a number of interpreting brokers of ships as may be judged necessary, in proportion to the extension of their commercial relations.

For these duties, they shall always be preferred to the ordinary brokers of the same place, when they understand two living idioms of the languages of Europe; which knowledge shall be an indispensable requisite for every one who may be an interpreting broker of a ship.

730. Upon the appointment, aptitude, and requisites, which the brokers of ships shall possess, for the purpose of entering into possession of their offices, there shall be observed the regulations prescribed with respect to the ordinary brokers, in the first section, second title, book first, with only the restriction that the amount of their security shall be reduced to one-half designated in the article referred to.

731. The particular functions of interpreting brokers of ships areFirst. To intervene in contracts of affreightments, which the captains or consignees of vessels have not made directly with the freighters.

Second. To assist the captains and supercargoes of foreign vessels, and to serve as interpreters in their declarations, protests, and other proceedings, which may occur to them in the tribunals and official offices, it being understood that such persons shall remain at liberty not to avail themselves of the services of a broker, when they can manage their affairs by themselves, or by the assistance of their consignees.

Third. To translate the documents which the above-mentioned foreign captain and supercargo may have to present in the same offices, certifying that the translations have been made well and faithfully, without which requisite they shall not be admitted.

Fourth. To represent the captains and supercargoes in the judicial tribunals, when they cannot personally appear themselves, or through the medium of the naviero or the consignee of the ship.

732. The obligation of the interpreting brokers shall also be to make three kinds of entries

First. Concerning the captains to whom they (the brokers) may render the assistance which corresponds to their duties, expressing the flag, the name, the quality, and the tonnage, of the vessel, and the ports of her departure and destination.

Second. The documents which they may translate, copying the translations to the letter, in the register.

Third. Concerning the contracts of affreightment, in which the brokers may intervene, expressing in each article the name of the vessel, its flag, its matriculation and tonnage, the names of the captain and the freighter, the destination for which she may be freighted, the price of the freight, and the money in which it shall be paid, the effects of the cargo, the special conditions agreed upon between the freighter and the captain, upon the subject of demurrage, and the time fixed for commencing and finishing the loading of the vessel, referring upon this subject to the original contract signed by the parties of which the broker ought to preserve a copy.

These three classes of entries shall be made in seperate books, with the formalities prescribed in article 40 of this Code.

733. The interpreting brokers are prohibited from purchasing any goods on board of the vessels which they go to visit in port, neither for themselves, or any other person.

734. These ship brokers shall be also subject to the prohibitions prescribed in the articles 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106, and 107, of this Code.

735. In case of the decease or removal of an interpreting broker, his books shall be taken possession of in the same manner as with respect to the ordinary ship brokers, as is prescribed in article 96 of this Code.

736. The pay which belongs to ship brokers, for their functions, shall be regulated in port by a particular tariff, for the approbation of which the Crown reserves its rights, and in the meantime the practice shall be pursued, which is, at the present time, actually observed.

MERCANTILE LAW CASES.

SIGHT BILLS.

The decision rendered by Judge Strawbridge, of the Fourth District Court, New Orleans, in the case of Nimick us. Martin & Co., will be found interesting to merchants. The action was on a bill of exchange for $1,500, drawn at sight by Martin & Co., of New Orleans, on J. S. Lake & Co., of New York. Payment being refused on presentation, the bill was protested for non-payment, and suit instituted. There was no protest for non-acceptance. The following are the reasons given by the Judge for sustaining the action of the plaintiff:

The question mainly debated in this case is, whether a bill of exchange at sight is payable on presentation or entitled to grace?

On the abstract question, as part of the common law, I have not now, nor have I for thirty years had the least doubt. Chitty, in his Treatise on Bills, page 409, speaks of a difference in decisions and treatises on the subject, but concludes that "it is now settled that the days of grace are allowed." Judge Kent, in his Commentaries, vol. 3, page 100, uses similar expressions, but qualifies this as "the better opinion." Neither of them refer to any decisions, nor has the research of any one engaged in this case found one which sustains the position of the defendant. The treatises referred to are those of Chitty and Bailey, who admit the days of grace, and Kidd and Beaurs, who deny them, without citing any authority; and the foreign writers, Pothier and Jousse. Of these latter it may be remarked, that notwithstanding the very great weight due to the opinion of Pothier, the reason given by him, namely: "the inconvenience a traveller might sustain by waiting whilst the days of grace are running," is insufficient to show that such is the law. The inconvenience might easily be avoided by taking a draft at sight without grace, (which, by the way, though well known amongst merchants, would be a very useless and incongruous act, if all drafts at sight were payable on presentation) or a draft on demand, or the more common device almost universal in this country of a bank check. Be the opinion of these civil law writers correct or not, it cannot establish such to be the law merchant in the city of New York. If we were at liberty to examine into the reason of the thing, it would seem much stronger in favor of a sight draft, than of one at sixty days or six months, where all reason fails.

The plaintiff, however, relies on the usage of New York, and under a commission issued from this court he has produced a mass of proof almost overwhelming. Some opposing testimony has also been taken. If as has been asserted, more such could have been produced, it is the error of the defendant not to have

done so. The court cannot hesitate, under the great preponderancy of testimony, in which merchants, lawyers, brokers, and notaries almost unanimously concur. It has, however, not been introduced without opposition, and very high authority pro and con has been laid before the court to establish or impeach the rule that "where the law is clear, proof of custom cannot be received to vary it." I concur in the opinion of Judge Story, in 2 Summer's Report, 377, “that usages amongst merchants are to be sparingly adopted, as being often founded in mere mistake," and it may be added, on crude opinions of the laws, and not from the knowledge and experience of numerous cases and facts, but he never asserted that they were to be disregarded. Perhaps these conflicting opinions might be reconciled by close examination; perhaps some of these were cases of positive legislation and fixed rule which certainly cannot be varied by usage, whilst others were cases of commercial laws almost wholly dependant on the usage of merchants, in which cases it would be difficult to assign any good reason why a system based on custom should not be changed in the same manner. Indeed, in a case referred to by Chitty, Judge Buller mentioned a case before Justice Willes in London, where it was left to a jury of merchants, who decided (of course under the custom) that days of grace were allowed on sight bills. No one would think of offering proof that, by the custom of the city of New York, the right of primogeniture existed there. Nor would any one, I think, deny the right to show by proof that it was the usage there to pay notes in bank before three o'clock, or they would be subject to protest.

The treatises on insurance present numerous instances where the constructions of a policy here is different from that adopted in England, and like differences exist in different States, all arising out of usage.

It is not, however, necessary, in this case, to reconcile these differences. The case of Renner vs. the Bank of Columbia, 9 Wheaton, 58, appears to the Court decisive of the present. The bill there sued on had not been protested until the fourth day after that of payment, and by the general Merchant law, the liability of the endorser was gone. This was, however, shown to be in conformity with the usage of the banks in the district, and, on the showing, the plaintiff had judgment. If, then, the custom of any community can vary the law by adding a fourth day of grace, it can abridge them a day, or dispense with them altogether. Here the proof does establish that for forty years, and longer than any witness produced can remember, the usage in the city of New York has been to pay sight drafts on presentment, or protest followed.

It has not escaped the notice of the court, that the testimony given in Renner's case was not excepted to; and secondly: that some of Judge Thompson's expressions appear to lay stress on the fact of defendant's having before dealt with the bank, and knew their mode of business. But leaving these out of view, the broad principles laid down and on which the case was decided, cover all that is in contest here. Judgment is therefore rendered for the plaintiff with damages and costs. J. Livingston for plaintiff; Kendall & Howard for defendants.

ACTION TO RECOVER MONEY LOANED.

In the Superior Court, (city of New York, Sept. 1849.) Judge Sanford presiding. Jeremiah Van Rensselaer, and others vs. William A. Bayley.

This was an action for money lent. From the accounts produced by the plaintiffs, it appeared that during the year 1847, they had lent various sums to the defendant, and received part payment on account of them. From their accounts, it appeared that in January, 1848, there was a balance due to the plaintiffs of about $6,000, which they now sued for. The plaintiffs relied on the implied admission of defendant that their account against him was correct, as he had an interview with them after they furnished the account, and made no objection to it. As security for the money lent defendant, he had hypothecated with plaintiff 550 shares of Harlem Railroad Stock, which they sold on the 11th of January, 1848. The defendant now alleged that this stock was sold without his authority or giving him due notice, and in an improper manner, and he claimed as an offs et

against the plaintiffs' demand, the loss which he had sustained by the sale of the stock. In reply to this, the plaintiffs produced the testimony of their agent, who deposed to having given the defendant notice on a Saturday that unless the plaintiffs where paid their money, the stock would be sold on the following Tuesday. As to the stock being sold on the day, and in the manner alleged by the plaintiffs, the evidence was not very clear. It appeared from the evidence of the brokers who it was alleged sold the stock, that they did sell a quantity of Harlem Railroad stock at the Board of Brokers, on the day on which plaintiffs alleged that defendant's stock was sold, but there was no entry in their books going to positively identify the defendant's stock, as that which was sold by them on that day.

The court charged the jury, that according to the rule of law and common sense, when a man receives an account, and afterwards comes in contact with the persons who presented it and makes no objection to it, it is implied that he then deems it correct; leaving him however, at liberty, if he afterwards finds it incorrect, to show it to be so. If the defendant had satisfied the jury that the plaintiffs sold his stock without proper notice or in an improper manner, then such sale was illegal, and the defendant is entitled to claim the highest price which such stock since sold for; and if the sale of the stock was illegal, it extinguishes the plaintiffs' claim, as it sold but for 39 per cent, and has since sold at 63, which would amount to more than the plaintiffs' debt. To render the sale legal, the stock, in this case, should be sold only with reasonable notice, and in a proper manner. The stock must be sold at auction, no other way of sale being known to the law. There might, however, be some custom in relation to such sales, but no proof had been offered to show it. In regard to the place of sale, there was nothing in the constitution or nature of the Board of Brokers to show that it was not as good a place for the sale as any other in the Exchange. A sale made at the Board of Brokers was therefore as good a sale as if made elsewhere. If the jury were satisfied that the sale was not made with sufficient notice, or at auction, or without the defendant being called on before the sale to pay his balance, then they would find for the defendant. But if they were satisfied that those requsites were complied with, then they should find for the plaintiffs.

Verdict for plaintiffs, $6,384.

SUIT TO RECOVER FOR CLOTHING, ETC., FURNISHED A MINOR.

In the Commercial Court, Cincinnati, (October 9, 1849,) Collins & Timberlake vs. Srunker.

The plaintiffs, storekeepers in Lexington, Ky., brought the suit to recover $286 for articles of clothing, &c., furnished to defendant's son, in 1843, within a period of about eighteen months, while he was a student in Lexington College, under the charge of Professor McCown.

The evidence was documentary, and rather voluminous, and included the accounts of the plaintiffs.

Mr. Riddle for the plaintiffs, in his defence, relied upon the testimony he had introduced, to show that positive instructions had been given to Professor McCown not to open an account, a sufficient supply of the requisite articles being furnished by defendant for the use of his son, when he entered the College; and drew the attention of the Court to the case of Watson vs. Watson, in Johnson's Reports; where upon a case taken up to one of the higher courts on a certiorari, a judg ment, giving a tradesman damages for goods furnished to a minor, was reversed, upon the principle, that the discretion of the parent was to determine the necessity of the articles required. This did not, of course, apply to the case of a delinquent parent, but the principle was obviously applicable to the present case, the defendant having equiped his son in a manner suitable to his situation. Counsel then read the plaintiffs' bill, drawing particular attention to sundry items for Cologne and Florida water, tobacco, kid gloves, fancy scarfs, cigars, penknives, powder and shot, four pair of fine boots, and the same number of shoes, within two months; all which matters he submitted were more abundantly dealt out to this young lad than would be proper even if he were the son of a rich Carolina or Louisiana planter,