able sense; as a mark of ingenuousness, and a consciousness of the difficulty of attaining useful knowledge; dispositions which powerfully solicit liberal and enlightened minds to impart important aid. On the other hand, petulance, forwardness, and presumption, subject young inquirers to every disadvantage, and to many mortifications. They alarm men of superior parts and improvement, and render them averse to intimacy with persons from whom nothing is to be expected but irritation or disgust. They bring into suspicion the soundness of their understandings; so that these can hardly obtain the reputation of just judgment even when it is deserved.

440. Rule 3. Always remain satisfied with the evidence which the nature of a proposition admits; because, To decide without evidence, is weakness and absurdity-To be satisfied with no evidence, is skepticism-To demand the same kind or degree of evidence for every proposition, is unnatural and unreasonable.

Illus. 1. The propositions of science, of arts, and of business, are supported by different kinds of evidence. No candid reasoner will demand the same species of evidence for them all. He is entitled to no other than the nature of each affords. Few subjects admit that complete conviction which excludes the possibility of doubt. The far greater part present only higher or lower degrees of probability. Though, in the sciences of quantity, the mind proceeds on the firm ground of demonstration, it would be absurd to expect equal satisfaction in morals, politics, or natural history, because these sciences are incapable of such evidence.

2. Moral and political propositions are supported by evidence deduced from the human constitution, the order of nature, the happiness of individuals, and of communities, which is far from being so conclusive and direct, as to exclude hesitation, or even difference of opinion yet these propositions involve truths very important to mankind. The rewards or punishments, assigned by their own minds, by the opinion of their fellow-creatures, and by the laws of society, depend upon them.

Example. In natural history, which furnishes an account of animals, vegetables, and minerals; in geography, which supplies instruction concerning the surface of the earth, what parts are covered with land or water, where hills, valleys, capes, cities, are situated, where currents run, and particular winds blow; in civil history, which recounts the transactions, opinions, and manners of nations in former times; in the administration of justice and civil government, which applies the laws of the community to the actions of individuals, in order to protect the lives and property of the innocent, and to punish the guilty; in the relations we daily receive from foreign countries concerning the public events of nations, or the industry, customs, and sentiments of individuals;-in all these cases, we must depend upon the evidence of testimony; and if the information be not in its nature incredible, and we have no reason to question the veracity of the relater, we ought to be satisfied with that evidence.

Illus. 3. Testimony is perhaps among the least satisfactory chan. nels by which truth is conveyed to the mind. It is less satisfactory

than those of intuition and reasoning, at least in the sciences of quantity. It is also inferior to those of consciousness and sensation; but it is, notwithstanding, of high importance to the comfort, peace, and happiness of society. No inconvenience results from following it with discretion. Were it rejected, every disorder and danger would ensue. Man is made to be satisfied with it. His situation

often admits nothing more convincing.

Obs. It was chiefly to vindicate the credibility of this species of evidence, to which inquirers sometimes will not allow the influence it, deserves, that we advanced the rule under consideration; and it may not be improper to sketch the limits within which this evidence appears to be unexceptionable.

441. The first thing to be considered, then, is the nature of the relation which solicits our belief; because, if it be incredible, we need not go farther; we may reject the testimony without examination, because we are more certain that what is incredible cannot be true, than we can be certain of the truth of any testimony.

Illus. A relation is incredible two ways, either by containing an action in itself impracticable, or by containing circumstances contradictory to one another.

I. If, for instance, we were told, that an ordinary man bore a mountain on his back from Italy to France; or that there are men in the world who believe two and three make six; we would reject such relations as unworthy of the least credit, because they contain actions and opinions which contradict all our conceptions and experience of human powers and faculties.

II. If, again, a relation represent the performer of an action in different places at the same time, we refuse credit, because it involves a contradiction, and supposes the coexistence of things which we know to be impossible. But if the action be practicable, if the agent be adequate to the performance, and if the account be intelligible and consistent, the next step is to examine the nature of the testimony; and if that also be unexceptionable, the mind is prepared to believe, and it will be impatient if not permitted to be

stow assent.

442. The circumstances of inquiry relative to the credibility of the testimony, are, 1st. Whether the relater was fully informed of the nature and particulars of the action; and, 2dly. Whether he could be seduced by any temptation to misrepresent them.

Illus. 1. The article of full information may be subdivided into several other inquiries; whether the action was an object of the senses of the relater; whether he had full time to examine it, and possessed the perfect use of his faculties at the time of examination; whether he examined the same action, or similar actions, at different times, and always formed similar judgments; and, finally, whether his account is supported, at least not contradicted, by other accounts of credit.

2. With regard to the character of the relater, we have reason to

rely on his veracity, if we have no cause to doubt it; and if, at the same time, marks of sincerity, attention, or discernment appear, we cannot demand better foundation for assent. If an historian be exposed to no temptation to falsify or misrepresent, we suppose that he relates the truth; because it is much more easy to relate truth than to relate falsehood. Truth requires no anxious caution to preserve consistency, no struggle to repress the remonstrances of conscience, which even the most abandoned men cannot altogether silence. It follows the natural and consistent train of causes and effects. It presents a credibility and authority which command conviction.

3. But if, besides a general attachment to truth, we discover in an historian other symptoms of integrity, such as relating truth when it was his interest to conceal or misrepresent it; when it might hurt friends, gratify enemies, or expose himself to danger from the resentment of those whom it might offend; we have the best reason to credit his testimony; because he discovers not only great attachment to truth, but the strongest aversion to falsehood, and evinces, that the temptations which induce men of little virtue to disguise truth, and those of no virtue to suppress it, do not affect him. He is at least sincere, and his testimony must be believed, unless it can be proved that he was misinformed or had been mistaken.

4. If a relation be consistent, the only ground for charging its author with mistake or misinformation, is its contradiction of other accounts of credit, or its containing transactions of which we can explain neither the motives nor the manner. If two històrians contradict one another, which seldom happens, unless in cases of the most violent prevalence of party-spirit, the evidence of both will be destroyed, or the small portion of credit that remains will operate in favor of the more respectable author. If one author omit what is related by another, the omission may excite suspicion, but forms no direct argument against the credibility; because many circumstances, unknown to us, might occasion the oversight of which we complain.

5. Neither is the containing of transactions of which we cannot explain the motives or the manner, a good argument against the au thenticity of a narrative; because the deficiency may be chargeable on the hearer or the reader, not on the relater. Men of all ages measure the motives, opinions, and actions of others, however different from themselves in constitution, or dissimilar in situation, by their own; and we need not be told, that nothing can be more fallacious than such a standard. A remarkable passage of history may be produced to illustrate this observation.

Example. Herodotus, in travelling to collect materials for his history of Greece, received intelligence that some Phoenician seamen had embarked on the Red Sea, sailed round the south coast of Africa, and returned home by the Columns of Hercules, or the Straits of Gibraltar; in which voyage, they must have circumnavigated the Cape of Good Hope, commonly accounted one of the most brilliant discoveries of modern enterprise. The historian subjoins his own opinion; that the incident was incredible, because the voyagers reported, that in some part of their navigations, they had beheld the ecliptic, or the line of motion of the sun, situated to the north of the zenith of their course. The historian, however, judged by a

false standard; he condemned as incredible what he did not understand; because it was unknown, perhaps, in his time, that the appearance specified actually takes place, in the navigation he had related. He reprobates the account for a circumstance which is the most plausible characteristic of its authenticity; for it could hardly be supposed to have been conjectured unless it had been seen.

Conclusion. We have now offered every rule and observation, which appeared of importance to be attended to in forming our judg ments in science, arts, and business-we have unfolded the sources of those prejudices which obstruct the rectitude of our judgmentswe have inculcated patience and attention in forming them when we have full information-we have enjoined suspense of judgment when information is wanting or deficient-we have recommended, finally, satisfaction with the best evidence that can be procured, and the propriety of judging and acting on that evidence:-we know nothing more that can be done to render our judgments sound and logical, but that we carefully habituate ourselves to the practice of these rules.

REMARK.

Having thus far conducted the pupil through a popular course of INTELLECTUAL PHILOSOPHY, agreeably to the doctrines of the most respectable and most authentic authors, I take leave to offer him a word of advice previously to his entrance upon the remaining portion of the volume. Logic is neither a frivolous, an ostentatious, nor an unnecessary branch of your studies; but she pretends not to make mechanical reasoners; she pretends only to lend you her aid to find out truth, and to guide the exertions of your own faculties in the pursuit of knowledge. Her pretensions are at least commendable, and her efforts are entitled to the most patient reflection and candid examination. If, then, you will travel in the road that leads to the temple of truth, if you will employ your faculties to discriminate that celestial object when you have reached her sacred mansion, her handmaid, Logic, offers to conduct you thither: you have your choice, then, whether you shall remain a stranger to her power, and be always the companion of those whom Prejudice consigns to ignorance and insignificance; or press on with those who become her candidates, who are grateful for her favors, and who improve them for their advantage. Strive, then, my friend, to obtain the flattering distinction claimed by superior judgment, and by which you can avoid the disgrace attached to ignorance and stupidity.

443. THAT the young logician may proceed with perspicuity, we begin with examining IDEAS as existing separately, or detached from one another. Ideas, as the impressions made on the mind either by external objects, through the medium of the senses, or by the consciousness which it has of its own internal operations, have been defined in Articles 34 and 36.

Illus. 1. When an external object presents itself to any of the five senses, sight, hearing, taste, touch, smell, some picture, or notion, or conception, of it is formed in the mind; but this picture, or notion, or conception, is totally different from the object, and is called the Idea of it; whereas, the object is called the Archetype of the Idea. (Art. 38. Illus. 1, 2, 3.)

2. By sight, we receive the greatest number, and the most lively of all our Ideas; as, for example, those of all the visible objects in nature, animated and inanimated, with which we are already acquainted, or can become acquainted. By hearing, we get Ideas of natural and artificial sounds, particularly of the sounds of language, and the important information which they convey. The Ideas of the other three senses, taste, smell, touch, are not nearly so numerous, and they relate mostly to the preservation or the comfortable subsistence of the individual. By taste and smell, we are directed to those aliments which are necessary and salutary, and are diverted from those which are hurtful or destructive. By the touch, we examine the surfaces of bodies, and receive all those Ideas which that operation is qualified to suggest. All the Ideas we acquire through the medium of the external senses, are said to be derived from sensation. (Art. 41.) The only other source of Ideas is our own consciousness of the feelings and operations, which pass within our own minds, and is called Reflection. (Art. 50. and 51.)

3. You will understand what is meant by Reflection, as a source