the processes of transformation that were the subjectmatter of the last chapter. This is the order demanded by pedagogical considerations, though it is not the genetic order; for all the general truths that are inferred from in deduction are the products of processes chiefly inductive.

58. ORGANIZED EXPERIENCE AND DEDUCTION.The conception of induction given above discloses its function in organizing human experience. It is necessary to have this preliminary understanding of its place in the attainment of knowledge, though the study of its processes in detail will be deferred for later treatment. By it our piecemeal mental images are united into concepts which pick out the important common phases of experience and express them in the form of widely general truths. As personal and racial experience accumulates and is handed on from moment to moment of our individual lives by memory, and from generation to generation of the racial life by spoken and written record, these truths of experience become organized into laws and principles to which is ascribed universal validity. This character of supposed universality enables the mind to extend them beyond the past, which has bequeathed them to us, to the indefinite and unborn future.

This extension of organized experience to the future can take place, however, only by an act of mental mediation. The general truth which experience has provided is applicable beyond the past only when the mind is able to identify certain elements in the instance before its attention with those found in the experiences from which the general truth has developed. It is the work

of deduction to do this identifying, or, should the identification be impossible, to declare that fact in a negative judgment. Induction has gathered up the truth embodied in the generalization, moving slowly and creepingly from fact to fact. The act of identifying a hitherto unexamined instance as essentially a repetition of former experience, or of denying this connection, is performed by deduction. From another stand-point we may view deduction as a process of interpreting a present fact by bringing forward an organized form of past experience which has characteristics in common with the new fact and hence is explanatory of it. This last statement views deduction as an elaborate form of apperception, and regards the deductive syllogism as a formal instrument for establishing the validity of the apperceptive process. A practical illustration will establish this point of view. Suppose that an analysis is made of the argument that all voluntary acts are with a view to promoting personal satisfaction, that Mr. B's gift of $200,000 to promote the education of the negroes in the South was a voluntary act, and that hence Mr. B gave the fund with a view to increase his personal satisfaction. Putting this argument into conventional syllogistic form, we have:

All voluntary acts aim to promote personal satisfaction; Mr. B's gift for negro education is a voluntary act; Therefore, Mr. B's gift for negro education aims to promote his personal satisfaction.

In this instance our first proposition embodies a sweeping generalization which claims the warrant of universal experience. It is a product of inductive activi

ties reaching back into the indefinite past. Whether it be true or not is a question of the nature and teachings of a given phase of experience. To test it, resort must be had to the data of experience themselves. But admitting it for the sake of the illustration, the next act of mind, illustrated in the second proposition, is to identify (or deny the identity of) Mr. B's act of giving a gift for negro education with the class of acts known as voluntary. The moment the identification is made the conclusion follows.

It is often said that induction is going from the particular (or less general) to the (more) general, while deduction is passing from the general to the less general or particular. This is true in a sense. There is no doubt that the principle is more general in character than any one item of experience out of which it has grown. But it must be remembered that the items of experience that are the basis of a generalization lose their identity in the mental process of generalizing from them. An oak grows from an acorn, but the acorn from which a particular oak has grown cannot be placed beside it to compare with it. The mental function of generalizing or reasoning inductively is like the evolution wrought by organic growth. In the same way there is a certain error involved in saying that deduction is the process of thinking from the more to the less general. For the fact is, the more general, i. e., the concept, rule, or principle, is present in the thought embodied in the conclusion no less than in the thought with which we begin. Deduction is rather a process of interpretation by which identity of nature is recognized as obtaining between an isolated item of present experience and the large sum-total of experience.

Thus it is apparent that induction prepares the way for deduction. There are no general truths until experience is fairly organized. And as soon as this organization by induction has taken place in any field of knowledge, we are supplied thereby with premises for deductive reasoning.

59. POSTULATES UPON WHICH DEDUCTION IS BASED. -Deduction starts with certain axiomatic truths that are closely akin to those admitted in geometry. The most important of these are grouped together under the name of the Three Primary Laws of Thought. They are: (1) The Law of Identity: Whatever is, is.

(2) The Law of Contradiction: Nothing can both be and not be.

(3) The Law of Excluded Middle: Everything must

Contradiction: A is not both A and not-A.

Excluded Middle: A is either A or not-A.

The Law of Identity means that the essential character of anything in regard to which a judgment is made remains or abides in spite of minor changes. It does not preclude change. It merely asserts that a core of self-identity holds together the real essence or nature of the thing amid its changes. Identity is found in one and the same thing, which remains recognizable as the same amid minor changes, as when we recognize a person as the same through the changes from infancy to old age. It is also to be detected in the essential nature of the individuals constituting a class. The individuals exhibit their sameness even though it is obscured and overlaid by the differences which divide them into sub-groups and finally into individuals.

Thus in each individual example of the class horse we find a certain group of unvarying characteristics that constitute what we might call the "horseness" of horses. The first abstract formula for the law of identity is rather better adapted to exhibit the self-identity belonging to one and the same thing, passing through the changes incident to its evolution; while the second formula better expresses the identical attributes which bind together the individuals of a class.

The Law of Contradiction is the complementary of the law of identity. It places a limitation upon the latter. It virtually tells us that when change has exceeded a certain bound the changing thing ceases to be self-identical, and must thenceforth be regarded as not the same. Identity ceases at the point where one thing passes over into another. Two individuals do not belong to the same class in case the bond of likeness is too slender to overcome the difference. And when a thing can no longer show identity, it really becomes another thing. Let A change until it is no longer A, and it forthwith is not-A. It cannot be both at once. A body cannot be alive and not-alive at the same instant of time. As soon as the change takes place from one state to its contradictory state, our judgments respecting the matter in question must be entirely cast aside and replaced by others conforming to its new nature. This is but another way of recognizing that contradictory attributes cannot be applied to one and the same subject-matter in the same instant of its being. A man may be alive to-day and not-alive to-morrow, courteous in one breath and discourteous in the next, but we cannot think him