The same intention is apparent in the refusal to acquiesce in the proposition to refer the settlement of the treaty line to a commission, to be constituted of an equal number chosen by each party, with an umpire to be designated by a friendly power from the most skilful men in Europe; or secondly, that the commission should be entirely composed of such scientific men in Europe, to be selected by some friendly power, to be attended in the survey and view of the country by agents appointed by the parties.

It was in answer to this proposition, that the suggestion of the impracticability of the treaty line was made, and the intention became apparent to lead us away from that inconvenient obstacle to their wishes and plans - the treaty language. The proposition was so equitable and fair so just to all parties, and so full of promise of adjustment upon proceedings satisfactory to us, that it could not be peremptorily rejected.

But although it was entertained, the answer to it clogged the proposition with so many conditions, and so limited the powers of the commissioners, and required the concession on our part of the all important fact that the St. Johns and Restigooch are not Atlantic rivers—that the original plan was at once deprived of all vitality or power or use, and in fact the reference would have been merely an agreement to abide by the decision, provided both parties should be satisfied and assent to it.

It is certainly somewhat remarkable that if the assumed fact is true, viz. that the treaty line can not be laid down or fixed according to the treaty, that so much unwillingness should be exhibited to have an attempt made to ascertain it, or if Great Britain is so strongly convinced

of the justice and strength of her argument and claim, that she should be so reluctant to refer the whole question to disinterested and scientific Europeans.

There is an apparent, and I doubt not, a real anxiety to avoid discussion or examination based upon the treaty, and I fear, that if we once abandon that line in search of a conventional one, we shall never be able to bring them back again to consider the present line, or to recognize the treaty as of any binding efficacy. I fear too that the only question in negotiations for a conventional line, will be, how large a portion of our territory we must yield up. The suggestion made by our Government to take the River St. Johns from its mouth to its source, as the boundary, was rejected, with a simple expression of wonder that it should have been made; and our Government is told explicitly that " His Majesty's Government can not consent to embarrass the negotiation respecting the boundary by mixing up with it a discussion regarding the navigation of the St. John, as an integral part of the question."

The intimation seems plain, that no negotiation for an exchange of territory or privileges will be entered into, but the single point will be, how shall the disputed territory be divided between the parties. I fear that if we abandon the treaty language, so clear and so decided in our favor, and so much at variance with their claim, we shall leave a certainty for an uncertainty, and throw doubt, confusion and embarrassment over our claim and our course of action, and yield to Great Britain the great obstacle we now present to her grasping spirit-the solemn treaty of '83.

And what security have we that any line can be fixed upon which shall be permanent, or what certainty is there

that the new line may not be declared to be "impracticable," whenever it may come in contact with any of the plans or wishes of Great Britain? It would certainly be difficult to present a stronger and clearer case than we now do, and if diplomacy and skill can manufacture doubts and embarrassments in the discussion of the question, as now presented, we may well despair of ever fixing a certain and unalterable line of boundary. If I am accused of injustice or severity in these remarks, I would point in justification to the remarkable progress of the doubts and assertions in relation to the treaty-line of Boundary. When the question as to which river was the true St. Croix of the Treaty (which was the only question then in dispute) was before the Commissioners under the Treaty of 1794, the British Agent founds his principal argument for the westernmost river, upon the ground, that a line due north from the source of that river would only include a part of one of the rivers (the St. Johns) which have their mouth within New Brunswick. He says, "The most accustomed and convenient rule in cases of this kind, is, to leave to each power respectively the sources of those rivers that empty themselves, or whose mouths are within its territory upon the sea coast, if it can be done consistently with, or in conformity with the intent of the treaty. A line due north from the source of the western or main branch of the Schoudiac or St. Croix, will fully secure this effect to the United States in every instance, and also to Great Britain in all instances except in that of the river St. John, wherein it becomes impossible by reason that the sources of this river are to the westward, not only of the western boundary line of Nova Scotia, but of the sources of the Penobscot and even of the Kennebec, so that this north line must of necessity cross the St. John,

but it will cross it in a part of it almost at the foot of the highlands and where it ceases to be navigable. But if a north line is traced from the source of the Cheputnatecook, it will not only cross the river St. John, within about fifty miles from Frederickton, the metropolis of New Brunswick, but will cut off the sources of the rivers which fall into the Bay of Chaleurs, if not of many others, probably of the Meramichi, among them which fall into the Gulf of St. Lawrence, and thereby be productive of inconvenient consequences to the two powers, if not of contention between them, instead of "terminating their differences in such a manner, as may be best calculated to produce mutual satisfaction and good understanding, which is one of the principal and avowed objects of the Treaty."-At this time then, there was no doubt that the line running due north to the highlands of the treaty must cross the St. John's River, and if the starting point was carried east, it is admitted that such line would cut off the Restigooch, which is nearly as far north as our claim. And certainly the line was to run equally far north, whether the starting point was east or west-unless the highlands inclined to the south. And yet we are now required as a preliminary to admit that the St. John and Restigooch are not Atlantic rivers, within the meaning of the treaty.

In 1814, when the negotiations which resulted in the Treaty of Ghent, were in progress, no pretence was made that our line did not extend beyond the St. John's and according to our present views.

Great Britain then by her negotiators expressly stated that she "desires the revision of the frontier between her North American dominions and those of the United States, not with any view to an acquisition of territory, as such, but for the purpose of securing her possessions, and pre

venting future disputes, and such a VARIATION of the line of frontier as may secure a direct communication between Quebec and Halifax." And when our negotiators peremptorily refused to agree to any cession of territory, the answer was that they "were not prepared to anticipate the objections contained in the note of the American Plenipotentiaries, that they were instructed to treat for the revision of their boundary lines, with the statement which they have subsequently made, that they had no authority to cede any part, however insignificant, of the territories of the United States, although the proposal left it open for them to demand an equivalent for such session in territory or otherwise." And yet now that territory, which they then offered to pay us for, is claimed as clearly their own, and that line which then was admitted and recognized as including the territory as claimed by us, is now declared to be impracticable and must be abandoned, and a more convenient one sought for and established.

I feel most sensibly, that this question now presented is one of very grave importance, and that the action now to be had by the Legislature of Maine, may, and probably will have a very material influence upon the relations between this Government and Great Britain.

The painful conviction is forced upon me, that Great Britain is determined to hold this territory that she now claims, deeming it highly important as securing a connection between her provinces in time of war and peace, and I reiterate the assertion heretofore made, that "we have little to hope from the forbearance or action of the British Government." Their aim is apparent to expunge the treaty-provision, and to hold on with an unyielding grasp to their modern claim, and to reject all propositions having the treaty line for their basis. I can not but regard it as