SECT. III. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE REMOVAL OF PAIN AND POSITIVE PLEASURE. WE fhall carry this propofition yet a step farther. We shall venture to propofe, that pain and pleasure are not only not neceffarily dependent for their existence on their mutual diminution or removal, but that, in reality, the diminution or ceafing of pleasure does not operate like positive pain; and that the removal or diminution of pain, in its effect, has very little resemblance to pofitive pleasure * The former of these propofitions will, I believe, be much more readily allowed than the latter; because it is very evident that pleasure, when it has run its career, fets us down very nearly where it found us. Pleasure of every kind quickly fatisfies; and when it is over, we relapse into indifference, or rather we fall into a foft tranquillity, which is tinged with the agreeable colour of the former fenfation. I own it is not at first view fo apparent, that the removal of a great pain does not resemble pofitive pleasure; but let us recollect in what state we have found our minds upon escaping fome imminent danger, or on being released from the feverity of fome cruel pain. We have on fuch occafions found, if I am not much mistaken, the temper of our minds in a tenor very remote from that which attends the prefence of pofitive pleasure; we have found them in a state of much fobriety, impreffed with a fenfe of awe, in a * Mr. Locke [Effay on Human Understanding, 1. ii. c. 20. fect. 16.] thinks that the removal or leffening of a pain is confidered and operates as a pleasure, and the lofs or diminishing of pleasure as a pain. It is this opinion which we confider here. fort fort of tranquillity fhadowed with horror. The fashion of the countenance and the gefture of the body on fuch occafions is fo correspondent to this state of mind, that any perfon, a ftranger to the cause of the appearance, would rather judge us under fome confternation, than in the enjoyment. of any thing like positive pleasure. Ως δ' όταν ανδρ' αλη πυκίνη λαβή, ος ενι παίξῃ Ανδρος ες αφνεις, θαμβος δ' εχει εισοροωνίας. Iliad. 24. As when a wretch, who, confcious of his crime, Just gains fome frontier, breathlefs, pale, amaz'd; This ftriking appearance of the man whom Homer fupposes to have just escaped an imminent danger, the sort of mixt paffion of terror and furprize, with which he affects the spectators, paints very strongly the manner in which we find ourselves affected upon occafions any way fimilar. For when we have fuffered from any violent emotion, the mind naturally continues in fomething like the fame condition, after the cause which firft produced it has ceased to operate. The toffing of the sea remains after the storm; and when this remain of horror has entirely fubfided, all the paffion, which the accident raised, fubfides along with it; and the mind returns to its usual state of indifference. In short, pleasure (I mean any thing either in the inward sensation, or in the outward appearance, like pleasure from a pofitive caufe) has never, I imagine, its origin from the removal of pain or danger. 4 SECT. SECT. IV. OF DELIGHT AND PLEASURE AS OPPOSED TO BUT EACH OTHER. T fhall we therefore fay, that the removal of pain or its diminution is always fimply painful? or affirm that the ceffation or the leffening of pleasure is always attended itself with a pleasure? By no means. What I advance is no more than this; first, that there are pleafures and pains of a pofitive and independent nature; and fecondly, that the feeling which results from the ceafing or diminution of pain does not bear a fufficient refemblance to pofitive pleasure, to have it confidered as of the fame nature, or to entitle it to be known by the fame name; and thirdly, that upon the fame principle the removal or qualification of pleasure has no resemblance to pofitive pain. It is certain that the former feeling (the removal or moderation of pain) has something in it far from diftreffing or difagreeable in its nature. This feeling, in many cafes fo agreeable, but in all fo different from positive pleafure, has no name which I know; but that hinders not its being a very real one, and very different from all others. It is most certain, that every fpecies of fatisfaction or pleasure, how different foever in its manner of affecting, is of a positive nature in the mind of him who feels it. The affection is undoubtedly pofitive; but the caufe may be, as in this cafe it certainly is, a fort of Privation. And it is very reasonable that we should diftinguish by fome term two things so diftinct in nature, as a pleasure that is fuch fimply, and without any relation, from that pleasure which cannot exist without a relation, and that too a relation to pain. Very extraordinary it would be, if these affections, fo diftinguishable in their causes, causes, fo different in their effects, fhould be confounded with each other, because vulgar use has ranged them under the fame general title. Whenever I have occasion to speak of this fpecies of relative pleasure, I call it Delight; and I fhall take the best care I can, to use that word in no other fenfe. I am fatisfied the word is not commonly used in this appropriated fignification; but I thought it better to take up a word already known, and to limit its fignification, than to introduce a new one, which would not perhaps incorporate fo well with the language. I should never have presumed the leaft alteration in our words, if the nature of the language, framed for the purposes of business rather than those of philofophy, and the nature of my subject, that leads me out of the common track of difcourfe, did not in a manner neceffitate me to it. I fhall make use of this liberty with all poffible caution. As I make ufe of the word Delight to exprefs the fenfation which accompanies the removal of pain or danger; so when I speak of positive pleasure, I shall for the most part call it fimply Pleasure. SECT. V. JOY AND GRIEF. T must be observed, that the ceffation of pleasure affects the mind three ways. If it fimply ceases, after having continued a proper time, the effect is indifference; if it be abruptly broken off, there enfues an uneafy fenfe called difappointment; if the object be so totally loft that there is no chance of enjoying it again, a paffion arises in the mind, which is called grief. Now, there is none of thefe, not even grief, which is the most violent, that I think has any refemblance to positive pain. The perfon who grieves, fuffers his paffion paffion to grow upon him; he indulges it, he loves it: but this never happens in the case of actual pain, which no man ever willingly endured for any confiderable time. That grief should be willingly endured, though far from a simply pleafing fenfation, is not fo difficult to be understood. It is the nature of grief to keep its object perpetually in its eye, to present it in its most pleasurable views, to repeat all the circumstances that attend it, even to the last minuteness; to go back to every particular enjoyment, to dwell upon each, and to find a thousand new perfections in all, that were not fufficiently understood before; in grief, the pleasure is ftill uppermoft; and the affliction we fuffer has no refemblance to abfolute pain, which is always odious, and which we endeavour to shake off as foon as poffible. The Odyssey of Homer, which abounds with fo many natural and affecting images, has none more striking than those which Menelaus raifes of the calamitous fate of his friends, and his own manner of feeling it. He owns, indeed, that he often gives himself fome intermiffion from fuch melancholy reflections; but he obferves, too, that, melancholy as they are, they give him pleasure. Αλλ εμπης πανίας μεν οδυρόμενος και αχευων, Still in fhort intervals of pleafing woe, HOм. Od. iv. VOL. I. On |