Institutes of Metaphysic: The Theory of Knowing the Mind

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W. Blackwood and sons, 1854 - 530 páginas

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Anticipations of Prop I by the philosophers of Germany
19
Illustration from logic
21
How ill the necessary truths have fared in Germany and in our
23
What necessary truth
27
A remedial system uniting truth and reason not impossible
33
Another difficulty obviated
42
This system also adverse to psychologyand why
43
The inconsistency of philosophers inextricable
46
Advantages of this method
49
This consideration necessitates a new section of philosophy called
59
Their laws of thought always turn out at best to be mere laws of ima
61
Continuation of these remarks
65
PROPOSITION VI
70
86
71
PROPOSITION I
75
12
85
PROPOSITION II
93
It is false because counterproposition I is false
99
The unit of cognition explained How it is determined
106
PROPOSITION IV
117
Its criterion is the law of contradiction Law explained
135
PROPOSITION V
140
Psychological conception of idealism
148
THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICULAR IN COGNITION
152
25
179
Nominalism is annihilated by Proposition VI
182
29
185
PROPOSITION VII
191
Another circumstance which may have caused the neglect of this propo
201
The second clause of proposition has had a standing in philosophy from
208
illustra
215
PROPOSITION IX
235
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 1 Purport of this proposition in relation to Proposition I
236
Objection obviated 4 Another objection obviated
238
David Hume outgoes this proposition 6 What this proposition contends for 7 The mind must always know itself in but not as some determinate condi...
240
Ninth Counterproposition
241
Its twofold error Page 230 231 232 233 235 ib 236 ib ib 237 238
242
History of word essence
243
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS 1 Comment on data of proof of this proposition 2 Tenth Counterproposition 3 The Leibnitzian restriction...
244
Comment on first misconception
267
Comment on second misconception
268
Comment on third misconception
269
Key to the Greek philosophy
271
Return to counterproposition It is founded on a confusion of the dis tinction between sense and intellect
273
The Lockian and the Kantian psychology in limiting the counterpropo sition effect no subversion of sensualism
274
Kants doctrine impotent against sensualism
276
The statement in par 4 and the charge in par 7 are borne out by the foregoing remarks
278
Kant sometimes nearly right He errs through a neglect of necessary truth
279
The true compromise between Sense and Intellect
280
PROPOSITION XI
283
DEMONSTRATION ib OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS
284
Why this proposition is introduced ib 2 Distinction between knowing and thinking
285
The truth and the error of representationism
292
PROPOSITION XII
293
Why this proposition is introduced
294
On what condition matter per se might be thought of
295
In attempting to think it we must leave out an element essential to its cognition and therefore it cannot be thought of
296
Illustration
297
Self must be represented just as much as it must be presented ib 7 Twelfth Counterproposition
298
PROPOSITION XV
317
PROPOSITION XVI
325
PROPOSITION XVII
328
Secondly It places before us the mere phenomenal
336
PROPOSITION IL
362
PROPOSITION XXIL
376
How these remarks qualify the doctrine of the absolute given in Pro
384
The main result of the epistemology
391
PROPOSITION I
397
PROPOSITION III
404
DEMONSTRATION
409
PROPOSITION VI
416
A to www pube if we can be ignorant of matter per
418
The advantage of discriminating the necessary from the contingent laws
432
PROPOSITION VII
440
PROPOSITION I
443
33
496
45
515
48

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Página 93 - The object of knowledge, whatever it may be, is always something more than is naturally or usually regarded as the object. It always is, and must be, the object with the addition of one's self, — object plus subject ; thing, or thought, mecum. Self is an integral and essential part of every object of cognition ' — a various wording of the general doctrine.
Página 404 - Therefore, we can be ignorant only of what can possibly be known ; in other words, there can be an ignorance only of that of which there can be a knowledge.
Página 510 - All absolute existences are contingent except "one; in other words, there is One, but only " one, Absolute Existence which is strictly " necessary ; and that existence is a supreme " and infinite and everlasting Mind in synthesis
Página 91 - Hegel, — but who has ever yet uttered one intelligible word about Hegel ? Not any of his countrymen, — not any foreigner, — seldom even himself. With peaks, here and there, more lucent than the sun, bis intervals are filled with a sea of darkness, unnavigable by the aid of any compass, and an atmosphere, or rather vacuum, in which no human intellect can breathe.
Página 2 - Of these obligations, the latter is the more stringent : it is more proper that philosophy should be reasoned, than that it should be true ; because while truth may perhaps be attainable by man, to reason is certainly his province, and within his power.
Página 26 - Affirm, nothing except what is enforced by reason as a necessary truth — that is, as a truth the supposed reversal of which would involve a contradiction ; and deny nothing, unless its affirmation involves a contradiction — that is, contradicts some necessary truth or law of reason.
Página 28 - From this single proposition the whole system is deduced in a series of demonstrations, each of which professes to be as strict as any demonstration in Euclid, while the whole of them taken together constitute one great demonstration. If this rigorous necessity is not their character to the very letter, — if there is a single weak point in the system, — if there be any one...
Página 510 - Neither the existence nor the non-existence of things is "conceivable out of relation to our intelligence, and therefore " the highest and most binding law of all reason is, that under no " circumstances can a supreme mind be conceived as abstracted
Página 80 - I' is the object of intel" lect alone. We are never objects of sense to ourselves. A man "can see and touch his body, but he cannot see and touch "himself. When the cognizance of self is laid down as the " condition of all knowledge, this of course does not mean that " certain objects of sense (external things, to wit) are apprehended " through certain other objects of sense (our own bodies, namely), " for such a statement would be altogether futile.
Página 165 - To this day, all philosophic truth is Plato rightly divined; all philosophic error is Plato misunderstood.

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