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NOTES AND ANECDOTES, Political and Miscellaneous-from 1798 to 1830-Drawn from the Portfolio of an Officer of the Empire; and translated in Paris, from the French, for the Messenger.

THE HUNDRED DAYS.

The most extraordinary event in our history, the return from the island of Elba, is already 20 years removed; perhaps the moment has arrived for speaking the truth; in any event it can injure no one. Napoleon is no more, and the glory attached to his name is great enough, to allow the impartial judgment of an epoch in his life, without injury to his immense renown. His lieutenants have, for the most part, descended to the tomb; and the few who are still alive, ought ardently to desire, that a light thrown on facts hitherto viewed through the medium of passion, might dissipate those accusations of ignorance and treason, which have been published as a means of concealing the faults of others.

Here 1 must explain myself. I am about to speak of military and political events; I have been in service, but I have not attained those exalted positions from which one is allowed to observe and to appreciate facts. I might perhaps, justly be denied the experience necessary to qualify me to pronounce with a mature and certain judgment. But it must have been observed from the commencement of this work, that I alone do not speak-that I do not put forth my isolated opinious. Accident has placed me near a great number of distinguished men; being anxious to acquire information, I have been a witness to many things, have heard and have read much. I have sought after truth through the best sources, and I think I have secured its possession. Being a young officer at the period of the battle of Waterloo, I judged of that fearful disaster, with the ideas peculiar to my age, and felt the impressions which all my comrades partook. I also cried treason-against whom? I did not know; but it was absolutely impossible that we were not betrayed, for with the Emperor who could conquer us? Besides, a defeat weighs as heavily on the heart of the General, as on that of the lowest soldier, that we dared not avow it, without seeking out some extraordinary cause, some excuse. Af terwards, and with a few more years added to my age, I read everything that was written on the hundred days and the battle of Waterloo. My sincere conviction at this moment, is, that it would have required a miracle to have prevented the actual occurrence. Faults were committed by everybody. The Emperor, the Generals (with some few glorious exceptions), the army, were no longer the Emperor, the Generals, the army of the fine campaigns of the republic and the empire; and, in conscience, could it have been otherwise? All the apologies published at St. Helena and elsewhere, when I read them over at this day, only seem to me to prove, that we would have gained the battle of Waterloo if we had not lost it.

In my anxiety to inform myself correctly, I have applied to every source of information-I have addressed myself to men placed in the best situations, for ascertaining and appreciating the facts. A precious manuscript has been communicated to me, written in 1818, as a refutatian of General Gourgaud's history of the

campaign of 1815-it has never been published; the Emperor was still alive, and in misfortune. The author, a general officer, commanding a corps of the army in this campaign, desired to remain faithful to the end, to the man whom he had served: he sacrificed everything to him, even to the publication of a truth, in which his military reputation, and that of many other Generals were interested.*

This manuscript, so far as I am concerned, has not been a revelation, but the confirmation of a former opinion; it was only the opinion I had instinctively formed, supported by facts, theoretical principles, and exact calculations. During the hundred days there was nothing superhuman, nothing supernatural, but the journey from Elba to Paris. Everything which followed that event re-entered the condition of humanity. It is man with his passions, his weakness, his limited faculties; and the disaster of Waterloo was but the inevitable result of a struggle too unequal, and of faults which cannot be denied without refusing to listen to

evidence.

The author will not permit me to copy the MSS. now under my eyes. He wrote under the influence of recent grief. The picture of the misfortunes of his country, the presence of foreigners, dictated bitter expressions, which he would at this day efface; but I shall borrow from him the principal features of the examination to which I am proceeding. I do not pretend to present a complete recital of the military events of 1815, but a summary of the most important facts of that short and deplorable campaign.

In the first place, it must be confessed that the miraculous return from Elba was a misfortune both for the Emperor and for France; for the Emperor, inasmuch as it changed his supportable exile to a frightful transportation; for France, in that it cost it an army and treasures, and brought about a second invasion and a prolonged occupation. The Bourbons had proved in 1814, that they had learnt nothing, and had forgotten nothing: the return from Elba made them confess a few faults, but even that event could not force them to learn or to forget. The restoration carried in itself an original vice, a principle of destruction. It was condemned to perish :-the return from the island of Elba prolonged its existence a few years.

The first fault that the Emperor committed, was to arrest his progress at Paris, on the 20th of March. 1 copy the manuscript.

"The details given, by General Gourgaud, in his history of the campaign of 1815, published at St. He lena, on the situation of the armies of the coalition at the moment that Napoleon, with an inconceivable boldness and unexampled good fortune, passed, as he himself said, from steeple to steeple to Paris, will suffice to convince us that the first fault which he committed was to arrest himself at the Tuileries, instead of continuing his march to the Rhine. It is probable that he would have arrived there as easily as at Paris; and in such enterprises it is always necessary to profit by the astonishment and stupor of the enemy. Above all, he should not have suffered the enthusiasm with which such miraculous success had inspired his partizans, to grow cold. Paris, for him, was not on the Seine-it was on the Rhine.

*See note at end of this volume.

"The moment that he paused, that he began to cal- | sabre-victory, was doubtful; without this despotism, it culate his means, he should have considered himself was impossible. Time and means were wanting for a lost; for it cannot be thought that he seriously flattered regular war; it was necessary to undertake an irregular himself with being able to impose on the allies. His war-a war without money and without magazines—a feigned moderation, and his pacific declarations, only war like the first campaign of Italy; and in desperate served to betray his weakness, and perhaps to cool the circumstances, these are sometimes successful. public enthusiasm. Undoubtedly Napoleon found it necessary to reorganize his army, and to create means, but he might have done everything while marching forward; and the easy conquest of the Rhine would have furnished him an immense increase of resources, of which he would at the same time have deprived his enemies."

The apologists of the Emperor have said, as an excuse for his not having marched immediately to the Rhine, that he entertained the hope of peace; and that public opinion would have disapproved his course if he had acted before he had exhausted all means of conciliation. The Emperor never believed in the continuance of peace; he might have desired it, but he could not have expected it but as the consequence of a victory. The true secret of all this is, that Napoleon was no longer General Bonaparte. One cannot expend with impunity, in 20 years, the energy and activity that would have sufficed for ten first rate men. Everything wears out at last, and there are bounds to the human faculties.

The second plan was, to fortify the frontiers, to act on the defensive, to await the attack, to watch a favorable moment, or a fault of the enemy, and to profit by them. But such a course did not suit the character of Napoleon. The conduct and the delays of a defensive war were not adapted to his temperament; and it must be confessed that this sort of warfare is but little in accord with our military spirit. This plan was more in harmony than the two others, with the new system which the Emperor had permitted to introduce itself in France; but this new system was supremely disagreea

The Bourbons had, during the few months of their first sojourn in France, created some interests connected with themselves. The representatives of royalist opinions, weak and scattered, before 1814, were united and strengthened. They formed in 1815, with the representatives of the new interests, a mass of formidable adversaries. On the other side, the friends of liberty, fearing the return of the imperial despotism, only offered their support in exchange for strong guaranties. Napoleon, with only his own partizans, thus found himself thrown between two opinions-one his avowed enemy, and the other armed against him with all its distrust. It was necessary that despotism should re-appear powerful, in order to restrain these two parties. The Emperor could do nothing but by men of action, by the men who had brought him from the gulf of Juan to Paris. It was necessary that he should reign as he had reigned; he required that fascination of glory, by means of which, he had for a long time caused every-ble to him. The sounds which echoed from the tribune thing, even liberty, to be forgotten. In the inevitable struggle which was then coming on between a divided and exhausted nation, and all Europe combined against her, a prompt and decisive march might have electrified men's spirits, and have produced the most brilliant and unexpected results. In a word, there was wanting one of those miracles of the campaign of Italy; and such miracles never spring from an acte additionel, or a champ de mai. To engage in a struggle of internal politics at Paris, without being able to deceive any one, was only to produce new enemies; and the Emperor had already enough whom there was a much more urgent necessity for combatting.

In the critical situation in which he found himself after his triumph of the 20th of March, Napoleon had to choose between three plans. I have mentioned the first; it was probably the best-not in June, but the 21st of March. It had the immense advantage of leav ing everything in the interior undecided. The return from the island of Elba had inflamed men's imaginations. France should have been left under the empire of this first impression, and the national patriotism should not have been suffered to evaporate in the vain debates of the tribune. In Rome, during periods of public danger, a dictator was appointed, and the senate and the tribunes of the people were silent before this supreme officer. The Emperor was a dictator, already nominated. There was but one party on which he could confidently reckon; this party neither asked for guaranties nor liberty, but war and battles-this party could alone serve him; the others made demands of him, but could give him nothing. To sum up the matter, with what has been called the despotism of the

wounded his ears. Already he regretted the concessions which he had been condemned to make; it was despotism which he hoped to reseize when he commenced hostilities. The acclamations of victory, had it remained faithful to the imperial standard, would have soon controlled and silenced the importunate voices of the tribune.

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The third plan, that which the Emperor adopted, was identically the same with the first, but with the enthusiasm of the people cooled, and three great months lost these three months were an age. During these three months the coalition had not remained inactive, and an Anglo-Prussian army of two hundred and twenty thousand men, the avant-garde of six hundred thousand Austrians and Russians, already menaced our frontier. We had a hundred and fifteen thousand men to oppose to them.

If any doubts could remain about the immense advantage the Emperor would have derived from commencing the war the morning after his arrival at Paris, the first results of the contest, so tardily commenced, would suffice to remove them. If Napoleon, profiting by the first fault that was committed, that of a concentration too near the extreme frontier, was enabled to surprise the enemy already on its guard, and obtain the first advantage, what might he not have hoped from his troops, suddenly turned loose upon a dispersed enemy, without any plans for the campaign, and deprived of its means of action! On the 15th of June, when two hundred and twenty thousand men were already nearly united, the Emperor desired to prevent a greater assemblage of his enemies: his plan was to surprise his adversaries, and to beat them in detail.

No plan could be wiser or better combined; but Napo- | 1815, there was any possibility of beating the enemy, leon should have commenced two months earlier; he of making them suffer those checks which bring about would not then have found before him a force double his great results, it was undoubtedly on the day of the 16th, and particularly at the left wing of the army.

own.

A great fault then was committed at this period-it was entirely the Emperor's. In pursuing the examination of facts, it will be easy to perceive the fatal influence of this error on subsequent events.

On the 15th of June the armies of the enemy might still have been surprised. They were so in fact, but the corps of which they were composed, were already near enough to each other to prevent this surprise from being fatal. The plan of the campaign was then, as it should have been, to operate the disjunction of the English and Prussian armies, so as to be able to act separately against the one and the other.

The details of the movements and engagements of the 15th, on the passage of the Sambre, have nothing striking. The Prussians, who were first encountered by the French columns, gave way, and retreated before them. That was a success, but a success of little importance. In the recitals that have been made of this short and deplorable campaign, it is at this point that the intention is first disclosed of representing the conduct of Marshal Ney, as the principal cause of the reverses of Napoleon. He is reproached for not having occupied the position of Quatre-Bras. The accusasion against the unfortunate Marshal has something plausible in it. Ney commanded the left of the army: the English were opposed to him-and the position of Quatre-Bras was really the point of junction between the English and Prussian armies.

In fact, it is probable that the position of Quatre-Bras might have been easily carried on the morning, and even as late as two or three o'clock in the afternoon, as it was but feebly occupied until that hour, and thus the English army might have been separated from the Prussians, and, perhaps its divisions might have been beaten one after the other, as they arrived on the field of battle from different directions. Afterwards this became extremely difficult. The enemy had discovered the importance of this position, and had strengthened it by forces sufficient to render all chance of a successful attack nearly impossible; and yet the failure of a desperate attack on this point would not have been fatal. | Marshal Ney had not called his troops to his aid with sufficient promptness; and when they had successively rejoined him, the enemy had already assembled the greatest part of its own. It was then easily enabled to resist the feeble attacks of Prince Jérôme, who was at the wood of Bouffé, while the right wing, though commanded by an officer whose ardor and intelligence on the field of battle were not less brilliant than his eloquence at the tribune (General Foy), itself made no progress.

At last, stimulated by the reiterated orders of Napoleon, the Marshal felt, but a little too late, all the importance of the position, and the error he had committed, in not carrying it in time. He then made the greatest efforts to succeed, but it was in vain. The divisions of Prince Jérôme and of General Foy were actively engaged without any result, when Colonel Forbin Janson, an ordnance officer of the Emperor, carried the Marshal the particular orders of Napoleon, accompanied by these words: "Marshal, the safety of France is in your hands.” In despair, at not being able

Marshal Ney, I do not fear to say so, was beneath himself in the campaign of 1815. His adieux and his oaths to Louis XVIII, his affair of Lons-le-Saulnier, his return to Napoleon, whose abdication he had urged in 1814-all these recollections overpowered him. Ney had not the heart of a traitor; it was in good faith that he promised Louis XVIII to fight Napoleon. After-to possess himself of this position, at seeing the forces wards he found himself too weak to resist the appeal of him to whom he owed his fortune, under whose eyes he had served so gloriously, and all of whose labors he had partaken. That judges could be found to condemn Marshal Ney, guilty, as he undoubtedly was, but protected by the capitulation of Paris, is a stain upon the peerage. It is an infamous stain upon the memory of Louis XVIII, to have shed the blood of a man, who had poured out so much for France.

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of the enemy increase every moment, and the efforts of his infantry continue powerless, the Marshal summoned the lieutenant-general, commanding the Cuirassiers, and repeating the words of the Emperor, said to him-" My dear General, the safety of France is depend ant upon the result; an extraordinary effort is required. Take your cavalry—throw yourself in the midst of the English army-crush it, and pass over its prostrate bodies." It was the hottest moment of the day: it was beThe conduct of Ney at Lons-le-Saulnier had been tween six and seven in the afternoon. Such an order, openly condemned by his ancient comrades. His pre-like that of the Emperor's, was easier to give than to sence at the army had been observed with pain. He felt all the difficulty of his situation; and this man, whose coup d'œil had before been so quick and certain, whose action had been so rapid, showed himself, under these circumstances, uncertain and weak. On the 16th, the day of the battle of Ligny, the fate of the army was in his hands. His inaction compromised everything, for it was at the point which he commanded that the greatest events were to be decided.

The battle of Ligny was an unfortunate success, be- | cause it advanced nothing. The Emperor required a victory; he yielded to the vain pleasure of driving Blucher's army before him; but his purpose, which from the fault of Marshal Ney he failed to obtain, was to separate the English from the Prussian army. If, in

execute. The General represented to Marshal Ney that he had but a single brigade of Cuirassiers with him, that the greater part of his corps had remained, in compliance with the orders of the Marshal himself, two leagues in the rear, at Frasnes. In fine, that he had not force enough for such an enterprise. "No matter," replied the Marshal, “charge with what you have—crush the English army-pass over its body: the safety of France is in your hands. Proceed; you shall be followed by all the cavalry present."

In fact, he had at hand more than four thousand horses of the guard, and of the division Pitré, which were half a cannon shot off.

There was no time for deliberation at such a moment. The General darted forward, as a victim devoted to

death, at the head of six hundred Cuirassiers, and without giving them time to perceive or to calculate the greatness of the danger, he drew them desperately into this gulf of fire.

With forces so inferior to an enemy, who trust less than ourselves to chance, it was not necessary to have thus hurried a decision of the campaign; but it would seem that a fatality has in all times led us to precipitate ourselves, in gaiety of heart, into the gulf, and always to attack the English bull by the horns. It may be remarked, that from the battle of Agincourt to that of Waterloo, nearly all the victories gained over us by the English have been in battles in which they acted on the defensive. We rush headlong upon them, when in formidable positions selected before hand, which they know marvellously well how to defend. One may say that we take pains to wage precisely that sort of war upon them which suits their courage. We may cite in modern times Vimiera, Talavera, Bussago, Salamanca, and lastly, Waterloo. Whether it be the character, or the military genius of the English, or the spirit of their government, that imposes greater circumspection on their Generals, one would believe the English nation less suited for an offensive than a defensive war. In consequence of great superiority of force as at Toulouse, or of absolute necessity as at Alknaer, they decided with much difficulty to act on the offensive. It has been seen with what success they did so under the circumstances of the last case in 1799. Why then at Waterloo, were they not forced to become the aggressors?

The first regiment of the enemy which it encountered was the 69th infantry. This regiment, composed of Scotch, fired at thirty paces; but without stopping the Cuirassiers passed over the bodies of the men, utterly destroyed it, and overthrew everything in their way. Some even penetrated into the farm of Quatre-Bras, and were there killed. Lord Wellington had only time to leap on a horse, and save himself from this terrible attack. The charge of the Cuirassiers had succeeded against all probability; a large breach was made; the army of the enemy was staggered; the English legions were wavering and uncertain, awaiting what was to come next. The least support from the cavalry in reserve; the least movement on the part of the infantry engaged on the right, would have completed the success. Nothing moved. This formidable cavalry was abandoned to itself; alone, dispersed, disbandoned by the very impetuosity of its charge, it saw itself assailed by the muskets of the enemy, then recovered from their astonishment and fright; it abandoned the field of battle as it had carried it, and without being even pursued by the enemy's cavalry which had not then arrived. The General himself had his horse shot, and returned on foot from the midst of the English, and at last encoun- The day of the 16th resulted in the abandonment of tered near the point from which he had set out, a di- Fleurus, after an energetic resistance on the part of the vision which had just begun to take part in the action, Prussians. For the purpose of supporting the right orders having been given to it too late. The attacks of wing of the Prussians, the Duke of Wellington judged this division, directed against an enemy already reco- it necessary to retire during the night, leaving only a vered from its alarm, were as fruitless as they were tardy. weak rear-guard at Quatre-Bras to make this moveIn war a favorable moment cannot be neglected with ment. Marshal Ney had no knowledge of this mancuimpunity, and the numerous cavalry of the left wing vre, and, remained in his position, waiting further did not take advantage of the proper moment to pre-orders. He was drawn from the inactivity into which cipitate itself upon the enemy. The distant position of he had been plunged by the little success of the previous three brigades of the reserve of Cuirassiers, was a great evening, by the arrival of the Emperor, who moving on misfortune for the army, and for France. If they had the morning of the 17th, with his columns upon Quatrebeen in the line, and ready to profit by this happy bold- | Bras, obliged the rear-guard of Wellington to rejoin the ness, and to throw themselves in the midst of the main body of the army. enemy, perhaps in less than an hour the English army The Emperor thought he had finished with the Pruswould have been disposed off. It would have disap-sians; being ignorant, like Marshal Ney, of the movepeared under the feet of the horses and the swords of the cavalry, and this day would have secured us one of those results which decide the destinies of empires. In fact, the English army once destroyed, the Prussian army would have found itself attacked in the flank, pressed upon in front, and would have been unable to escape complete destruction; it would never have repassed the Rhine. The victory would have brought back the Belgians to our standards, as well as the inhabitants on the banks of the Rhine; and we would have made cheap work of the Russians and Austrians. This dream might have been realized during nearly the quarter of an hour; it agitated more than one head.

It cannot be concluded from these chances of success, that it was prudent to trust everything to chance, as was done in this campaign. The success that we were on the point of obtaining at Quatre-Bras would have been a miracle, and, in the disproportion between the contending armies, a miracle was necessary. But war has so many unexpected chances, that it was not impossible, that that which could alone save Napoleon might turn up; it was within an ace of doing so.

ment of the English army, he supposed that the two armies were separated. Entrusting then to Marshal Grouchy, the care of pursuing the Prussians, and of pressing them without respite, and above all of preventing them from joining the English, he proceeded with the greater part of his forces against the army of Wellington. A sort of fatality presided over the lot of Napoleon. On the right, Marshal Grouchy lost the day of the 17th, and the track of Blucher. On the left, fatigue and the want of order condemned the troops to inaction. It was only at noon that the Emperor, arriving at Quatre-Bras, set the troops of Marshal Ney in motion, for the purpose of following and firing on the retreating rear-guard of the English.

Towards three o'clock a beating rain commenced, which continued until the next morning. The army took whatever position it could during the night, not without some disorder and confusion. The AngloBelgic army, on the contrary, had effected its retreat without being disturbed, as no one was informed of the movement; and it had been established since the morning in a camp which it had prepared for itself, and

did not suffer either from the bad weather or want of charge by all the cavalry, when at so great a distance food.

from the infantry. Such a movement must either be successful or compromise everything: it had failed of success, and from that moment there was no further hope of victory. The evil destiny of France seemed to preside over all the false measures of the day. A

Too little attention is paid to the effect produced on men, especially on the evening preceding a battle, by excessive fatigue and want of food and rest. Causes of physical exhaustion operate on the moral spirit of an army, and produce discouragement and disgust. Rep-brigade of carabiniers, of a thousand horses, had been resent then to yourself, the French army, wearied by eight days of forced marches, wanting food, passing through a country covered with water, sleeping in the mud, and without protection against constant rains. You may then judge of the disadvantage under which it had to encounter fresh troops, superior in number, and on ground selected by themselves, and carefully fortified.

The Emperor, after separating from Marshal Grouchy, whom he had perhaps suffered to remain at too great a distance from him on the evening of so important a battle, had not more than 55 or 60,000 men to oppose to 90,000 English, Hollanders and Belgians.

On the 18th, towards 11 o'clock, the weather cleared off. It could then be seen that the movement effected by the English on the preceding evening, was not a retreat, but a change of position. At the moment that the Emperor was giving his orders to the Generals assembled around him, a cannon, fired from the English camp, gave the signal of combat. The engagement commenced with the left of the French army; the second corps consumed itself in fruitless efforts to carry the wood, and entrenched chateau of Hougoumont.

preserved from the fatal charge. Placed near a battery of the guard, the Major-General had received the most express orders not to make the least movement without the order of his immediate chief. This brigade of carabiniers was then in the plain. Marshal Ney observed it, ran to it, showed great indignation at its inaction, and ordered it to precipitate itself on seven or eight thousand English, placed en echelon on the inclination of a hill, and flanked by numerous batteries of artillery. The carabiniers were compelled to obey. Whether from want of strength, or unskilfulness, their charge was entirely unsuccessful; half of the brigade was in an instant prostrate on the ground. When, as will be seen, the fate of the battle was afterwards determined by the charge of the English guards, one may comprehend the service this brigade of carabiniers might have rendered, had it remained untouched.

Towards three o'clock the heads of the columns of General Bulow were perceived, and Napoleon had to detach 10,000 men to face this attack.

It has been asserted that the appearance of the heads of the columns of the Prussian corps of Bulow caused a fatal error, and that these troops of the enemy were In the centre of the army a corps, manœuvering with mistaken for the avant-garde of the body of Marshal a sort of hesitation, was charged by the English cavalry, Grouchy's army, to which numerous officers of ordnance and had one of its divisions compromised. This move-had been despatched. I do not know whether such an ment of the English cavalry necessarily brought on the engagement of our own, and unfortunately involved the greatest part of the French cavalry in the action at a very unlucky moment.

error was committed, but there is little probability that it was. The indecision of Marshal Grouchy, under these circumstances, was undoubtedly a great misfortune; but it is doubtful whether the Marshal, had he even acted with decision, could have presented himself in line. The arrival of Bulow's corps had a fatal influence on the result of the battle, but only in conse

the route of Charleroi would have been closed against us.

This charge was neither skilfully nor successfully executed. The masses of cavalry did not advance in that compact and imposing order which inspires confidence, and gives promise of success. Instead of reserv-quence of the necessity which it produced, of withdrawing the great effort for the moment of meeting the ing ten thousand men from the main body of the army, enemy, the cavalry of General Milhaud was let loose already so much weakened. The attack of the Prusfirst, then that of the Imperial Guard, and lastly, the sians on this point was not only restrained, but repulsed right of the reserve cavalry of the 4th corps, which was with a vigor above all praise, by Count Lobau and imprudently involved by its General, in consequence of General Duhesme. This was, perhaps, the finest feat his not receiving the orders of his commander-in-chief; of arms of the day; it was a service of the highest and all arrived in disorder, pellmell, and out of breath, importance, for had the movement of Bulow been sucon the rideau occupied by the line of English artillery.cessful, the French army would have been divided, and The pieces were abandoned, but the horses might have been driven away. This, which it must be confessed, The old guard still remained untouched; the day was the only success during the day, is, perhaps, what drew to a close. The fighting grew more and more was called a victory. This pretended success had, it is feeble, but even while yielding, the field was not detrue, great effect on the distant positions of the enemy, serted by flight, and the corps were not seriously where movements for a retreat were commenced; but injured. If success was afterwards impossible, a retreat in the rear of the artillery there was a double line of might at least have been effected during the night infantry formed in a square. Our cavalry had to behind the Sambre, thus securing the only reserve remain several hours in this cruel position, unable to which remained. The Emperor did not, however, retire for fear of drawing the army after it, or to charge judge this expedient; the old guard was suffered to again for want of room. Without infantry and without take part in the engagement. This was a decisive artillery to support it, in presence of the enemy's squares stroke-it might save or lose everything; but, if it re(which, however, reserved their fire), but exposed to paired nothing, the army would be left without resource. a cloud of marksmen, whose every fire counted-thus The guard, with all its courage, and all its admirable receiving death without being able to return it. devotion, could not cut through the masses of English, Napoleon quickly recognized the imprudence of a and had soon to fall back before an impetuous charge

VOL. IV-5

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