349. The leading principle of all our active powers is Reason, and it comprehends both a regard to what is right and honorable, and a regard to our happiness upon the whole. All the principles of action-whether they be notions of duty, rectitude, or moral obligation-when rightly understood, lead to the same course of life; they are fountains whose streams unite and run in the same channel.

Obs. When we say a man ought to do such a thing, the ought, which expresses the moral obligation, has a respect, on the one hand, to the person who ought, and, on the other, to the action which he ought to do. Those two correlates are essential to every moral obligation; take away either, and the obligation ceases to exist.

350. The circumstances, both in the action and in the agent, necessary to constitute a moral obligation, are these :— I. With regard to the action, it must be a voluntary action, or præstation of the person obliged, and not of another.

II. The opinion of the agent in doing the action gives it its moral obligation.

Obs. With respect to the person obliged, to things only which come within the sphere of his natural power can he be under a moral obligation. As respects the agent, if he does a materially good action, without any belief of its being good, but from some other principle, it is no good action in him. And if he does it with the belief of its being ill, it is ill in him.

Corol. These qualifications of the action, and of the agent, in moral obligation, are superevident; and the agreement of all men in them, shows that all men have the same notion, and a distinct notion, of moral obligation.

V. Analysis of the Sense of Duty.

351. We are next to consider how we learn to judge and determine that this is right, and that is wrong.

Obs. The abstract notion of moral good and ill would be of no use to direct our life, if we had not the power of applying it to particu lar actions, and determining what is morally good, and what is morally ill.

352. By the external senses, we have not only the original conceptions of the various qualities of bodies, but the original judgments that this body has such a quality, that such another so by our moral faculty, we have both the original conceptions of right and wrong, of merit and demerit, in ourselves and others; and also the original judgments that this conduct is right, that is wrong; that this character has worth, that demerit.

Illus. 1. The testimony of our moral faculty, like that of the external senses, is the testimony of nature, and we have the same reason to rely upon it.

2. The truths immediately testified by the external senses, are the first principles from which we reason, with regard to the material world, and from which all our knowledge of it is deduced.

3. The truths immediately testified by our moral 'faculty, are the first principles of all moral reasoning, from which all our knowledge of our duty must be deduced.

353. Moral reasoning is all reasoning that is brought to prove that such conduct is right and deserving of moral approbation, or that it is wrong, or that it is indifferent, and, in itself, neither morally good nor ill.

Corol. 1. All that we can properly call moral judgments, are reducible to one or other of these, because all human actions, considered in a moral point of view, are either good, or bad, or indifferent.

2. Let it be understood, therefore, that in the reasoning which we call moral, the conclusion always is-That something in the conduct of moral agents is good or bad, in a greater or a less degree, or indifferent.

354. All moral reasonings rest upon one or more first principles of morals, whose truth is immediately perceived, without reasoning, by all men come to years of understanding.

Illus. This is common to every branch of human knowledge that deserves the name of science; and these first principles are the dictates of our natural faculties.

Example 1. In astronomy and in optics, the first principles are phenomena attested by the human eye; and with him who disbelieves the testimony of that little organ, the whole of those two noble fabrics of science falls to pieces like the visions of the night.

2. The principles of music all depend upon the testimony of the ear; those of natural philosophy, upon the facts attested by the senses; those of mathematics, upon the necessary relations of quantities considered abstractedly. (Art. 44. Illus.) The science of politics borrows its principles from what we know by experience of the character and conduct of man. The first principles of morals are the immediate dictates of the moral faculty.

3. He that will judge of the color of an object, must consult his eyes in a good light, when there is no medium, or contiguous object, that may give it a false tinge. In like manner, he that will judge of the first principles of morals, must consult his conscience, or moral faculty; when he is calm and dispassionate, unbiased by interest, affection, or fashion.

Corol. The sum of the reasonings that we have made, or that we might make, on this analysis of the sense of duty, is-that, by an original power of the mind, which we call conscience, or the moral faculty, we have the conception of right and wrong in human conduct, of merit and demerit, of duty and moral obligation, and our other. moral conceptions; and that, by the same faculty, we perceive some things

in human conduct to be right, and others to be wrong; that the first principles of morals are the dictates of this faculty; and that we have the same reason to rely upon those dictates, as upon the determinations of our senses, or of our other natural faculties.

VI. Of Moral Approbation and Disapprobation.

355. The judgments we form in speculative matters are dry and unaffecting ;-our moral judgments, from their nature, are necessarily accompanied with AFFECTIONS and FEELINGS, which we are now to consider.

Illus. We approve of good actions and disapprove of bad ones; and this approbation and disapprobation, when we analyze it, appears to include not only a moral judgment of the action, but some affection, favorable or unfavorable, towards the agent, and some feeling in ourselves.

356. Moral worth, even in a stranger, with whom we have not the least connection, never fails to produce some degree of esteem, mixed with good-will. The esteem which we have for a man on account of his moral worth, is different from that which is grounded upon his intellectual accomplishments, his birth, fortune, and connection with us.

Illus. Moral worth, when it is not set off by eminent abilities and external advantages, is like a diamond in the mine, which is rough and unpolished, and perhaps crusted over with some other baser material that takes away its lustre. But, when it is attended with these advantages, it is like a diamond cut and polished, and set round with pearls, in a massy crown. Its lustre then attracts every eye; and yet these things, which add so much to its appearance, add but little to its real value.

Corol. There is no judgment of the heart more clear, or more irresistible than this-That esteem and regard are really due to good conduct, and the contrary to base and unworthy conduct. Nor can we conceive a greater depravity in the heart of man, than it would be to see and acknowledge worth without feeling any respect to it; or to see and acknowledge the highest worthlessness without any degree of dislike and indignation.

357. The object of moral approbation is, then, either some disposition of the mind, or some external action.

Illus. Probity is the most approved disposition; and the external expressions of probity the most approved actions. These constitute the whole, or the most essential part of virtue. Other subjects may be admired or contemned, but these alone are the subjects of moral approbation, of esteem and love.

358. PARTIALITY, which makes us blind to the faults of our friends, and the merits of those to whom, from prejudice or passion, we are ill affected, is the foundation of our wrong

judgment with regard to the character of others, and of self-deceit with regard to our own.

359. Moral approbation or disapprobation is accompanied with agreeable or uneasy feelings, in the breast of the spectator or judge.

Illus. The benevolent affections give pleasure, the malevolent desires give pain, in one degree or another.” And when we contemplate a noble character, though but in ancient story, or even in a novel, a comedy, or a tragedy, like a beautiful object, it gives a lively and pleasant emotion to the spirits; it warms the heart, and invigorates the frame; like the beams of a meridian sun, it enlivens the face of nature, and diffuses heat, light, and joy, all around.

Example. We feel a sympathy with the noble Caractacus, and are afflicted in his distress; and Alfred the Great compels us to rejoice in his prosperity; we even catch some sparks of that celestial fire that animated the conduct of the latter; and it is impossible to accompany the former to Rome, without feeling the glow of his virtue and magnanimity.

Corol. This sympathy is the necessary effect of our judgment of the conduct of those men, and of our approbation and esteem due to that conduct; for real sympathy is always the effect of some benevolent affection, such as esteem, love, pity, or humanity.

360. Sympathy gathers strength from the social tie, and bids us claim some property in the worth of a father, or a mother, a brother, or a sister, a relation, or an acquaintance, and chiefly so in that friend whom we value above all her sex; but the highest pleasure of our soul is, when we are conscious of good conduct in ourselves.

Obs. On the other hand, the view of a vicious character, especially if that character be connected with us, like that of an ugly and deformed object, is disagreeable, and our sympathy is very painful indeed; for we blush for those faults by which we feel ourselves dis

honored.

Corol. If bad conduct, in those in whom we are interested, be uneasy and painful, it is much more so when we are conscious of it in ourselves. This uneasy feeling has a name in all languages; we call it remorse. In repentance, contrition, and remorse, self-reproach, and even indignation, are largely intermixed with the affection of sorrow.

Note. We shall here close our division of "The Intellectual Powers," recommending to the more advanced reader the study of Reid and Stewart's writings on the same subject. What we have said is sufficient in an elementary treatise.

13

BOOK III.

SUBJECTS OF COLLATERAL INQUIRY, WITH THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS.

CHAPTER I.

OF THE PRIMARY AND SECONDARY QUALITIES
OF BODIES.

361. We have observed in Chapter II. of Book II. that sensation is generally conjoined with perception; but these terms denote two separate and distinct acts of the mind, and we have no appropriate name to designate the conjunction of sensation with perception. Both are generally confounded together under one term, which comes to be more strictly appropriated either to the sensation or the perception, according as the one or the other more strongly occupies the attention of the mind.

Illus. 1. If it be asked what I mean by the smell of a rose, it is evident that, in the general acceptation of the phrase, this denotes a sensation of the mind, as appears from the epithets fragrant, agreeable, &c., which are applicable to it, and which have meaning when referred to a sentient being. (Art. 105. Illus. 1, 2, and 3.) Along, however, with this sensation of an agreeable odor, there is conjoined a perception, by which we form a certain notion of that quality in the rose, which is the cause of its odor; but this perception is totally distinct from the sensation (Art. 42 and 108.); for the perception cannot be said to be agreeable or otherwise, and it has an external object, the existence of which depends not upon the act of the mind, as doth the sensation. (See Art. 106. and Illus. Art. 110.) Yet we have no name by which to distinguish the object of this perception, unless it be that which more properly belongs to the accompanying sensation, to wit, the smell of the rose; a defect of language which is, no doubt, the source of much ambiguity.

2. Again, if it be asked, What is the effect produced by applying the hand upon any solid and compact substance? it will be answer