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upon the scene of time after the universe has completed its first and initial melody; we shall be compelled to quit the scene of time ere the universe shall have entered upon its last. All that we behold or can behold is an intermediate process, a process which hovers somewhere between the opening and the close, and whose link of connection with either the opening or the close is incapable of being discerned. Under these circumstances we are thrown back upon our reflective faculties, and obliged to seek from inference what we are unable to learn from actual perception. Now to us as to the imaginary being whom we introduced between the second and the eleventh tune, there are open two possible inferences from the facts before us. We may either hold that the different vibrations of this universe grow out of one another, or we may hold that each of them is a change of melody produced by the influence of a higher power. The former view is that commonly attributed to the evolutionist; the latter is that generally claimed for the creationist. But the question which we ask is this—Are these any more alternatives in the case of the universe than in the case of the musical-box? We have seen that in the case of the musical-box they are not alternatives at all, that it is not only possible but necessary to accept both at the same moment; the one tune grows out of the other, but it does so simply from the fact that there has been a musician at work. Is there anything in the case of the universe which should prevent the same combination of elements ? is there any reason why this musical-box also should not at one and the same moment be the result of its mechanical construction and the result of the musician's art? Let us suppose that we had succeeded in tracing the link which connects the man with the animal, and the link which binds the animal to the plant; let us suppose even that we had succeeded in discovering the missing link between the life of the plant and that other species of life to which we popularly give the name of dead matter, —would this close the question between the evolutionist and the creationist? It would certainly prove that there is a connection between the melodies performed by the musical-box of the universe, but we are not aware that the creationist has ever denied that fact any more than the evolutionist. We have seen already that theism demands the ultimate unity of all things as strongly as does any theory of modern science, and this is only in other words to say that it demands the recognition of a certain link of connection which shall bind together the varieties of existence. The sole question is, What is the binding link? To find the connection even between the man and what is popularly called dead matter, would not be equivalent to discovering the ultimate source of things; for the doctrine of evolution most strongly asserts that matter is not an ultimate, but, on the contrary, is itself only a phenomenon produced by an antecedent cause.
According to the Book of Genesis, which may be taken to represent the views of creationism, the link which connects the different species of existence is a word or command of God: “God said, Let there be light ;” “God said, Let there be a firmament;” “God said, Let the waters be gathered together.” Let it be observed that in the view of the writer of Genesis this is really a reduction of all varieties to a principle of unity. The Book of Genesis contemplates as strongly as the book of evolution the possibility of reducing the varied phenomena of nature to a single species ; only, the species to which it does reduce them is a species of life. It is this which makes us recognise in the Book of Genesis an advocate of the theory of creationism. Here, as in the system of evolution, all things are ultimately referred to a single origin; but their origin is said to be, not an unintelligent law, nor a material mechanism, but a living Spirit. We have no difficulty, accordingly, when we have accepted this principle of unity, in admitting along with it a principle of constant variety ; in other words, we have no difficulty in recognising in the first chapter of Genesis an illustration at once of the aim contemplated by evolution and of the power evinced by the attribute of special creation. In this musical-box the melodies are at once connected and disconnected,—they are connected in point of fact, they are disconnected in point of nature. The link which binds them and constitutes their unity is the word and will of an omnipotent Being who has chosen so to do, but who, had He chosen otherwise, might have left them for ever disjoined ; their unity is the fact of their common creation, their identity of species is the formula, “God said."
Now, at first sight, the modern doctrine of evolution is the direct antithesis of this view. In the Book of Genesis the varieties in the order of nature are constituted by that very act of creation which at the same time constitutes their unity. The element common to them all is the fact that God speaks ; but the actual speech of God is the bringing forth of variations in the order of nature. If God's work of creation were a single act, there would be nothing special about it; but when it is represented as a series of acts, each one of these must be regarded as a special manifestation of Divine power. That in the Book of Genesis which makes the acts of God special creations, is not the varied character of the objects created; it is the fact that each of them is created. Let us suppose that the six days' creation had been represented, not as the making of different things, but as a
repeated creation of precisely the same thing six times over, the six days' creation would none the less be a record of six special manifestations of Divine power. That which makes the speciality is not the variety in the object, but the fact that the object, whether it be varied from or identical with its predecessor, has involved the putting forth of another act of Divine will; the formula, “God said,” which binds the varieties into one, is at the same time the very thing which renders them special creations.
To this view, as we have said, the modern doctrine of evolution seems to present a direct negative. Here the formula, “God said,” is conspicuous by its absence. There is a seeming tendency to ignore all transcendental causes, all influences that cannot be weighed and measured in material scales. The unity to which it is sought to reduce the phenomena of nature is to appearance a purely physical unity; the links by which it is attempted to bind the highest to the lowest species are the influences called heredity, concomitant variation, natural selection, and environment. We are pointed, in the first instance, to the fact that like begets like, that the offspring has a tendency to repeat the qualities of the parent. We are pointed, next, to the converse fact that like does not beget an exact likeness. We are shown how the qualities of the offspring diverge, in some respects, from the qualities of the