ADDITIONAL PAY ROLL. 599 House of Representatives, February 24, 1827. The Committee on the Pay Roll of the House of Representatives, REPORT; That the amount of travel and attendance of the members at the present Session, the additional pay of the Speaker, together with the pay of the Clerk, Assistant Clerk, Door keeper, Page and attendant, to be nineteen thousand twenty three dollars; and report herewith a Resolve. URIAH HOLT, Per Order. CHAPTER XLIX. Resolve on the Pay Roll of the House of Representatives. Resolvd, That there be allowed and paid out of the Treasury of this State, to the several persons mentioned in the preceding Roll, the several sums set against their respective names, amounting to nineteen thousand and twenty three dollars. [Approved by the Governor, February 26, 1827.] CHAPTER L. Resolve additional to the Pay Roll. Resolved, That in addition to the amount made up on the Pay Roll of the House of Representatives for the present Session, there be allowed and paid to the following members, the sums affixed to their names respectively, for additional attendance according to the number of days set against their names respectively; to wit. To Daniel Goodenow, of Alfred, one day, two dollars; Jonathan Knowles, of Hampden, two days, four dollars; Levi G. Fletcher, of Bingham, six days, twelve dollars; Samuel Eastman, of Strong, two days, four dollars; Paul Spooner, of Cooper, six days, twelve dollars; And the Treasurer is hereby authorized to pay the members aforesaid accordingly. [Approved by the Governor, February 26, 1827.] CHAPTER LI. Resolve respecting the Deputy Secretary of State. Resolved, That there be allowed and paid out of the Treasury of the State to the Deputy Secretary of State, the sum of three dollars for each day he may have been necessarily employed in said Office; Provided, The account of said Deputy be first examined and allowed by the Governor and Council. [Approved by the Governor, February 26, 1827.] STATE OF MAINE. SECRETARY OF STATE'S OFFICE, I hereby certify, That the Resolves contained in this Pamphlet have been compared with the originals deposited in this Office, and appear to be correctly printed. AMOS NICHOLS, Secretary of State. APPENDIX. 81110 REPORT AND RESOLVES of the two HOUSES OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN RELATION TO INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Feb. 8, 1827. The Committee to whom was referred so much of the Governor's Communication at the commencement of the Session as relates to the subject of Internal Improvement, and a system for a proportional distribution of the surplus funds of the United States to promote Internal Improvement, have had that subject under consideration and ask leave to REPORT: That they are aware that much diversity of opinion exists as to the Constitutional power of the Government of the United States to appropriate money for the purposes of Internal Improvement. It is said that no idea was entertained, either by the advocates or opposers of the Constitution, at the time when it was formed and adopted, that any such power was granted to the General Government. The general idea then was, that that was a Government for exterior and foreign affairs, and for objects purely National, but that all subjects of exclusive internal interest and domestic concern were left to the care of the States. In the animated discussion which that instrument produced in every State of the Union, it is scarcely possible that a grant of power so important and extensive in all its bearings should have escaped animadversion, if it was actually contained in it, or was intended so to be. But we do not propose to enter into an argument on the Constitutional question. We have looked at it, only in a practical point of view. It is well known that the revenue of the United States, derived from imposts and the sale of the public domain, is much more than enough to cover all the ordinary expenses of the government, exclusive of the charge on those funds for paying off the public debt. By existing laws $10,000,000 are annually applied for this purpose. By the operation of the sinking fund about one half of the debt has been paid since the conclusion of the last war, and it is calculated that the whole will be extinguished in about seven years more. If our income is not then diminished, and we believe that it will not be, and our current expenditure is not increased, and it is thought that it need not be, there will be an annual surplus of about $10,000,000, which may be appropriated to works of public improvements or to the purposes of education. How this may be disposed of so as to produce the greatest public good, is a question worthy of great consideration. So far as opinions have been expressed on the subject, there seems to be an united sentiment that it ought to be appropriated to promote the internal improvement of the country, by constructing Roads and Canals, and improving navigable water courses, &c., or to aid in the work of the general Education of the People, by contributing to the support of Schools, or to both these objects jointly. If the surplus revenue of the United States is to take this direction, under what management should it be expended? Two modes have been suggested. First, for the General Government to direct the expenditure on such works of National utility as they shall think advisable; reserving to themselves exclusively the selection of the objects, the employment of the agents, and the sole direction of the works of improvement within the territorial jurisdiction of the several States. The second, is to distribute the funds to the several States in just and equitable proportions, and to leave the expenditure to the judgment and discretion of the State Government, under a general restriction that it shall be exclusively appropriated to works of Internal Improvement and to Education. Your Committee after mature deliberation have come to a decided opinion that the latter mode is preferable, and if the Legislature shall concur with them in their views, they think there is a propriety in their publicly expressing such opinion. The objections to the first mode we believe are many and strong. The first relates to economy. The distance of the seat of the General Government from the remote parts of the Union, is such, that its officers cannot have that constant oversight of its agents employed in the expenditure, which is indispensably necessary to exercise over them an efficient and useful control. Under such circumstances, the expenses will always be great in proportion to the work accomplished. With a lavish expenditure, the work advances slowly and the agents grow rich. Such are the lessons of common experience in private life, where the principal is at such a distance from the agent that he cannot oversee and give him direction in the detail of his business. That the public will find it so, we believe none can doubt. INTERNAL IMPROVEMENT. 603 But there are solid and weighty objections to this mode of a different character. These Roads and Canals are to be constructed within the territorial limits of the several States. We do not advert in this, to the apparent violation of State sove reignty; we look only to the practical side of the question. The United States' Government, may, perhaps, think a Canal of public utility, which the State might think peculiarly injurious to itself. It might be such an one as might be beneficial to a neighboring State, but injurious in a high degree to the State within which it was made, by diverting from it its accustomed trade. It is unnecessary to enlarge on the unpleasant consequences which might and probably would grow out of such cases, the heart-burnings and jealousies between neighboring States, and the discord between the General Government and those of the individual States. The dangerous uses to which the exercise of such a power by the United States' Government may hereafter be applied, constitutes another objection. It will usually be an object with each of the States to have as large a portion of the public money expended within its limits as can be obtained. Yet the Government may withhold the whole from any particular State which they choose. Thus one State may be enriched by a great and disproportionate exdenditure within its limits as a reward for its faithful attachment to the men in power, while every thing may be refused to another which contributes double the amount to the public treasury. The extent to which this may be carried, for the purpose of punishing opposition, or rewarding a blind subserviency to an existing administration-of purchasing support to a corrupt or pernicious system of government by buying the people with their own money, may easily be seen, and need not be more than hinted at by your Committee. Nothing can be more dangerous to the purity and stability of our political institutions. The unlimited and overwhelming influence which this gives to the General Government, in the employment at the public expense of a vast number of persons in any State which they please, is another objection to this system. This influence, systematically managed for such a purpose, may be carried so far, as, in no distant time, substantially to annihilate the State. Governments, and lead to a practical consolidation of all power in the Government of the Union. The State Governments. are, we believe, in our system, the great bulwark of liberty; when they are shorn of their honors, and crippled in their authority, and the mass of political power is absorbed in the great Central Government, the forms of liberty may remain, but the substance will be gone. It cannot have escaped general observation, that hitherto in the administration of the |