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of battle, his rear became van. This very movement, together with some variations in the wind, of which the English dexterously availed themselves, brought the two fleets so near each other, that the action commenced immediately, the wind blowing from the west, and the French running from north to south, the English from south to north. This manner of combating, by which a close and stationary action was avoided, the ships firing only as they passed each other in opposite directions, was the result of the manœuvre just made by the French fleet.

It suited the count d' Orvilliers so much the better, as since he had not been able to decline the engagement, it assured him, at least, that it could not be decisive. For it was a necessary consequence of this order of battle, that the two fleets must break their line during the action, and that the party who should have sustained the least damage, could not immediately pursue their advantages, whether against any particular ship of the enemy, or against his entire fleet. The two fleets thus standing on opposite tacks, and but a slight distance apart, the first ships of the English van, and those of the French rear, which, as we have said, was become the van, began to exchange broadsides, and the battle was joined successively, as the whole English line passed close along side of the whole French line; so that the rear, commanded by sir Hugh Palliser, and the van by the count Duchaffault, were the last to attack each other. The effects of this collision were very destructive on both sides; but as the French, according to their custom, had fired at the tackling, and the English, as they usually do, at the body of the ships, the hulls of the French vessels were more severely damaged, than those of their enemies; whereas the English were much the greater sufferers in their masts, yards, and rigging. The French, profiting of this advantage of their sails, soon tacked and formed their line anew. The British van and centre also in a short time recovered their stations, though the admiral's ship had suffered extremely. But the ships of Palliser and several others, not only had not yet tacked, but being in a disabled condition, they obeyed the wind and fell rapidly to leeward. In this state of things, whether the count d' Orvilliers intended, as the English pretend, to cut their line, and separate these ships from the rest of the fleet, or, as the French affirm, wishing to place himself under the wind, in order, as he expected a second battle, to deprive the English of the advantage he would thus gain for himself, of using the lower batteries with effect, he made signals for all his fleet to advance by a successive movement, and penetrate between the ships of Keppel and those of Palliser.

The English admiral, perceiving the design of his adversary, immediately put his ships about, and stood athwart the enemy's

foremost division, directing at the same time sir Robert Harland to form his division in a line astern, in order to face the enemy, till sir Hugh Palliser could bring up his ships. It is not clear, whether this movement of Keppel frustrated the project of the count d' Orvilliers, for intercepting Palliser's division, or whether it was merely the intention of that admiral to get under the wind; but certain it is, that in consequence of this evolution the English remained to the windward. It was therefore in their power to renew the battle, provided, however, that all their ships had been in condition to take part in the action; and this would have been the wish of Keppel. But the squadron of Palliser, since the admiral and Harland had thrown themselves between him and the French, to whom they were now very near, found itself to the windward of the other divisions, and of course, remote from the French fleet, and little within reach to be of any assistance in case of a new engagement. On this consideration, Keppel made a signal for all the ships to the windward to resume their respective posts in the order of battle. Here a mistake happened, which prevented the execution of his orders. Palliser's

ship, the Formidable, not having repeated the signal, the captains of the other ships understood that of Keppel as an order to rally in the wake of the commander of their own division, which they did accordingly.

Meanwhile, the French continued drawn up, to leeward, in order of battle. Keppel renewed the same signal, but with no better success. Afterwards, about five in the evening, [Palliser says at seven,] he commanded the captain of the frigate, Fox, to convey to Palliser a verbal message of the same import as the order he had already intimated by signals. It was still in vain; neither the Formidable nor the other ships obeyed. On seeing this, and the day far spent, Keppel made the signal to each of the ships of Palliser to resume their stations in the line; excepting, however, the Formidable, apparently from a certain regard to the rank, and particular functions of the vice-admiral. This time, his orders were executed; but night came, and put an end to all possibility of further operations against the enemy.

Such are the causes which prevented admiral Keppel from renewing the battle; whether the disobedience of Palliser proceeded from the impossibility of managing his ships, disabled in the engagement, as seems probable, and as the court martial decided, in the solemn trial which followed, or that it was owing to any personal pique of that officer, who, being of the ministerial party, was politically at variance with Keppel. Be this as it may, the French thence took occasion to say, that from noon till night they offered battle to Keppel, who would not accept it. The fact in itself is incontestable ; but as to the intentions of the British admiral, it is certain that he

was well disposed to recommence the action, but was prevented by the obstacles we have just related.

Satisfied with their conduct in this combat, and with its issue, which might be represented as a victory, a thing so important at this first epoch of the war, or finding the condition of their fleet too shattered to warrant their exposing themselves to the hazards of a second battle, the French profited in the night of a fair wind to recover their own coasts; and entered the next day with full sails into the port of Brest. They had, however, left in the place of battle, three ships with lights at the mast heads, to deceive the English into the belief that all their fleet was still there. At break of day, the French fleet

was already at such a distance that it was only discernible from the mast heads of the largest ships in the British fleet; nothing remained in sight but the three vessels above mentioned. Keppel ordered the Prince George, the Robust, and another ship, to give them chase, but as they were good sailers, and the English had suffered extremely in their sails and rigging, this pursuit was fruitless. Admiral Keppel made the best of his way to Plymouth, where he purposed to repair the damages of his fleet; he left, however, some ships that had suffered the least, to protect the British trade, and especially the fleets which were expected.

The English, in this action, had one hundred and forty killed, and about four hundred wounded. The loss of the French is uncertain; but it is probable that it exceeded that of the English. Some private authorities lead to this belief, as also the throng of sailors and marines with which they are accustomed to fill their vessels.

The two fleets proceeded again to sea the next month. But whether they mutually sought to meet each other, as they gave out, or that each endeavored to avoid the other, as it was reciprocally asserted, it is certain that they did not meet again. It is equally indisputable that the trade of England was effectually protected; while, on the other hand, an immense number of French vessels with rich and valuable cargoes, fell into the power of the enemy. These losses excited the complaints of the cities of Bordeaux, Nantz, Saint Malo, and Havre de Grace.

Such was the issue of the battle of Ouessant, which commenced the European war. The English observed in it, to their great surprise, that the French not only fought with their accustomed valor, but that they displayed also no ordinary dexterity in profiting of the advantage of wind, in the management of their ships, and in their naval evolutions. Hence they could not but infer, that if they obtained successes in the present war, they would have to pay dearer for them than in the last.

Public rejoicings were made in France, to animate the people, and inspire them with better hopes. The impression was quite

different in England; some complained of Keppel, others of Palliser, according to the various humors of the parties; all of fortune. After certain warm discussions, the admiral and vice-admiral were both put upon trial; but both were acquitted; the first, to the universal exultation of the people; the second to the particular gratification of the friends of the ministry.

END OF BOOK NINTH.

BOOK TENTH.

1778. THE unfortunate issue of the war of Canada, and the inutility of the advantages obtained in the campaign of Pennsylvania, had at length shaken the obstinacy of the British ministers. They began to believe that it was impossible to reduce the Americans by force of arms; and every day confirmed them in this persuasion, since France, so powerful by land and by sea, had united her forces to those of the Congress. It was too manifest to be doubted, that if the Americans had been able to withstand, in the preceding campaign, the utmost efforts of England, it would be infinitely more easy for them to resist in future; their union being more consolidated by time, their hopes secured by propitious fortune, and their arms seconded by those of a formidable potentate. Besides, it was no longer to be hoped that as many troops could be sent to America in future years as had been sent thither in the past. For, without reference to the almost absolute impossibility of procuring more German troops, and the extreme slowness of recruiting in England, there was to be feared an invasion of the French, in the very heart of the kingdom, and moreover, it was necessary to throw strong garrisons into the West India islands, to shelter them from the assaults of the French, who were known to have a respectable force in their vicinity. It was no mystery in the British cabinet, that the principal object which the French were aiming at in the present war, after the separation of America from Great Britain, was the conquest of the rich colonies of England in the West Indies; and that in anticipation of events, they had assembled numerous troops in their own possessions. The English islands of the West Indies thus found themselves exposed, almost without defence, to the attempts of the enemy. Whether the ministers had believed that war with France was not likely to break out immediately, or that they had relied upon their sanguine hopes of a complete triumph in the preceding campaign, they had flattered themselves that in any event, their victories upon the American continent would enable them to pass into their islands in good time, all the succours that could be necessary. Jealousy was also entertained of Canada, not only on the part of the Americans, but also, and much more, on that of the French; for the Canadians were more French than English, and the memory of their origin appeared to be still dear them. It was therefore necessary to leave in that province such garrisons as could answer for it. These various considerations, not only rendered it impracticable to reenforce the armies which acted against the United States; but even imposed the necessity of weakening them by detachments for the different exigencies of the service. But, on the other hand, the courage of the ministers did not desert