Dr. Reid conceives ought never to be trusted; for the analogy between a balance and a man deliberating, though one of the strongest that can be found between matter and mind, is too weak to support any argument. A piece of dead, inactive matter, and an active and intelligent being, are things very unlike; and because the one would remain at rest in a certain case, it does not follow that the other would be inactive in a case somewhat similar.

Illus. The argument is no better than this, that, because a dead animal moves only as it is pushed, and, if pushed with equal force in contrary directions, must remain at rest, therefore the same thing must happen to a living animal; for surely the similitude between a dead animal and a living, is as great as between a balance and a man.

Corol. The conclusion which results from all that has been said on analogy, is, that, in our inquiries concerning the mind and its operations, we ought never to trust to reasonings drawn from some supposed similitude of body to mind; and that we ought to be very much upon our guard, that we be not imposed upon by those analogical terms and phrases by which the operations of the mind are expressed in all languages.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE PROPER MEANS OF KNOWING THE OPERATIONS OF OUR OWN MINDS.

86. SINCE we ought to pay no regard to hypotheses, and to be very suspicious of analogical reasoning, it may be asked, from what sources must the knowledge of the mind, and its faculties, be drawn? I answer, from the three following. The first is attention to the structure of language; because the language of mankind is expressive of their thoughts, and of the various operations of their minds.

Illus. 1. Those operations which are common to mankind, have various forms of speech corresponding to them in all languages. These various forms of speech are the signs of the various operations of the understanding, will, and passions; and by those signs these operations are expressed. A due attention, therefore, to the signs, may, in many cases, give considerable light to the things signified by them.

2. But languages, from their imperfections, can never be adequate to all the varieties of human thought. There may, therefore, be things really distinct in their nature, and capable of being distinguished by the human mind, which are not distinguished in common

language. There may also be peculiarities in a particular language, of the causes of which we are ignorant, and from which, therefore, we can draw no conclusion. But whatever we find common to all languages, must have a common cause; must be owing to some common notion or sentiment of the human mind.

87. The second source of information on this subject, is a due attention to the course of human actions and conduct. The actions of men are effects; their sentiments, their passions, and their affections, are the causes of those effects; and we may, in many cases, form a judgment of the cause, by observing the effect.

Illus. 1. Thus, the behavior of parents towards their children gives sufficient evidence, even to those who never had children, that the parental affection is common to mankind. The general conduct of men, too, shows us what are the natural objects of their esteem, their admiration, their love, their approbation, their resentment, and of all their original dispositions. From the conduct of men in all ages, it is likewise obvious, that man is, by his nature, a social animal; that he delights to associate with his species; to converse, and to exchange good offices with them.

2. Not only the actions, but even the opinions of mankind, may sometimes give light into the frame of the human mind. The opinions of men may be considered as the effects of their intellectual powers, as their actions are the effects of their active principles. Even the prejudices and errors of mankind, when they are general, must have some cause no less general; the discovery of which will throw some light upon the frame of the human understanding.

88. The third, and main source of information, respecting the mind and its faculties, is accurate and attentive reflection upon the operations of our own mind. The power of the understanding to take notice of its own operations, to attend to them, and examine them on all sides, is the power of reflection; and all the notions we have of mind, and of its operations, have been called ideas of reflection.

Illus. 1. The term reflection implies nothing more than the deliberate and mature exercise of consciousness. But to acquire a habit of reflection upon the powers of our own minds, or of the deliberate exercise of consciousness, is a work of time and labor, even to those who begin early, and whose natural talents are tolerably fitted for it. This is the last of the powers of the mind that unfolds itself; and though many persons seem incapable of acquiring it in any considerable degree, it may be greatly improved by exercise. It is by the proper employment of this power that men become fitted to discover the laws by which their own thoughts are regulated, and to make advances in the science of intellectual philosophy.

2. When two persons are speaking to us at once, we can attend to either of them at pleasure, without being much disturbed by the

other. If we attempt to listen to both, we can understand neither. The fact seems to be, that when we attend constantly to one of the speakers, the words spoken by the other make no impression on the mind, in consequence of our not attending to them; and affect us as little as if they had not been uttered. This power, however, of the mind, to attend to either speaker at pleasure, supposes that it is, at one and the same time, conscious of the sensations which both produce. And the power of reflection, in like manner, turns the mind inward, to view and observe its own actions and operations; but art and pains are requisite to set it at a distance, as it were, from itself, and make it an object of its own scrutiny. Yet art and pains will daily diminish this difficulty, and thereby enable us to think with precision and accuracy on many important subjects, wherein others must blindly follow a leader.

CHAPTER VI.

OF THE DIFFICULTY OF ATTENDING TO THE OPERATIONS OF OUR OWN MINDS, INTERSPERSED WITH OBSERVATIONS WHICH MAY ASSIST US IN OVERCOMING THIS DIFFICULTY.

89. THE difficulty of attending to our mental operations ought to be well understood, and justly estimated, by those who would make any progress in the art of logic; that they may neither, on the one hand, expect success without labor and application of thought, nor, on the other, be discouraged, by conceiving that the obstacles which lie in the way are insuperable, and that there is no certainty to be attained in the science of intellectual philosophy.

Obs. The following development of the causes of this difficulty, and the effects which have arisen from it, will enable us to form a true judgment of these causes and effects.

90. The number and quick succession of the operations of the mind make it difficult to give due attention to them. It is well known, that if a number of objects be presented even to the eye (in quick succession) they are confounded in the mind and imagination. We retain a confused notion of the whole, and a more confused one of the several parts, especially if they are objects to which we have never before given particular attention. No succession can be more quick than that of thought. The mind is busy while we are awake, continually passing from one thought and one operation to another. The scene is constantly shifting. You

will be instantly sensible of this, if you try but for one minute to keep the same thought in your imagination without addition or variation.

Illus. Think, for illustration, on Daniel cast into the lions' den; and you will find it impossible to keep the scene of your imagination fixed. Other objects will intrude without being called: the machinations of his enemies to get a royal statute established, that whosoever should ask a petition of any god or man for thirty days, save of king Darius, should be cast into the den of lions-the immutability of the laws of the Medes and Persians-the king's command -the remarkable presentiment of Darius, that the God whom Daniel served would deliver him-the king's disquietude over nighthis going early to the den on the following morning, and crying with a lamentable voice, O Danicl, servant of the living God, is thy God, whom thou servest continually, able to deliver thee from the lions?-the reply of Daniel, "My God hath sent his angel, and hath shut the lions' mouths, that they have not hurt me "—the reason of this, "forasmuch as before him innocence was found in me "-the appeal to Darius," and also before thee, O king, have I done no hurt -the punishment of the men who accused Daniel-of their wives and children-and, finally, the decree of the king, "that in every dominion of my kingdom men tremble and fear before the God of Daniel"-these, all these objects will intrude, without being called; and all you can do is to reject the intruders as quickly as possible, and return to the principal object, if you would picture to yourself only Daniel shut up in the lions' den.

91. We proceed in this examination, contrary to habits which have been early acquired, and confirmed by long, unvaried practice. From infancy we are accustomed to attend to objects of sense, and to them only; and, when sensible objects have acquired such strong hold of the attention by confirmed habit, it is not easy to dispossess them. When we grow up, a variety of external objects solicits our attention, excites our curiosity, engages our affections, or touches our passions; and the constant round of employment about external objects, draws off the mind from attending to itself.

Пllus. Yet here much may be done by experience, and nothing will contribute so much to form this talent of reflection, as that study which has the operations of the mind for its object. By habituating us to reflect on the subjects of our consciousness, it enables us to retard, in a considerable degree, the current of thought; to arrest many of those ideas, which would otherwise escape our notice; and to render the arguments, which we would employ for the conviction of others, an exact transcript of those trains of inquiry and reasoning, which originally led us to form our opinions.

92. Mental operations, from their very nature, lead the mind to give its attention to some other object. Our sensa

tions are natural signs, and turn our attention to the things signified by them. In perception, memory, judgment, imagination, and reasoning, there is an object distinct from the mind itself; and, while we are led by a strong impulse to attend to the object, the operation escapes our notice. Our passions, affections, and all our active powers, have, in like manner, their objects, which engross our attention, and divert it from the powers themselves.

93. When the mind is agitated by any passion, as soon as we turn our attention from the object of the passion to the passion itself, the passion subsides or vanishes, and by that means escapes our inquiry.

Illus. Thus, when a man is angry, he is conscious of his passion; yet he attends not to it, but to an external object; his attention is turned to the person who offended him, and the circumstances of the offence, while the passion of anger is not in the least the object of his attention. This, indeed, is common to almost every operation of the mind. When it is exerted, we are conscious of it; but then we do not attend to the operation, but to its object. When the mind is drawn off from the object, to attend to its own operation, that operation ceases, and escapes our notice.

94. In what relates to the operations of the mind, it is not enough that we be able to give attention to them; we must, by exercise and habit, acquire the ability of distinguishing accurately their minute differences, of resolving and analyzing complex operations into their simple ingredients, of unfolding the ambiguity of words, which in this science is greater than in any other, and of giving them the accuracy and precision of mathematical language. For, doubtless, the same precision in the use of words; the same cool attention to the minute differences of things; the same talent for abstraction and analyzing, which fit one for the study of mathematics, are no less necessary in the science of mind.

CHAPTER VII.

DIVISION OF THE POWERS OF THE MIND.

95. THE powers of the human mind, and the science of intellectual philosophy, furnish the proper basis upon which every other science rests, because the human faculties are