removed, upon payment to the county clerk of double the amount for which the land was sold, all taxes subsequently accruing, and six per cent interest. The clerk was required to transmit a list to the auditor, of lands redeemed, semiannually. The auditor was directed to furnish, in turn to the clerk, a list of all lands lying in his county, which had been forfeited to the State; and the clerk was authorized to advertise and sell the same biennially. The sheriff was required to assist in the sales. The clerk was directed to execute and deliver certificates of sale to the purchasers, and on presentation of these certificates, the auditor was required to convey the lands to them. Such are the substantial provisions of the statute of 1845. The language of this law is broad enough to vest the title ipso facto in the State. It is free from all ambiguity whateverdeclares the title of the owner forfeited and transfers it to the State. If constitutional, which, as we have seen, is at least a debatable point, the purchaser, at a sale of these forfeited lands, will acquire a valid title, where the law has been strictly complied with by the officers making the sale. The only requirements are, a list transmitted by the auditor to the clerk, an advertisement by the clerk, and a sale by the clerk 470 and sheriff. It may be a question, however, whether the owner may not redeem at any time before a legal sale of his land takes place. The prior statutes of Illinois were similar to the Ohio acts referred to; if the land was not sold at the ordinary tax sale, they were directed to be stricken off to the State, and afterwards sold to the highest bidder. It is presumed, that in all cases where lands have been forfeited or struck off to the State, they cease to be taxable; and if again listed and sold by the officers the purchaser will acquire no title.2 And under the Ohio and Illinois statutes, the county auditor in the former, and the county clerk in the latter State, cannot advertise and sell, until they are furnished with a transcript of the forfeited lands by the State auditor.3 1 Buckley v. Osborn, 8 Ohio, 180. 2 Of course, the proceedings prior to the forfeiture must have been regular in all respects. 3 Hannel v. Smith, 15 Ohio, 134. The Ohio statute of February 1, 1825, declared, that forfeited lands should vest in the State, with a proviso that the former owner might reinvest himself with the title by paying all taxes, penalties, and interest due upon the land, at any time prior to the disposition of the land by the State. The act of March 14, 1831, made provision for the sale of the land, and declared, "that if any lands shall be sold by virtue of the provisions of this act, the property of a feme covert, minor, or insane person, or person in captivity, the owner or owners thereof shall have the right to redeem the same," &c. In Reynolds v. Leiper's heirs, which was an application to redeem from a sale made of forfeited lands under the foregoing statutes, it appeared that the land in question belonged to Thomas Leiper, and was forfeited in 1826. Leiper died in May, 1831, leaving the applicants his heirs, all of whom mere minors; the land was sold December 12, 1831, for the taxes due thereon for the years 1826, 1827, 1828, 1829, 1830, and 1831. The redemption * was resisted upon the ground, that as the forfeiture * 471 happened during the lifetime of the ancestor, no such estate descended to the heirs, as would authorize them to redeem. The Common Pleas ordered a redemption, and the order was affirmed by the Supreme Court. In Hodgdon v. Wight, where land was forfeited to the State for the non-payment of taxes due upon it, and afterwards sold and conveyed to the purchaser, and between the day of forfeiture and the day of the sale, the owner paid several assessments of State taxes due upon the land, which were received by the State without objection, and appropriated; this was held to be no waiver of the forfeiture. By the court: "It is insisted that the State could not assess the land as owned by others, and receive payment from them for such taxes, and yet claim to be itself the owner of those lands by forfeiture. There would have been an inconsistency in such proceedings, if there had been no intention to permit the owners to redeem. The State, however, does not appear to have insisted upon forfeitures when it could obtain payment without. Such a course of proceedings might, perhaps, be properly regarded as a pledge, that 1 6 & 7 Ohio, 250. 2 36 Me. 326. the owners would be permitted to redeem. By the act approved August 10, 1848, the owners of the lands forfeited, were not only permitted to redeem them from the State, until they were finally sold at auction by the land agent, but provision was made that they might redeem from the purchaser at any time within one year after the sale. Under such circumstances, by continuing to assess them, and to receive payment of taxes, the State cannot be considered to have waived any claim to a forfeiture, further than it has manifested an intention to do so by its enactments." (a) There was a statute in Ohio, which made it the duty of tenants for life to list the estate and pay all taxes assessed upon it, and declared that a neglect to do so "shall forfeit to the person or persons in remainder or reversion, all the estate which he or she, so neglecting or refusing, may have in said lands," &c. In the lessee of McMillan v. Robbins, * 472 which was an action of ejectment by the reversioner to enforce a forfeiture under this statute, it appeared, upon the trial, that William McMillan, the owner, made a will devising the lands to his wife for life, with remainder to the lessors of the plaintiff, and died. The wife, on February 29, 1825, made a lease to the defendant of the premises thus devised to her, and which were the same in controversy, for and during the term of her natural life, upon certain trusts for herself and minor children, and thereupon the defendant entered into possession. Neither the tenant for life, nor her lessee, ever caused the land to be listed for taxation in the name of the one or the other, but it stood listed in the name of the "heirs of William McMillan." The taxes for 1827 and 1828 were not paid, and the land was sold for these taxes in December, 1828, to William Corry one of the lessors of the plaintiff. On April 28, 1829, the defendant deposited with the county auditor money to redeem from the tax sale. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff, the court holding, -1. That the law was constitu (a) Where land is claimed by forfeiture under act of 1844, the legality of proceedings may be questioned without paying or tendering tax, as c. 6, § 145, of R. S. of 1857 relates to sales and not forfeitures. Williamsburg v. Lord, 51 Me. 599. 1 5 Hamm. 28. tional. 2. That it applied as well to tenants for life who held the estate in trust, as to ordinary tenants. 3. That a forfeiture had been incurred. 4. That the defendant could not redeem, because his interest was divested by the forfeiture, and a redemption could not restore him to his former rights; and, 5. That the remainder-man could enforce the forfeiture by ejectment. [A statute of Virginia, of March 11, 1834, provided, that lands, delinquent as to taxes, should be forfeited October 1, 1834. Subsequent acts provided that they might be redeemed within a limited time afterwards. Under this act it was held, in Usher v. Pride,1 that the title of the owners was divested October 1, 1834, and that the subsequent statute granted them a mere right to redeem, and to revest the title by proceedings within the after-limited time, and did not remove the forfeiture, or postpone the time when the title was to divest.] 1 15 Gratt. 190. CHAPTER XXXIII. OF THE EFFECT OF THE REPEAL OF THE LAW UNDER WHICH THE PROCEEDINGS TOOK PLACE. It is a well-established principle of law, that when a statute is repealed, it must be considered, as to all transactions in fieri, closed as never having had an existence at all. This rule is subject to two exceptions: 1. Where existing rights and remedies are expressly saved by the repealing clause; and, 2. Where rights have become perfected and vested under the old law, the repealed statute is regarded as in full force, notwithstanding its repeal. In the former case the old law is regarded as in full force, because the legislature have so declared, and its authority is amply sufficient to accomplish that intention; and in the latter instance, where a right has become vested, it is not within the scope of legislative power to divest it by a repeal of the statute under which it was acquired.2 The general rule is illustrated by the case of McQuilken v. Doe, where the land in question was sold November 4, 1824, for the State, county, and road tax. The road tax was assessed under the law of 1822, which was repealed September 1, 1824, after the assessment of the tax, but before the sale took place. The repealing law contained this clause: "saving, however, any act done, &c., previous to the passage of this act, &c." The court held the sale void, saying, "The road law being thus repealed, the case is without difficulty. The law * is well settled, that when a statute is repealed, it must * 474 be considered, except as to transactions passed and closed, as if it had never existed. The case before us is one 1 Dwarris, 676; Smith's Comm. 890. 8 8 Black. 581. |