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merely a manifestation to the senses of a Force whose being is inscrutable—he transforms in a moment the whole structure which he has elaborately reared. He has been arguing throughout for the production of all things by evolution; he now informs us that at the back of all things there is a process quite distinct from evolution, a process which we can only describe in terms of our own ignorance as the successive manifestations of an incomprehensible Power. When Mr Spencer has promulgated this theory, in what light are we henceforth to regard him ? Has he done with the system of evolution what at the outset he promised to do? has he made it coextensive with the universe ? On the contrary, we have no hesitation in saying that in the last analysis he has abandoned it altogether, and abandoned it in favour of something very like that very doctrine of creation which his philosophy is designed to refute. If the nebulous fire-cloud with all which it contains be itself only the shadow of a Power which is transcendental, and if every movement of evolution, by which the fire-cloud breaks into variety, is in reality effected only by the movement of that Power, can we any longer be said to be dealing with a theory whose aim is to establish the unity of species ? Are we not, on the contrary, engaged in the contemplation of a theory which does not finally hold the unity of species, but has gone back, at the last stage, to the despised and rejected doctrine of a series of special creations? If all things are the manifestations of a transcendental Force, in what sense can the plant be said to be one with the animal, or the animal one with the man? They are no doubt one in the sense that they are each and all manifestations of the same transcendent Power, but every theist in the world would admit such a unity as that. In fact we have here in another form a repetition of the old creed of the six days' creation, except that the number of the days is indefinitely multiplied. The first chapter of Genesis united its varieties of species by the formula “God said "; the evolutionism of Mr Herbert Spencer disjoins its unity of species by a statement which amounts to precisely the same formula— the statement that the converging forces of this universe are but the repeated manifestations of an inscrutable Power.

What does the creationist mean when he says that the man is a different species from the animal, and the animal a different species from the plant ? Clearly this, that the one could never have grown out of the other without the intervention of a Power which transcends the limits of our present knowledge. Grant to the creationist that such a Power has intervened, and it will be as easy for him to admit that the man has grown out of the animal, as it is to hold that the man was made immediately

from the dust of the earth-as easy, that is to say, so far as the principle of creationism is concerned. Let a man once be persuaded that the life which is within him is the result of an intervention by a higher Power, and it will be a matter of comparative indifference to him through what medium that Power has operated; he will feel that he is no more divorced from God by the establishment of a link between him and the lower animals, than by the establishment of a link between him and the dust of the ground, and in each case for the same reason — because both are only symbols through which acts a higher Power. Yet this is precisely the position of the doctrine of evolution as represented by its chief apostle. Mr Spencer, after linking together every order of life and matter in a common chain of unity, has wound up by telling us that the chain is itself only a symbol, and that the real agent of the whole process is a Power that transcends the limits of our knowledge. To this Power, according to his system, must be ultimately referred every change of species and every order of development. The discovery of the missing link between the man and the animal would not explain the passage of the animal to the man, for the real link between them is not a link of mechanism, but their mutual connection with a transcendental Power of which each of them is but a single manifestation : is not

the doctrine of a special creation here abundantly restored ?

Will it be said that the doctrine of evolution is not bound to follow in this respect the views of its leading apostle? Will it be contended that the man of science has nothing more to do than to find the visible chain that connects visible phenomena, and that all ulterior conclusions belong to the sphere of speculation ? Such a principle, if carried out to its logical issue, would destroy the existence of science itself, but let us for the moment suppose it to be true. Let us limit our horizon to the region comprehended by the material chain of evolution embraced in the system of Mr Darwin. We ask if it is possible to account for the existence even of this chain on the principle of material evolution alone. We have already seen that in the system of Mr Darwin there are two things demanded at the very beginning, as the prerequisites of a doctrine of evolution—the law of heredity, and the law of concomitant variation. On the one hand we saw that like begets like, that the offspring bears some resemblance to its parent. On the other hand we found that like does not beget an exact likeness, that the offspring in some respect differs from the type of its parent. These two laws are essential to the very existence of a Darwinian evolution. But now we would ask to what extent the Darwinian evolution can explain

these laws themselves? Heredity it certainly can explain ; that like should beget like, is just what we should expect from the existence of an evolutionary principle. But how can it account for the other law—the principle of concomitant variation? How can it explain the origin of the first point of unlikeness which the offspring exhibited to its parent? That like begets like is a law of evolution; but is it a law of evolution that like should beget unlike? We are not arguing against the principles of Darwinism—we do not believe that the point in hand is any objection to the Darwinian theory; we merely contend that it shows the Darwinian theory to require the alliance and co-operation of some other theory. It is easy to account for the breaking up of unity into variety of species after the principle of variation has begun—after the offspring has begun to diverge from the type of the parent. But how are we to account for the first divergence? how are we to explain the beginnings of that unlikeness which by propagation and heredity ultimately results in a new order of being? This is a point which Darwinism does not explain, because it lies behind Darwinism. The Darwinian theory accepts as a fact of nature the law of concomitant variation just as it accepts as a fact of nature the law of hereditary transmission, and in so doing it is perfectly scientific. But philosophy ever lies behind

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